

case #102742-27-1014945

( AMERICAN

(27)

# JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY)

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

Edited by

HENRY T. ROWELL


KEMP MALONE, BENJAMIN D. MERITT, JAMES H. OLIVER

EVELYN H. CLIFT: Secretary

Honorary Editor

DAVID M. ROBINSON

405-  
1002



VOLUME LXXI

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

LONDON: ARTHUR F. BIRD

PARIS: ALBERT FONTEMOING

LEIPZIG: F. A. BROOKHAUS

1950

# CONTENTS OF VOLUME LXX

No. 277

	PAGE
<i>κεστός ἰμάς</i> and the Saltire of Aphrodite. By CAMPBELL BONNER,	1
<i>Princeps</i> and <i>Frumentationes</i> . By G. E. F. CHILVER, - - -	7
Emotional Conflict and its Significance in the Lesbia-Poems of Catullus. By FRANK OLIN COPLEY, - - -	22
Parmenides and the World of Seeming. By EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.,	41
The Word <i>ἐπεισόδιον</i> in Aristotle's <i>Poetics</i> . By ALLAN H. GILBERT,	56
The Purpose of Timoleon's Mission. By H. D. WESTLAKE, - - -	65
REVIEWS: - - - - -	76
<i>Louis' Albinos: Épitomé</i> (HAROLD CHERNISS).— <i>Ninck's</i> Die Entdeckung von Europa durch die Griechen (LIONEL PEARSON).— <i>Pohlenz's</i> Der Hellenische Mensch. (WILLIAM C. GREENE).— <i>Lambert's</i> Die indirekte Rede als künstlerisches Stilmittel des Livius (KONRAD GRIES).— <i>Enk's</i> Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Liber I (Monobiblos), cum prolegomenis, conspectu librorum et commentationum ad IV libros Propertii pertinentium, notis criticis, commentario exegetico (ARCHIBALD W. ALLEN).— <i>Rozelaar's</i> Lukrez. Versuch einer Deutung (LUDWIG EDELSTEIN).— <i>van den Bruwaene's</i> Études sur Cicéron (WALTER ALLEN, JR.).— <i>Bourne's</i> The Public Works of the Julio-Claudians and Flavians (HERBERT BLOCH).— <i>Castelin's</i> The Coinage of Rhœtana in Mesopotamia (J. F. GILLIAM).— <i>Ryan and Casey's</i> The De Incarnatione of Athanasius, Part I: The Long Recension Manuscripts; Part II: The Short Recension (FREDERICK WALTER LENZ).— <i>Lehmann's</i> Statues on Coins of Southern Italy and Sicily in the Classical Period (SARAH ELIZABETH FREEMAN).— <i>de Romilly's</i> Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien: la pensée de l'historien et la genèse de l'œuvre (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR).— <i>Des Places' Le Pronom</i> chez Pindare (RICHMOND LATTIMORE).— <i>Wilkin's</i> Eternal Lawyer: A Legal Biography of Cicero (WALTER ALLEN, JR.).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	111

## No. 273

	PAGE
Epigraphical Notes. By MARCUS N. TOD, - - -	113
Livy's Use of Dramatic Speech. By KONRAD GRIES, - - -	118
The Unity of Empedocles' Thought. By HERBERT S. LONG, - -	142
The Morphology of the Greek Comparative System: Its Rhythmical and Repetitive Features. By A. C. MOORHOUSE, - - -	159
The "Sardinian Fish" of the Greeks and Romans. By ALFRED C. ANDREWS, - - -	171
Note on a Digression of Thucydides (VI, 54-59). By LIONEL PEARSON, - - -	186
Note sur l'Inscription Amphictionique, I. G., II <sup>2</sup> , 1126. By GEORGES DAUX, - - -	189
REVIEWS: - - -	192
<i>Tarn's Alexander the Great.</i> Vol. I, Narrative; Vol. II, Sources and Studies (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.).— <i>Creaghan</i> and <i>Raubitschek's</i> Early Christian Epitaphs from Athens (GLANVILLE DOWNEY).— <i>Thiel's</i> Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times (ROBERT O. FINK).— <i>Norberg's</i> Beiträge zur spätlateinischen Syntax (EDITH FRANCES CLAFLIN).— <i>Knudtson's</i> Bakchiastexte und andere Papyri der Lunder Papyrussammlung (P Lund Univ Bibl 4) (ELIZABETH H. GILLIAM).— <i>Arnaldi's</i> Da Plauto a Terenzio, I: Plauto (GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH).	

# CONTENTS.

v

No. 279

	PAGE
Callisthenes and Alexander. By TRUESDELL S. BROWN,	225
Repetition in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite. By H. N. PORTER,	249
Sophoclean "Orthodoxy" in the <i>Philocetes</i> . By NORMAN T. PRATT, JR.,	273
Stoic Logic and the Text of Sextus Empiricus. By BENSON MATES,	290
Patrons Providing Financial Aid to the Tribes of Roman Athens. By JAMES H. OLIVER,	299
Three Notes: By WENDELL CLAUSEN,	309
<i>I. G.</i> , <i>C. I. L.</i> and <i>P. I. R.</i> ,	315
REVIEWS:	317
<i>Winnington-Ingram's</i> Euripides and Dionysus. An Interpretation of the Bacchae (GILBERT NORWOOD).— <i>von Salis' Antike und Renaissance. Über Nachleben und Weiterwirken der alten in der neueren Kunst</i> (MARGARETE BIEBER).— <i>Georgiev's</i> Die Sprachliche Zugehörigkeit der Etrusker (GORDON M. MESSING).— <i>L'Orange's</i> Apotheosis in Ancient Portraiture (M. P. CHARLESWORTH).— <i>Festugière's</i> Liberté et civilisation chez les Grecs (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR).— <i>Bossert and Camber's</i> Karatepe. A Preliminary Report on a New Hittite Site (JULIUS LEWY).— <i>Thompson's</i> A Glossary of Greek Fishes (ALFRED C. ANDREWS).	



## No. 280

	PAGE
Ancient Instruction in "Grammar" according to Quintilian. By KURT VON FRITZ, - - - - -	337
On Editing the Homeric Poems. By GEORGE M. BOLLING, - - -	367
Plautine Chronology. By W. B. SEDGWICK, - - - - -	376
Heraclitus and Death in Battle (Fr. 24D). By G. S. KIRK, - -	384
The Text of Gaius' <i>Institutes</i> and Justinian's <i>Corpus</i> . By ALFRED R. BELLINGER, - - - - -	394
Addenda to Pages 301, 302 and 304. By JAMES H. OLIVER, - -	403
The Family of Critias. By THOMAS G. ROSENMEYER, - - -	404
Euripides, <i>Medea</i> , 160-172. A New Interpretation. By FRANCIS R. WALTON, - - - - -	411
REVIEWS: - - - - -	414
<i>Wehrli's Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar.</i> Heft III: Klearchos (HAROLD CHERNISS).— <i>Moretti's Ara</i> <i>Pacis Augustae</i> (A. W. VAN BUREN).— <i>Pritchett and</i> <i>Neugebauer's The Calendars of Athens</i> (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR).— <i>Curtius' Europäische Literatur und latein-</i> <i>isches Mittelalter</i> (LEO SPITZER).— <i>Radermacher's Weinen</i> <i>und Lachen. Studien über antikes Lebensgefühl</i> (LUDWIG BIELER).— <i>Ehrenberg's Aspects of the Ancient World. Es-</i> <i>says and Reviews</i> (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.).— <i>Walzer's Galen,</i> <i>On Medical Experience.</i> First Edition of the Arabic Ver- sion with English Translation and Notes (ISAAC RABINO- WITZ).— <i>Cruttwell's Virgil's Mind at Work. An Analysis</i> <i>of the Symbolism of the Aeneid</i> (GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH). — <i>Ernout's Philologica</i> (JAMES W. POULTNEY).— <i>Thomp-</i> <i>son's The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus</i> (CHARLES UPSON CLARK).— <i>Wetster's Political Interpre-</i> <i>tations in Greek Literature</i> (MABEL LANG).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	448
INDEX TO VOLUME LXX, - - - - -	453



# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXX, 1

WHOLE NO. 277

## ΚΕΣΤΟΣ ΙΜΑΣ AND THE SALTIRE OF APHRODITE.

A series of monographs which promises great interest has recently been inaugurated with a little work by Count Du Mesnil du Buisson, called "*Le sautoir d'Atargatis et la chaîne d'amulettes.*"<sup>1</sup> The author examines the ornaments that appear on figures of the Naked Goddess, the divinity of fecundity who was known to her widely scattered worshippers as Ishtar, Astarte, Atargatis, or Aphrodite. He gives special attention to an ornament consisting of two bands, each of which passes over a shoulder and under the opposite arm, crossing the other band between the breasts and on the back. Because of the diagonal cross which is thus presented to both front and back views, Count Du Mesnil calls the ornament *sautoir*. That is the English word *saltire*, meaning a diagonal or St. Andrew's cross; the term is used chiefly in heraldry, but it will serve our purpose.

No mark is more characteristic of the Naked Goddess than this saltire. It appears on crude, almost shapeless, representations of her from Kish and Susa dating from a time early in the third millennium before Christ.<sup>2</sup> Figurines from Syria and from the Indus Valley show it at about 1400 B. C.<sup>3</sup> Almost a thousand years later it is to be seen on figurines of the Persian period,<sup>4</sup> and its continuance for several centuries more is attested by the occurrence of saltire bands on representations of Aphro-

<sup>1</sup> *Documenta et Monumenta Orientis Antiqui*, ed. W. F. Albright et A. De Buck. Vol. I: *Études d'iconographie orientale*. 1. *Le sautoir d'Atargatis et la chaîne d'amulettes*, par le Comte Du Mesnil du Buisson. Pp. 26, 13 plates (Leiden, 1947).

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 9 and Fig. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 11 and Fig. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 15, Pl. 4.

dite in paintings of the Hellenistic and Roman periods. A striking and familiar example is the Pompeian wall painting of Aphrodite and Ares seated together, with a little Eros at their feet trying on the warrior's helmet, while another holds his sword.<sup>5</sup> Here the cords that make the saltire are closely hung with little ornaments; but in a Dura bas-relief of Atargatis (A. D. 225-250) it is indicated in reddish brown paint as a pair of simple bands or straps crossing on the breast, that is, in what must surely be a primitive form.<sup>6</sup>

If we consider only the great antiquity and the wide distribution of the saltire, nothing could have a better claim to be the object that Homer calls the *κεστός ἰμός* of Aphrodite, "wherein were all her enchantments." An attempt will be made to show that the *κεστός ἰμός* may actually be the saltire; but first it is well to see whether magical powers might readily be ascribed to an object of that form.

It is well known that cords, bands, and knots were very widely believed to be capable of magical use.<sup>7</sup> Sometimes, it would seem, they were thought to confine and conserve the *mana* or inherent magic of a person within his body. It may be for this reason that the Roman *flamen Dialis* might wear no knots in his garments, and even his ring must be broken or cut to interrupt its circuit;<sup>8</sup> else the beneficent power inherent in the sacred person of the *flamen* might be hindered from exerting itself in the rites belonging to his office. Much more commonly, however, knots, cords, and bands were supposed to inhibit or avert the exercise of a power external to the wearer and possibly hostile to him. The ordinary Greek words for amulet, *περίπλον*, *περίσπασμα*, mean "that which is tied round" the person, and the primitive amulet was doubtless the mere cord itself.

On Attic vase paintings we often see a cord or a ribbon tied

<sup>5</sup> Herrmann-Bruckmann, *Denkmäler der Malerei des Altertums*, Taf. 4; more conveniently accessible in Pfuhl, *Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen*, Abb. 668.

<sup>6</sup> Du Mesnil, *op. cit.*, p. 22, Pl. 11; *Excavations at Dura-Europos*, Ninth Season (1935-1936), Pl. 19.

<sup>7</sup> See P. Wolters' indispensable article, "Faden und Knoten als Amulett" (*Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, VIII, Beiheft, pp. 1-22), with several figures that illustrate the diagonal and crossed cords mentioned in this paper.

<sup>8</sup> Aulus Gellius, X, 15.

round the arm or the leg of a young athlete. Hetairai sometimes wore a band round a thigh. Even necklaces, which early developed into elaborate ornaments, were probably first used as prophylactic bands. A variety of cord amulet that is of special interest for our purpose was worn diagonally round the body, passing downwards from the right shoulder across to the left flank, then under the left arm and upwards across the back to the starting point. It is likely that this diagonal arrangement was magically significant in itself. Mr. W. Deonna has collected examples of superstitions that ascribe an apotropaic value to motions made diagonally across the body, like grasping the left thumb with the right hand, or to lines drawn across it in a slanting direction, as when the ancient mystai (according to a probable conjecture) wore a thread tied from the right hand to the left foot.<sup>9</sup> If one such diagonal was a good prophylactic, two might be even better; and one may regard the saltire as derived from two cords or straps looped diagonally round the body in opposite directions.

The little that Homer tells us of Aphrodite's *κεστός ἰμάς* is contained in two lines (*Il.*, XIV, 214-215):

ἧ καὶ ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κέστον ἰμάντα  
ποικίλον· ἔνθα δέ οἱ θελκτῆρια πάντα τέτυκτο.

The details may be discussed under separate headings, as follows:

1. It was not a girdle (*ζώνη*), for in Homeric times that was worn just above the hips. The poet says of both Calypso and Circe *περὶ δὲ ζώνην βάλετ' ἱξυί*, while Aphrodite wore the *κεστός ἰμάς* higher on her body—*ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κέστον ἰμάντα*.<sup>10</sup>

Some of the older commentators supposed the *κεστός ἰμάς* to be a *στροφίον* such as Athenian women wore to support their breasts; but a leather thong or strap would be ill suited for that purpose.

Several authorities—Helbig, Ameis, Faesi, Leaf—go so far in emphasizing the preëminently magical character of the object as to say that it was not an ornament nor an article of apparel, but merely a patterned strap carried in the *κόλπος*, a fold of the garment. It is true that when Aphrodite lends the object

<sup>9</sup> W. Deonna, *Rev. Ét. Grecques*, XLII (1929), pp. 169 ff., especially pp. 174-175.

<sup>10</sup> *Od.*, V, 231, X, 544; *Il.*, XIV, 214.

to Hera she says *τεῶ ἑγκάτθεο κόλπω* (219), but that merely suggests a convenient way by which Hera may carry it away hidden; it does not mean that Aphrodite herself had worn it in this loose and not very safe manner. A modern man may carry a lucky piece in a pocket, and so may a modern woman, if she has a pocket. But no ancient man or woman would carry a valued magical object unattached to the person. Ancient amulets might be in the forms of rings, pendants, necklaces, bracelets, or mere cords or bands tied round any part of the body. But those who are versed in the ways of magic are not likely to believe that a charm such as Aphrodite's could be a mere piece of decorated leather carried loose in a fold of the garment. The interpretation favored by Helbig, Leaf, and the others is to be definitely rejected.

2. The *κεστός ἰμάς* is *ποικίλος*, which is usually taken to indicate that it has color or pattern or both. If, as has hitherto been assumed, *κεστός* means "pierced," the strap may have been embroidered (pierced for the stitches) or simply adorned with a pattern of pierced holes.<sup>10a</sup> But another possibility should not be overlooked. From Hesiod on *ποικίλος* sometimes has the meanings "artful," "subtle," "wily," and that meaning is extended from persons to things.<sup>11</sup> If that development of the meaning could be assumed for Homer's time, *ποικίλον* might imply "charged with subtle art," i. e., "magical" (the repetition of the word in 220 may slightly favor that interpretation), and the *δέ*<sup>12</sup> of the clause that immediately follows would stand, like that in *Il.*, I, 259, where we might expect *γάρ*.

3. In it were Aphrodite's enchantments. As modern commentators have observed, we are not to infer from *τέτυκτο* that the strap was decorated with scenes or even symbols representing in some way the magical powers that it exerted. *τέτυκτο* here

<sup>10a</sup> In an article which appeared after this paper was sent to the editor, Mr. Wace has shown that Homer's supposed allusions to the embroidering of textiles really refer to weaving in color patterns, and that in such passages *ποικίλος* means "patterned" or "many colored" (*A. J. A.*, LII, pp. 51-55). This somewhat lessens the probability that *κεστός* means "embroidered."

<sup>11</sup> See Liddell-Scott-Jones, s. v. *ποικίλος*, III, 3, c, and Jebb on *Bacchylides*, 9, 43.

<sup>12</sup> So the manuscripts: *τέ* Hermann, followed by most editors.

has a weaker meaning, scarcely more than "were." The *ιμάς* is simply the seat of magical charms.

4. Both ancient and modern commentators, taking *κεστός* to mean embroidered, derive it from *κεντέω*, or rather from a hypothetical \**κέντω*, to prick or pierce, that is, for the stitches of an embroidered pattern. It could also be taken in a stricter sense to describe anything decorated with a mere pattern of pierced holes. That a present *κέντω* once existed seems to be shown by the infinitive *κένσαι*, which occurs once, *Il.*, XXIII, 337.

A good authority, F. Bechtel, says that were it not for the meaning that seems to belong to *κεστός* in *Il.*, XIV, 214 (and to *πολύκεστος* in *Il.*, III, 371), the word could be better referred to the stem *κε-*, "split," which is to be seen in *κείων* (*Od.*, XIV, 425), in several forms of *κέάζω*, and in *κέαρνον* and *κέστρα*, tools for splitting wood. He did not, however, see how an adjective meaning "split," "cleft," could be applied to Aphrodite's magic strap, and was therefore led, reluctantly, it would seem, to follow the usual interpretation.<sup>13</sup>

And yet "split strap" may after all describe this object accurately. Take a leather strap of suitable length, split it from both ends, leaving a short portion at the middle untouched. Then lay the undivided middle part over the breastbone, pass the upper ends over the shoulders, the lower under the arms; cross the ends on the back and fasten them together. You then have a crude and perhaps a common primitive form of the saltire, which is the most ancient and constant attribute of the goddess of love and fecundity, and also a possible illustration of Homer's *κεστός ιμάς*. It is scarcely necessary to remark that that name might well persist after it was found more convenient to make the saltire of two crossed straps or cords rather than of a single split strap. Decorative modifications would follow naturally. The magical saltire might be dyed, embroidered, strengthened at the middle by strong stitching or a metal boss, and so on.

To the theory that *κεστός ιμάς* means a split strap there is an objection which is more serious than the doubt about the etymology. That objection proceeds from the interpretation of *Il.*, III, 371. When Menelaus broke his sword on the helmet of Paris, he rushed upon his enemy, seized him by the helmet, and tried to drag him to the Greek lines, the chin-strap half strangling

<sup>13</sup> F. Bechtel, *Lexilogus zu Homer*, pp. 192-193.

Paris as Menelaus drew him along. This chin-strap is called *πολύκεστος ἰμάς* and *ὄχευς τρυφαλείας*. The meaning "embroidered" or "decorated with pierced holes" would undoubtedly be appropriate here. A modern reader naturally thinks first of a strap pierced at intervals with several holes intended to engage the tongue of a buckle, as in an ordinary belt; but buckles with movable tongues were apparently not known in the Homeric period.<sup>14</sup> Finally, *πολύκεστος* could perhaps mean "slit" into several narrow thongs, and it is conceivable that a chin-strap so divided might be easier on the wearer. In that case the ends of the separate thongs would either be attached at different points, or else they would be brought together again, after passing under the chin, and fastened to some point of attachment on the side of the helmet.

The arrangement last suggested is not easy to understand, perhaps not easy to accept; and because of its difficulty it may seem that the case for *κεστός* = split, left, must be abandoned. It is still possible, however, that we have to do with two homonyms, *κεστός*, split, from *κε-*, and *κεστός*, pierced, from *κεντ-*. There is such a pair in *κείω*, split, and *κείω*, lie.

On the whole, the argument for identifying the *κεστός ἰμάς* with the saltire of the ancient goddess of fecundity deserves to be considered; no more is claimed for it. In that identification we should have a reasonable solution of an old problem. Those who cannot accept it, and who hold that *κεστός ἰμάς* means a single pierced or embroidered strap, should next consider whether their decorated strap may be the single diagonal band which continued to be worn as a prophylactic until late times. That band is not a girdle, and one could say, in describing its removal, *ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο*. It would at least be better than the notion that Aphrodite's treasure was a mere piece of decorated leather which, not being attached to her person, could easily be dropped and lost.

CAMPBELL BONNER.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

<sup>14</sup> Ridgeway, *The Early Age of Greece*, I, p. 592. I owe this reference to Clark Hopkins.

## PRINCEPS AND FRUMENTATIONES.<sup>1</sup>

The machinery for the supply and distribution of corn under the early Principate has always been recognised as one of the most characteristic departments of the Roman administration. It is also peculiarly well fitted, perhaps chiefly through the nature of the government's relationships both with the exporting provinces and with the Roman *plebs*, to illustrate the function of the *Princeps* in the constitution. The present review, confined to the period of the "Augustan Principate" and to the broadest lines of the department's history at the Roman end, is mainly an attempt to examine these constitutional issues once again. The opposition between *Princeps* and Senate which has often been depicted throughout the history of corn distributions may possibly deserve reconsideration in the light of recent work on the position of Augustus and his successors.

It is in the reign of Claudius that the opposition is generally most sharply drawn. There exists a fairly well-established doctrine that Claudius in some manner "took over" from the Senate the responsibility, both administrative and financial, for the regular corn doles, and that his *fiscus* in compensation appropriated the revenues of the corn-exporting provinces.<sup>2</sup> The supporters of this doctrine tend to appeal without further discussion to the eminent authority of Professor Rostovtzeff;<sup>3</sup> and it is sometimes difficult to discover which of the particular pieces of ancient evidence adduced by him have most inspired them

<sup>1</sup> The writer offers his warmest thanks to Mr. R. Syme and to Professor A. Momigliano for help given during the preparation of this article.

<sup>2</sup> So A. Momigliano, *L'opera dell'Imperatore Claudio* (1932), p. 96; D. van Berchem, *Les distributions de blé et d'argent à la plèbe romaine sous l'empire* (Geneva, 1939), p. 72; V. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius* (1940), p. 118; T. Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, V (1940), p. 41; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World from 30 B. C. to A. D. 138* (1944), p. 163. M. P. Charlesworth, *C. A. H.*, X (1934), p. 689 is far more cautious.

<sup>3</sup> *R.-E.*, VII (1912), s. v. "Frumentum," coll. 177-8; cf. *Römische Bleitesserae* (*Klio*, Beiheft III [1903]), p. 15; *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (1926), pp. 80, 509 (repeated in the German and Italian editions).



with confidence. But one alleged circumstance appears to have made a great impression.<sup>4</sup> Claudius is held to have abolished the *praefecti frumenti dandi*, senatorial officials who from the frequent appearance of the words "ex s. c." in their titles<sup>5</sup> were thought to be entirely independent of the *Princeps*. Instead, we are told, he entrusted distribution, presumably under the authority of the *praefectus annonae*, to the *curator de Minucia*, an official of whom the example cited is a Claudian freedman.<sup>6</sup>

The abolition of the senatorial *praefecti* was inferred from a supposed gap in the records of these officials between the principate of Claudius and that of Trajan.<sup>7</sup> Long ago Cardinali warned that the grouping of inscriptions might be due to pure chance;<sup>8</sup> but his caution was generally unheeded, especially as he was convinced for other reasons that Claudius deprived the Senate of control over distribution. Yet the list of *praefecti* always included a number of names of unknown date; and the tenuousness of the gap can be clearly appreciated if we look at two names, one near its supposed beginning, the other almost certainly before the end which has been most commonly assumed.

The earlier of these two has passed practically unnoticed in this connection.<sup>9</sup> M. Iulius Romulus was adlected, apparently into the actual office of tribune, by Claudius himself, and between that time and his tenure of office as "pro praefecto frumenti dandi" was legate (under Claudius) of the legion XV Apollinaris, then praetor, and then legate for two years to the proconsul of Asia.<sup>10</sup> The chronology is not free from difficulties,

<sup>4</sup> Frank in particular (*loc. cit.*) implied that a change in the ownership of imported corn could be inferred from this organisational reform alone.

<sup>5</sup> E. g., *I. L. S.*, 913, 943, 947, 972, 3783.

<sup>6</sup> *I. L. S.*, 6071; cf. O. Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten*<sup>2</sup> (1905), pp. 233 f. But see below, n. 35.

<sup>7</sup> To the list drawn up by L. Cantarelli, *Bull. Arch. Comm.*, XXIII (1895), pp. 217 ff. add *L'Année Epigraphique*, 1908, 237; 1911, 111, 185, as well as M. Iulius Romulus discussed below.

<sup>8</sup> G. Cardinali in De Ruggiero, *Dizionario Epigrafico*, III (1904?), s. v. "Frumentatio," 248 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Van Berchem, *op. cit.*, p. 72 relegates mention of him to a footnote without any modification of the conclusions of his text. Other features of the man's career are discussed by A. Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand*, pp. 63, 228.

<sup>10</sup> *Not. Scav.*, 1924, p. 346 (Velletri) = *L'Année Epigraphique*, 1925,

but Divus Claudius is last mentioned in connection with the legatory legateship, and it appears rather more likely than not that he was already dead by the time Romulus was administering corn distribution.<sup>11</sup> Even if the adlection as tribune belongs to A. D. 42, when Claudius is known to have granted this magistracy to certain *equites*,<sup>12</sup> the earliest possible date for the appointment as "pro praefecto frumenti dandi" would be 48, and the abolition of the office could not fall before the last years of the principate, which we shall see later to be a difficult period in which to place a change of this kind.<sup>13</sup> But since it is not clear that the men made tribunes in 42 became permanent members of the Senate<sup>14</sup> the more natural date for the decisive adlection of an *eques* is the census year 48; and if Romulus was tribune for 48-9 it is only by holding his subsequent posts without intermission that he can have dealt with corn matters before Claudius died. Nor does the word "pro" in his title, even if we assume it to have been correctly cut, offer any reasonable escape. This word before the title of an office may perhaps have a variety of uses, but all of them suppose the continuance of the office in question as a part of the regular Roman machinery. The natural explanation is that at this time one

85, "M. IULIO... F. VOL. ROMULO PROCOS. | EXTRA sortEM PROVIN-  
CIAE MACEDONIAE | LEGATO pro PR. PROVIN... PRO PRAEF. |  
FRUMENTI dANDI EX S. C. LEGATO PRO PR. | ITERUM provincIAE  
ASIAE PRAETORI | LEGATO Divi CLAUDII LEG XV APOLLINAR. |  
ADLECTO trib. PLEBIS A DIVO CLAUDIO | SEVIRO EQUITUM  
ROMANOR. EQUI. Publ. | ..... UM TRIB. MILITUM...

<sup>11</sup> G. Mancini, who first published the inscription in *Notizie degli Scavi*, took the word "iterum" to mean that the legateship in Asia was held in 54, first under Claudius, then under Nero. This argument would clinch the matter, but the legate of a proconsul should not need re-appointment on a change of *Princeps*. It would be equally unwise to base our chronology on the appearance of a M. Iulius Romulus in a subordinate position in Sardinia in 69 (*I. L. S.*, 5947): the identity of the two men is probably rightly rejected by S. J. de Laet, *De Samenstelling van den romeinschen Senaat* (Antwerp, 1941), p. 192.

<sup>12</sup> Dio, LX, 11, 8.

<sup>13</sup> See below p. 13.

<sup>14</sup> Men similarly made tribunes under Augustus were allowed to choose whether they would retain the broad stripe (Dio, LIV, 30, 2; Suetonius, *Aug.*, 40, 1), but is "adlectus a principe" a proper description of this process in so early a period? Later we get phrases like "quaesturam cum lato clavo obtulit" (cf. *I. L. S.*, 6998—Hadrianic).

of the duly appointed *praefecti* was through some accident not available to discharge his functions: he may have died during his term. Moreover the familiar addition of the words "ex senatusconsulto" are a further indication that the Senate's part in these matters, whatever that part may have been, was still unimpaired. If this state of affairs existed in the latest years of Claudius, to say nothing of the early years of Nero, then the value of the "gap" in the *praefecti* as fundamental evidence for the reforms of Claudius is considerably diluted. The *praefectura* may conceivably have been abolished by Nero, perhaps when he suspended the *frumentationes* after the fire of Rome:<sup>15</sup> but the gap loses most of its attractions if we abandon the Claudian setting for its commencement, and it would perhaps be wiser not to stake too heavily against the possibility of further epigraphical finds removing it altogether.

The situation at the other end of the period is even less tidy for the supporters of the traditional view. Here we have the senator Sospes,<sup>16</sup> who held the *praefectura frumenti dandi* after his praetorship and subsequently was decorated for his services as legate of the legion XIII Gemina "expeditione Suebica et Sarmatica." In the interval he held a post as "curator coloniarum et municipiorum," which some have found difficulty in dating so early as Domitian's reign, with the result that his military exploits were once attributed to the war of Antoninus Pius.<sup>17</sup> But it is practically certain that a campaign not only against Sarmatae but against Suebi could have been conducted by the legate of XIII Gemina only when his legion was stationed in Pannonia, which it left immediately after the conquest of Dacia to become the permanent garrison of the latter province. Historians are therefore now almost unanimous with Dessau in believing that Sospes took part in one of the campaigns of Domitian on this front, whether that of 92-3 or the fighting which coincided with the end of the Dacian wars in 88-9.<sup>18</sup> At the latest

<sup>15</sup> Dio (Xiphilinus), LXII, 18, 5. See the ingenious reconstruction by van Berchem, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-6.

<sup>16</sup> *I. L. S.*, 1017. Probably a Caesennius, but his family connections are not firm enough to help with chronology: cf. *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, III, 567; E. Groag in *R.-E.*, X, col. 1074.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. A. von Domaszewski, *Rh. Mus.* 1893, p. 247.

<sup>18</sup> So "bello Suebico item Sarmatico," *I. L. S.*, 2719; "bellum Germ-

he can have participated in the war of Nerva,<sup>19</sup> but this hypothesis still brings his tenure of the *praefectura* well back into Domitian's reign, when the deliberate revival of the office is almost incomprehensible. In any case the circumstances of the supposed revival, even under Nerva or Trajan, tend either to be simply evaded<sup>20</sup> or to be explained in the lamest terms. It is not for instance obvious why any relevance should be seen in a Nervan sesterce with the legend PLEBEI URBANAE FRUMENTO CONSTITUTO,<sup>21</sup> since we cannot suppose that the *frumentationes* as well as the *praefecti* had been suspended under the Flavians: the coin presumably refers to some abnormal distribution of corn.<sup>22</sup>

To sum up, there is an acting *praefectus* who looks suspiciously Neronian. There is a *praefectus* who looks even more suspiciously Domitianic. And the hypothesis of an interruption between Claudius and the end of the century, after which the officials admittedly continue fairly regularly until almost the time of Diocletian,<sup>23</sup> fails to correspond with any known circumstances in the principates of Nerva or Trajan. We can now examine more closely the circumstances of the principate of Claudius.

To deny that Claudius abolished the *praefecti* is obviously not to remove the real keystone of his known work in the department of the corn supply. Indeed, as we have already seen, Cardinali was able to suppose a virtual revolution in these matters during

anicum et Sarmaticum," *C. I. L.*, XI, 5992. On the whole subject see especially C. Patsch, *Sitzungsberichte*, 217/1 Abh. (1937), pp. 32-44.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *I. L. S.*, 2720, "bello Suebico"; Pliny, *Pan.*, 8, 2.

<sup>20</sup> *R.-E.*, s. v. "Frumentum," col. 178, "wieder geteilt wurden die Kompetenzen des Praefectus Annonae unter Traian, welcher die Praefecti Frumenti dandi wieder einsetzte." More usual is a reference to Trajan's "pro-senatorial" policy: cf. R. Paribeni, *Optimus Princeps*, I, p. 177.

<sup>21</sup> Van Berchem, *op. cit.*, p. 77; cf. Mattingly and Sydenham, *Roman Imperial Coinage*, II, pp. 229 f.

<sup>22</sup> So R. Syme, *J. R. S.*, XX (1930), p. 62. C. H. V. Sutherland, *ibid.*, XXV (1935), p. 154, says there is no "warrant" for rendering the legend as "anything but an organisation or even re-organisation of the system of corn-doles. . . ." Only the warrant which bids us swallow gnats as opposed to camels.

<sup>23</sup> Cantarelli, *op. cit.* Cf. *I. L. S.*, 1180, 1188, 8981.

Claudius' principate without taking any account of the alleged gap in the records. There is, however, a rather important difference which could be made in our conception of the methods by which Claudius proceeded. The removal of the *praefecti* would have been a decisive and blatant type of action. Kornemann maintained that they were virtually the equivalent of collegiate magistrates,<sup>24</sup> whose position was better described under the alternative title "curatores" assigned to them in a *senatusconsultum* of 11 B. C.<sup>25</sup> However this may be—and the degree of their independence of the *Princeps* will be discussed in a moment—, it is rash to be cavalier about officials who derive their existence "ex senatusconsulto." This phrase does not of course mean that a senatorial decree governed the nomination of each annual college. But it does mean that the genesis of the board and the definition of its duties had been the subject of a decree promoted by Augustus in 22 B. C., or perhaps when the conditions of appointment were modified in 18.<sup>26</sup> It would hardly therefore have been proper for Claudius to sweep such a college out of existence by a wave of his arm, or by the arrival of one of his procurators or of the *praefectus annonae* at the place of distribution. The exercise of his *auctoritas* in such a matter would normally have been directed through constitutional channels, namely by the promotion of a fresh *senatusconsultum*. Unless like Cardinali we regard responsibility for corn distribution as one of the Senate's most jealously guarded privileges,<sup>27</sup> we need not suppose that such a proposal would have encountered grave political difficulties, and we know that Claudius was ready to proceed through *senatusconsulta* on

<sup>24</sup> E. Kornemann, *R.-E.*, IV (1901), s. v. "Curatores," coll. 1779 ff.

<sup>25</sup> Frontinus, *De Aquaeductibus*, 100. Such variations of language in a legal document are surprising, but it seems clear that "ii, per quos frumentum plebei datur," "curatores frumenti" (cf. *I. L. S.*, 907) and "praefecti frumenti dandi" describe the same group of officials. So "cura frumenti populo dividundi" in Suetorius, *Aug.*, 37.

<sup>26</sup> Dio, LIV, 1, 4; 17, 1; a college first of two, then of four, ex-praetors, holding office for one year. The phrase "ex s. c." is also apt to be misinterpreted in a different direction: see below, pp. 18-19.

<sup>27</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 239 ff. In *Augustus* (1928), p. 173 he writes: "di quell'amministrazione il senato era stato sempre gelosissimo ed ogni ingerenza abusiva aveva sempre considerata come arma di pressione e di attentato contro le istituzioni vigenti."

occasions. But is it wholly superfluous to ask for evidence that he did so, whether in this connection, or when seeking to attain other objectives related to the corn supply?

Moreover this question of evidence becomes even more awkward if we adopt the traditional view that the transfer of responsibility to the *praefectus annonae* is to be dated after A. D. 49. This was maintained because Seneca writing in that year to the *praefectus* Pompeius Paulinus made no obvious mention of distribution among his duties.<sup>28</sup> But for the history of Claudius' principate after 49 we possess the narrative of Tacitus, to say nothing of Cassius Dio. If on a matter not so much economic as constitutional we have to choose between the silence of Tacitus<sup>29</sup> and the presumed silence of one of Seneca's exhortations, there can be little doubt of the answer; and we may agree with van Berchem<sup>30</sup> that if Claudius took any step requiring legislation on this topic the more probable date is near the beginning of the reign when he was concerned to tidy up the confusion which caused only one month's supply of grain to be available in Rome at Gaius' death.<sup>31</sup> But if any confidence can be placed in the reliability of our sources for this period, it is at least possible that most Claudian reforms in the field of the *annona* were carried out by the means which Claudius and his advisers must have preferred when they were able to take them, namely by direct administrative action rather than by formal consultation with the Senate.

This is perfectly consistent with our evidence for the measures which Claudius is definitely known to have taken in this field. These fall into three groups: first, the building of the harbour at Ostia and the construction of the related works;<sup>32</sup> secondly, the assistance and privileges afforded to grain importers and shipbuilders;<sup>33</sup> and thirdly the organisation of distribution at

<sup>28</sup> Seneca, *Dial.*, X (*De Brevitate Vitae*), 18. For the date of this treatise see Hirschfeld, *Philologus*, 1870, p. 50.

<sup>29</sup> For examples of what Tacitus thought worth recording in these years cf. *Ann.*, XI, 13, 22, 25; XII, 23, 53.

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 72-3. He also points out that Seneca does in fact mention "*ratio frumenti publici*" and a general care for the human stomach.

<sup>31</sup> Seneca, *loc. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Scramuzza, *op. cit.*, pp. 165 ff., with full bibliography.

<sup>33</sup> Suetonius, *Claud.*, 18, 2; Gaius, *Inst.*, I, 32 c; Ulpian, III, 6.

the Porticus Minucia,<sup>34</sup> the consequent enormous improvement in the machinery of distribution and, though not certainly so early, the appointment of a "curator Minuciae."<sup>35</sup> Legislation of a not particularly controversial kind was needed, and is recorded, for the modifications to the Lex Papia Poppaea and for the other bribes to traders which Suetonius said were still enforced in his own day; but the public works were presumably financed with funds at the disposal of the *Princeps*, and the remaining changes could be effected without public discussion of any embarrassing nature. It is essential here to be clear about the distinction between administrative improvements, including if necessary the appointment of any number of imperial officers with a wide range of practical competence, and changes in the existing ordinances of the Senate or the Roman people; also between reforms the success of which depended upon the personal cooperation of average members of the Senate and those which could be carried out by the recognised servants of the *Princeps*. Into the former class, on both criteria, falls the extraordinarily efficient organisation at the Porticus Minucia, a typical achievement of the Claudian Principate; but other measures, even if less far-reaching in their consequences, needed a more constitutional approach. Into which class can we put the supposed transference of responsibility for distribution, even if we suppose that the *praefecti frumenti dandi* were not involved?

It may be useful to concentrate first on the financial aspects of this problem, and in particular to ask what precise financial mechanism the supporters of this doctrine believe to have existed previously. The cost of the grain is clearly supposed to have been borne by the Senate, and no doubt various means can be devised of ascribing sufficient money resources to the Aerarium Saturni for the fulfilment of this task.<sup>36</sup> But money is far from

<sup>34</sup> Cf. van Berchem, *op. cit.*, pp. 88 ff.; Platner-Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (1929), pp. 421 ff.; G. Lugli, *Roma Antica, il centro monumentale* (1946), p. 533.

<sup>35</sup> See the evidence in Platner-Ashby, *loc. cit.* But the barbarous-sounding "curator de Minucia" of *I. L. S.*, 6071 (see above, n. 6) is nothing but a humble corn-recipient who was *curator* of a college: see van Berchem, p. 38.

<sup>36</sup> See for instance T. Frank, *J. R. S.*, XXIII (1933), pp. 143 ff.

being the end of the story: there is also the question how the grain was procured. There would appear to be three possible answers. First, the Senate may have acquired the grain as part of the tribute from provinces of which it enjoyed the revenue. Secondly, it may have bought the corn in the open market, perhaps employing specific traders to act on its behalf. Thirdly, it may have bought corn from Augustus and his successors. There is a general, and probably a justified, aversion to the third answer, implying as it does regular payments from the Aerarium to the *Princeps*, of which there is no trace and which would have constituted a flow of money exactly contrary to the frequent known subventions by the *Princeps* to the Aerarium. This possibility need not perhaps be seriously considered.

The solution which appears to have won most favour recently<sup>37</sup> appears to be the first. The Senate under Augustus and Tiberius had no need to pay the *Princeps* for anything, since in this period it had financial control of all the revenues of corn-producing areas. This proposition is believed to follow from a hard-worked passage of Velleius, which implies that the destination of the Egyptian revenues under Augustus was the Aerarium Saturni;<sup>38</sup> *a fortiori*, the Senate will have obtained the revenues of provinces less intimately controlled by Augustus than Egypt. But this statement of Velleius must not be pressed into more duties than its context warrants. For current terminology on matters relating to public finance it may be important evidence. It may prove that there was no distinct name for a Roman treasury other than Aerarium not only immediately after the conquest of Egypt but even in A. D. 30 when Velleius was writing.<sup>39</sup> But Velleius was not speaking technically, nor attempting to draw constitutional lines: his concern is only with the amount of money which Rome drew from Egypt, not with the way in which that money was handled. He stands

<sup>37</sup> E. g. van Berchem, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

<sup>38</sup> Velleius, II, 37, 3, "divus Augustus . . . paene idem facta Aegyptio stipendiaria quantum pater eius Galliis in aerarium reditus contulit." The significance of this passage is especially emphasised by Frank, *J. R. S.*, *cit.*, p. 143.

<sup>39</sup> Tacitus, on the other hand, writing of an event only two years later (*Ann.*, VI, 2), is evidence *not* for terminology, but for actual constitutional practice.



therefore in no contradiction whatever to the considerable body of evidence which suggests that in practice Augustus handled, spent, and accounted for a large volume of the revenues of the provinces. Into the details of this evidence it would be superfluous to enter here, as also into that which suggests that the origins of the later "fiscus" lay in public moneys rather than in the private property of the early emperors.<sup>40</sup> But if it be accepted in whole or even in part, then it is fair to ask what public funds Augustus is likely to have controlled if not those deriving from Egypt.

But here again we have entered upon a question of the more strictly financial type. It is perhaps too easy to confuse finance, which means the nature and ownership of the funds on which drawings were made to meet the cost of the corn, and procurement, that is to say the nature and authorship of the negotiations undertaken to acquire the corn and to see that it reached the right place at the right time. On the former issue there is admittedly no reason to doubt that the funds legally or constitutionally belonged to the *Aerarium*, if this was the only recognised Roman treasury at the time; but why should we suppose that they invariably derived from that part of the *Aerarium's* funds which were not (or had not been) in the hands of the *Princeps*? This is a hypothesis which would only seem plausible if our views of the institution in its other aspects appeared to demand the complete abstention of the *Princeps* from corn matters. When we turn to procurement we may reasonably seek strong proof from those who contend that Augustus kept right out of the picture. Much the same considerations apply whether we adopt our first or our second hypothesis of the way in which corn was acquired. It is in fact probable that the second hypothesis is correct, and that whether or not the corn was derived from taxation paid in kind the utmost use was made of private shippers in arranging its export, as well as its import into Italy.<sup>41</sup> But even a system of this kind necessitated elaborate negotiations between the state and the traders; and when we ask

<sup>40</sup> Or these matters a full bibliography is provided by Hugh Last, *J. R. S.*, XXXIV (1944), pp. 51 ff.

<sup>41</sup> This is decisively argued by Rostovtzeff, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Frumentum," coll. 142-3; cf. A. C. Johnson, *Roman Egypt (Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, II* [1936]), pp. 401 ff., 481 ff.

who represented the government the regular answer is that at least after A. D. 8 the responsible official was the *praefectus annonae*, that is to say precisely that imperial official who is supposed to have supplanted the "Senate's administration" under Claudius.<sup>42</sup> This is of course exactly what we should expect; indeed it seems likely that in so far as similar negotiations were needed in the period before the first *praefectus* was appointed they too were conducted by an individual or individuals rather carefully chosen by Augustus and not necessarily of senatorial standing. The task called for a fair measure of skill, application, and commercial experience; and the regular senatorial officers (the *praefecti frumenti dandi*) had plenty on their hands in connection with distribution. Explicit evidence is lacking; but in its absence it is perhaps easier to envisage Augustus laying on the corn through his own machinery with the same success that he achieved immediately after he assumed the *cura annonae* in 22 B. C. than to imagine that senatorial officers managed to do a job which the aediles under the late Republic had been so notoriously incapable of doing. But if this view be near the truth, and if we still suppose that the Senate owned the corn when it was distributed, then we seem to be back at the hypothesis that the Senate consciously transferred funds to (or at least through) the *Princeps*; and this is what nobody seems to have ventured to assert in terms. Except for maintaining that the funds expended not only by Augustus but by Claudius on their various *curae* were strictly speaking public funds, the present writer has no desire to challenge the prevailing caution on that point.

The truth would seem to be very much simpler if we could rid ourselves of the remaining vestiges of the "dyarchy." Throughout much of the writing about these problems has run the tacit premiss that the administration of the empire under Augustus was divided into two sections, one run by the *Princeps* the other by the Senate, and that the line between them was

<sup>42</sup> On the duties of the *praefectus* and the date of the first appointment cf. Hirschfeld, *Verwaltungsbeamten*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 234 ff.; Rostovtzeff, "Frumentum," col. 171; *C. A. H.*, X, pp. 202-3 (G. H. Stevenson). On his negotiations with the trade see the attractive suggestion of M. Fisher, *J. R. S.*, XXX (1940), p. 106 about the measures recorded in Suetonius, *Claud.*, 18.

firmly drawn and jealously guarded.<sup>43</sup> The distribution of corn on this view belonged to the Senate's sphere, and the officers in charge before the Claudian encroachment reflected senatorial responsibility in a way in which the appointment of senators to govern the "provinciae Caesaris" did not. One principal objection to this view has always been the difficulty of translating into contemporary Latin the constitutional distinctions which it attempts to draw. But to the administration of corn matters it appears to be peculiarly inapplicable. There is nothing in our sources to represent this as a field of which Augustus took half and left half to the Senate, everything to suggest that they cooperated together over the whole.<sup>44</sup> It would be strange if Augustus had his *cura* defined so as to exclude distribution, since it is commonly agreed that he continued to interest himself personally in distribution questions, for instance in fixing the number of recipients.<sup>45</sup> When Suetonius mentions the "*cura frumenti populo dividundi*" as one of the new tasks devised by Augustus for senators<sup>46</sup> there is nothing to indicate that Augustus was creating "une organisation autonome";<sup>47</sup> he was able to father the new board precisely because he had himself already assumed general responsibility for corn, and in selecting senators to run it he was not resigning that responsibility to the Senate. His reason for this selection was "*quo plures rei publicae capessèrent*," in other words to promote that cooperation between himself and the Senate which was so desirable both on political grounds and because competent administrators were not plentiful elsewhere. Finally, it is important not to be misled by the phrase "*ex s. c.*" which appears in the title of these *praefecti*:<sup>48</sup> it need imply no more than that Augustus, as was

<sup>43</sup> See n. 27 above.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. A. von Premerstein, *Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats*, p. 140, "Diese (bzw. die *cura annonae*) hat der Princeps im Jahre 22 . . . vorübergehend übernommen, dann durch Kuratoren und Präfecten verwalten lassen, die er im Zusammenwirken mit der Senat bestellte. . ."

<sup>45</sup> Suetonius, *Aug.*, 41, 42; Dio, LV, 10, 1; cf. van Berchem, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 ff.

<sup>46</sup> *Aug.*, 37.

<sup>47</sup> Van Berchem, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

<sup>48</sup> See above, p. 12. The *cippi* of the *curafores riparum et alvei Tiberis* (*I. L. S.*, 5924 ff.) provide an interesting parallel; and in their case we

natural, thought the creation of such a board a formal enough matter to merit the promotion of a decree.<sup>49</sup> If it be contended that this proves the political importance which was attached to corn distribution, we need not quarrel, but there is no hint in the ancient sources that anyone but Augustus was regarded by the *plebs frumentaria* as the author of the benefits conferred.

It may now be possible to attempt some reconstruction of the sequence of events.<sup>50</sup> (1) After making some extraordinary distributions of grain in 23 B. C. Augustus in the next year assumed the *cura annonae* on the strength of the continuing shortage of supplies.<sup>51</sup> For this office he had a precedent not only in the dictator Caesar but in Pompeius Magnus, like which worthy model we may assume that he was far from reluctant to sustain the general responsibility for corn questions after the immediate danger had passed. Apart from the regulation of the distribution lists the *cura* remained practically in abeyance for nearly three decades, but it would have been Augustus' right, and indeed his duty, to intervene during this period in any crisis affecting the corn supplies of Rome.<sup>52</sup> From the outset the entire operations of the *cura* were financed by moneys under the control of Augustus.<sup>53</sup> (2) An immediate distinction was drawn between the administration of supply and that of distribution. In the former no specific incidents are recorded before A. D. 6, but without doubt measures for the continued assurance of supplies were taken in the intervening years: the

need not suppose that the disappearance of the words "ex s. c." under Claudius was the result of any legal change rather than of a shift in emphasis brought about by the passage of time.

<sup>49</sup> The fresh light thrown upon the usages of this phrase by M. Grant, *From Imperium to Auctoritas* (1946), is remarkable. See especially pp. 95 ff.

<sup>50</sup> Comparison with Cardinali's points in *Diz. Epig.*, 240 may be found helpful.

<sup>51</sup> *Res Gestae*, 5, 2; Dio, LIV, 1, 3.

<sup>52</sup> The view of Cardinali (*Diz. Epig.*, 241; *Augustus*, p. 172), followed by van Berchem (*op. cit.*, p. 68), that Augustus laid down the *cura* immediately the famine was over is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of Augustus' *curae*, which did not necessitate incessant activity in their fields of reference. Augustus is clearly speaking of long-term appointments in the relevant chapter of the *Res Gestae*.

<sup>53</sup> Consequently Nero's complaints reported in Tacitus (*Ann.*, XV, 18), if indeed they refer to expenditure on corn at all, do not reflect any new situation.

12 million *modii* needed annually for the *frumentationes* were now more than covered by imports from Egypt alone,<sup>54</sup> and in addition Augustus was able on occasions to issue corn in supplementation of the ration or to the numerous persons not eligible for inclusion on the lists.<sup>55</sup> In A. D. 6, however, this part of the *cura* broke down sufficiently to require the appointment of a board of consulars, to which re-appointments were made in the following year.<sup>56</sup> Shortly afterwards the new office of *praefectura annonae* came into being, the first holder being appropriately an ex-praefect of Egypt.<sup>57</sup> (3) Augustus had immediately promoted a *senatusconsultum* to establish a board of two ex-praetors, chosen by lot, to preside over the distribution of the corn which he was prepared to provide free to the *plebs frumentaria*; in 18 B. C. the membership of the board was increased to four.<sup>58</sup> Prolonged attention was given by the *Princeps* to the distribution lists, and conditions were ultimately imposed which fixed the number of recipients at approximately 200,000.<sup>59</sup> (4) Early in his principate Claudius took a number of new measures to secure Rome's grain imports, the total requirements of which<sup>60</sup> had perhaps risen with an increase in the population of the city. From these measures he proceeded to the lavish constructional work designed to bring corn into Rome with the minimum of risk. Finally (though the date cannot be precisely determined) his attention was turned to the machinery of the *frumentationes*; and in addition to further building operations his civil service, doubtless under the supervision of the *praefectus annonae*, created what to all appearances was one of the tidiest bureaucratic institutions of the ancient world. But the formal arrangements of Augustus were not

<sup>54</sup> Victor, *Epit.*, I, 6.

<sup>55</sup> *Res Gestae*, 18; Suetonius, *Aug.*, 41. The main thesis of van Berchem's book, which I find convincing, enables him to give a most satisfactory interpretation of these vexed passages (*op. cit.*, pp. 70-1, 86-8).

<sup>56</sup> Dio, LV, 26, 2; 31, 4.

<sup>57</sup> C. Turranius, first known from Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 7.

<sup>58</sup> See above, n. 26.

<sup>59</sup> *Res Gestae*, 15; Dio, LV, 10, 1. Cf. van Berchem, pp. 26 ff.

<sup>60</sup> That is to say, requirements for all types of consumer. The number of recipients of free corn remained roughly constant throughout the first two centuries of the Empire.

revoked, and the presidency at free distributions continued to rest with senators.<sup>61</sup>

In the realm of finance the principate of Claudius was radical, if by this we mean that it gave decisive recognition to changes inherent in the history of the preceding seventy years. But it no longer seems to have been a period of spectacular incident, much less of legislation on financial questions.<sup>62</sup> The history of the corn supply was similar. It is not merely that little record of constitutional changes appears in our literary sources: one or other of them might have been expected to mention an open encroachment by the *Princeps* on the prerogatives of the Senate, but their incompleteness may be felt to be a barrier to this type of argument. More important is the enormous complexity of the operation which would have been needed to give effect to the administrative and financial transfer in which many modern scholars have believed. Constitutional change would have been almost the least significant element. A large "service department," and with it several revenue agencies, would have had to hand over their records; and an elaborate organisation, involving numerous personnel both in Rome and in the provinces, would have had to operate under new management, even if we suppose that the personnel could remain largely unchanged. The essence of such a reform might certainly come about gradually: to achieve it as the work of a year or two would have needed the fullest cooperation of all concerned, and not least of the individual senators in office at the time. On almost any hypothesis about the details open consultation of the Senate would appear to have been desirable. From all this we need not suppose that Claudius would have shrunk had such a change been needed. The alternative analysis we have given is not intended to deny his government either enterprise or efficiency; but it may be that the substance of its achievement would have been less had its administrative problems in terms of human beings been so intractable as others have suggested.

THE QUEEN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

G. E. F. CHILVER.

<sup>61</sup> Certain later developments, e.g. the creation of a *fiscus frumentarius* (Cardinali, *Diz. Epig.*, 246; Rostovtzeff, "Frumentum," col. 178), are merely refinements of the administrative machinery.

<sup>62</sup> See the summary by Last, *loc. cit.*, p. 59.

## EMOTIONAL CONFLICT AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN THE LESBIA-POEMS OF CATULLUS

Students of Catullus have long been aware of the fact that Catullus' love for Lesbia did not run true to the usual pattern of the ancient love-affair. Even its very circumstances stamp it as unusual, for it is the love of a gentleman for a Roman *matrona*, not the conventional passion of the young man for a *meretrix*. It is, in other words, a love between social equals; more than that, it is, baldly stated, a case of adultery, and stands therefore in open violation of the accepted moral code.<sup>1</sup> This fact has led some commentators to accuse Catullus of blindness and of self-deception when he declares himself *pius*, speaks of his *fiâes*, and reveals his expectation that Lesbia could reciprocate his own exalted feelings.<sup>2</sup>

It is not, however, my purpose here to deal with these criticisms, which in the end are scarcely more than moral strictures. With Catullus, the fact of adultery must be accepted. To defend it on moral grounds is worse than useless; to attack it on those grounds is to disseminate prejudice and misunderstanding. In the end, Catullus is not the first nor the last man in the world to fall in love with a married woman; it is a common, and tragic, experience, in this day as in that. That Catullus felt himself privileged to carry that love to the point of actual liaison is a condemnation not so much of the man as of the age in which he lived.

Rather, laying aside the moral issue, and laying aside, too, any speculation as to the reasoning, perverted or otherwise, by which Catullus may have justified his pursuit of an adulterous affair, I should like to examine the nature of his love for Lesbia as he himself describes it, with a view to resolving some of the problems it presents and to revealing those of its characteristics which set it apart from the usual Roman or Greek love-affair and give it a special character of its own.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Plautus, *Curc.*, 37-38: *dum te abstineas nupta, vidua, virgine, iuventute et pueris liberis, ama quidlibet.*

<sup>2</sup> E.g. E. T. Merrill, *Catullus* (Boston, 1893), Introd., pp. xx-xxi; Gustav Friedrich, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Leipzig, 1908), p. 492 (on c. 76, 1).

As a general rule, the ancient love-affair as we find it in erotic poetry had two outstanding characteristics: it was ephemeral, and it lay almost wholly in the physical sphere. It was not a prelude to marriage, and in fact had nothing whatever to do with marriage.<sup>3</sup> In every case it was coterminous with the physical attractions of the beloved, as a host of passages warning of the ravages of time amply attest.<sup>4</sup> This is not to say that the ancient lover had no interest in the intellectual or spiritual charms of his lady, but only that any such interest as he possessed was distinctly of secondary importance, and played no real part in his passion. From beginning to end, his love is a glorification of his desire; any spiritual, non-physical elements which may have been in it are no more than incidentals. His attention never focuses upon them long enough to enable him to make of love the mutually interdependent complex of the physical, the emotional, the intellectual, and the spiritual which today we call by that name.

It is precisely an absorption in the non-physical aspects of love that sets Catullus' love for Lesbia apart from the common run of ancient affairs and gives to it its special character. It is notable from the very start that nowhere in the Lesbia-poems does Catullus dwell on the joys of physical intimacy—this in the face of his complete lack of reserve in such poems as 32 and 56. Kisses he mentions, of course, but beyond that there is nothing more immodest in the Lesbia-poems than the almost bashful *multa iocosa* of c. 8.<sup>5</sup> This is not to suggest that he practiced any restraint in such matters, or to claim for him a delicacy of feeling that would not merely have set him apart from his

<sup>3</sup> Cf. E. Rohde, *Der Griechische Roman* (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 63-77. The fact that many of the love-affairs of the New Comedy end in marriage is beside the point. Such ending is quite accidental in nearly every case: in the beginning the young man's intentions were merely to win a mistress, not a wife. This fact is clearly signalized by Terence's *Phormio*, in which Antipho finds the marriage which he underwent in order to satisfy his passion highly embarrassing: cf. 173-176, and compare *Andria*, 438-442.

<sup>4</sup> E. g. *Anth. Pal.*, V, 21, 27, 23, 28, 74, 79, 85, 112; Theocritus, VII, 120-121; XXIII, 27-34; Horace, *Od.*, I, 25; Tibullus, I, 1, 69-74; VIII, 41-48; Propertius, II, 13, 19-20; Ovid, *Ars Am.*, III, 69-72.

<sup>5</sup> Contrast e. g. Propertius, I, 3; II, 15. Even the relatively modest Tibullus thinks fondly of the joys of the couch in his idyllic picture of love-in-a-cottage: I, 1, 45-46.



contemporaries but would have marked him as abnormal. It is rather to be taken as *prima facie* evidence that his interest in Lesbia lay elsewhere, that his love, while it had its overpowering physical side, had an even more compelling aspect that was not physical in its nature.<sup>6</sup>

Curiously enough, the earlier Lesbia-poems show no demonstrable evidence of this aspect. They are tender and affectionate (3, 5, 7), full of amatory gayety and enthusiasm (36, 43, 83, 86, 92, 107), occasionally touched with melancholy (2, 70), or with awe (51). Apart from their unique sweetness—a reflection of the man himself rather than of his love—and their surpassing poetic art, they are almost conventional in character. It would appear that as long as Catullus and Lesbia were happy together, as long as he felt that his feelings were reciprocated, he either was unaware that his love for her possessed any special or unusual characteristics, or felt no need to attempt an expression of them. Lesbia apparently was accepting him as he was, and was understanding and appreciating the affection he bore her.

It is only when he began to perceive that Lesbia was not viewing their love in the same way as he was that there began for him the long struggle, never successfully concluded, to give adequate expression to his feelings, to explain the nature of the non-physical side of his love—the very side that had made it significant and worth while to him. Only after we have clearly understood this struggle can we fully understand the Lesbia-poems themselves.

The first hint of the struggle is to be found in c. 109, and lies in the contrast between the first and last distichs of the poem.<sup>7</sup> The experience lying behind it would appear to be

<sup>6</sup> In point of fact we do not even learn from Catullus' poems anything about Lesbia's appearance. Not a single one of her physical characteristics is ever mentioned. She is *pulcherrima tota* (86, 5); she is *candida diva* (68, 70), both conventional and colorless phrases. Even in c. 51, where the overpowering effect of her beauty and charm is described, there is no hint of a single physical trait: cf. E. A. Havelock, *The Lyric Genius of Catullus* (Oxford, 1939), p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> In the following discussion I am laying aside considerations of chronology, and am not suggesting that the poems discussed were written in the order in which I have taken them up. It is convenient to study the development of Catullus' concept of love in a step-by-step fashion;

something of this sort: Lesbia and Catullus have had a discussion of the nature of their mutual feelings; Lesbia has protested undying love on her side, and has offered to Catullus an *amor iucundus perpetuusque*. As Catullus reflects on this discussion, it occurs to him that the phrase Lesbia has used is too hackneyed and ordinary. It does not ring true; more important than that, it does not at all express the feeling that he himself possesses, nor does it describe the kind of love in which he is interested. In legal language, he does not like the terms of the contract she proposes. After, therefore, expressing (vv. 3-4) the hope that, whatever she meant by *amor iucundus perpetuusque*, she meant it sincerely, he goes on to attempt an expression of what he himself desired. What he wants is not *amor*, for that to him means primarily the standard brand of erotic interest. He does not want something merely *iucundus*, for he sees clearly enough that such a feeling is *perpetuus* only as long as it remains *iucundus*. Rather, he wants a love which is not mere physical attraction, but rather has its basis in a harmony of body, intellect, emotion, and spirit. Unfortunately, no word exists in the Latin language which will adequately express this idea. He tries, therefore, to analyze the feeling itself, to break it up into its component parts, and in that way to find expression for it. It is, first of all, something that lasts throughout life, and does not disappear with youth and beauty. It is no mere casual connection; it is a bond, covenant, *foedus*. Perhaps *amicitia* is the right word. But *amicitia* has two faults: it is not normally used of relations between men and women,<sup>8</sup> and it is essentially a cold and formal term.<sup>9</sup> It is adequate only in that it expresses a feeling based on elements that are not physical in nature. To lift it out of its usual formal sphere, Catullus adds to it the epithet *sancta*; this, he hopes, will show that he does not mean the ordinary feeling of friendship, but something more exalted in character.<sup>10</sup> In the end, Catullus' attempt at expression is not

needless to say, his ideas may not have developed in any such orderly way, but may well have undergone periods of regression, as the poet groped for words to express his feelings.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Kroll on v. 6 (Wilhelm Kroll, *C. Valerius Catullus* [Leipzig, 1929]).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Oskar Hezel, *Catull u. das griechische Epigramm* (Stuttgart, 1932 [*Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft*, XVII]), pp. 67-68.

<sup>10</sup> Kroll, *ibid.*: "die Stärke seiner Empfindung hebt C. ganz über die

successful; he succeeds only in indicating that his love is no ordinary love, and that *amor* is not the proper term for it. To the average ancient, as to the modern reader, his *aeternum sanctae foedus amicitiae* must have remained something of a puzzle.

One idea which this phrase does suggest rather clearly is that of loyalty, *fides*. This is implied not only by *foedus*, with its hint of contractual obligations,<sup>11</sup> but also by *amicitia*, and by *sancta*, with its connotation of inviolability.<sup>12</sup> As if seizing upon this idea of *fides* as the one phase of his love which he can express with clarity, Catullus, in c. 87, tries once again to formulate his concept of the affection he bore Lesbia. Leaving aside the term *amicitia* as essentially unsuccessful, he combines *fides* with a quantitative rather than a qualitative expression, perhaps in the hope that the two together will more nearly express his meaning.

He tells us in the first distich that no woman can truly say that she has been loved *as much as* Lesbia has been by him; then, to show that his love was not merely greater in quantity—or intensity—he adds in the second distich:

nulla *fides* ullo fuit umquam in foedere tanta  
quanta in amore tuo ex parte reperta mea est.

He bore for her, in other words, not merely a passion (*amor*) that surpassed all others; in addition, his feeling was possessed of a constancy, a trustworthiness, a *loyalty* (*fides*) such as no other had ever known.<sup>13</sup> In this poem, as in c. 109, we gain the impression that Catullus first expresses the nature of his love

gewöhnliche Auffassung der Liebe hinaus und lässt sie als *sancta* . . . erscheinen . . .”; cf. Ellis, *op. cit.*, *ad loc.*

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Cicero, *De Off.*, I, 7, 23: *fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas.*

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Marcian, *Dig.*, I, 8, 8: *sanctum est, quod ab iniuria hominum defensum atque munitum est.*

<sup>13</sup> Propertius also protests his *fides*, and says that it will last to the grave: *ossa tibi iuro per matris et ossa parentis . . . me tibi ad extremas mansurum, vita, tenebras; ambos una fides auferet, una dies* (II, 20, 15-18; cf. *ibid.*, 4 and 34; II, 24b, 26b). But as III, 25 shows, his *fides* proved of much shorter duration. Further, both he and Ovid (*Am.*, I, 3) “protest too much”; their sentiments have a conventional ring, and completely lack the simple intensity of feeling which characterizes Catullus.

in more or less conventional terms, and then, finding that expression inadequate, attempts to correct it by adding some element which is unmistakably non-physical—in this case, *fides*. Again, just as in *c.* 109, the amended declaration is unsatisfactory and incomplete: it does not say what Catullus wanted to say. It is no more than a thrust in the right direction, but a thrust that does not reach its goal. *Amor* and *fides* together do not completely define his love.

It is of course possible that in neither *c.* 109 nor *c.* 87 was Catullus attempting to define his love in its entirety. The thought of *fides* may have been uppermost in his mind at the time he wrote both poems, possibly because of some incident, now lost, in which Lesbia had signally indicated her lack of the very quality of loyalty which to Catullus was so important. In spite of this possibility, both poems give the impression of a basic dissatisfaction with the standard erotic vocabulary, of a realization that, for Catullus, *amor*, *amare*, and the other terms regularly associated with love did not express his own feelings.

This struggle with terms, with a language which as yet possessed no adequate expression of the concept of love as he knew it, becomes more obvious in *c.* 72.<sup>14</sup> He begins, as in *c.* 109, by contrasting Lesbia's words with his own: she had said *solum nosse Catullum, velle tenere*, using phrases both of which lay wholly in the physical sphere and conveyed no hint of anything but the most conventional of carnal passion. To this he offers his own contrasting term, *dilexi*, a word which can refer to the affection of friends as well as to that of lovers. But he realizes at once that *diligere* does not by itself express his meaning, even when he adds *non tantum ut vulgus amicam*, for this could be interpreted as meaning no more than that his love was greater, or more intense, than the ordinary.<sup>15</sup> In the pentameter, there-

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Kroll, introd. note: "Er versucht, das Besondere seiner Empfindung für sie in Worte zu fassen und einer Empfindungsweise Ausdruck zu geben, die für die Antike neu war. Dabei ist völlige Klarheit nicht erreicht und konnte nicht erreicht werden, weil die Empfindung selbst unklar war; aber das Ringen mit dem Ausdruck hat hier wie in *c.* 75.76 etwas Ergreifendes. Die im Inhalt ähnliche Ausführung bei Ovid *Am.* 3.11.33 wirkt konventionell." Cf. also Hezel, *op. cit.* (see note 9), p. 65.

<sup>15</sup> Kroll, *ad loc.*: "*dilexi* kann auch von sinnlicher Liebe gesagt werden (wie *amare* von Freundschaft) vgl. 6, 4.81, 2; dass es hier um etwas Höheres handelt, ergibt sich erst aus dem Folgenden."

fore, he tries to clarify his meaning by adding the simile *sed pater ut gnatos diligit et generos*. This line has only a superficial and accidental resemblance to the well-known words of Andromache to Hector,<sup>16</sup> or of Chrysis to Pamphilus,<sup>17</sup> or to any of the imitations of these passages.<sup>18</sup> All of these latter express primarily, or perhaps exclusively, the idea of helplessness and dependence; they impose upon the one party to the relationship a special responsibility for the welfare of the other.

It is at once apparent that Catullus had no such idea in mind; he is not assuming the rôle of a Hector, much less suggesting that Lesbia might have felt toward him the helpless dependence of a child upon its father. Nor is the line to be interpreted as evidence of naive bewilderment on Catullus' part, as a kind of extravagant expression engendered by hurt and confusion.<sup>19</sup> Rather, it is to be taken as one more attempt to express the non-physical aspect of his love. It is a line deliberately thought out and devised toward this end. In order to convey the idea that his love for Lesbia had a different quality, one completely dissociated from the carnal, different even from the sincere passion which many of his contemporaries must have known, Catullus compares it to the clearest example he can find of love which has no share in physical interest, the love of a father for his sons. Then, as if even that were not sufficiently divorced from the physical—for father and child are, after all, bound by the physical tie of blood-relationship—he adds "sons-in-law." The love which a *paterfamilias* bore the men who had married his daughters could not by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as having a physical basis: it must have been based exclusively on a feeling of intellectual, emotional, and spiritual sympathy, coupled with that intense community of interest which characterized the Roman family.<sup>20</sup> The *paternal* aspect of such affection is entirely irrelevant; Catullus does not mean that he

<sup>16</sup> *Iliad*, VI, 429-30: "Ἑκτορ, ἀτὰρ σὺ μοι ἔσσι πατὴρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ ἥδὲ κατέργητος, σὺ δέ μοι θαλερὸς παρακοίτης.

<sup>17</sup> Terence, *Andria*, 295: *te isti virum do, amicum tutorem patrem*.

<sup>18</sup> E. g. Propertius, I, 11, 23: *tu mihi socia domus, tu, Cynthia, sola parentes*; II, 18b, 33-34: *cum tibi nec frater nec sit tibi filius ullus, frater ego et tibi sim filius unus ego*.

<sup>19</sup> Havelock, *op. cit.* (see note 6), p. 85, has correctly pointed out the error in this view.

<sup>20</sup> Havelock, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

felt as a father feels, *qua* father. He means only that his love had the same spiritual, non-physical quality that a father's love possesses.

In the end, the expression is fumbling. It could scarcely be expected that Catullus' contemporaries would make the correct equation of ideas. The line probably produced some wise nodding of heads and quoting of the Andromache passage, and probably, too, became the occasion for cynical jibes at the poet's naiveté. It is fair to doubt that Catullus was understood—possibly because he himself did not clearly understand his own feelings.<sup>21</sup>

It is as if in realization of these facts that in this same poem, Catullus goes on to attempt an expression of his love in still other terms. In the last two distichs he proclaims that his affection for Lesbia had two aspects, and that these aspects were totally different in character, one from the other. So different were they that they were capable of being completely separated, in such a way that the one could continue and grow stronger while the other grew ever weaker. In vv. 5-6, he describes the emotional experience which has accompanied this separation:


nunc te cognovi: quare etsi impensius uror,  
multo mi tamen es vilior et levior.

In other words the flame of passion, representing the physical side of his love, has grown ever hotter, while his spiritual esteem, the non-physical side, has fallen lower and lower: Lesbia is ever "cheaper" and "of less moment (*levior*)" in his eyes.

The contrast in ideas is immediately apparent in these lines; no less apparent is the fact that while Catullus finds no difficulty in expressing the carnal side of his love, for which *impensius uror* is a perfectly clear and understandable expression, he is not so capable of defining its other aspect. In vv. 3-4, he attempted a definition in positive terms; now he tries to phrase one in a negative way, by showing what he has lost now that this side of his love has become weakened. His sense of Lesbia's *value* and *importance* to him, he says, is diminishing. But "value" and "importance" do not suggest love; at best, they suggest the personal esteem which accompanies friendship.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Kroll, above, note 14.

<sup>22</sup> The meaning of the phrase *vilior et levior* is well illustrated by Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 80 (of Antonius Primus and Domitian): *Neque ipse*



This may be part of love, just as is the *fides* of which he made such point in *cc.* 109 and 87, but it is by no means the whole story. Standing alone, the definition is quite inadequate, and may have stirred his readers to the same sort of incredulity as did his use of *amicitia* in *c.* 109.

In the light of this fact, one may well imagine that the abrupt question "*qui potis est?*" expresses the reader's wonder not only at how such a paradox of sentiment was possible, but also at how there could truly be any element of this second kind in a love-affair. What have such colorless concepts as "value" and "importance" to do with love, unless they are associated with the usual, basically physical, interpretation of that passion? And if these concepts do properly belong to this enigmatic "other side" of love, how can they be expressed positively?

Catullus' answer to the question again consists in an attempt to point up a contrast between the two aspects of his love:

quod amantem iniuria talis  
cogit amare magis, sed bene velle minus.

What the *iniuria* was need not concern us at the moment, since it has no bearing on the question in hand.<sup>23</sup> Significant only is the fact that it is forcing (*cogit*) him into a position which must have seemed paradoxical to his readers, but was not so to him. To them, a man "esteemed" (*bene velle*) his mistress only in proportion as he "loved" (*amare*) her; to Catullus, these are two separate emotional phenomena, and only if he can explain the nature of them both can he reveal the nature of his love. Once more, as in *vv.* 5-6, he finds no difficulty in expressing the carnal side: for this purpose *amare* serves very well. But for the non-physical side he is thrown back on a flat and almost insipid phrase, *bene velle*. It expresses nothing more than a rather vague feeling of good will, a sort of warm friendliness.<sup>24</sup>

(*sc.* Antonius) *deerat adrogantia vocare offensas, nimius commemorandis quae meruisset. Alios ut imbelles, Caecina-n ut captivom ac dediticium increpat. Unde paulatim levior viliorque haberi, manente tamen in speciem amicitia.* (Referred to by Kroll, *cd loc.*).

<sup>23</sup> I shall revert to it later. Ellis (on *v.* 8) says that it was "doubtless a preference shown by Lesbia to some rival of Catullus." I doubt if it was as trivial a matter as this.

<sup>24</sup> Its meaning is excellently shown by Plautus, *Truc.*, 434-442:

pro di immortales! non amantis mulieris  
sed socii unanimantis, fidentis fuit

But the sentiment is at least non-physical in character, and Catullus hopes that by placing it in juxtaposition to *amare*, and thus implying that it was equivalent to *amare* in intensity and importance, he may be able to give some indication of its special meaning to him. Had he been a modern writer, with centuries of romantic tradition behind him, he could have stated his case very simply and clearly: "The hurt she has done me compels me to *desire* her more, but to *love* her less." To us, familiar as we are with the concept of romantic love, it is no paradox to desire without loving; to Catullus' contemporaries "desire" and "love" were scarcely to be dissociated from each other; to Catullus himself they were indeed dissociated, but he had no adequate means of expressing the dichotomy.

This poem also raises another question, which must be answered if the nature of Catullus' love for Lesbia is to be fully understood: why should a "hurt" cause his physical passion to increase, even as it caused his love—to use the modern term—to diminish? The answer is given at least partly by c. 75:

Huc est mens deducta tua, mea Lesbia, culpa,  
atque ita se officio perdidit ipsa suo,  
ut iam nec bene velle queat tibi, si optima fias,  
nec desistere amare, omnia si facias.

In this poem we see the same contrast of ideas as in c. 72, and in the same terms: *bene velle* and *amare* once more are used to express the twofold nature of his love. The sole difference is that now the "hurt" has gone so deep that love—again in the modern sense—has been completely destroyed, and only passion, desire, remains. Moreover, his passion has reached such a degree that it can never be satisfied. The "hurt" then, must have been of such character that it could enflame desire at the same time that it destroyed spiritual affection; more than that, it must have caused desire to reach its apogee when all spiritual affection was irrevocably dead. It can have been no mere matter

---

officium facere quod modo haec fecit mihi,  
suppositionem pueri quae mihi credidit,  
germanae quod sorori non credit soror.  
ostendit sese iam mihi medullitus:  
se mihi infidelem numquam, dum vivat, fore.  
egone illam ut non amem? egone illi ut non bene velim?  
me potius non amabo quam huic desit amor.



of feminine coquetry or of ordinary *amantium irae*,<sup>25</sup> for Catullus has already shown his willingness—albeit not without some grief—to overlook the occasional deviations of Lesbia from the straight path that he had set for himself,<sup>26</sup> and such incidents, even if they had weakened his feeling of *bene velle*, could scarcely have roused his passions to such an unbearable pitch.

Only one thing, it seems to me, can account for the violence of Catullus' reaction, and this is the realization, brought home to him at long last, of Lesbia's utter profligacy and complete promiscuity. This is what hurt him so deeply, not of course because it convicted her of immorality, but because it made clear to him the fact that she had never really understood or appreciated the quality of the love he bore her. Always dissatisfied with her own interpretations of their love, he has now seen that she was not even honestly attempting to understand what he meant. In brief, she did not care that he felt for her as no other man had ever felt for any woman; if she had, she would not, with such complete disregard for his feelings, have slipped from the *rara furta*, which he could tolerate, to the sexual orgies in which she was now indulging. In c. 75, these escapades are only hinted at in the phrases *si optima fias* and *omnia si facias*; the lines *glubit magnanimi Remi nepotes* (c. 58), *puella nam mi. . . consedit istic* (c. 37), and *cum suis vivat valeatque moechis quos simul complexa tenet trecentos* (c. 11) give the true picture of her depravity, and their sorrowful bitterness shows the true depth of the hurt she had inflicted upon him. Not with the best of wills could his *amicitia—fides—bene velle—diligere* survive such an attack. And conversely, her conduct served only to heighten his desire to possess her,

<sup>25</sup> Ellis appears to accept this inadequate explanation (on 72, 8) and follows the younger Dousa in quoting *Anth. Pal.*, V, 256, 3-4: ὕβρις ἔρωτας ἔλυσεν· μάτην ὅδε μῦθος ἀλᾶται. ὕβρις ἐμὴν ἐρέθει μᾶλλον ἐρωμανίην. On 75, he quotes Theognis, 1091-1094: ἀργαλέως μοι θυμὸς ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι, γιγνώσκων χαλεπὸν μὲν, ὅταν φίλος ἀνδρὶ γένηται, ἐχθαίρειν, χαλεπὸν δ' οὐκ ἐθέλοντα φιλεῖν. Kroll also uses this latter quotation, but presumably only as a parallel for the mechanical juxtaposition of ideas. Neither passage shows anything approaching Catullus' intensity of feeling.

<sup>26</sup> The lines are almost tearful, and yet resigned: *quae tamen etsi uno non est contenta Catullo, rara verecundae furta feremus erae, ne nimium simus stultorum more molesti* (68, 135-137).

for it showed to what lengths she could go to arouse, enjoy, and satisfy the sexual impulses of men. Catullus knew no squeamishness on this score; her knowledge, openly displayed, of the arts of love tempted and tormented him. As the full extent of her libidinous skill is made clear to him, he feels an insatiable desire to share in it. Thus it is that he can say *ut iam nec bene velle queat tibi, si optima fias, nec desistere amare, omnia si facias*.

Thus far we have dealt only with Catullus' struggle for adequate expression of the nature of his love. Even though he never attained complete clarity of terms, he did succeed in presenting a clear picture of the psychological conflict which that love occasioned. On the one side, Lesbia's physical attractions impel him toward an ever-increasing desire for possession; on the other, his loss of respect, spiritual affection, intellectual and emotional sympathy, drive him ever more to despise her. The emotional conflict itself is evidence of the power and significance that resided in the non-physical side of his love, for if this side had had less power and significance, no such conflict would have resulted. Instead, Catullus would have fallen resignedly into that attitude of mock despair which was canonical for ill-starred lovers among his predecessors and followers.<sup>27</sup> The very fact that he experiences no such shallow emotion, but is instead driven half-mad with heartbreak proves that he had attained to a concept of love unfamiliar to the other erotic poets of ancient times, and far more akin to our modern conception of romantic love.

In spite, then, of the terminological difficulties experienced by the poet, the conflict and the nature and intensity of the feelings that brought it about are clear to see and to understand. But even as Catullus reveals this conflict, a further idea begins to manifest itself, an idea which gives greater point and meaning not only to cc. 72 and 75, but even more to cc. 85 and 76. This is the idea of guilt, a feeling which arises in Catullus' mind not from any sense of wrong-doing in having participated in an immoral affair<sup>28</sup> but from the very emotional conflict itself.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. e. g. *Anth. Pal.*, V, 256 (above, note 25); Theognis, 1091-1094 (*ibid.*), Anacreon, 89: *ἔρῳ τε δῆνυτε κοῦκ ἔρῳ καὶ μάλισμα καὶ μάλισμα*; Ovid, *Am.*, III, 11b, 14.

<sup>28</sup> The simple innocence of 68, 143-146 shows how far he was from any feeling of guilt in this connection.

Not only is Catullus torn by two opposing, and to him anti-pathetic, emotions, and thereby subjected to unbearable tension; he seems to sense, too, that there is something fundamentally unsound in the conflict itself. Nebulously at first, but with increasing clarity, the idea arises in his mind that he ought not to continue to desire the woman for whom he has lost all sense of spiritual and intellectual sympathy. In other words, *amare* and *bene velle* belong together; the one without the other is wrong. In making this association he has set up for himself a moral ideal which has much in common with the modern, romantic ideal of love. And in continuing to desire Lesbia, as he does, he finds himself standing in open violation of his ideal.

The feeling of guilt which results from this violation of his self-conceived moral principle shows itself at first only in a sort of vague wonder: in c. 72 he is not only describing the emotional conflict which he is experiencing and trying, by describing it, to understand it; in addition, he hints that he is aware that he is allowing himself to be involved in an unhealthy situation. The question "*qui potis est?*" is half addressed to himself; it is as if he were a trifle concerned at his own feelings and were not entirely satisfied that he is doing right in feeling toward Lesbia as he does. And if, in c. 72, this inchoate sense of guilt can only be read between the lines, it becomes much clearer in c. 75, where in the face of the same basic conflict Catullus remarks that his heart "has destroyed itself in the performance of its native office": *ita se officio perdidit ipsa suo*. Its "office" is to love; in loving Lesbia it has been led by her wrong-doing to a form of loving which consists wholly of physical desire, unaccompanied by spiritual and intellectual esteem. In so doing, his heart has "destroyed itself"; the poet's concepts of right and wrong are in confusion, and he is caught up in a situation in which willy-nilly he is pursuing a course which he knows is wrong. It is this feeling of guilt, of wrong-doing, which gives the poem its tragic overtones. Catullus is not merely frustrated or stubborn;<sup>20</sup> he is afflicted by a realization that he has not been true to his own ideal. It is not only that Lesbia has not been true to him: he has not been true to himself. Yet he persists in his course; he goes on desiring her when he knows

<sup>20</sup> This is Ellis' view (*ad loc.*), which strikes me as essentially shallow.

he should not; he is now even convinced that he can never cease to desire her. This is the guilt which oppresses him and throws him into despair.

The conflict and the guilt which it occasioned are rendered somewhat clearer in *c.* 85. The phrase *odi et amo* is usually translated, "I hate and I love," and it is thereby implied that Catullus meant *odisse* to be the opposite of *amare*. But in the light of *cc.* 72 and 75 it should be clear that this is not the case: *odisse* is not the opposite of *amare*, but of *bene velle*, and the conflict of feeling here is precisely the same as that which is expressed in the *amare magis . . . bene velle minus* of *c.* 72, and the *nec bene velle queat . . . nec desistere amare* of *c.* 75. The emotion expressed by *odisse* is the final revulsion which has filled the gap, so to speak, that was left when all the poet's spiritual and intellectual affection was gone; expressed negatively, it is *bene velle desiisse*.<sup>30</sup> But *odisse* is clear in meaning as *bene velle*, and the various synonyms attempted for it, never could be. It could never be confused with physical passion: one does not "hate" a woman for her physical qualities, nor does "hatred" have a physical basis. "Hatred" is antipathy (as opposed to sympathy), ill-will (as opposed to esteem), revulsion (as opposed to affection). It is thus not the opposite of *amare*, which to Catullus expresses physical desire, but of *bene velle* and its synonyms, by which he tried to express the nature of the non-physical side of his love.<sup>31</sup> If Catullus could have found a word which would adequately express the opposite of *odisse*, he would have been able to say clearly what he tried to say by means of such inadequate terms as *bene velle*, *diligere*, *fides*, and *amicitia*.

As for the "torment" of which the distich speaks, this is not occasioned merely by the stress and strain of conflicting feelings, nor is it expressive solely of mental confusion. If it were, we should find Catullus here in no greater danger of real unhappiness than is Terence's Phaedria in the *Eunuchus*.<sup>32</sup> The very

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Hezel, *op. cit.* (see note 9), p. 55: "An die Stelle von 'non bene velle' ist 'odisse' getreten."

<sup>31</sup> Ovid has expressed the same conflict of feeling *Am.*, III, 11, 38: *aversor morum crimina, corpus amo*. This comes much closer to Catullus' meaning than do most of the other parallels cited by the editors (e.g. Kroll, Ellis).

<sup>32</sup> 70-73: *nunc ego et illam scelestam esse et me miserum sentio*:

simplicity of the distich, the sharp black and white of its emotions, are enough to prove that no such shallow interpretation may be given it. Catullus' *excrucior* is not to be ascribed to the conventional lover's despair. The distich becomes much clearer in meaning and reveals the true depth of the poet's feeling if we realize that the thing which causes his torment is his sense of guilt, his perception that the desire he feels is wrong. It is wrong because it is accompanied by hatred rather than by sympathy, esteem, and good-will. He sees that under the circumstances he ought not to desire Lesbia, yet in spite of that, he does. At the risk of over-simplification and importing into an ancient author concepts strictly modern, one might say that it is not so much his heart as his conscience which is here putting him on the rack. He is violating his self-imposed and self-conceived moral code; he knows it, yet he cannot help it. It is this which is the cause of his torment. Well might his contemporaries ask "*quare id facis?*" for they could have had no conception of his feelings. For that matter, Catullus himself does not understand why he suffers so—witness the despairing "*nescio*" which he offers in reply. He senses only that he is possessed at once by two emotions which he knows, perhaps only by a sort of cloudy intuition, ought to be mutually exclusive. The modern, backed by his tradition of romantic love, can understand Catullus better than could the poet himself, for it is now commonly accepted, at least as an ideal, that desire is right only if it is accompanied by love—using the word again in its modern sense. Unaccompanied by spiritual and intellectual sympathy, physical desire is, if not morally wrong, at least unworthy or improper. Whatever may be modern practice in this respect, the accepted moral code condemns such unrelieved animal feelings, and our ideal of love assumes the justice of this condemnation. Catullus, alone of the ancient erotic poets, has a prevision of this ideal, and c. 85 shows that he was scarcely the happier for his deviation from the norm of his times. The modern, at least, could understand the reason for his sense of wrong-doing; Catullus senses only the wrong-doing; the reason is beyond his grasp. To be conscious of doing wrong, but not to know why the wrong is wrong—this is indeed *excruciari*.

*et taedet et amore ardeo, et prudens sciens, vivos vidensque pereo, nec quid agam scio.*

The conflict of feeling and the guilt consequent upon it reach their final and much-expanded statement in *c.* 76. The poem may be divided into three parts: *vv.* 1-8 constitute an attempted definition of the poet's love in terms of actions and thoughts; *vv.* 9-16 describe the destruction of that love, the resulting torment, and the resolution of the poet to rid himself of it; *vv.* 17-26 are a prayer to the gods to assist him in that resolution. This division has no special significance, but arises naturally from the succession of Catullus' thoughts, which pass in orderly progression from one idea to the next.<sup>33</sup>

In the first eight lines, Catullus returns again to the attempt to define the nature of his love by a process of analysis, by a description of the various types of thought and action which made it up. Very prominent is the idea of *fides*, which is expressed here in much the same terms as those which appear in *cc.* 109 and 87.<sup>34</sup> To this concept, he now adds that of *pietas*, that peculiarly ancient virtue, the definition of which rather escapes any modern tongue, but which means basically the quality of doing the right thing in the right way at the right time. If these two ideas may be classed as feelings or psychological states, Catullus goes on to describe what he *did* in the name of his love. Here he limits himself to rather general terms; he speaks of *benefacta*, *quaecumque homines bene dicere aut facere possunt*, thus leaving the reader to assume that in response to his love he left no kind or thoughtful word unspoken or act unperformed.

His love, then, was characterized by *fides*, *pietas*, *bene dicere*, and *bene facere*, all of them either spiritual qualities or outgrowths of spiritual qualities. In the end, they represent only an expansion of the concept which Catullus had expressed by *bene velle* in the earlier poems, and it is obvious that he has been no more successful here than there in making clear the nature of his feelings. For while all the qualities he mentions are indubitably parts of the non-physical aspect of love, they do not completely describe it. An essential element, which might best be called spiritual and intellectual sympathy, has been omitted—for the reason, of course, that although Catullus felt this sympathy, he did not know how to put it into words. That he did

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Kroll, introd. note.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. especially 76, 3-4 and 87, 3-4; 109, 6.

indeed feel it is revealed by vs. 9: *omnia quae ingratae perierunt credita menti*: his love perished, he says, when it became clear that the heart to which it was entrusted lacked the power or will to respond to it—lacked, in other words, the very sympathy which alone could have answered and complemented his own. He offered to Lesbia loyalty, constancy, rightness and kindness of thought and deed, and sympathy, that mutual understanding of thought, emotion, and purpose which is the *sine qua non* of love. She scorned them all, either because she was incapable of understanding such a love, or because she did not find it of interest. To Catullus' love she consistently offered nothing but kisses, embraces, the *iocosa* and *incunda* of the conventional passion of the day. Even her protestations of fidelity were couched in these terms.<sup>35</sup> And when Catullus protests her defection from even this relatively trivial kind of fidelity, she tells him not to be a nuisance and a fool.<sup>36</sup> In the end, her utter lack of appreciation and understanding, demonstrated by her shameless conduct, sends the structure of his love crashing to ruin.

With the loss of his spiritual love, Catullus is left with nothing but a steadily mounting physical desire, and we have already seen the torment to which this passion subjected him, not because it was unrequited—for there is nothing in the Lesbia-poems to indicate that Lesbia was unwilling to continue to entertain Catullus as a lover, and some evidence that she was anxious to do so<sup>37</sup>—but because of his conviction that his desire was wrong. This torturing sense of wrong-doing is the fearful state from which he wishes, in c. 76, now to free himself. It should be easy, he thinks: *quare cur tu te iam amplius excrucies?* But it is not. The gods seem to be against him.<sup>38</sup> And his love has lasted a long time; one cannot simply shrug off an emotion so deeply implanted. Yet it must be done, for he can know no

<sup>35</sup> Cf. 109, 1-2; 72, 1-2.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. 68, 137: *ne nimium simus stultorum more molesti*. I feel certain that Catullus is here "quoting" from a passage-at-arms between himself and Lesbia.

<sup>37</sup> E. g. the mission of Furius and Aurelius, c. 11.

<sup>38</sup> I interpret *dis invitis* as a concessive: "even though the gods are unwilling" (i. e. to let you cease to be *miser*), in spite of Kroll's note *ad loc.* For if the gods were unwilling that he should *continue* in his misery, why should he feel it necessary, in his prayer, to ask for their mercy (vv. 17-18) and to remind them of his deserts (vv. 25-26)?

peace of mind until he is rid of the oppressing sensation of guilt which his continuing passion occasions.

The last part of the poem, the prayer to the gods, makes it clear that it is indeed from guilt, from a sense of wrong-doing, that Catullus wishes to be freed. If it were merely from the unhappiness consequent upon unrequited love, he would scarcely have described his state of mind as a disease. Unhappiness and disappointment may be bitter, but they are normal feelings, and can hardly be characterized as *pestis perniciosque, torpor, taeter morbus*, all of which suggest that Catullus is convinced of the abnormality, or in moral terms, of the wrongness of his feelings. Nor is the problem solved if we explain his suffering as arising not from disappointment but from the fact that he persists in loving when his love is unanswered. If this were so, then Lesbia's reform, and return to his arms should satisfy him. But he says emphatically that he does not want her now, not even if she could learn to love him as he had once loved her, or could learn to be "chaste" (*pudica*), i. e. could show toward him the loyalty and constancy that he had shown toward her. The poem becomes clear in meaning only if we understand that it is not from love itself that Catullus wishes release, but from the sense of wrong, of guilt, of unworthiness that has arisen from the persistence of his physical passion after his spiritual and intellectual affection has been destroyed. As his thought progresses, he thinks with ever-increasing loathing of the moral wrong of which he finds himself guilty. Starting as *pestis perniciosque* it is next *torpor*, and finally ends as *taeter morbus*, "foul disease," a phrase which can describe only a hideously ugly state of mind. Neither disappointment nor persistence in unrequited love could well be so described; the phrase is apt only if it denotes a sense of wrong, of obliquity, and of shame. Catullus' feeling here shows his conviction that love, to be good and right, must be composed of two mutually necessary parts, desire on the one hand and spiritual sympathy on the other. He does not say what spiritual sympathy alone might be; such a "Platonic" relationship between man and woman would have been quite beyond his comprehension. But he is clear that physical desire alone is not merely empty and meaningless, but—if I may venture to use the anachronistic term—sinful.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> A word of caution is needed here, lest I be accused of making a



It is this concept of love as a dual entity made up of aspects one of which is not only incomplete but wrong without the other, that sets Catullus' love for Lesbia apart from the ordinary ancient love-affair and gives it a character approaching more nearly to that of the romantic tradition of later times. Only in the light of this concept do the poems of conflict—cc. 109, 87, 72, 75, and 76—become clear in meaning; without it they remain either a puzzle or fall into the class of poetry represented by such poems as Ovid, *Amores*, III, 11 b and 14, pieces the frivolity of which is utterly out of harmony with the passionate sincerity of Catullus. That Catullus himself did not clearly understand the nature of his own feelings, and that, for all his struggle for expression, he never succeeded in formulating them in unequivocal terms, is due to the fact that his concept of love was not only new to him, but was equally new to the world in which he lived and to the language which he spoke. Many centuries before the advent of the poets of romantic love, Catullus foreshadowed the ideal to which they, and the Western European world after them, at least in theory subscribed.

FRANK OLIN COPLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

Puritan of Catullus. I do not mean to imply that he felt this same guilt in his—doubtless countless—casual relations with *meretrices* or other women of easy virtue. It is only when he has *loved* that he can feel as he does here, and he would have been the last to characterize as "love" the fly-by-night joys of the *lupanar* or the *convivium*.

## PARMENIDES AND THE WORLD OF SEEMING.

The great fame of Parmenides is that of the founder of logic and metaphysics. Yet though he wished to draw a picture of reality according to the laws of thought alone, his true subject was the whole which includes both thought and action. If philosophy is the expression of one's intellectual reaction to the total environment, every significant part of that environment must to some extent always contribute to the content and formulation of thought. Thus there may be some importance in considering the attitude of Parmenides to the world about him—that which he believed to be a realm of Seeming or Opinion, but which the philosophically naive mind calls the "real world." The following discussion deals not only with his philosophical analysis of this realm, but also with his political beliefs. It will show, I think, that he was actively interested in practical matters, and will also give some indication of the direction of his sympathies, in line with the aristocratic tradition.<sup>1</sup>

Parmenides' philosophy may be regarded, from one point of view, as arising from his contemplation of the difficulties and errors of his predecessors, and of the uncritical attitude of people generally in their everyday judgments. Earlier thinkers had begun with perception and built up their theories with arguments based on the observation of phenomena. Parmenides also took his departure from the immediate situation, the presently existing complex of observable fact; his attention was focused, however, not on the structure of the world but on the fact that it can be apprehended as a unity, that what really exists is not any combination of air or water or other parts, but the whole itself.

<sup>1</sup> This paper was completed before the appearance of Gregory Vlastos' study of "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," *C. P.*, XLII (1947), pp. 156-178, in which he interprets Parmenides' philosophy as a link in the democratic tradition. It will be seen that I have approached the subject from a different point of view, and have reached opposite conclusions. I believe that Vlastos' arguments are essentially correct except in the case of Parmenides, where there is considerable difficulty in establishing equality as a centrally important principle. Greater attention would seem to be due to other forms of equality and other interpretations of justice, whose existence Vlastos has seen clearly in the case of Plato and Aristotle (pp. 175 ff.).

Expressing this recognition in its simplest conceptual terms, he said that *it is*; and in working out the implications of that apparently obvious statement, he soon reached a point beyond which he saw that analysis could not proceed, for the fact of Being excludes Not-being. Being is everywhere equal and continuous and both spatial and temporal change are impossible.

Thus the apprehension of the world's unity led directly to his radical and distinctive denial of all change. Others had felt the discrepancy between the One Being and the many of ordinary experience. Heraclitus bridged the gap by seeing unity in multiplicity, and affirming the reality and even the omnipresence of change—not a chaotic change, for though “war is the father of all and the king of all,” yet the *logos* is common, and “what is at variance agrees with itself”; and for Anaximander, too, Necessity and Justice are present as regulators in the constant process of becoming and passing away. Parmenides was not satisfied with this sort of solution, and insisted upon an answer which abolished all change whatever; that this was the aspect of his system which pleased him in contrast with the beliefs of others he shows when he says,

wherefore all this must be merely a name, whatever mortals have affirmed in confidence that it was true—becoming and perishing, being and not being, and change of place and alternation of bright color (fr. 8, 38-41).<sup>2</sup>

The same emphasis is present in his positive description of Being (fr. 8, 42-49). It is complete, homogeneous, and inviolable.

Parmenides was keenly conscious of the novelty of his approach, of the method of investigation by which he attained his peculiar results. The figure of the journey and the way, which appears in the prologue, is prominent throughout the poem. He is guided on the true way by divine forces. Other, mistaken philosophies arise from wrong assumptions and a wrong start. Parmenides distinguishes three ways of investigation. The first, based on the principle that *it is*, and that it is impossible for it not to be

<sup>2</sup> All references to Parmenides' fragments and to the doxographical reports are to Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5th ed. (Berlin, 1934-37). Recent studies have made it possible to pass over many points of interpretation without detailed discussion. Especially valuable are the works of Reinhardt, Fränkel, Verdenius, F. M. Cornford's "Parmenides' Two Ways," *C. Q.*, XXVII (1933), pp. 97-111, and O. Gigon, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie* (Basel, 1945).

(fr. 2, 3), is the true way of the earlier fragments (through 8, 49), leading to the unshaken heart of well-rounded Truth (fr. 1, 29). The second way, that "it is not, and must needs not be" (fr. 2, 5 f.), is "utterly undiscernible" (*παναπειθέα*); it cannot lead anywhere, and cannot form a basis for inquiry. There is nothing to be said about it except that it is impossible.

The third way, however, is at least one which can be followed. Philosophically it is the way of those who cannot decide between the first two ways, "who have decided that to be and not to be are the same and not the same, and all things have a back-turning road" (fr. 6, 8-9). Apparently this means that in order to explain the fact of change they think of things as becoming one thing from another, coming into existence as being and not being at the same time. The *παλίντροπος κέλευθος* of line 9 certainly suggests the "road up and down" of the Ionian philosophers,<sup>3</sup> but he has in mind not only philosophers, but all men in so far as they are restricted to mortals' ways of knowing:

But I hold thee back also from this way whereupon mortals wander, knowing nothing, two-headed; for perplexity guides the wandering thought in their breasts, and they are borne along both deaf and blind, wondering, undiscerning hordes (fr. 6, 4-7).

Parmenides here shows a certain contempt mixed with pity for those who follow this path. The phrase *εἰδότες οὐδέν*, "knowing nothing," is reminiscent of the language of mystery religion,<sup>4</sup> and clearly sets them apart from the fortunate initiates of whom he is one (and so far as we learn from the poem, the only one). In addition, Parmenides is clearly and emphatically convinced that this is in no sense a true way. Its results are "opinions of mortals," "the deceptive order of my words"; they are "all plausible" (fr. 1, 30; 8, 51 f., 60).

And yet this third way is that which Parmenides himself followed in the second part of his poem, in which he condescended for a time to share the common error and developed a cosmo-

<sup>3</sup> Heraclitus, fr. 60: *οὐδὲς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὁυρή*. Cf. also 49a, 51. See Kranz, *Vors.*, I, p. 233, 2 ff., note. Verdenius' denial of an influence of Heraclitus upon Parmenides (W. J. Verdenius, *Parmenides: Some Comments on His Poem* [Groningen, 1942], pp. 77 f.), like most others, depends too much upon hair-splitting distinctions to be convincing.

<sup>4</sup> See the passages cited by Cornford, *loc. cit.*, p. 100, n. 2; C. M. Bowra, "The Proem of Parmenides," *C.Q.*, XXXII (1937), p. 109.

logical system differing in details but not in its general principles from those of his predecessors. Why did he not remain satisfied with his uncompromisingly logical view of the nature of Being? The relation between the Way of Truth and the Way of Opinion has often been discussed, and many different answers have been suggested in ancient and modern times. We shall later return to some aspects of this problem; the answer seems to depend largely on our understanding of his whole attitude toward the realm of Opinion and Seeming. And here we cannot remain in the domain of metaphysical speculation or reasoning, because this world is in fact nothing more than the "actual" world of our everyday experience. The maze of changing and shifting phenomena is what Parmenides himself, as a man, must not only take as a starting-point in philosophical analysis, but must contend with in practical life. Hence we might expect to find even in what we know of his biography some indications of his attitude to the World of Seeming.

In the scanty tradition about Parmenides' life, only one or two items have importance in this connection. In the first place, he "made laws for his fellow citizens" in Elea;<sup>5</sup> "he regulated his native city with excellent laws, so that the magistrates exacted an oath from the citizens each year to abide by the laws of Parmenides."<sup>6</sup> Here is revealed to us a Parmenides not only interested in the world about him but deeply enough concerned to take an active part in politics. It is unfortunate that we cannot discover more about this activity. None of the details of his legislation have been preserved, and Plutarch's statement that it was "excellent" is not a very useful clue. One might suppose that Parmenides was a more or less impartial arbitrator, like Solon, called upon to mediate in a political crisis precisely because of his lofty unconcern with practical affairs; but the adventures of his follower Zeno make this seem unlikely, as well as the general trend of political events in southern Italy at this period. Though little is known of the history of Elea in the years following its foundation in 540 B. C., it apparently had some commercial importance, enjoying close relations with Rhegium and Massilia; and the emergence of commercial interests

<sup>5</sup> Spensippus *apud* Diogenes Laertius, IX, 23 (28 A 1); cf. Strabo, VI, 1, p. 252 (28 A 12).

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 32, 1226a (28 A 12).

suggests a parallel with other cities of southern Italy, like Croton and Sybaris. Here the development of commerce led to the emergence of mercantile and artisan groups who allied themselves with small farmers in a struggle for political expression against the land-holding aristocrats. If this was true in Elea we might expect to find Parmenides on the side of the aristocratic class to which he belonged by birth.<sup>7</sup>

Zeno was also a citizen of Elea, according to our sources a man "very noble both in philosophy and in the state."<sup>8</sup> He entered a conspiracy against a tyrant named Nearchus, was apprehended, and after having shown great courage under torture, was put to death.<sup>9</sup> The tyrants of southern Italy at this time were leaders of opposition against the landed aristocracy, so that Zeno's position in this struggle is clear. It is interesting to note also that Melissus, the other prominent pupil of Parmenides, was a leader of the anti-Athenian party in Samos and fought a naval battle against Pericles in 441 B. C.<sup>10</sup>

The second important biographical item has to do with Parmenides' relation to Pythagoreanism. "He also associated with Ameinias the Pythagorean, the son of Diochaetes, as Sotion says, a man who was poor but a gentleman. He followed him devotedly and after his death built a shrine for him, being of a famous and rich family; and he was turned to the life of peace by Ameinias, not by Xenophanes."<sup>11</sup> This report in itself does not state that he was a member of the Pythagorean Society, but that is affirmed

<sup>7</sup> γένους . . . ὑπάρχων λαμπροῦ καὶ πλούτου, Diogenes Laertius, IX, 21 (28 A 1). On the history of Elea, see especially E. Ciaceri, *Storia della Magna Grecia* (Milan, 1928), pp. 285 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Diogenes Laertius, IX, 26.

<sup>9</sup> Vors.<sup>2</sup>, 29 A 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9. Timaeus is probably the source of Diodorus' account (Burnet, *E. G. P.*<sup>4</sup>, p. 311, n. 5). Though the details of the story vary in different accounts, its general accuracy cannot be questioned.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch, *Per.*, 26.

<sup>11</sup> Diogenes Laertius, IX, 21 (28 A 1). This would rest on the authority of Parmenides himself if Diels is right in his conjecture that the report is based on his dedicatory epitaph written for the ἡρώων. That there is some degree of philosophical relationship between Parmenides and Xenophanes would not disprove the former's allegiance to Pythagoreanism. And Reinhardt may be right in his contention that Parmenides influenced Xenophanes rather than the reverse (K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* [Bonn, 1916]).

in other passages.<sup>12</sup> His philosophical views mark him as in some degree heterodox, but it is significant that he is never characterized as an apostate, like Hippasus. One author even speaks of the establishment of a "Pythagorean and Parmenidean way of life."<sup>13</sup>

The Pythagorean Society was deeply involved in politics, and maintained some degree of political control in the affairs of Croton and other cities of southern Italy from the last years of the sixth century through much of the first half of the fifth, perhaps pushing for a time as far north as Elea. It may be at this time of strong Pythagorean influence or dominance that Parmenides' legislative work was done. The most reasonable chronological estimate would place the active years of his life precisely in those decades of the early fifth century when the Pythagoreans were strongest.

The Pythagoreans built up a political theory of "keeping one's place" and of the natural fitness of a certain few to rule. They "approved submissiveness to rulers and obedience to teachers,"<sup>14</sup> and said that "rulers should be not only wise but lovers of men, while the ruled should be not only obedient but lovers of their rulers."<sup>15</sup> Their political philosophy is closely allied to ethics and supported by metaphysics; Archytas says that government is in accordance with nature "when it imitates the justice of nature; this is proportional justice, which comes to each man according to each man's worth."<sup>16</sup> In the Pythagorean system political theory, which grows directly out of political action, is closely correlated with philosophical speculation. Harmony, order, and hierarchy, which are the dominant principles of the one, pass directly into the other; Limit regulates the Unlimited just as magistrates dominate their fellow-citizens, and even the proportions of mathematics are parallel to the harmonies of society.

Does Parmenides follow his Pythagorean mentors in this

<sup>12</sup> 28 A 4, 12; 58 A. For documentation of statements on the Pythagoreans, see my *Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory* (Baltimore, 1942: Connecticut College Monograph No. 2).

<sup>13</sup> Cebes, *Tab.* 2.

<sup>14</sup> Iamblichus, *V. P.*, 183.

<sup>15</sup> Aristoxenus, fr. 18, *Vors.*<sup>2</sup>, 58 D 4.

<sup>16</sup> Fr. 2c, A. Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne* (Liège, 1922), p. 86.

general parallelism between political action, political theory, and metaphysical speculation? In the fragments of this poem are no pronouncements on political, or even ethical, matters, but his language shows certain indications of such thoughts. Throughout the exposition of the nature of Being he repeatedly emphasizes its limitedness, and the severity of the control to which it is subject. Most important, the strenuous opposition to change, or rather the denial of change, which we saw in the first part of his poem, is indicative of his attitude to the problems of society. In any but a perfect state the view that change is undesirable or impossible is bound to be a conservative view. Parmenides, as a member of the aristocracy, would have felt keenly the desirability of maintaining its traditional values and prerogatives. Throughout this period men of his class were reacting in a hostile way to new ideas and trends of thought which emphasized the mutability of objects and events. In Anaximander and Heraclitus philosophical ideas took on the very language of social relationships, with the former expressing the relations of phenomena in terms of justice and injustice and the latter affirming that war is the father of all things, that a king may become a slave or a slave a king, and so on. Parmenides keeps his argument strictly in the realm of abstraction, but he cannot have been completely indifferent to its broader implications.

Let us return now to the second part of the poem, in which, as we saw, the philosopher consciously follows a path of error. The important passage is at the end of the eighth fragment:

Here I put an end to the trustworthy reasoning and thought concerning the truth. Henceforward learn what seems to mortals, hearkening to the deceitful order of my words. For mortals have made up their minds to name two forms, of which it is not right to name one—that is where they have gone astray—and have distinguished them as opposite in fashion and assigned to them marks apart from one another: here the flaming Fire of heaven, gentle, very light, in every direction the same with itself, but not the same as the other; and also that other, its very opposite, blind Night, as to form dense and heavy. This disposition of things, all plausible, I tell thee; for so no mortal judgment shall ever outstrip thee (fr. 8, 50-61, tr. Cornford).

Our initial problem is why Parmenides saw fit to include such an account in his poem. Is he presenting the opinions of actual mortals, either the general view of the common man or the



opinions of a rival philosophical school, or is this a sketch of previous philosophical views for the use of his pupils, or a youthful view of his own, now rejected, or perhaps a tentative hypothesis? All these views have been suggested, and all must be rejected.<sup>17</sup> Surely the common man does not think in this way, and the cosmology of the later fragments does not correspond closely enough with that of his predecessors to allow the view that he is here presenting, in refutation, the theories of the Pythagoreans, or Heraclitus, or some other group. This view is open to the fatal objection, also, that there is "no trace of any controversial, critical, or ironical flavour."<sup>18</sup> The second part is thus not refutation nor parody nor a straw man to be demolished, nor the *reductio ad absurdum* of a set of philosophical principles. Nor is it to be regarded as "partly true"; such a concept of truth would be impossible for Parmenides.

The judgment of most ancient critics was that this part represented opinions of Parmenides himself. Aristotle says,

Being forced to follow the observed facts, and supposing the existence which is one in definition but more than one according to our sensation, he now posits two causes and two principles, calling them hot and cold.<sup>19</sup>

Aristotle certainly made errors in his interpretation of the relation between the two cosmologies, and especially in equating Being with Fire ("hot") and Not-being with Night ("cold," "earth"). Nevertheless, the straightforward, serious manner of the exposition certainly leads to the belief that he is right in supposing the theory to be in substance Parmenides' own. Verdenius emphasizes this tone:

No one can read this part of Parmenides' work with unbiased mind without being struck by its sincere and apodeictical tone, which shows beyond doubt that the substance of this doctrine emanates from the writer's own conviction.<sup>20</sup>

If the theories expressed are not the historical opinions of any

<sup>17</sup> Verdenius, *op. cit.*, pp. 45 ff., gives a useful brief summary of the controversy. Cf. Zeller-Nestle, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I<sup>7</sup>, pp. 723 ff.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Met.* A 986 b 31, tr. Ross.

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

group, the phrase "opinions of mortals" must indicate that he is giving the best possible account of the world of sense-perception and seeming, based on the false but necessary premises on which mortals must rely. But this analysis is not set forth in such a way as to emphasize their falsity; i. e., we cannot regard that as a fundamental purpose of his exposition. Fränkel says it "lays bare the fallacy responsible for the quasi-existence of the deceptive system,"<sup>21</sup> but this is really done in the first part of the poem rather than in the Way of Seeming.

The World of Seeming is not, ontologically, another world, but only another, mistaken, way of regarding the world. The situation is difficult and paradoxical. One realizes that only Being is, that it can only have negative qualities, that it is like a solid immovable sphere; and yet one somehow apprehends a great diversity of things and a complex world of becoming and change. This can only be through an error, through assuming something else to exist alongside of Being, and that in turn can only be Not-being; but it is impossible to disregard this world of Seeming, because in it our whole practical life takes place. Only by assuming its truth can we find answers to the problems and questions of everyday life; so that in the end it is necessary to learn about it.<sup>22</sup> And in fact an important aspect of the Way of Seeming is its excellence. The order of the goddess' words is deceitful (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλόν, 8, 52), but the poet is to hearken to them (μάνθανε . . . ἀκούων); and a little further on:

τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἑοικότα πάντα φατίξω,

ὥς οὐ μὴ ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσῃ (8, 60-61). . .

<sup>21</sup> C. P., XLI (1946), p. 170; cf. Fränkel's "Parmenidesstudien," *Gött. Nachr.*, phil.-hist. Kl., 1930, pp. 174 f. The words quoted in the text do in a measure describe an *effect* of the Way of Seeming, but can scarcely describe its whole *purpose*. As Fränkel says, the system is logically consistent once the initial postulate is accepted; and the sincere manner would comport very strangely with a *reductio ad absurdum*. Reinhardt characterized the second part as a story of mortal errors, as neither eristic nor hypothesis, but the proof that error has its cause, and the explanation how it came to be (*Parmenides*, pp. 9 f.). "Sie (the goddess) bringt Wahrheit über den Wahn, sie zeigt, wie er entstanden ist und weshalb er entstehen musste" (p. 25). This again supposes that the second part is *about* error, i. e. essentially a logical explanation, rather than a cosmology. Both of these views disregard the practical value which the system can have and which is indicated in fr. 8, 61. See below.

<sup>22</sup> χρῆν δὲ σε πάντα πυνέσθαι, fr. 1, 28-30.

"So no mortal judgment shall ever outstrip thee"; this clearly means that the account to follow is better than any other possible account of the world, once Not-being is admitted.<sup>23</sup> It is in fact a "second-best" philosophy. The truly best is recognized to be unattainable or impracticable and the second-best gives a provisional solution which will be practically valuable. The Way of Seeming is in a sense a compromise offered to counteract the harmful views of other thinkers, and of people in general. Other systems contained dangerous invitations to regard change as fundamental and desirable, ideas which could be answered logically by the Way of Truth, but which were too close to the everyday experience and assumptions of men to be combatted by that severe document. They must be met and defeated on their own terms.

The inclusion of this part thus provides an important clue to the purpose and meaning of Parmenides' poem as a whole. Professor Jaeger interprets Parmenides' work as an enthusiastic exposition of his new philosophical method and the power of reason. "Our salvation depends on our abandoning the world of opinion for the world of truth."<sup>24</sup> But if this is true, why does Parmenides not abandon the world of opinion entirely? It may be true that "every line he wrote pulsates with his ardent faith in the newly discovered powers of pure reason,"<sup>25</sup> but in spite of the high tone of certainty in the poem, it is evident that Parmenides was baffled by the very difficult, or insoluble, problem of reconciling the world in which he *believed* and the world in which he must perforce *live*. If salvation comes with the conversion to the Way of Truth, it must have been very plain to the poet that very few would be able to attain it. This insight is too austere, too paradoxical to convince the mass of men. They may attain, if not salvation, at least a better or more desirable way of life by following Parmenides' guidance on the Way of Seeming.

We may now consider briefly one or two details of the Parmenidean cosmology, without attempting an exposition of the whole system. Line 3, 54 (τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεὼν εἶσται—ἐν. φ)

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Verdenius, *op. cit.*, p. 48. I say nothing here of fr. 1, 31-32, which has not been satisfactorily explained even in the excellent discussion of Verdenius, pp. 49 ff.

<sup>24</sup> W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I (tr. G. Highet, Oxford, 1939), p. 176.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν) has been quoted above in Cornford's ambiguous translation, "of which it is not right to name one—that is where they have gone astray," which itself needs to be explained. It can mean "of which one should not be named, but the other may," or "of which not one, i.e. neither, may be named," or "of which one (they say) may not be named without the other." The first would imply that Parmenides rejected one of the two principles (Night), and is favored by those who believe that there is a close parallel between Being and Not-being in the first part and Fire and Night in the second, respectively. But if this part is in some way true or valid, we cannot suppose that one of its fundamental principles is rejected at the outset; Parmenides elsewhere emphasizes their equality (9, 4, ἴσων ἀμφοτέρων). The second is preferred by Cornford himself, who says that "mortals, though they have rightly named Being, have been wrong in going further and naming in addition *two* forms when not *one* should have been named."<sup>26</sup> But mortals have not named Being; that was done by the goddess; and to take *μίαν* οὐ as equivalent to οὐδεμίαν involves some strain. The third interpretation is that of Verdenius, making τῶν *μίαν* οὐ *χρεών* ἐστίν part of the view of mortals, and referring ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν to the whole of lines 53-54.<sup>27</sup> This may be right, though it does not seem a natural reading of the Greek. One expects an infinitive rather than ἐστίν and it is hard to avoid thinking of the ἐν ᾧ clause as referring to what just precedes. It seems that Parmenides is here emphasizing the arbitrary character of this judgment of men, and perhaps the deliberateness of their decision in this crucial matter in which they have gone astray. The point is not (yet) the nature of the two forms, but the fact that there are two where there should be only one principle, Being, which is really not a form at all. He is saying not that one of the pair should be excluded because of its nature, but that the fundamental error in all men's thought is precisely in introducing a pair of forms at all. It is perhaps hard to suppose that the parallelism between Being and Fire and between Not-being and Night did not occur to Parmenides at all, but the relationships are different in the two pairs. Fire is correlative to Being only in so far as it has some sort of priority or superiority to

<sup>26</sup> F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (New York, 1939), p. 46.

<sup>27</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 62.

Night, which exists in precisely the same way as Fire. Not-being, on the other hand, has no existence at all.

The dualism of Parmenides' cosmology is not new; a conflict of opposites was inherent in the Ionian philosophy, especially in Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, and language similar to Parmenides' was used of the Pythagoreans.<sup>28</sup> But one interesting feature of Parmenides' dualism is that he emphasizes the separateness of the opposing elements.<sup>29</sup> The active principle which governs the relations of this pair is not qualitative change. Light and Night are not the end-terms of a constant process of alteration like the condensation and rarefaction which Anaximenes invented. Rather they interact and combine to form concrete things through mixture. In the doxographical accounts of his cosmology the concept of mixture is prominent (28 A 37). As Gigon shows,<sup>30</sup> Parmenides adopts the principle of mixture in his development of the "second-best cosmology" in order to avoid that of qualitative change. Qualitative change carries the implication that "anything can change to anything," and in the social realm that of mobility among the various classes. A commoner may become king and vice-versa. But in a mixture, each element retains its individual quality and worth, and the ideal is a "good" mixture or an "orderly" one.

Fire and Night are equal and the whole is full of both alike (fr. 9, 3-4). It seems that in some way the former is superior, but the evidence on this point is not decisive. An indication is contained in the general parallelism between Being and Light, but as we have seen, its extent is doubtful.<sup>31</sup> But in the process of knowing, for example, knowledge is governed by the predominance of one element over another. "That of which there is

<sup>28</sup> Alexander Polyhistor *apud* Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 26: *ισόμοιρά τ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φῶς καὶ σκότος καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν.*

<sup>29</sup> Fr. 8, 55 ff.: *δύο, τάντ' αἰ, ἐκρίναντο, χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν . . . ἐωυτῷ παντὶ ὅσῃ τωτόν, τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ μὴ τωτόν· ἀτὰρ κάκεινο κατ' αὐτὸ τάντ' αἰ, all these expressions within five lines; 9, 2: τὰ κατὰ σφετέρως δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖσι τε καὶ τοῖς.*

<sup>30</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 263 f.; 273 f.; cf. p. 104: "Anaximenes gibt als erster die konkrete Anschauung des endlosen Wandels der sichtbaren Dinge und wird darum in einem entscheidendem Punkt der Hauptgegner des Parmenides."

<sup>31</sup> Certain doxographical reports are apparently formulated with reference to Aristotle's theory of causality: 28 A 23, 35.

more is thought.”<sup>32</sup> Each of the opposites perceives its like, but Night taken alone gives the “vision” proper to a corpse; memory is the province of Light, forgetfulness of Night. And when he says that old age comes about through deficiency of Light,<sup>33</sup> the poet shows that for him that which is positive and vigorous generally depends on that element, whereas the other is negative. So that like the harmony of the Pythagoreans, the *κράσις* of Parmenides means the dominance of one force or element over another.

Nor is this dominance merely fortuitous and fluctuating. Throughout the Way of Being are indications of strict control, and in the Way of Seeming, too, there is a supervising divinity: For the narrower (circles) are filled with fire, the ones next to those with night, and nearby strains the realm of flame. But in the midst of these is the goddess, who rules all things (fr. 12, 1-3).

In fragment 10 the promise of knowledge to come culminates in the forceful action of *Ananke*:

Thou shalt know too the *embracing* Heaven, whence it was born, and how *Necessity* drove and *fettered* it to *hold* the *limits* of the stars (tr. Cornford).

Though it seems an exaggeration to regard the World of Seeming as merely a copy, as Gigon does, it reflects many of the characteristics of the World of Being. This is true of details—as the World of Being is “like a well-rounded Sphere,” so Parmenides is said to have called the earth spherical (28 A 44)—but even more of the general principles of stability, orderliness, and strict control.

Parmenides’ interest in the “real world” is shown even in the literary form which he gives to his doctrine. Poetry was the proper medium for an inspired message, and it was also the medium in which the greatest educative works of the Greek people had been composed. Though prose had been used, for informative works and for philosophical exposition, and though it might have been better suited to the intricate logical exposition of his ideas, Parmenides chose verse in order to carry conviction to as wide an audience as possible.

<sup>32</sup> Fr. 16; cf. 28 A 46.

<sup>33</sup> 28 A 46. The text has “warmth” (τοῦ θερμοῦ), but that is from Aristotle’s misinterpretation.

Parmenides is very sure and very articulate about the accuracy of his argument. He is not writing an essay or discussion, or presenting a hypothesis, but laying down the eternal truth. The poem abounds in dogmatic and positive statements; it aims at "valid arguments, cogent conclusions, and complete evidence."<sup>34</sup> And beyond the confidence of logical cogency there is also a messianic element. He presents himself in the prologue as an initiate, a "man who knows" (*εἰδότες ὧντα*, fr. 1, 3), and he has both the certainty and the exclusiveness of the mystics. As Professor Jaeger has pointed out,

Philosophy was consciously taking the place of religion. It has been said that for Parmenides both God and emotion are meaningless compared with the rigorous laws of thought; but the obverse of this fact is that Parmenides considers thought and the truth which it apprehends to be something very like religion. It was the consciousness of his high mission which led him, in the prelude to his poem, to draw the first real picture of a philosopher—the 'man who knows,' led by the daughters of light, far from the paths of men, along the hard road to the house of truth.<sup>35</sup>

Religion was for Parmenides, then, an expression of his concern with persuasion; his eagerness to convert led him to seek divine sanction for his exposition.

In its strictness Parmenides' religious attitude confirms the previous analysis of his character. He does not speak of his One Being as a god, as had Xenophanes. Here he makes a clear break from earlier systems;<sup>36</sup>—a necessary break, for if he was to deny motion he must also deny life. If his One is not a god, however, still he frequently uses divine names, even outside the poetic and imaginative framework of the prologue. And it seems very suggestive that these divinities are everywhere restrictive forces, usually with a moral function and connotation. We hear of "avenging Justice" who holds the keys of the gates between Night and Day (fr. 1, 14), who "with her fetters does not let it loose or suffer it (*sc.* Being) either to come into being or to perish, but holds it fast" (fr. 8, 14 f.), of "overmastering Necessity" who "holds it in the bonds of the limit that fences it about" (fr. 8, 30 f.). We learn that "Destiny has fettered it

<sup>34</sup> Verdenius, pp. 3 f.

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 177.

<sup>36</sup> Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

so as to be whole and immovable" (fr. 8, 37), that "Necessity fettered (the Heaven) to hold the limits of the stars" (fr. 10, 4), and that there is a "Divinity who governs all things" who "sends souls now from the visible into the invisible and now back again."<sup>37</sup> Even the kindly goddess who tells the poet the secret of all things is at the same time stern and dogmatic. Thus apparently Parmenides' conception of divinity is one of a super-eminent power whose function is primarily to hold nature and man within bounds.

In summary, the legislative activity of Parmenides and his association with the politically-minded Pythagoreans show him to be capable of taking interest in practical affairs. The very fact of his writing a didactic poem, the rhetorical warmth of its style, the elaboration of the second part as a socially valuable doctrine, all show that his philosophy is not alien to this interest. And the appropriateness of his intellectual position to his position in life and the correlation of his views with those of other thinkers, opposing and agreeing, which are sometimes expressed in social terms, make it seem not unlikely that he was influenced in their formation by his reaction to the problems of the "world of seeming."

In so far as he had an immediate aim of conviction and conversion, it is questionable how successful he can have been in it. Certainly he attracted a number of brilliant and devoted disciples, but it was naive to expect many to follow the severe, logical development of his thoughts, and a type of theory which almost everyone must regard as absurd—or to expect many to be influenced strongly by a system frankly presented as truly false and only second-best. Yet his greatness, as was said at the outset, is as a thinker, not as a statesman, and his important influence was not upon his contemporaries but upon later philosophers.

EDWIN L. MINAR, JR.

CONNECTICUT COLLEGE.

<sup>37</sup> Simplicius, *Vors.*<sup>5</sup>, 28 B 13.



## THE WORD ΕΠΕΙΣΟΔΙΟΝ IN ARISTOTLE'S *POETICS*.

### I

It is evident that in *Poetics* 12, 52b16 Aristotle uses the word *ἐπεισόδιον* in a special sense to indicate the part of a tragedy between two choral songs—an act, as it were. But otherwise the word is treated by Liddell and Scott as referring primarily to interpolation or digression.<sup>1</sup> It has come into the modern languages in this sense, though with some qualification. For example in Italian, Palazzi<sup>2</sup> in defining it uses the words “accessoria,” “digressione,” though he warns against using it erroneously to mean “fatto, avvenimento ch  abbia del curioso, particolare di un avvenimento, avventura, vicenda, caso e sim.” The *Oxford English Dictionary* stresses the idea of interpolation or digression. So in the *Poetics* the word is supposed to be used sometimes for a section of a tragedy, sometimes for actions interpolated in or accessory to the main action.<sup>3</sup> Translators have generally, though not universally, transliterated rather than translated the word into the language of their renderings, often leaving the reader to decide for himself between the two meanings. Moreover, the translator himself seems often to have been influenced by the usual sense of the word in both Greek and the modern languages, even to the extent of reading it into the Greek without evident consideration of the less usual meaning, or of any other possible meaning. Gudeman, however, calls attention to another possibility, saying that

<sup>1</sup> Such a meaning is sometimes proper when the word is applied to poetry. For example, when Longinus (9, 12) speaks of bits of the *Iliad* used as *ἐπεισόδια* in the *Odyssey*, he seems to have in mind at any rate slight and subordinate parts. See also Suidas, *Lexicon*, 2143, 2144.

<sup>2</sup> Fernando Palazzi, *Novissimo Dizionario della Lingua Italiana* (Milano, 1939).

<sup>3</sup> Modern writers sometimes add to the confusion by shifting without realizing it from one to the other; for example: “If the author does not aim at dramatic unity, if he is satisfied merely to string together episodes which have no necessary logical or developmental relation to one another, until his romance attains the desired length . . . Longus does not eschew the episode, . . . But his episodes, while appearing to interrupt the flow of the story . . .” (F. A. Todd, *Some Ancient Novels* [London, 1940], pp. 57-8).

Im Sinne von "Akt" ist der Ausdruck zuerst bei Aristoteles nachweisbar und zwar nur in der Poetik. So noch 4.49a28. Die Bezeichnung hat aber, vermutlich wegen ihrer Doppelbedeutung (s. Anm. zu 9.51b33), keinen Anklang gefunden und scheint frühzeitig, wohl schon von den Alexandrinern, durch *μόριον* oder durch das noch häufigere *μέρος* ersetzt worden zu sein.<sup>4</sup>

Rostagni points out that the many *parts* (πολλὰ μέρη) mentioned in Chapter 24 "sono in realtà gli *episodi*."<sup>5</sup> It seems, then, that the meaning of the word *ἐπεισόδιον* throughout the *Poetics* should be examined.

## II

### INDIVIDUAL PASSAGES IN THE *POETICS*

4.49a28. This is normally accepted as referring to the sections between choruses. Fyfe translates as "acts,"<sup>6</sup> Gudeman and Susemihl as "Akte,"<sup>7</sup> and Valgimigli accepts that meaning.<sup>8</sup>

9.51b33-5. Gudeman makes the episodes here "Einschaltungen," and Rostagni says that the word is not used in the technical sense of Chapter 12. Butcher, on the contrary, translates: "I call a plot 'eepisodic' in which the episodes or acts succeed one another without probable or necessary sequence."<sup>9</sup> Valgimigli translates with *episodi*, but gives the following note: "La parola dunque non importa alcun significato di discontinuità qual'è nell'aggettivo *ἐπεισοδιώδης*. Ma non per questo occorre intenderla in altro senso dal normale e tanto meno mutarla."<sup>10</sup> Most other translators merely transliterate, leaving their meaning uncertain. The "eepisodic" plot seems, then, to be a poor type of simple plot in which there is neither probability nor necessity as to τὰ ἐπεισόδια μετ' ἄλλα,<sup>11</sup> or as Albergiani

<sup>4</sup> Alfred Gudeman, *Aristoteles ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ mit Einleitung, Text und Adnotatio Critica* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1934), p. 233.

<sup>5</sup> Augusto Rostagni, *La Poetica di Aristotele* (Torino, 1945), p. 147.

<sup>6</sup> W. Hamilton Fyfe, *Aristotle: the Poetics* (London-New York, 1927), p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> Franz Susemihl, *Aristoteles über die Dichtkunst* (Leipzig, 1865), p. 83; Gudeman, p. 233.

<sup>8</sup> Manara Valgimigli, *Poetica: Introduzione Traduzione Commento* (Bari, 1934), p. 95.

<sup>9</sup> S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* (London, 1895), p. 35.

<sup>10</sup> Valgimigli, p. 86.

<sup>11</sup> The use of the adjective *ἐπεισοδιώδης* is illustrated by *Metaphysics*,

renders it, "Il rapporto fra un episodio e l'altro non è nè necessario nè verosimile."<sup>12</sup> Any such desirable relation can hardly be between intercalated parts but must be between those that make up the main body of the play. There is a parallel in the *Metaphysics*:

οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὕσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγωδία (XIV, 3, 1090b19).

The "episodes" of nature are apparently to be considered as fundamental parts, not as accessory and unnecessary. If Aristotle's illustration from tragedy is valid throughout, the episodes of the bad tragedy are essential portions—usually "acts"—, not interpolations or digressions.<sup>13</sup> It would seem, then, that Butcher and Valgimigli are correct; the separate parts or acts of the episodic tragedy are not well connected. Aristotle's habit is to

XII, 1076a1, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν. Ross translates this: "[They] make the substance of the universe a mere series of episodes" (*Metaphysics*, trans. W. D. Ross [Oxford, 1908]).

McMahon's translation, perhaps now to be taken as a mere curiosity, runs: "These make the substance of the Universe to be adventitious." He comments: "This is the rendering of Themistius . . . It literally is applied to poetry" (*The Metaphysics of Aristotle* [London, 1857], p. 347). He then goes on to speak of the Catalogue of the Ships. His rendering gives full force to the notion that an episode is apart from the main action, as he apparently thought the Catalogue of Ships is. See p. 62 below.

Gilbert Norwood remarks: "In tragic criticism ἐπεισόδιον is a word neither of praise nor of blame, whereas ἐπεισοδιώδης is a reproach, meaning that the separate acts stand out too separately." "Ἐπεισόδιον in comedy means not an ordinary act or scene as in tragedy, but a confessedly inserted irrelevant interlude" ("Episodes in Old Comedy," *C. P.*, XXV [1930], pp. 219, 223).

Discussing tragedy, Norwood speaks of "bad construction, what Aristotle calls 'episodic' plots, namely, plays the several scenes of which are more or less accidentally combined and form no organic whole" (*Greek Tragedy* [London, 1920], p. 312).

<sup>12</sup> Ferdinando Albergiani, *La Poetica: Introduzione, Traduzione, Commento* (Firenze, 1934), p. 18.

<sup>13</sup> This opinion is expressed by Albert Schweigler: "Eine Tragödie ist ἐπεισοδιώδης, wenn die einzelnen Handlungen oder Auftritte (τὰ ἐπεισόδια) keinen innern Zusammenhang haben, sondern jedes für sich besteht. [For *Poetics* 51b33, 52b16 he accepts episodes as "Acte oder Aufzüge."] An andern Stellen der Poetik bezeichnet jedoch ἐπεισόδιον eine 'Episode' im jetzt gewöhnlichen Sinne des Worts" (*Die Metaphysik der Aristoteles: Grundtext, Übersetzung und Commentar* [Tübingen, 1848], IV, pp. 295-6).

name a type of play from a striking feature, as pathetic, or involved; in the episodic play the separate parts rather than the whole are prominent.

12, 52b16, 20. Here the technical use of the word is clear, the μέρος or part between choric songs.

17, 55b1. Aristotle says here that after an outline has been made it is necessary to ἐπεισοδιῶν καὶ παρατείνειν. These two verbs have caused difficulty. Gudeman translates "Episoden einflechten"; Bywater "lengthen it out by the insertion of episodes";<sup>14</sup> Pye "insert the episodes";<sup>15</sup> Rostagni "introdurre gli episodî." Hardy, however, says "faire les episodes,"<sup>16</sup> and Valgimigli "li distribuisca in episodi e dia loro il necessario svolgimento." He comments, moreover, "Tutto ciò, naturalmente, perché il poeta non perda mai di vista la unità complessiva e organica della sua creazione."<sup>17</sup> Clearest of all is Cooper, who says that Aristotle "employs 'episodes,' and a related verb, to describe the elaborations, or filling, with which an outline sketch may be lengthened out into an epic poem."<sup>18</sup>

In similar fashion Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (III, 17—1418a33) speaks of episodizing a speech: Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιῶν ἐπαίνοισ. Some of the translations are much as for the *Poetics*, that is, not very illuminating. Annibale Caro, however, in 1570, put it thus: "Si deue riempiere l'oratione di laudi."<sup>19</sup> And in the same year Alessandro Piccolomini, with more expansion:

Nelle orationi . . . per non lasciarsi materia, fa di bisogno di supplire accumulando, & riempiendo l'oratione a guisa d'Episodii, delle lodi di questa cose, o di quella, si come vsa di fare Isocrate . . . di che Gorgia si vantaua: cioè che mai non gli sarebbe mancata materia da distender.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Ingram Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909), p. 49.

<sup>15</sup> Henry James Pye, *A Commentary Illustrating the Poetico of Aristotle* (London, 1792), p. 47.

<sup>16</sup> J. Hardy, *Aristote: Poétique* (Paris, 1932), p. 54.

<sup>17</sup> Valgimigli, p. 127.

<sup>18</sup> Lane Cooper, *An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy* (New York, 1922), pp. 54-5.

<sup>19</sup> *Rettorica d' Aristotile* (Venice, 1570), III, p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> Alessandro Piccolomini, *I Tre Libri della Retorica d'Aristotele* (Venice, 1571), p. 282. The examples of Isocrates and Gorgias are in the Greek.

But Bernardo Segni had rendered it: "Le digressioni vi si debbon' far' con le lodi" (*Rettorica et Poetica d'Aristotile* [Vinegia, 1551], p. 135v).

Whatever "à guisa d'Episodii" may mean, the notion of having plenty of material is there. Is this what Butcher meant when he said "fill in the episodes and amplify in detail?"

17, 55b13. Here occurs the same verb as just above, and the noun in addition. Translators vary their earlier renderings somewhat, but the idea of insertion generally remains, though Albergiani says: "Si può passare alla composizione degli episodi."<sup>21</sup> Hardy: "établir les épisodes." Gilbert: "the episodes may be composed."<sup>22</sup> Aristotle has just said that the gist of the play is first settled and the names assigned. Evidently what would then remain would be to expand the summary with suitable details, rather than to insert semi-extraneous matter. If at this point the writing of the play in its details is not indicated, Aristotle fails to require that essential process. Moreover the two events Aristotle mentions are vital to the *Iphigenia in Tauris*. Though perhaps he here confuses the detail somewhat,<sup>23</sup> Aristotle affirms that Orestes' madness is that δι' ἧς ἀλόφθη (55b14). The purification is also essential to the escape. The outline would have permitted some other method, but there must be some means both for the capture and for the escape. These actions are, however, not ἐπεισόδια in the sense of Chapter 12, complete portions between choric songs; the madness, indeed, is known only through the narrative of the herdsman who witnessed it. The word ἐπεισόδια in this passage, then, seems to refer to portions of the main plot, not to insertions. Again it is difficult to be sure how much Butcher means by translating: "It remains to fill in the episodes. We must see that they are relevant to the action." For the last sentence Aristotle has merely: ὅπως δὲ ἔσται οἰκεία τὰ ἐπεισόδια. The short outline is to grow into a full-length play. The word παρὰτείνειν,<sup>24</sup> associated with ἐπεισοδιοῦν in the preceding passage, is lacking here. Doubtless ἐπεισοδιοῦν is understood to include it,

<sup>21</sup> Bernardo Segni renders: "Et doppio questo subito, posto i nomi, si debbono cominciare gli Episodii" (p. 188).

<sup>22</sup> Allan H. Gilbert, *Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden* (New York, 1940), p. 95.

<sup>23</sup> He is not captured because of his madness, but almost in spite of it. Similarly for the *Oedipus Rex*, Aristotle errs in saying that the messenger came to cheer Oedipus (52a25); he came to bring word of the death of Polybus, and tries to cheer Oedipus on the spur of the moment. See Gudeman, *op. cit.*, on 10, 52a24.

<sup>24</sup> An attempt to amend this word to read παρὰτείνειν, referred to by Pye, seems not to have found favor.

for while Aristotle deals with other elements, the chief lengthening of the outline to make the play is that the short statements become long actions.

17, 55b16. In the drama the sections are short—as the drama is short—but the epic gets its length from them. Aristotle's summary of the *Odyssey* is shorter than that of the *Iphigenia*, though the work itself is longer. Two words only—μόνου ὄντος—imply the narratives of the deaths of Odysseus' followers, as by the acts of Polyphemus and of Scylla and Charybdis.

17, 55b23. Having summarized the *Odyssey*, Aristotle remarks: "This, then, is the thing itself; the rest is ἐπεισόδια." Evidently all the rest of the *Odyssey* is not interpolated narrative; the sense is that all the rest is detail, or expansion of the outline.

It seems then, that an expanded rendering of ἐπεισοδιοῦν καὶ παρατείνειν (55b1) might be "to develop the stories told in outline into plays, by preparing for stage-presentation the deeds mentioned in the outline, and to secure proper length."

18, 56a31. Fyfe renders this: "transferring a whole speech or scene," and Margoliouth about the same. Pye has: "fitting a speech, or whole act." The others generally transliterate. But evidently Aristotle is not thinking here of a mere transfer of digressions.

23, 59a35-6. νῦν δ' ἐν μέρος ἀπολαβὼν ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον νεῶν καταλόγῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίοις [dis] διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποιήσιν. This passage is textually difficult. Rostagni writes:

Alcuni edd. espungono questo pron.; altri interpretano τῶν πραγμάτων. Intendo = τῶν ἄλλων cioè "delle altre parti," le quali non sono propriamente nominate, ma risultano come nominate dalla sottrazione dello ἐν μέρος. E appunto dalle altre parti della guerra Omero ricava gli *episodî* con cui "diversifica" (διαλαμβάνει) il racconto dell'ira di Achille: questi *episodî* sono quindi anche *μέρη* o residui di *μέρη* (cfr. 18. 56a14; 26. 62b9) che rendono πολύμυθον (18. 56a12) il suo poema.

This brings out the loose use by which Aristotle says that the *Iliad* is made of one μέρος, and yet has many *μέρη*.<sup>25</sup> Gudeman is still more specific on the episodes as excurses:

Auf die zahlreichen, den Kern des einheitlichen μύθος nicht berührenden « παρεκβάσεις » bei Homer haben schon die antiken Erklärer, letzten Endes auf alexandrinischer Gelehrsamkeit fußend, hingewiesen. Hier seien nur die gewichtigsten kurz

<sup>25</sup> 26, 62b9. The parts make one action, so far as is possible (*ibid.*, 12).

angeführt, da alle bei Adam op. cit. S. 45-48. 59 aufgezählt sind: Thersites, Schiffskatalog, Zweikampf des Paris und Menelaos, Teichoskopie, Beschreibung des Bogens des Pandaros, der Zweikampf der Aphrodite und des Diomedes, des Glaukos und Diomedes, Hektors Abschied, Melaeger und Doloneia. In der Odyssee werden die Geschichte des Theoklymenos, der Kampf des Odysseus und Iros und die Eberjagd als *ἐπεισόδια* bezeichnet . . . Wenn allein diese Episode [Schiffskatalog] ausdrücklich genannt wird, so geschah dies wohl a potiori, da sie bei weitem umfangreichste in der Ilias ist und zugleich wie keine zweite den exkurshaften Charakter an der Stirn trägt.

This raises the question what an excursus is. The boar-hunt in the *Odyssey* may be allowed as such, since it is a description of something that happened many years before, connected with the narrative merely as explanatory. But the parting of Hector and Andromache is in the course of the narrated action. It comes in the sequence of the day's events and could not be a part of any other story. It does give details, but Aristotle could hardly have contemplated an *Iliad* in which nothing is known of Hector except that Achilles killed him. The Catalogue of Ships is indeed a long passage unlike the narrative in which it was set. Homer could have been content merely to say generally that the Greek army was large; he chose to prove it by particulars.<sup>26</sup> But how except by giving details can Aristotle's brief outline become epic or tragedy? A striking scene in the normal course of action, however detailed, is not an excursus. Details can be developed out of proportion to the whole, so that the main action is forgotten, but is that true of Homer's catalogue? Would the main action of the *Iliad* be more impressive if the muster roll of the armies were omitted? When Homer wrote it, was he not developing the kernel of his action from within rather than thrusting something in from without? To be sure the catalogues, with changes for death and recruiting, could be used as a preface to battles before Troy at any time during the ten years. The parting of Hector and Andromache is limited by the infancy of Astyanax (VI, 466-75). The short account of how Pandarus got the horn for his bow (IV, 105-11), since it happened years before, is an obvious excursus. The tale of Meleager

<sup>26</sup> Gilbert Norwood writes: "Aristotle (*Poetic* 1459a) calls the 'Catalogue of Ships' an *ἐπεισόδιον*. It is plainly not irrelevant, but 'half-intrusive'; that is, appropriate in its essence, but expanded to greater length than is strictly needed" (*C. P.*, XXV [1930], p. 219, note 2).

(IX, 529-99), however, though the events happened years before, is used as a pertinent instance by Phoinix in his attempt to move Achilles; the story is not part of the Trojan theme, but it, or some equivalent argument, is essential to the speech by Phoinix.

In their difficulties with this passage, some of the translators abandon the word *episodes*, in one or both instances, for *incidents* (Fyfe), *events* (Butcher), and "autres faits" (Hardy). These at least are without the suggestion of something inserted from without.

The matter is one of emphasis. It is true that the portions mentioned are in some sense detachable, but can more than two of those from the *Iliad* be called interpolations or merely accessory narratives? Aristotle is justified by the history of the long poem in allowing some inserted narratives, and perhaps includes the possibility in his remarks on the *Iliad*. But it seems that what he is saying here is that primarily Homer takes a limited and unified story and keeps it such by developing the action. To lengthen it chiefly by independent narratives not nascent in the outline would be to give it an objectionable "eepisodic" plot.

24, 59b30. Here the difficult verb ἐπεισοδιοῦν, as well as the noun, again appears. In the preceding sentences Aristotle has been showing how the various parts (μέρη) are handled, by means of synchronous action, to give variety. He then concludes with the references to ἐπεισόδια. Since the earlier sentences do not refer to irrelevant action but to the handling of the parts of the one story selected,<sup>27</sup> it appears that ἐπεισόδιον at the end is a synonym for μέρος. Something of the sort appears in the renderings of Fyfe, "variety due to the diverse incidents," and Margoliouth, "variation of the character of the scenes."

### III

It is probable that Aristotle's emphasis on unity has been sometimes overinterpreted and allowed to become rigid, yet it is evident from his precepts and from the instances he chooses that he is an apostle of unity. His discussion is primarily of the well-constructed narrative. It is, then, *a priori* unlikely that he would often refer without sign of disapproval to the use of irrelevant matter, since he does censure the plot he calls "eepisodic." But otherwise the word ἐπεισόδιον seems not to imply

<sup>27</sup> Margoliouth, supplying, translates "several portions of the story."



objection, though the many parts of the one action of the epic are less tightly held than those of the one dramatic action (26, 62b4-12). It is unlikely, then, that he intended the word to indicate parts not derived from the brief, naked outline.<sup>28</sup> It seems still less likely that he abandoned incomplete discussion of the development of the main action from within, in order to speak on the use of accessory material. It seems, then, that he employed the word *ἐπεισόδιον* not merely to mean the part of a play between the choral songs, but more loosely to mean any action that is a subordinate but necessary component of the integral action of the play.

Why, in defiance of the conventional belief in Aristotelian unity, have men continued to suppose that the episode of the *Poetics*—except in the technical sense—is an inserted or incidental slightly-attached part? One explanation is to be found in bad habits of translation. The reader or translator saw before him what seemed to be the word *episode*, known to him as a modern word. He did not pause to ask what Aristotle may have meant by it, though the technical employment of the word in Chapters 4 and 12 should have excited suspicions. If he turned to a Greek lexicon, as he probably did not for a word so easy of transliteration, he found no suggestion of an unusual Aristotelian meaning other than the technical one. If, reflecting for himself on the significance of a passage in the *Poetics* where the word occurred, he attempted to translate rather than merely to transliterate, he commonly selected a word without a flavor of interpolation, such as I have quoted from various versions. Margoliouth came closest to revolt, since he transliterated in but one passage (23, 59a35-6), yet that one, with his failure to include *ἐπεισόδιον* in his glossary, shows that he had not thought of the matter as a whole, however admirable he might be in single passages. The conventional interpretation, appearing in his use of *interlude* (17, 55b23), overpowered him. Too many of the others who have tried to put the *Poetics* into a modern language have, like myself, yielded to the translator's temptation to save thought by transliterating.

ALLAN H. GILBERT.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

<sup>28</sup> I have borrowed the word *naked* from Daniel Heinsius, *De Tragoedia Constitutione Liber* (Lugd. Batav., 1643), chap. 11. He seems, however, to think of the episode as an interpolation.

## THE PURPOSE OF TIMOLEON'S MISSION.

What Timoleon accomplished in Sicily is, in broad outline, undisputed; what he was sent to accomplish is much less clear. His achievement is admirably summarised in the Syracusan decree read at his funeral and reproduced by Diodorus and Plutarch in which reasons are given for the honours paid to him.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the substance of the Siceliot appeal to Corinth and of the orders issued to him by the Corinthian government, which must have been closely parallel, is not recorded with a similar precision and unanimity. He was evidently entrusted with the task of protecting the Syracusans and other Siceliots against oppressors or potential oppressors, but the question whether it was against the Carthaginians or the Sicilian tyrants or both simultaneously that Corinthian aid was sought and granted is one of some complexity, and all three interpretations of the somewhat indefinite and even contradictory evidence have received a measure of support from modern scholars.<sup>2</sup>

The earliest reference to the mission of Timoleon; which occurs in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (8, 1429b), appears at first glance to support the first of these views. Despite its brevity the passage is of some interest because it was almost certainly written too early to have been derived from Timaeus,

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus, XVI, 90, 1 [ὅτι τοὺς τυράννους καταλύσας καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καταπολεμήσας καὶ τὰς μεγίστας τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἀνοικίσας αἷτις ἐγενήθη τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῖς Σικελιώταις]; Plutarch, *Timol.*, 39, 5. In spite of their divergences, which are the result of inaccurate transmission, these passages amount virtually to documentary evidence. Some Sicilian writer, probably Athanis or Timaeus, must have copied the decree.

<sup>2</sup> For the first (Carthage): Arnoldt, *Timoleon*, p. 73; Holm, *Gesch. Siciliens*, II, pp. 193; Lenschau, *R.-E.*, VIII, col. 1594; Stier, *R.-E.*, VI A, coll. 1277-8. For the second (tyranny): Meltzer, *Gesch. der Karthager*, I, p. 319; Clasen, *Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.*, XXXII (1886), p. 316; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, III, 1, p. 581; Glotz, *Hist. grecque*, III, p. 413. For the third (both): Freeman, *History of Sicily*, IV, pp. 292-3; Hackforth, *C. A. H.*, VI, pp. 285-8 (though he is inclined to believe that "it was fear of an attack by the Carthaginians that occasioned this appeal"); Pais, *Storia dell' Italia antica e della Sicilia*, II<sup>2</sup>, pp. 572-3 (apparently). Wickert, *R.-E.*, IV A, col. 1515, believes the problem to be insoluble. Contrast Thucydides, VI, 8, 2 on the orders issued to the commanders of the Athenian expedition to Sicily.

whose work has, for good or ill, so deeply influenced the surviving records of Sicilian history.<sup>3</sup> The author mentions, among other instances of unexpected success against overwhelming odds, the achievement of the Corinthians who Συρακοσίοις ἐννέα τριήρεσι βοηθήσαντες Καρχηδονίους ἑκατὸν καὶ πεντήκοντα ναυσὶν ἐπὶ τοῖς λιμέσι τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμοῦντας τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἅπασαν πλὴν τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἔχοντας οὐδὲν ἤττον κατεπολέμησαν. He is, however, interested only in the result of the Corinthian enterprise and not in its motives, and the purpose of his work is to give advice to orators, from whom meticulous accuracy in their illustrations from history does not seem to have been expected. In one respect the passage is palpably misleading: a reader unfamiliar with Sicilian history in this period would naturally conclude that the nine Corinthian triremes engaged the large Carthaginian fleet in battle, and this inference is in fact made by Aelian.<sup>4</sup> The implication, and it is only an implication, that assistance was given to the Syracusans because they were being attacked or threatened by Carthage may be equally fallacious.

It will be convenient to consider next the *Timoleon* of Plutarch, who supplies a greater volume of evidence on this question than any other author, though he seems never to have asked himself why his hero went to Sicily. Preoccupied with personal issues and moral lessons, he is never tired of speculating on the part played by τύχη and ἀρετή in the successes of Timoleon,<sup>5</sup> but the purely historical question here under discussion is one to which, even if the answer was readily available to him,<sup>6</sup> he was probably indifferent. In this instance, as so often in his *Lives*, the value of his work to the historian lies in what he preserves incidentally and almost accidentally. Several passages in the *Timoleon* throw light upon the aims of the Corinthian mission, but before they are examined it is necessary to point out that

<sup>3</sup> It is noteworthy that the author refers only to "Corinthians" and does not mention Timoleon, although in his preceding example he attributes to Dion the achievement of having expelled Dionysius II.

<sup>4</sup> V. H., IV, 8, which seems to have been derived directly from this passage.

<sup>5</sup> Ziegler, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXII (1933), pp. 54-8.

<sup>6</sup> If, as I have suggested in *C. Q.*, XXXII (1938), pp. 65-74, much of the *Timoleon* is dependent upon a Peripatetic biography and not directly on Timaeus, the author of this work may well have omitted to define the purpose of the Corinthian mission.

some of the evidence applied to this problem and ostensibly relevant to it is inadmissible

In the most recent biographical sketch of Timoleon it has been maintained that because the Syracusans honoured him by resolving to employ a Corinthian in any subsequent war against barbarians (Plut., 38, 4, *ὁ δὲ σάκκισ συμπίεσαι πόλεμος αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἄλλοφύλους*), his mission must have been directed against Carthage and not against tyranny.<sup>7</sup> A parallel, though equally unconvincing, argument might be advanced in support of the opposite conclusion, namely, that Timoleon must have been charged with the suppression of tyranny rather than with the defence of Greek Sicily against Carthaginian aggression because he did not resign his command immediately after the conclusion of peace with Carthage but retained it until he had overthrown Mamercus and Hippo. Arguments of this kind are based upon a confusion between intentions and results. A number of passages in the *Timoleon* stress the magnitude of the successes gained against the Carthaginians or the tyrants or both,<sup>8</sup> but they are totally irrelevant to the present discussion. Just as Timoleon was led by circumstances to launch a programme of political and social reconstruction which he can scarcely have envisaged at the outset, so his military operations undertaken in defence of Siceliot liberties were largely dependent upon the aggressive moves of his opponents. The attainments of his mission must have far exceeded, and probably tended to obscure, its aim, and it is essential to discriminate carefully between them.

In one passage Plutarch states unequivocally that the Siceliot appeal to Corinth was prompted by fear of the Carthaginians, who had recently landed large forces in Sicily (2, 1, *ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Καρχηδονίων στόλῳ μεγάλῳ παραγενομένων εἰς Σικελίαν, καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπαιρουμένων, φοβηθέντες οἱ Σικελιώται πρεσβεῖαν ἐβουλεύοντο πέμπειν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ παρὰ Κορινθίων βοήθειαν αἰτεῖν*). This statement, however, stands entirely alone, and he proceeds to stultify it before the end of the same sentence by using language

<sup>7</sup> Stier, *R.-E.*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> Apart from 39, 5, cited in n. 1 above, the most important are: 23, 2 and 4 (though there may be some significance in the fact that the official proclamation in 2 mentions only the suppression of tyranny, whereas the unofficial comment in 4 includes also successes against Carthage); 29, 6; 35, 1; 37, 5. Diodorus, XVI, 65, 9 also deals exclusively with results.

from which the reader must infer that Corinthian assistance was sought against the tyrants (2, 2, τὴν πόλιν ὀρώντες φιλελεύθερον καὶ μισοτύραννον οὔσαν αἰεῖ).<sup>9</sup> This latter view is presupposed elsewhere by Plutarch and underlies his entire narrative, as may be seen from the following:

(a) 7, 6. In the dispatch in which Hicetas tried to deter the Corinthians from intervening in Sicily he explained that their tardiness in answering the appeal had forced him to form an alliance with the Carthaginians against Dionysius. He was acting in bad faith and sought only to anticipate charges of treachery for having first associated himself with the appeal and then intrigued with Carthage (cf. 7, 3, μὴνύοντα τὴν μεταβολὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ προδοσίαν). His argument indicates, however, that Dionysius and not Carthage was the enemy against whom protection was solicited. To justify collaboration with a third party on the ground that he required immediate help against the enemy was at least a plausible defence: to justify collaboration with the enemy on the ground that he required immediate help against a third party would have been somewhat ridiculous.

(b) 9, 6. The envoys of Hicetas informed Timoleon at Rhegium that he must dismiss his fleet and army ὥς τοῦ πολέμου μικρὸν ἀπολείποντος συνηρῆσθαι. The war to which Plutarch here refers is certainly the war against Dionysius,<sup>10</sup> whom Hicetas had a few days earlier defeated and deprived of all Syracuse except Ortygia, as is recorded in the same chapter (9, 3). The envoys evidently assumed that it was in this war that Timoleon had been sent to intervene.<sup>11</sup>

(c) 10, 7-8. Andromachus of Tauromenium is described as one who πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους φανερὸς ἦν αἰεὶ διακείμενος ἀπεχθῶς καὶ ἀλλοτρίως and accordingly (δῶ) cooperated with the Corinthians in their attempt to liberate Sicily. This explanation of his policy is incompatible with the view that they had come to protect the Siceliots against Carthage. It probably originates from Timaeus, who was the son of Andromachus, and is not merely an inference by Plutarch from his knowledge of the general situation.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the use of *μισοτύραννος* in 3, 4 discussed below, p. 74.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. 1, 6, where, before any mention has been made of Carthaginian aggression, the Syracusan aristocrats appoint Hicetas to be *στρατηγὸν τοῦ πολέμου* (also *Nepos, Timol.*, 2, 1, quoted below, p. 70).

<sup>11</sup> Clasen, *Timaios von Tauromenion*, p. 75, n. 3.

(d) 11, 6. Timoleon was at first distrusted by the Siceliots because Callippus and Pharax ἀμφότεροι φάσκοντες ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἤκειν καὶ τοῦ καταλύειν τοὺς μονάρχους had proved even more oppressive than the tyrants. The passage implies that Timoleon, like his ill-famed predecessors, was sent to Sicily to eradicate tyranny and declared this to be the aim of his mission in a diplomatic offensive begun as soon as he landed (12, 1). The Siceliots suspected that they were being cajoled by specious promises εἰς μεταβολὴν δεσπότητος καινοῦ (12, 1). Hence they must have believed his first objective to be the expulsion of their present masters.<sup>12</sup>

From the cumulative evidence of these passages the conclusion may be drawn with some confidence that to Timaeus, whose work undoubtedly supplied Plutarch, directly or indirectly, with the foundation of his *Timoleon*, the Siceliots appealed for help against tyranny and the orders issued to the Corinthian expeditionary force were to answer this appeal. This evidence surely outweighs the single unambiguous statement quoted above that the Siceliots appealed to Corinth through fear of Carthage (2, 1). Plutarch is occasionally guilty of a palpable blunder, and in this instance he, or more probably the Peripatetic biographer upon whom he may have relied at this stage, may well have erred through somewhat careless condensation of a much longer narrative. As the sentence stands, what the Siceliots feared may be assumed to have been the Carthaginian activities described in the genitive absolute. This genitive absolute, however, probably summarises a substantial excursus (ἐν τούτῳ) by Timaeus on Carthaginian plans to take advantage of Siceliot dissensions, ending with an account of the landing by Carthaginian forces in Sicily and the repressive measures undertaken by them in their own province, of which some details are preserved by Diodorus.<sup>13</sup> To a biographer of Timoleon these events would be

<sup>12</sup> 16, 2-3 is also noteworthy. The Corinthians were encouraged to send reinforcements to Timoleon because within fifty days after landing in Sicily he had gained possession of Ortygia and expelled Dionysius. While this passage is valuable for its indication that the mission of Timoleon was not directed against Dionysius alone, it also implies that the reinforcements were sent to enable him to complete the task so auspiciously begun, namely the suppression of tyranny throughout Greek Sicily. Nevertheless, it is not entirely certain that the object of the second expedition was the same as that of the first.

<sup>13</sup> XVI, 67, which is, however, probably derived from Theopompus and

of little interest and could be almost entirely ignored. After completing the excursus Timaeus must have returned to his main theme, the struggle for possession of Syracuse, and have proceeded to describe the fears of the Siceliots which led them to appeal to Corinth. Hence it may be only through compression that the aggressive attitude of the Carthaginians and the fears of the Siceliots have become connected in the narrative of Plutarch.

If Polybius is to be believed, Timaeus was abnormally fallible because he was abnormally prejudiced (cf. XII, 7, 1), and it would be hazardous to assume that if he held the view on the aim of the Corinthian mission ascribed to him above he was necessarily right. Here, however, his attitude cannot have been influenced by his admiration for Timoleon, which Polybius and others believed to have been excessive:<sup>14</sup> whatever the task assigned to the Corinthian expeditionary force, the credit due to its leader was unaffected. Moreover, Timaeus had every reason to be well-informed on this point. His father was the first Siceliot ally with whom Timoleon conferred, and their consultations began before the development of the situation at Syracuse suggested that Carthaginian intervention might prove more dangerous than the tyranny of Dionysius.

The evidence of Nepos, though relatively insignificant both in quantity and in quality, points to the same conclusion as that of Plutarch. In his *Timoleon*, which is certainly dependent upon the tradition established by Timaeus,<sup>15</sup> he refers to the reoccupation of Syracuse by Dionysius, *cuius adversarii opem a Corinthiis petierunt ducemque quic in bello uterentur postularunt* (2, 1). This statement confirms the view that to Timaeus Corinthian aid was sought and granted against the tyrants rather than against the Carthaginians, whom Nepos does not even men-

not from Timaeus (see n. 18). If the views on the chronology of Diodorus expressed below (p. 73) are accepted, the Carthaginian landing took place after the Corinthians had made preparations to answer the Siceliot appeal, but Timaeus was not an annalist and perhaps chose to record in the same passage all the activities of the Carthaginians anterior to the arrival of Timoleon.

<sup>14</sup> Polybius, XII, 23, 4-7; Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, V, 12, 7; Marcellinus, *Vit. Thuc.*, 27.

<sup>15</sup> I have analysed this wretched compilation and discussed its relation to the *Timoleon* of Plutarch in *op. cit.*, pp. 65-7.

tion until he records their defeat at the Crimisus (2, 4). His assumption that the Siceliot appeal was for assistance against Dionysius alone is probably mistaken,<sup>16</sup> but there is no reason to doubt the general accuracy of his brief statement.

The contribution of Diodorus is of considerably greater value. The appeal to Corinth was, he states, for a general τὸν ἐπιμελησόμενον τῆς πόλεως καὶ καταλύσοντα τὴν τῶν τυραννείων ἐπιβαλομένων πλεονεξίαν (XVI, 65, 1). This phrase is deplorably vague, but it has been too lightly rejected by those who believe that the Siceliots appealed for help against Carthage. It implies that the embassy was sent to Corinth before Dionysius had firmly reestablished his tyranny at Syracuse,<sup>17</sup> and here Diodorus, who at this stage was probably following Theopompus,<sup>18</sup> may well have been better informed than Plutarch. The absence of any explicit reference to Dionysius may be deliberate:<sup>19</sup> it gives a further indication that aid was sought against the widespread recrudescence of tyranny throughout Greek Sicily (cf. τυραννίσι πολλαῖς καὶ ποικίλαις δουλεύειν ἀναγκαζόμενοι in the same sentence), but it may also reflect a reluctance to urge open conflict between the Corinthians and Dionysius, who had maintained the friendship with Peloponnesian states initiated by his father.<sup>20</sup> The activities of the Carthaginians before the fleet and army of Mago appeared at Syracuse to cooperate with Hicetas are described far more fully by Diodorus than by Plutarch, but his account is somewhat confused. He explains that shortly before the arrival of Timoleon the Carthaginians πυθόμενοι τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κατὰ Σικελίαν ἐσομένου πολέμου had made overtures to the tyrants,

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Timol.*, 16, 2-3, discussed in n. 12 above, and Diodorus, XVI, 65, 1, discussed in the next paragraph.

<sup>17</sup> Probably the aristocratic refugees at Leontini claimed to act on behalf of the Syracusan πόλις (hence the description of Hicetas as τὸν τῶν Συρακοσίων δυναστεύοντα in 67, 1, unless this is an error), but ἐπιβάλλεσθαι, which must mean "attempt" here, indicates that some part of Syracuse was still free at the time of the appeal.

<sup>18</sup> Hammond, *C. Q.*, XXXII (1938), pp. 141-4, whose arguments, so far as his Group 2 is concerned, seem to me to be conclusive.

<sup>19</sup> Diodorus fails to mention the return of Dionysius, who reappears abruptly in the narrative in 68, 1, where the attempt of Hicetas to besiege Syracuse is recorded.

<sup>20</sup> He sent a fleet to aid the Spartans soon after his accession (Xenophon, *Hell.*, VII, 4, 12). Corinthian support for Dion had been almost negligible.



especially Hicetas, and landed a large expeditionary force under Hanno, which proceeded to besiege the Campanians of Entella, a town in their own province (67, 1-3). The narrative of Diodorus has been adduced as evidence that the Carthaginian decision to intervene was prompted by the mission of Timoleon.<sup>21</sup> This interpretation seems to be an arbitrary one: the "impending war" is surely the struggle between Dionysius and his adversaries led by Hicetas, which was only beginning when the Carthaginians assembled their armament,<sup>22</sup> combined probably with outbreaks of violence elsewhere precipitated by the ambitions of military adventurers.<sup>23</sup> It is difficult to believe that the Carthaginians felt their interests to be seriously endangered by the dispatch of an obscure Corinthian at the head of a few hundred mercenaries. Their motive in sending a large force to Sicily was partly to suppress an insurgent movement in their own province and partly to exploit the weakness and dissensions of the Siceliot. They appear to have already pushed their frontier eastwards as the empire of Syracuse disintegrated;<sup>24</sup> they may now have hoped to dominate the straits of Messina<sup>25</sup> and thereby to gain access to the markets of South Italy and the Adriatic formerly controlled by the Syracusans. In one respect the mission of Timoleon seemed likely to facilitate the attain-

<sup>21</sup> Beloch, *op. cit.*, III, 1, pp. 581-2; Hackforth, *C. A. H.*, VI, p. 286.

<sup>22</sup> It is in fact the same war as is referred to by Plutarch, 1, 6 and Nepos 2, 1 (see above p. 68 with n. 10), though in each passage this war is at a different stage of development. Diodorus, 66, 6, where the Carthaginian envoys at Metapontum *ἐντυχόντες τῷ Τιμολέοντι διεμαρτύραντο μὴ κατάρχειν πολέμου* is somewhat different, though nevertheless relevant to the present discussion. If Timoleon were sailing with orders to fight against the Carthaginians, mere protests on their part would have been entirely inappropriate; if he were sailing with orders to fight against the tyrants, a warning that they would use their formidable resources to prevent Corinthian intervention might have caused a less determined leader to dismiss his troops.

<sup>23</sup> Pais, *op. cit.*, II, p. 576, makes the acute suggestion that Mamercus and Hicetas were probably rivals at this time. Both may have aspired to dominate the whole plain of Leontini, one of the most productive areas in Sicily.

<sup>24</sup> On the south coast, Beloch, *op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 581, n. 4 (the objections of Scheliha, *Dion.*, pp. 153-4, n. 7, to this view are unconvincing); on the north coast, Diodorus, XIX, 2, 2 (Thermae under Carthaginian control before the birth of Agathocles about 361).

<sup>25</sup> Carthaginian influence was strong at Messina (Diodorus, 69, 6).

ment of their ambitions: it compelled Hicetas to accept their advances and to invite their collaboration in his conflict with Dionysius.<sup>26</sup>

The chronological arrangement of his material by Diodorus suggests that the Corinthians and the Carthaginians decided almost simultaneously to intervene in Sicily, neither side being actuated by a desire to frustrate the other. He assigns to 346/5 the Syracusan appeal to Corinth and the appointment of Timoleon; to 345/4 the assembly and departure of the Corinthian expedition, its arrival at Metapontum and Rhegium, the Carthaginian decision to send a force to Sicily, and the first operations of this force in the west. His account of Carthaginian activities is prefixed by the words *βραχὺ πρὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν* (67, 1), which are tantalisingly inexact, but they surely mean that the Carthaginian intervention in Sicily described in chapter 67 took place shortly before the events recorded at the end of chapter 66, namely the voyage of Timoleon and his arrival off the Italian coast. Hence, unless the annalistic system of Diodorus has broken down, the embassy to Corinth was apparently sent in the first half of 345, and both expeditions were organized during the following winter, the Carthaginians landing in the spring of 344 and the Corinthians reaching Italy in the early summer of the same year.<sup>27</sup> If chronological evidence alone were taken into consideration, Carthaginian intervention might have been the result of the appeal to Corinth, though there are good reasons for believing that it was not; on the other hand, the appeal to Corinth cannot have been the result of Carthaginian intervention.

Two rather more general considerations lend support to the view that Corinthian aid was sought and granted against tyranny

<sup>26</sup> From Diodorus, 67, 1 it is clear that the Carthaginians initiated these negotiations. Plutarch, who blackens the character of Hicetas for dramatic contrast with that of Timoleon, implies the opposite (2, 3; 7, 4-6), but his narrative shows that Hicetas was reluctant to incur obligations which might have proved embarrassing if he had succeeded in supplanting Dionysius as tyrant of Syracuse: he called in Carthaginian aid on a large scale only when the success of Timoleon had begun to endanger his own prospects.

<sup>27</sup> Beloch, *op. cit.*, III, 2, pp. 380-2, who does not, however, attempt in this discussion of the chronology to date the appeal to Corinth or the landing of the Carthaginian force in western Sicily.

and not against Carthage. The prime movers of the Siceliot appeal were evidently the Syracusan aristocrats who had found refuge at Leontini after the return of Dionysius.<sup>28</sup> This aristocratic faction must have been recruited largely from the survivors of the friends of Dion to whom Plato had addressed his *Seventh* and *Eighth Epistles*. The scheme advocated in the *Eighth Epistle* to end the deadlock between rival factions and individuals, if it had ever offered a workable compromise, had become obsolete, and no peaceful reconciliation of this kind could now be contemplated.<sup>29</sup> In these circumstances the appeal of the aristocrats to Corinth is more likely to have been designed to secure by force the liberation of their fellow-citizens and their own return to power at Syracuse than to obtain protection for the whole of Greek Sicily against an undeveloped threat of Carthaginian aggression. Secondly, Timoleon appears to have had only one qualification, apart from personal courage, for his appointment as leader of the Corinthian expedition,<sup>30</sup> namely, that he was *μυστράννος* (Plutarch, 3, 4) and had rescued Corinth from tyranny by causing the death of his own brother Timophanes.<sup>31</sup> The selection of Timoleon, which enabled the Corinthian government to avoid both the sacrifice of a more valuable leader and the odium of having rejected the appeal,<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Diodorus defines the petitioners as "the Syracusans" (65, 1), Plutarch first as "the Siceliots" and later as "the Syracusans" (2, 1 and 3), Nepos as "the enemies of Dionysius" (2, 1). It is clear from the narrative of Plutarch that the Syracusan aristocrats were largely, if not wholly, responsible for the appeal: they had put themselves under the leadership of Hicetas (1, 6), who shared in sending the embassy to the Peloponnese (2, 3; 7, 4). On their claim to represent Syracuse see above, n. 17.

<sup>29</sup> Of the three "constitutional monarchs" (*Ep.*, VIII, 355e-356b) the son of Dion and the Hipparinus who expelled Callippus were now dead, while Dionysius was disqualified by having regained his tyranny.

<sup>30</sup> Plutarch (3, 2) ascribes his appointment to divine agency operating through an obscure citizen who nominated him.

<sup>31</sup> The description of him by Diodorus (65, 2) as *πρωτεύοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνδρείᾳ τε καὶ συνέσει στρατηγικῇ* seems to be an exaggeration based on his subsequent exploits in Sicily. According to Plutarch he was serving in the ranks as a hoplite in a battle fought not long before he retired for twenty years from public life, while his more spectacular brother, who evidently overshadowed him, led the cavalry (4, 1) and was later put in command of 400 mercenaries (4, 4).

<sup>32</sup> Westlake, *C. Q.*, XXXIV (1940), p. 45.

is more appropriate if the task entrusted to him was the eradication of tyranny.

There is some superficial attractiveness in the view that a dual menace from tyrants and Carthaginians alike was responsible for the appeal to Corinth and the expedition of Timoleon. The originators of the appeal, perhaps suspecting that the Carthaginians were trying to entice Hicetas and might soon embark upon an aggressive policy, may have instructed their envoys to invite the Corinthians to liberate Greek Sicily without defining explicitly the adversaries likely to be encountered. On the other hand, the Corinthians, who normally kept in close touch with Syracuse, cannot have been ignorant of the general situation in Sicily, and almost all the evidence examined above points to the conclusion that their aid was sought and given against tyranny. If they had anticipated Carthaginian intervention on a large scale, they would surely have sent with Timoleon a much stronger force or none at all.<sup>33</sup> It is true that the Syracusans, as in other crises of their history, stood less in need of military resources than of a disinterested leader unaffected by local jealousies, and Gylippus had arrived in Sicily with a fleet even smaller than that of Timoleon.<sup>34</sup> Gylippus, however, could count upon an almost wholehearted response by the Syracusans against the common enemy, together with substantial support from other cities; Timoleon could not.

H. D. WESTLAKE.

KING'S COLLEGE,  
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM,  
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE.

<sup>33</sup> Clasen, *Jahrb. f. cl. Phil.*, *loc. cit.*, emphasises that the Corinthian force was too small to have much prospect of success against the Carthaginians.

<sup>34</sup> The fleet assembled by Gylippus at Leucas numbered 17 ships, but he left 13 of these to follow later, and they might well have been intercepted (Thucydides, VI, 104, 1; VII, 2, 1; 4, 7; 7, 1).

## REVIEWS

PIERRE LOUIS. *Albinos: Épitomé*. Paris. "Les Belles Lettres," 1945.  
Pp. xxxiii + 184.

This book is a critical edition and translation of that "exposition of Plato's principal doctrines" which hitherto has been generally available only in the third volume of the "Didot Plato" and in the sixth volume of Hermann's Teubner edition of Plato's Dialogues<sup>1</sup> where it is called *διδασκαλικὸς τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων* and is ascribed to Ἀλκίνοος. Dr. Louis like almost all modern critics adopts Freudenthal's explanation of Ἀλκινόοι as a palaeographical error for Ἀλβίνοι; in the matter of the title he follows Diels and Alline, holding that Ἐπιτομή, which appears in three of the oldest MSS, is authentic rather than Διδασκαλικός, which most of the MSS display.<sup>2</sup>

For the constitution of the present text ten MSS were used, whereas Hermann based his text upon two MSS only and according to Louis often gave erroneous reports of these.<sup>3</sup> To the best of my observation Louis's text differs from that of Hermann in 82 places. Most of these changes represent MS readings unknown to Hermann or neglected by him; but two are emendations of Chantraine's,<sup>4</sup> and eight are emendations proposed by Louis himself.<sup>5</sup> The present text

<sup>1</sup> R. E. Witt in the preface to his study, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (Cambridge, 1937), states that he had submitted along with his dissertation an emended text, critical apparatus, and new translation of the *Didaskalikos*, the publication of which was precluded by considerations of space.

<sup>2</sup> Since the first line of the work itself declares it to be τῶν κυριωτάτων Πλάτωνος δογμάτων . . . διδασκαλία, this has more claim to the honor of being the "authentic title," if we must speak of such a thing, than any superscription in our MSS.

<sup>3</sup> These two were Parisinus gr. 1962 (P) and Parisinus gr. 1309 (Q), however, the former of which is according to Louis the best MS and the latter the oldest of those among his MSS which descend from the archetype through a copy other than P.

<sup>4</sup> VI, 10 (p. 160, 11 Hermann): *ὄνομα*; ΣV, 3 (p. 171, 29 Hermann): *ὁμοίων*. Hereafter the references by chapter and section are to the text of Louis; those by page and line in parentheses are to that of Hermann.

<sup>5</sup> X, 1 (p. 164, 9): *μέτοχα* for *μετουσία* MSS; X, 4 (p. 165, 8): *διάφορον* for *διαφορά* MSS; XIV, 1 (p. 169, 14): *τὰ μὲν δὴ σώματα <συν>ίστάς, <ἐκ> τῶν ἐμφαινόμενων*; XIX, 2 (p. 174, 7): *τι κατὶν* for *τὸ κατὶν* MSS; XIX, 3 (p. 174, 19): *ἀπὸ γλώττης* for *ἀπ' αὐτῆς* MSS; XXVIII, 1 (p. 181, 24): *ἀνθρώπῳ* for *ἀνθρώπων* MSS (cf. *Republic*, 613 B 1); XXIX, 1 (p. 182, 16-17): *τὰ δὲ ἐν εἵδει αὐτῆς· λογικαὶ δὲ* for *τῷ δὲ ἐν εἵδει αὐτῆς· λογικαὶ δὲ* MSS; XXX, 5 (p. 184, 19): *εὐπαθὴς* for *ἀπαθὴς* MSS. Of these the first, second, fifth, and sixth are at least plausible. The third (XIV, 1) is improbable, for the unanswered *μὲν* supports Hermann's assumption of a lacuna later in the sentence. The fourth (XIX, 2) is at best unnecessary. In place of the seventh (XXIX, 1) I should prefer to read *τῷ δὲ [ἐν] εἵδει αὐτῆς λογικαὶ τε καὶ αἱ περὶ τὸ ἄλογον . . .*: "The two species of virtue are intellectual virtues and those of the unreasoning part of the soul"; misunderstanding of the dual caused both the insertion of *ἐν* and the change to *τῷ*. The eighth (XXX, 5) assumes an improbable use of *εὐπαθὴς*; and I suspect that *ἀπαθὴς ἐν*

is certainly a closer approximation to what Albinus wrote than any hitherto published, and it is moreover equipped with the first really critical apparatus of the writing yet to be made available to the public. As one might have expected, however, at least three-fourths of the four score variations from the text of Hermann do not affect the meaning of Albinus as it was represented by the earlier text. As fair examples of the more interesting improvements resulting from Louis's wider and more accurate knowledge of the MSS may be mentioned αὐτὸς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει in X, 3 instead of Hermann's αὐτοῦ τὸ σχῆμα φύσει (p. 164, 33) and συμπαγῆς in XVIII, 1 (cf. *Timaeus* 45 C 4) instead of Hermann's συμπαθῆς (p. 173, 19). On the other hand, in VI, 5 Louis has printed τὸ ἄρα ποῦν in place of Hermann's τὶ ἄρα ποῦν (p. 159, 4), presumably because the best MSS have τὸ, although Q S R T have τὶ; but here τὶ must be correct, unless we are to suppose that Albinus did not know the nature of the third figure, of which this is an illustration. In XXXI, 1 Louis has adopted Hermann's "emendation" ἀγαθόν for the κακόν of the MSS, retaining however the clause πάντως ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐξαπάτηται which Hermann bracketed (p. 185, 3-4); but κακόν is correct, for ἀποικονομησόμενος means not "retirer de" but the opposite and the whole sentence as the MSS give it means: "And if one has recourse to evil, such a person is assuredly deceived in his intention to get rid of a greater evil by means of some lesser evil; and in this way his course also will be involuntary." In a few places the reading of the MSS which Louis prints is plainly corrupt. So in X, 7 he retains τὸ ἀσώματον αὐτὸ εἶναι as did Hermann (p. 166, 1); his own translation assumes αὐτόν, however, which should be written instead of αὐτό<sup>6</sup> (cf. *ἔχων*, p. 165, 33, which guarantees the gender of the subsequent ambiguous forms). In XXV, 4 Louis prints ἔτι τε without recorded variant where Hermann read ἔτι δὲ (p. 178, 10); but both syntax and logic require subordination of this first clause, a requirement which could be easily met by reading ἐπεὶ τε. In XXXII, 1 Louis like Hermann (p. 185, 26) reads καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα ἔργα οὐδ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν (though P, the oldest MS, omits τὰ) which he translates "et bien qu'elles apparaissent dans nos actions, elles ne dépendent pas de nous"; this cannot be extracted from the Greek, and the following sentence shows that the author cannot have called the πάθη our actions, so that something like Shorey's suggestion to read a negative in place of τὰ is called for (*C. P.*, III [1908], p. 97). In XXXIV, 2 Louis retains αὐτονομῇ (p. 188, 22 Hermann) which he translates "aura sa fonction propre"; but, while the context requires some such meaning, αὐτονομῇ will not supply it, and the text here is certainly unsound.

The translation, which is printed on alternate pages, though generally adequate to the Greek of Albinus, nevertheless contains more inaccuracies than there is here room or need to list. A few of the more serious ones must be mentioned, however. The translation of IV, 5 (p. 155, 12-14), "Lorsque l'âme, après avoir façonné par la pensée ses opinions à l'aide de sensations et de souvenirs contemple les premières comme les seconds qui en dérivent, . . ." misconstrues τῇ διανοίᾳ and inverts the sense of the Greek which means: "When-

τις εἴη should simply be excised as a marginal note made by some strict Stoic reader, for the sentence has better balance without it.

<sup>6</sup> This was suggested by Shorey, *C. P.*, III (1908), p. 97.

ever the soul after having fashioned judgments out of sensation and memory looks in thought to these (judgments) as if to those things from which they were derived (i. e. to the sensations themselves). . . ."<sup>7</sup> In VIII, 3 (p. 163, 4) *εἰ μέλλει κατὰ πᾶν δέχεσθαι τὰ εἶδη* means "if it is going to receive the forms throughout all its extent" (cf. *Timaeus* 51 A 2) and not "s'il faut qu'elle reçoive absolument toutes les formes." In IX, 1 (p. 163, 20) "à la nature" may be only a misprint for "à la matière" as a translation of *τῇ ὕλῃ*.<sup>8</sup> In X, 4 *κατὰ μετοχὴν γάρ τινος ἔσται οὗτος καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθότητος* (p. 165, 7-8) means "for he would exist by participation in something and especially in goodness," not "car s'il est une chose à laquelle il participe, c'est certainement le bien," a translation which mistakes both the Greek and the argument.<sup>9</sup> To translate *παρὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους . . . παρὰ πάντας ἵππους . . . παρὰ τὰ ζῷα* in XII, 1 (pp. 166, 37-167, 2) "en comparant tous les hommes, . . . en comparant tous les chevaux, . . . en partant des êtres animés . . ." is to betray amazing ignorance of the technical use of *παρὰ* to express the existence of the ideas *apart from* the particulars (cf. *Phaedo* 74 A 11 and Aristotle's distinction in *Anal. Post.* 77 A 5-7). The first lines of XIII, 3 (p. 169, 3-5) present a small problem; *βυὶ ἐκινεῖτο μὲν τὸ πρῶτον τοῖς ἔχουσιν* cannot mean "se mouvant d'abord à leur image," which would not make sense even if the Greek could bear such a meaning. *τοῖς ἔχουσιν* and the preceding *τούτοις* must go together: "matter impressed with these traces moved at first in disorder." The problem is *ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ* which precedes *ἡ ὕλη* and causes doctrinal difficulty. It should be deleted, I think, as a false anticipation of the phrase in *εἶτα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ* which follows (cf. *δταν ἀπὴ τινος θεός* in *Timaeus* 53 B). In XIII, 3 (p. 169, 9-10) *τὰ λεπτομερέστερα* does not mean "les plus légers" nor does *τῶν ἀδρομερεστέρων* mean "les plus compacts," for the latter are things "consisting of coarser particles" (the former consisting of finer particles) so that they are really less compact, as is shown by *Timaeus* 58 B 2-5 which indicates also that *εἰς τὰς . . . χώρας* does not mean "les lieux qu'occupent les plus compacts" but "the interstitial spaces of the coarser bodies." *πάντα δὲ τὰ φλεγμαίνοντα ὑπὸ χολῆς τοῦτο πέτονθε* in XXII (p. 176, 1)

<sup>7</sup> On the following words, *ἀναζωγράφησιν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁ Πλάτων καλεῖ ἐσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ φαντασίαν*, Louis has a note (note 39) referring to *Theaetetus* 161 E and *Sophist* 263 D for *φαντασία* in the sense of "imagination," which it means in neither passage (cf. *Sophist* 264 B 1 where *φαίνεται* shows that it means "appearing" in its widest sense); the appropriate reference for this statement of Albinus is *Philebus* 40 A 9: *καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐξωγραφημένα*.

<sup>8</sup> So in VI, 6 (p. 32 of the translation) *ε* clause, *s'il n'a ni commencement ni milieu ni fin*, has been dropped before "il n'a pas de limites" (a case of haplography), and in X, 8 the translation of *ἡ πῦρ* (p. 166, 8) is missing. Most of the misprints in the volume can be corrected by the reader at sight; the following, however, are not transparent: in note 134 for IX read IV, in note 161 for 52 b read 53 b, in note 314 for 62 e-63 a read 61 e-62 a, in note 374 *des animaux* should apparently be *de l'âme*, in note 436 for *Dialogues suspects* read *Dialogues apocryphes*, and in note 475 for 33 s read 33 c.

<sup>9</sup> *κατὰ μετοχὴν* causes Louis trouble in XXVII, 4 (p. 180, 37) also, for he translates *τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν* there "les biens susceptibles de participation," though it means the opposite; "things that are good by participation (*scil.* in the true good)."

means that "everything that is inflamed is so because of bile," not "toutes les inflammations causées par la bile produisent aussi ces affections." *Timaeus* 85 B 5-7, to which Louis refers, should have saved him from this careless mistake. It is still worse, however, when he translates *ὡς δέξομεν* in XXIII, 1 (p. 176, 8) "comme nous l'avons montré," not seeing apparently that the future refers to the proof of the immortality of the soul to be given in chap. XXV. A slip of the pen may have been responsible for "avant le mort" as a translation of *μετὰ θάνατον* in XXV, 2 (p. 177, 35); but, when Louis wrote "avec elle" for *μετὰ ταύτην* in XXXIV, 3 (p. 188, 28), he was apparently trying to mitigate by means of this impossible rendering the contradiction between the text of Albinus as he reads it (*τρίτην τὴν δημοκρατικὴν καὶ μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ὀλιγαρχικὴν*) and *Republic* 555 A-B, where democracy follows oligarchy. The translation of *πλεονάζει ἐν τῷ λυπείσθαι* in XXXII, 2 (p. 186, 5), "il est submergé par le chagrin," with the note that *πλεονάζειν* is not Platonic but is found in *Timaeus* Locrus, disregards the nuance of Stoic terminology (*πάθος* = *πλεονάζουσα ὁρμή*, cf. *S. V. F.*, III, p. 130, 8 ff.); Albinus means that the person who is afraid has an excess of pain, though he has not been entirely deprived of pleasure.

Louis has generally paid insufficient attention to the Peripatetic and Stoic influence upon Albinus' manner of expression as well as upon his manner of interpretation. To be sure, the notes which are subjoined to the translation are meant not to be a "commentary" but only to indicate the passages in the Platonic corpus from which Albinus borrowed,<sup>10</sup> and even so they do refer now and again to Aristotelian or to Stoic usage. The very presence of a few such references, however, may give the impression that these references exhaust the subject, and the reader should be forewarned that this is not the case. No observation is made even upon such obviously and distinctively Aristotelian passages as the classification of theoretical knowledge in III, 4 (pp. 153, 36-154, 4), the *εἶδη* inseparable from matter which are distinguished from the ideas in IV, 7 (p. 155, 34-36), or in X, 2-3 the distinction between the mind in potency and the mind which actually knows all things at once and always (p. 164, 17-18), the unmoved mover that moves as the object of desire (p. 164, 20-24), and the argument whereby it is established that the first *νοῦς* can have no other object than itself (p. 164, 24-26). No indication is given of such simple facts as that *φυσικὴ ἔννοια* is Stoic terminology which in IV, 6 (p. 155, 21-29) Albinus tries to adapt to Platonism, that in dealing with hypothetical syllogisms Albinus uses the technical terminology of the Stoics (e. g. VI, 7 [p. 159, 22]), that the words which in XIV, 6 (p. 170, 20-23) precede the famous quotation from the *Timaeus*, to which reference is duly made in note 220, are themselves Chrysippus' definition of time, or that all of XI is an adaptation of Aristotelian arguments and is directed against the Stoic doctrine of the corporeality of qualities.

The references to the Platonic corpus, though many and usually

<sup>10</sup> Cf. p. XX, n. 38. Pp. XIX-XXI of the introduction contain a brief discussion of the sources of Albinus. Louis admits that Albinus must have been profoundly influenced by Gaius and must have used earlier commentaries and handbooks but insists that the multitude of citations of the Platonic dialogues proves that these were his principal source.



correct, are themselves neither complete nor always relevant. It is disappointing, for example, to find *Republic* 476 C ff. cited for IV, 3 (p. 154, 22-28) and not *Philebus* 59 A-C and *Timaeus* 29 B-C, to be told that the account given in XIV, 7 (p. 171, 7-10) of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars does not occur in the *Timaeus* and not to be told that it does occur in *Epinomis* 987 C, to find no reference to *Epinomis* 984 B-C or Aristotle's frag. 23 for the zoögonny of XV, 1 (p. 171, 14-17), or to be given everything but the pertinent reference, *Laws* 837 B-D, for the three species of love in XXXIII, 3. All too often a reference is given to a passage in which one finds the word used by Albinus, to be sure, but in a different sense or unrelated context. An example of this kind of irrelevance is the reference to *Phaedo* 109 B and 111 B and *Timaeus* 58 D for the αἰθήρ of XV, 4 (p. 171, 30-31). The name αἰθήρ occurs in those Platonic passages, but the thing named is not ἐξωτάτω in them as it is for Albinus (cf. *A. J. P.*, LVII [1936], p. 372), who has here adapted the entirely different Aristotelian body to Platonic cosmology. A still more flagrant example is the statement (p. 104, n. 310) that the word ἀντιληπτική in XIX, 5 (p. 174, 33) was borrowed from *Definitions* 416, for in the two passages both the context and the meaning of the word are entirely different. At times one is forced to wonder whether Louis verified even his references, not to mention the contexts, with proper care, as when in his note 59 he cites *Sophist* 287 B for the word ἀπόφασις. There is no such passage, of course; but the article on ἀπόφασις in Ast's *Lexicon* also contains a reference to this non-existent passage, a misprint apparently for *Sophist* 257 B.

HAROLD CHERNISS.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON.

---

MARTIN NINOK. Die Entdeckung von Europa durch die Griechen. Basle, Benno Schwabe & Co. (New York, Albert J. Phiebig), 1945. Pp. 287.

This book begins with an attempt to define the terms in its title and to answer the questions: In what sense did the Greeks, rather than any other people, discover Europe? and how or why did Europe come to be so called? In answer to the first question the author claims that the Greeks are the only people of the ancient world to whom we can attribute a real scientific spirit in discovery; that the Phoenicians were urged on only by practical considerations and the Romans were dependent on Greek scientists for their geographical knowledge; and this thought leads him on to praise Greek science in enthusiastic terms. While no one would deny the greatness of Greek scientific achievement it is also useful to recall how well the history of Greek geography illustrates the peculiar shortcomings of Greek science—its tendency to let speculation take the place of experimental work and its constant inability to bridge the gaps between theory and practice. And it must be pointed out that Ninok has taken too little notice of these shortcomings which, in

geography at least, are easy to understand, because one can hardly expect that Greek seafaring men should co-operate enthusiastically with Greek scientists in building up a detailed map of the world.

Is it likely, for example, that they co-operated in sixth century Miletus? Ninck draws a highly coloured picture of this city, "an ancient Venice," with its scientists attempting to co-ordinate and enter on the map the mass of new information streaming in every day and trying to draw general conclusions from the reports of returning mariners (p. 37). Even apart from the fact that the great age of Milesian expansion and colonization definitely preceded the great age of *historia*, the picture is quite unconvincing. An ancient mariner is a trader in search of new and profitable markets rather than a servant of science, and if he discovers a new source of wealth he is hardly likely to broadcast his information or even to share with his countrymen the prize for which he has risked his life. The Greeks, no less than the Phoenicians, had to earn their living in a hard world; as Hesiod tells us, it was poverty (not scientific curiosity) which made them voyage to distant lands; and if the Phoenicians are more famous for their jealous monopoly of trade routes, it is not because they were less devoted to science than the Greeks, but because their trade seems to have been more highly organized by the state. In fact, Ninck is too much inclined to explain the character of Greek exploration in terms of Greek national character, even when there is a simpler explanation lying ready to hand. For example, after noting that their exploration rarely penetrated far into the interior, he deduces that the Greeks had little taste for exploration by land. Little opportunity, one must reply, rather than little taste, when there were few navigable rivers in Europe that they could follow upstream and, if they deserted their ships and followed land routes, they must expect interference with native trade to be resented and resisted. It would have been well to lay more emphasis on the choice of islands and defensible peninsulas for initial settlement, as illustrating the fear of attack by jealous barbarians.

Chapter II is devoted to the second question—the origin of Europe as the name of a continent. Ninck tries to show that, like the names Hellas, Italia, and Asia, Europe was originally the name of a smaller area and its meaning gradually extended. He wants to identify the original Europe with the area in which Europa, as a mythological character, and Europa or Europus, as place names, occur in early times; and he comes to the conclusion that this area was bounded by the Corinthian Gulf on the south and the River Axios on the north. He admits himself, however, that the stages by which the use of the name was extended cannot be traced, so that his theory, even if correct, has little value. His etymology of Europe from *εὐρώς* (mould or rust) and his view that Europa was originally a dark-faced water nymph will probably not be widely accepted. It may be added here that on several occasions he seizes the opportunity for mythological and etymological digressions.

Chapter III is devoted to the history of Greek geographical theory and knowledge (*Wandlungen im Weltbild der Griechen*). This is a subject which lends itself fairly well to a simple and brief sketch; but if one tries to go beyond the bare outline, there is a risk of

becoming unintelligible unless the essay is expanded into a whole book. Ninek tries to show in this chapter of fifty-eight pages how the Greeks pictured the world to themselves at different epochs and he complements this history of geographical theory with a discussion of map-making from Hecataeus to Ptolemy. Unfortunately he does not succeed in making the individual theories of the early philosophers stand out clearly, because he does not take enough time to show the language they used and to quote actual fragments; and by harking back to Homer, in the manner of Strabo, and referring without warning to writers of different periods he is bound to confuse the uninitiated even further. For example, he refers to the celebrated Hippocratean statement ( $\pi\epsilon\lambda\lambda\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\nu$ , 12) that Ionia "lies midway between the sunrises towards the east" before he has even mentioned the view that Delphi was the central point of the world and before he has made sufficiently clear the early conception of a fixed horizon, according to which winter and summer sunrises were fixed points, not relative to the position of the observer (for this question he might have referred to W. A. Heidel, *The Frame of the Ancient Greek Maps* [New York, 1937]). Furthermore, his reference to this statement is packed into the same paragraph as a discussion of the Eastern and Western Ethiopians in Homer. In a book of this kind it must be assumed that a chapter on geographical theory is meant to be intelligible to a reader with no previous knowledge of the subject. It would have been better, therefore, to explain the old Ionian views more fully and more directly, instead of spending so much time over the vexed question of the early division of continents.

His two maps of the world according to Hecataeus and according to Eratosthenes cannot be allowed to pass without comment. Of the former, which is reproduced on the dust-cover, it must be enough to say that he has failed to take account of the remarks of Hugo Berger, who considers that the evidence for reconstruction, except in certain particulars, is lacking (*Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Erdkunde der Griechen* [2nd ed., Leipzig 1903], pp. 112-118). For Eratosthenes, of course, there is more precise information available, and it is disappointing to see that Ninek has made the same error in drawing his map that Kiepert makes in his *Atlas Antiquus*. Strabo (I, 4, 2) in giving the distances from point to point along the meridian which passes through Rhodes lists the number of stades from Meroe to Alexandria, to the Hellespont, to the Borysthenes, and then "to the parallel that runs through Thule, which Pytheas says is six days voyage north of Britain." Ninek, like Kiepert, puts Thule itself on this meridian, due north of the mouth of the Borysthenes, with the result that it is north-east, not north, of Britain. A more correct version of Eratosthenes' map can be found in Irene Curnow, *The World Mapped* (London, 1930).

Space for further detailed criticism of this chapter cannot be taken here. It is worth noting that, in discussing the origin of the doctrine of a spherical earth, he looks to Parmenides and Eudoxus for the germ of this point of view and makes a useful comparison between this development in geography and astronomy and the simultaneous development of solid geometry and of an increasing sense of three dimensions in art.

With Chapter IV. the treatment of discovery in different parts of Europe begins—first the East, then in subsequent chapters Greece and Crete, Italy and islands of the western Mediterranean, the West, and the North. The meaning of the definition of *Entdeckung* made in the first sentence of the book now becomes clear. The author is not concerned with commercial exploration or exploitation of new territories, but with what he calls “discovery in the scientific sense of the word—namely, the illumination and revelation of matter hitherto dark and undisclosed.” Hence he gives no sketch of colonial or economic development. In the chapter on the East, for example, the Spartocid dynasty receives exactly three lines (p. 133). His interest in this chapter is to show how Greek knowledge is revealed in literature and works of art; and accordingly he gives a number of illustrations of objects found in South Russia and some extensive quotations in translation from Herodotus. Before the time of Herodotus and before the nomad Scythians came into South Russia to displace the Cimmerians he is disposed to believe that Aristaeus of Proconnesus really did penetrate far into the interior. Post-Herodotean writers he dismisses (quite properly) as worthless from an ethnographical point of view until Strabo, who is again dealing with an entirely different world after the migrations of the intervening centuries. In fact, he is ready to deduce from the silence of Strabo that no Greek writer ever did describe conditions during or after the period of transition when the old Scythian empire was broken by up invading tribes in the third and second centuries B. C.

If this is correct, the conclusion should follow that the story of Greek discovery in Scythia is a story of failure; that no one discovered anything, in the proper sense of the word, between Herodotus and Strabo. But an answer must be made here which holds true for Gaul and Spain as well as for South Russia. The ethnographic works of which we have any knowledge originated mostly in Greece, Asia Minor, or Sicily, not in the remote northern or western colonies. This does not mean, however, that the merchants of Olbia, for example, knew no more in 350 than Herodotus could find out in 450; or that the Hellenized community of the kingdom of Pontus put nothing useful down on paper about contemporary conditions and events in the centuries that followed. We have to remember that even the story of Pytheas' voyage to the north-west is not known to us directly from a Massaliot source and we can scarcely speak with confidence about the local sources on which Posidonius drew for his knowledge of Gaul. Early ignorance of the interior of Gaul can easily be explained by the secretiveness of the merchants of Massalia; it is clearly impossible that the mystery could be maintained for some three centuries in Massalia itself; but it is exceedingly likely that of the local literary products of the western Hellenic outposts only a very small proportion reached the Alexandrian library.

A proper conclusion, therefore, should be that the literary sources available to us cannot be expected to give an adequate idea of the exploration, either scientific, commercial, or military, of the frontier areas of the Hellenic world; and if one would seek an answer

to the questions that arise, one must consult, in addition, not only archaeology but one's own imagination. But what of less remote areas, of Greece itself, Macedonia, Thrace, and the Italian peninsula? Here Ninck restricts himself for the most part to literary sources and quotes most extensively from authors whose stated purpose it is to describe the country and the people. For Greece itself his choice of literary material seems somewhat arbitrary, because he offers no extensive quotation from any author previous to the fourth century, by which time the real work of discovery was already finished. He makes no mention of the passages in Herodotus and Thucydides which illustrate the discovery of different areas of Greece in the fifth century; and he treats Polybius as the real discoverer of Italy, relegating earlier writers on Italy to a footnote (p. 171, n. 2). The Peloponnesian War, he might have added, played a great part in familiarizing people in the larger states with more remote parts of Greece and the interior of Sicily. Sometimes the lesson was learned painfully, like the disastrous discovery by Demosthenes that Aetolia was not a suitable country for hoplite warfare or the revelation of the character of the Thracian mercenaries when they massacred the people of Mycalessus (Thucydides, VII, 29). By confining himself to descriptive passages in post-classical Greek literature Ninck has left out a very important stage in the discovery of Greece itself.

The reader is therefore likely to be puzzled about the real object of the author, because the passages which he quotes do not really illustrate the history of Greek discovery in Greece and Italy, although the earlier chapters have suggested that this is what they will do and the closing chapters are concerned with discoveries in the West and North. As an introduction to Greek exploration the ordinary reader will not find this book either as useful or as stimulating as Cary and Warmington's *The Ancient Explorers* (London, 1929).

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

---

MAX POHLENZ: *Der Hellenische Mensch*. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1947. Pp. 478; illustrations.

As classical scholarship in Germany resumes the publication of its researches, necessarily under restricted conditions, it becomes of great interest to us in other lands to observe the direction that it proposes for itself. It is to be expected that the editing of texts will continue with the traditional German thoroughness. But quite as important is the investigation and appraisal of classical antiquity in its larger aspects in the light of modern problems. Any classical scholar who is worth his salt must sooner or later seek to determine the relation of his special interests to the whole context of ancient and modern life and thought, whether in the boldness of his youth or in the riper wisdom of his maturity. Two notable and encouraging examples of such attempts, by eminent German Hellenists, have come to the attention of the present reviewer.

The first such work to reach me after the War is the stimulating volume of essays by Bruno Snell: *Die Entdeckung des Geistes, Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denken bei den Griechen* (Hamburg, Claassen and Goverts, 1946. Pp. 264). Of the ten essays, written over a period of seventeen years, seven have received previous publication; but the present enlarged collection presents a logical if not complete study of the development of self-consciousness and its means of expression from Homer to Callimachus, with much of interest to students of literature and philosophy, as well as to philologists.

Max Pohlenz, a veteran scholar whose studies in both Greek and Latin letters are already well known, now gathers the rich and varied stores of his learning into a far-ranging work, the purpose of which is nothing less than the portrayal of the *ethos* of the ancient Greeks. This is a task that other scholars, admirably equipped, have shunned in favor of more specialized undertakings. Even the many-sided August Boeckh never achieved the writing of his projected "Hellen," though he gave an earnest of what it might have become in his *Encyclopädie* (pp. 263-300). Pohlenz has brooded long over his subject, and can incorporate some of his own earlier studies; as well as those of others, into this well-balanced and judicious survey. (Though it was published in 1947, the text was apparently printed before Snell's book, which is therefore cited in only a few of the numerous notes. Other notes, by the way, refer to many works by German scholars, but very rarely to any works by scholars of other countries.) In a book that deals with so many subjects,—literature, religion, philosophy, and semantics,—it would be unfair to expect that fulness of discussion which is to be found in more specialized treatises on various aspects of the subject. But few pertinent topics are overlooked; the author's judgment in all important matters is sound; the *dispositio* is admirable; the style is lucid; and the book abounds in skilfully chosen and well translated passages from the ancient authors that forcibly point up the discussion. The seventeen pages of illustrations (landscape, sculpture, architecture, vases) provide more than decoration; they contribute vividly to the interpretations set forth in the text.

Pohlenz has considered, and rejected, a simple chronological method of approach; that, he feels, would detract from the unity of the subject. He has followed instead a topical method, but has arranged his material within the several chapters on a chronological basis, assuming on the part of his reader a fair degree of familiarity with the main outlines of Greek history. The material is derived chiefly from literary and philosophical sources; it deduces from them, and analyzes, the psychological and social aspects of the Greek man in a rather generalized form, with only an occasional attempt to recognize more special and individualized expressions of humanity. The general questions raised by the book are briefly summarized (p. 8) as follows:

Ausgehen wollen wir von der Frage, wieweit überhaupt der hellenische Mensch von vornherein ein sicheres Bewusstsein seiner eigenen Persönlichkeit, ein klares Ichgefühl hat. Wir wollen dann verfolgen, wie dieses Ich sich gegenüber dem Du

fühlen lernt, wie es sich zu den übersinnlichen Mächten, zum Schicksal und zur Gottheit, weiter zur menschlichen Gemeinschaft einstellt, in der allein der Einzelne physisch und geistig existieren und sich voll entwickeln kann. Wir werden dann zusehen, wie über dem Lebenswege des Hellenen drei Leitsterne leuchten, das Wahre, das Schöne und das Gute, wie er sich theoretisch seine Umwelt durch Begründung von Wissenschaft und Philosophie unterwirft, wie er sie aus seinem ästhetischen Empfinden heraus künstlerisch gestaltet und wie er praktisch in ihr die Bestimmung, auf die ihn seine Natur hinweist, zu erfüllen sucht. Den Schluss mag die Frage bilden, was dieses Hellenentum für die Menschheit bedeutet, und was es ihr noch heute zu sagen hat.

It would be unprofitable to undertake here a detailed consideration of the sixteen chapters and of the concluding essay, or to single out the few points about which some scholars might disagree with the author; any disagreement would be about minor details, or would turn on questions of emphasis. I shall therefore merely indicate briefly the scope of the chapters, with a few words of comment.

The first, and briefer, part of the book is entitled *Das Ich und das Du*. Chapter I is a sketch of the development, from Homer to Plato, of the sense of personal identity; of the idea of the self, of mind, or soul. II presents the self as it feels itself confronted by external powers or situations: the gods, fate, the *cosmos*. Pohlenz well takes issue with those who simplify Greek tragedy into a "tragedy of fate," and stresses the conflict between the human will and fate, with resultant suffering, and sees the continuation of this emphasis on the self in the main course of Greek philosophy. III is a many-sided discussion of Greek religion and religious philosophy through Poseidonius. In IV, the author explores the implications of the Greek *weltgefühl*, its occasional pessimism, and the recourse of some Greeks to a belief in immortality (the triumph of *jenseits* over *diesseits*). Chapter V considers the social nature of the Greeks, contrasting the Spartan and the Athenian cultures; VI deals with the political ideals of fatherland and folk, with a solidarity transcending local attachments but drawing a line between Greek and barbarian. VII derives from literature and historiography its conclusions about the extent to which the Greeks portrayed themselves and others as individual persons.

The second part of the book, entitled *Das Ich und die Gestaltung des Lebens*, shows individual and society under their three guiding stars, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Chapter VIII finds in the Greek "urge to know" the source of their discovery of the True, of science (especially medicine), and of historiography. The clarity of Greek landscape is suggested, not for the first time, as one reason for vision and formal definition becoming for the Greeks the type of knowledge. For some pages, Pohlenz touches, like Snell (and, it may be added, Kurt von Fritz) on the development of concepts and terminology for the processes of cognition and thought. IX is a summary sketch, with a minimum of detail, of the course of Greek philosophy; it characterizes Ionian thought as unpolitical, Attic as political, Hellenistic as individualistic. X passes on to

aesthetic discovery and artistic creation: the Beautiful. The main emphasis is on formal considerations, such as symmetry; whether in the fine arts or in music and poetry or even prose. But there is also discussion of the tension between portrayal and idealization, and also of the more spiritual qualities of aesthetic feeling and character, and of theories of artistic creation. XI handles sensitively the difficult theme of the Greek feeling for nature. Though the Greek language lacks any expression corresponding to "*naturgefühl*," and *physis* has different overtones from our "nature," though the Greeks did not take walks in order to give themselves up to "free nature," their feeling for life as a whole included innumerable contacts with what we call "nature." (This chapter may well be supplemented by Snell's last essay, "Arkadien, die Entdeckung einer geistigen Landschaft.")

The remaining chapters are devoted to the Good. XII, on the practical conduct of life, is still on the philosophical rather than the political or historical level; for it exhibits, with some semantic elucidations, the conflicts and the reconciliation of ethical concepts, culminating in a general eudaemonism. XIII, on the forms of life and work, traces the effects of the changing Greek economy on Greek ideals and notions of social prestige; in spite of a tendency to a cleavage between practical-political and theoretical-scientific ideals, the characteristic Greek attitude, Pohlenz is persuaded, was neither boorish nor snobbish, but was based on a realization that man shall not live by bread alone. XIV, on women, marriage, the family, and slaves, is again a study of contrasting attitudes; if the Greek record is not wholly admirable, the best thought, at least, of the Greeks was enlightened and was indeed ahead of contemporary practice in Greece and elsewhere.

A chapter of special interest is XV, on cultural life and society. To whom was Greek literature addressed? Apart from lyrics and those exceptional instances of meditative self-address to be found in drama, and of the more or less limited audience of most Greek elegy, the strong trend, especially in the fifth century, was toward a general public. Greek literature and thought therefore became the expression of social life and its problems, and was in the best sense political. XVI raises the problem of complete manhood and of the means of achieving it. Are body and soul to be forever in conflict, and to be cultivated separately? Greek education, at least, sought to effect a harmony; even the unique role of the *agon*, in athletics, in drama, and in other activities, with its parallel in the tendency of all Greek thought toward antithetical or polarized expression, contributed to a generous emulation of commonly held ideals of excellence. The concluding essay (pp. 433-453), on Hellenism and mankind, on humanity and humanism, presents the individual as he confronts society and the world and finds himself in them. This essay both recapitulates many of the themes previously discussed, showing a trend toward an ideal transcending local and political boundaries, and glances at the impact of Hellenism on Roman humanism and on later times. It summarizes much of the earlier discussion; it could also be read as an independent essay.

This is a rich feast. If it hurries the banqueter from one course to another, if it often tempts the appetite without sating it, the fare



is solid and nutritious. The author has given memorable expression to ideas that deserved to be brought together in such a comprehensive work.

I have found no tendentious sentence in the text. The dedication reads: "*Dem deutschen Menschen gewidmet, zur Zeit seiner tiefsten Not, im festen Glauben an seinem Wiederaufstieg.*" For this sentiment men of good will in every land may feel respect, and may share the author's faith. His book is a happy augury for its realization.

WILLIAM C. GREENE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

---

ANDRÉ LAMBERT. Die indirekte Rede als künstlerisches Stilmittel des Livius. University of Zürich doctoral dissertation, 1946. Pp. 80.

The dissertation under consideration is the latest product of the current trend in Livian research that goes back for its origin to Witte's pathbreaking article "Über die Form der Darstellung in Livius' Geschichtswerk" (*Rh. Mus.*, LXV [1910], pp. 270-305 and 359-419). Briefly put, the aim of this trend has been to judge Livy on the basis of his own intentions, avowed or deducible, rather than from the point of view of the modern "scientific" historian, as had been the fashion among Livian appraisers, especially in Germany, during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The somewhat jaundiced criticism of scholars like H. Nissen (*Kritische Untersuchungen über die 4. und 5. Dekade des Livius* [Berlin, 1863]), H. Hesselbarth (*Historisch-kritische Untersuchungen zur dritten Dekade des Livius* [Halle, 1889]) and W. Soltan (e. g. *Livius' Geschichtswerk, seine Komposition und seine Quellen* [Leipzig, 1897]) was united in seeing in Livy a mere compiler, transcriber, and, occasionally, falsifier of his predecessors. The new trend, on the other hand, exemplified in a number of dissertations and other studies (e. g. L. Delaruelle's "Les procédés de rédaction de Tite-Live étudiés dans une de ses narrations," *Rev. Phil.*, XXXVII [1913], pp. 145-161; or F. Hellmann's masterly *Livius-Interpretationen* [Berlin, 1939]), has resulted in a more sympathetic treatment and in general in a truer evaluation of the *Ab Urbe Condita* than could be achieved by students annoyed at the historian for not being what they themselves were.

In another respect also Lambert is in harmony with present tendencies: he is not interested in statistical research (p. 19), nor in syntactical minutiae; instead, it is the personality and the artistic method and achievement of his author that form the subject of his investigation.

A puzzling fact is the absence hitherto of detailed studies on the abundant use made by Livy throughout his history of the device known as *oratio obliqua*—indirect discourse. Its prevalence, as well as its usefulness, has often, to be sure, been remarked, as Lambert points out (pp. 18-19), yet never treated with the thoroughness the subject deserves. Indeed, with the exception of the article

by R. Hansen, "Zum Gebrauch der oratio obliqua in Tacitus' *Historiae* und *Annales*" (*Festschrift Oberbibliothekar Wilhelm Munthe*, [Oslo, 1933], pp. 348-361), to which Lambert refers (p. 20, n. 1), I know of no studies on the use of indirect discourse in any other ancient historian. For Livy, at least, Lambert's dissertation serves admirably to fill the need. Logically, dispassionately (cf. e.g. the sensible remarks about "Quellenforschung" on pp. 5-6, in which it is refreshing to note the total absence of the disparaging attitude commonly taken nowadays by non-German scholars towards the aims and methods of Teutonic philological studies), with abundance of supporting material and a praiseworthy clarity of arrangement, he presents the problem and supplies the answer.

Ragnar Ullmann, whose work on the speeches in *oratio recta* is the most solid study of the subject (*La Technique des Discours dans Salluste, Tite Live et Tacite* [Oslo, 1927] and *Étude sur le Style des Discours de Tite Live* [Oslo, 1929—Lambert gives the publication date as 1928]), had dismissed the speeches in *or. obl.* as having "pas d'intérêt pour la composition" (*La Technique*, p. 23; cf. Lambert, p. 18). Accordingly, after an introductory chapter devoted to a presentation of the problems raised by the existence of speeches in ancient historiography in general and in Livy in particular, Lambert proceeds to a formal proof that Livy's speeches in indirect discourse are as artistic and rhetorically developed as those in *or. rect.* This proof consists of a competent and convincing analysis of fifteen of these speeches, ranging in length from one to fifty-eight lines of Teubner text, chosen from books I though VI and from book XXIV (which form the basis, though not exclusively, of the entire investigation), followed by lists of samples of such devices as alliteration, paronomasia, and the rhetorical question:

Once the rhetorical nature of the matter under study, and therefore, so to speak, its claim on our attention, have been established, Lambert turns to an examination of the forms the speeches assume and the purposes to which Livy puts them. Again using the method of presenting a brief yet representative selection of examples, the author sets up four distinct categories: suggested or reported speeches—brief summaries of the main points of a speech; somewhat longer summaries in which the various stages are sketched in with greater detail; full-length speeches, rivaling in execution—and in length—similar speeches in *or. rect.*; and speeches wherein both *or. rect.* and *or. obl.* are employed, with transition from the one to the other (in a few cases more than once). In the next chapter Lambert presents, in the same analytical manner, three main classes of uses: the expression of the thoughts, emotions, or opinions of a group; the further elaboration, explanation, or justification of events and statements; and the relation of messages, letters, and *rumores*. In these instances, Lambert not merely presents his illustrations in full, but illuminates them with interpretive remarks of an acutely sensitive nature. Indeed, one of the few objections to be made to the study as a whole is that these remarks are scattered throughout, rather than summarized in one conveniently located place.

Always, however, the peculiar flavor added to Livy's work by the insertion of these speeches in *or. obl.* is kept in the foreground: their importance in the general framework of the "indirect" method

of ancient historiography; their value for the attainment of the stylistic unity which was of paramount importance to the ancients; the skill with which Livy employs *or. obl.* to enhance the dramatic character of his story, e.g. in constructing climaxes; and, perhaps most attractive from the modern point of view, the vitality and human interest that the device makes possible—the reader finds himself not merely being informed of what is happening, but actually transported into the midst of events, in which he participates through the constant insight given him into the feelings and motives of individuals and groups. In Lambert's words: "wir vermögen mitzuleben und mitzuleiden, weil wir hinter den Tatsachen der Geschichte den Menschen sehen, der sie gestaltet" (p. 72).

This last point Lambert makes particularly clear in the first of his last three chapters, in which he draws a fruitful comparison between Livy and Polybius. In a series of six parallel passages the reader is shown exactly how the Roman transforms the pedantic and often clumsy and ineffective presentation of his Greek source: "Konzentration des Interesses auf die Hauptperson, trotzdem Einheit des Stils und flüssiges Fortschreiten der Erzählung, und zwar durch das eine Mittel der Einführung einer indirekten Rede . . ." (p. 59).

The study is concluded by two brief chapters on the use of indirect discourse in Sallust and Caesar, again elaborated so that the distinctive quality of Livy's approach is clearly shown. Sallust's use of the device is limited: "Sie soll uns keinen tieferen Einblick in die Gedanken der Personen geben, sondern vor allem die Handlung weiter fördern" (p. 66). Caesar, on the other hand, as is well known, uses *or. obl.* almost exclusively; for him it is no longer a "Stilmittel," but a "Stilprinzip" (p. 70), which results almost inevitably from the very nature of the *commentarius*.

Readable, compact, scholarly without ostentation, the dissertation offers little ground for adverse criticism. The "Stellenverzeichnis," which is limited to Livy, might have included Polybius, Sallust, and Caesar. There is no bibliography, so that one is occasionally compelled to hunt for a reference through earlier footnotes. The proof-reading is excellent; I have found no errors among the numerous quotations and citations, and only an infrequent slip, such as the inclusion in italics of *litterae* in example 11 on p. 23 and the failure to use italics for *consulum* in example 15 (fourth line) on the same page; on p. 40, in example 5, a semicolon should replace the comma after *creemus* (eleventh line). Finally, the statement (p. 9) that the number of speeches in the earlier part of the *Ab Urbe* is "kaum weniger" than in the later, more historical books, is not accurate: while the total number of speeches (*or. rect.* and *or. obl.*) decreases from 62 in book I to 56 in books XXX and XXXIX, the amount of space given to speeches as opposed to pure narrative increases from 18.2% in book I to 37.4% in book XLV.

These, however, are minor points. Lambert's study is a valuable contribution to our knowledge and understanding not merely of Livy but of the methods and ideals of ancient historiography as well.

KONRAD GRIES.

P. J. ENK. *Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Liber I* (Monobiblos), cum prolegomenis, conspectu librorum et commentationum ad IV libros Propertii pertinentium, notis criticis, commentario exegetico. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1946. Pars prior prolegomena et textum continens, pp. xii + 162; pars altera commentarium continens, pp. 210.

This work is the product of Enk's long interest in the elegies of Propertius. His *Ad Propertii Carmina commentarius criticus* appeared in 1911 and has been followed by a number of articles in *Museum* and *Mnemosyne*. His plan to follow the *Commentarius criticus* immediately by an edition of Propertius was abandoned in deference to O. L. Richmond's already projected new edition (Cambridge, 1928). The appearance of the latter and the general rejection which met Richmond's radical treatment of the text have induced Enk to revive his earlier plan, though he has now restricted himself to a text and commentary to Book I alone, together with an introduction to the whole of Propertius.

The *Prolegomena*, which occupy the major part of the first volume, begin with a clear and sensible evaluation of previous studies concerning the life of Propertius, the dates of publication and the division into books, the origin of Roman elegy, and the MSS of Propertius (pp. 3-54). In general these portions of Enk's work cover the same ground as Butler and Barber in the introduction to their edition of Propertius, and do not differ greatly in conclusions reached. A *Tabula poetarum qui Propertium aut imitati sunt aut saltem legerunt* (pp. 54-77), although it adds nothing to the list given by Hosius (ed. 3, praef. xxiii-xxx) and supplemented by Fletcher (*Mnemosyne*, 3rd Ser., I [1934], pp. 192-3), is far more usable than the cramped list of the Teubner edition, since Enk prints the passages themselves rather than references alone. Certain corrections should be noted: on page 55, line 34, for *Prop. I. 6. 24* read *Prop. I. 6. 34*; page 57, line 15, for *Prop. II. 9. 21* read *Prop. II. 19. 21*; page 58, line 30, for *Prop. 14. 4. 17* read *Prop. IV. 4. 17*; page 63, line 2, for *Sil. VI. 363* read *Sil. VI. 263*; page 66, line 8, for *Stat. Theb. XII. 38* read *Stat. Theb. XII. 338*; page 70, line 37, for *Auson. parent. XVIII. 15* read *Auson. parent. XVII. 15*; page 74, line 28, for *Rutil. I. 3. 61* read *Rutil. I. 361*.

The *Prolegomena* conclude with a very useful classified bibliography (pp. 78-124). It includes 82 complete editions of Propertius (either alone or together with other poets), 49 editions of selected elegies, 90 translations into 10 languages, and over 600 articles and monographs. Reviews of the more important items are also listed. It is not surprising that Enk has included few titles published since 1939, although his work was published in 1946. Omission of Troll's *Jahresbericht* for the years 1920-24 (*JAW*, CCVIII [1926], pp. 67-85) is evidently an oversight. Of other items which are not mentioned perhaps the most important is the discussion of Propertius III, 24 by B. O. Foster in this journal (XXX [1909], pp. 54-60). Butler's curt review of Enk's *Commentarius criticus* is not listed (*C.R.*, XXVI [1912], p. 170). On page 78, line 26, for *CCLXI*

read *CCLX*; on page 83, line 24, for *Class. Phil.* read *Class. Weekly*; on page 147 the reference to Ullman applies to verse 13 rather than verse 12, and the page should be given as 296 rather than 226.

The text of Book I with critical apparatus at the foot of the page concludes the first volume (pp. 125-162). Since there is as yet no full edition of Propertius with a critical apparatus fully adequate for students of the relations of the MSS, Enk has undertaken to provide an apparatus which will present the MS evidence for Book I in complete detail. He therefore reports all variants of NAFPDVVo, including purely orthographical differences with the sole exception of confusions of *e* and *ae* or *oe*. He also gives many particulars concerning erasures and corrections which may have bearing upon the MS relations. For all these MSS, except F, Enk has himself made new collations (collating ADVo directly, photographs of P and V, and Birt's photographic edition of N). The inclusion of occasional readings of inferior MSS and a large number of modern conjectures results in a very lengthy apparatus, which nevertheless remains clear to the eye because of the excellence of print and paper and the generous use of space.

Enk's evaluation of the MSS accords essentially with what may be considered the standard view. N is the oldest and best representative of a MS which is presumed to have existed in the Carolingian age. A is an independent witness to this archetype. F and P are both descended from A, and become important for the constitution of the text after II, 1, 63, where A ends. Inclusion of these two MSS in the apparatus of Book I is therefore important solely for judging the value of their evidence after the point where A breaks off. F, as Ullman has shown (*C. P.*, VI [1911], pp. 282-301), is a copy of a MS owned by Petrarch, which is now lost but was probably a copy of A. Readings of F have been known since Baehrens' edition, but a satisfactory collation adequately distinguishing the correcting hands was first published by Alice Catherine Ferguson in her valuable dissertation, *The MSS. of Propertius* (Chicago, 1934); the distinction of the hands is important because only the first two correctors supply material taken from Petrarch's MS. The chief novelties of Enk's apparatus, aside from its full reporting of minor details in the other MSS, are the precise distinction of the correcting hands in F, based largely on Ferguson's work, and the full presentation of P, which has hitherto been generally known only through the restricted selection of readings given by Butler and Barber. Enk follows Barber (*C. R.*, XLIX [1935], p. 235) in regarding P as descended from A independently of Petrarch's MS. The evidence, however, does not appear to warrant this conclusion, since a close relationship between F and P is indicated by important points of agreement between them against both A and N. Among the examples which Enk's apparatus shows in Book I are the following: 1, 10 *ysidos* FP *yasidos* A *iasidos* N; 2, 1 *victa* FP *vitta* A *vita* N; 3, 33 *ocellis* FP *ocellos* AN; 4, 10 *erat* F *erit* P *eat* AN; 10, 20 *egit* F *eger* P *egit* AN; 12, 19 *me neque* F<sup>2</sup>P *minimeque* F<sup>1</sup> *mi neque* AN; *desistere* FP *dissistere* AN; 15, 18 *ysiphile* F *ysiphile* P *hypsiphile* A *hysiphile* N; 15, 19 *ysiphile* FP *hypsiphile* AN; 20, 20 *missorum* FP *mysorum* A *misorum* N. The

agreement of P and F<sup>2</sup> in the reading *me neque* at 12, 19 is particularly significant, since Ullman has shown that *me neque* is probably a conjecture of Petrarch. At 20, 21, where A has *houm*, F has *hominum* and P now has the correct *heroum*; Enk states, however, that *heroum* in P is in an erasure, and it seems not unlikely that P originally had *hominum* with F. Since P and F thus agree in certain differences from A (and cannot have derived these readings from N, which agrees with A) it seems probable that P and F are both descended from Petrarch's MS. The family DVVo is included by Enk in his apparatus "*cum hi codices hic illic bonas praebeant lectiones*," but he does not attempt to explain the source of these readings, and finds Vo of value only as it confirms readings of D and V. All other MSS (except L which begins only at II, 21, 3) he considers valueless. He convincingly attacks the case which Bonazzi has made for Palatino-Vaticanus 910, but does not discuss the MSS other than FPL considered by Ferguson to be independently descended from A.

In his constitution of the text Enk seeks to avoid both excessive devotion to the authority of N and the temptation to re-write Propertius by assuming widespread interpolation, loss, and dislocation in the MSS. He follows Housman in assuming the loss of two verses after 1, 11, and Markland in transposing verses 15 and 16 of the fifteenth elegy to follow verse 20. A transposition of 15 and 16 is certainly necessary and, though the palaeographical argument of Butler and Barber for placing them after 22 is stronger than Enk allows, he is probably right in placing them after 20, since 22 leads naturally to 23-24, as 16 does not. Housman's arguments for assuming the loss of two verses in the first elegy are hardly strengthened by Enk's suggestion that there is thus revealed a strophic arrangement of  $8 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 8$  verses. This analysis requires an arbitrary separation of the Milanion example into two parts, and the uncertainty involved in making the assumption of strophic arrangement a basis for changes in the text of Propertius is illustrated by the fact that Jacoby, proposing to excise 33-34, believed that this same elegy falls into a quite different strophic arrangement,  $8 + 8 + 2 + 6 + 6 + 6$  (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, LIV [1933], p. 1983). Aside from these two points, Enk's text shows neither transpositions nor lacunae. In general it agrees more closely with the text offered by Butler and Barber than with any other, and in his preface he states his judgment that theirs is the best previous edition of Propertius. He agrees with them in departures from the reading of NA at a number of disputed points (*aut* 1, 25; *ducti* 3, 27; *ducere* 4, 14; *domo* . . . *Memmonia* 6, 4; *extrema* . . . *nequitia* 6, 26; *utere* 8, 19; *vera* 8, 22; *erit* 8, 27; *quae* . . . *cuique* 10, 19; *et modo* 11, 4; *amoto* 11, 15; *dignae* 13, 29; *quodcumque* 13, 36; *crimina* 18, 9; *sit* 20, 13). Occasionally he retains a reading of NA which they have rejected (*deus* 4, 26; *nostri* 4, 27; *solet* 5, 8; *fuerant* 11, 29; *in* 13, 24; *reponere* 17, 11; *ne* 21, 6). His defense of the MSS in each case deserves consideration, though the suggestion that *mea fata reponere* (17, 11) refers to the erection of a cenotaph is rather ingenious than convincing. Much more frequent are his departures from NA, so that his text is less con-

servative than that of Butler and Barber. The most attractive of the conjectures which he adopts are *nunc* (Beck) for *non* at 11, 21, and *Umbrae sacra* (Hoeufft) for *umbrosae* at 20, 7. He twice prints conjectures of his own: *pergaudent* for *persuadent* (2, 13) and *sed* for *et* (21, 9). Both meet undoubted difficulties in the received text, though neither provides an entirely convincing solution. *Litora* . . . *pergaudent* (2, 13) would mean that the *litora* themselves take pleasure in their own beauty, and so interrupt a series of examples illustrating the effect that natural beauty exercises upon the beholder. In elegy 21, where Enk retains the *ne* of the MSS in verse 6, he changes *et* to *sed* in verse 9 in order to provide a clear contrast between the information which Gallus wished concealed (that he died at the hands of brigands) and that which he wished revealed (the identity of his bones). If we accept this interpretation of the request made by Gallus, *sed* is unquestionably an improvement on *et*; but Enk does not discuss the contradiction thus implied between this elegy and the statement in the following elegy that Gallus (who must be the *propinquus* of 22, 7) never received burial. Since *sed* emphasizes rather than removes this contradiction, it remains a doubtful conjecture.

The commentary to Book I with an index forms the second volume. The fullness of the notes is indicated by the fact that 200 pages are devoted to the 22 elegies. There is hardly a line, and in some elegies hardly a word, that passes without comment. Every conjecture or interpretation of any possible value is reviewed. Possible sources and parallels are quoted freely and in full. Enk knows well what has been written on Propertius and has undertaken to bring together in his commentary everything that bears upon the first book. The merits and the faults of this method are evident. It is a convenience to have so much material clearly summarized; the full quotation of parallels is welcome, since the reader can quickly judge their worth for himself; there are many useful comments on Propertius' language, particularly on his use of *sermo cottidianus*. But of the mass of material presented much might well have been omitted. The comment on *miserum me* in 1, 1 (*statim ipso carminis initio poeta ostendit quam miserum Amor se reddiderit*) states what is both obvious and only half true; *miser* is in fact a technical term in erotic vocabulary and marks a lover who is the victim of violent and overpowering passion, whether he is "happy" or not in gaining the loved one's favor. *Dolor hic meus* (18, 13) is explained as meaning *ego dolens*, but even the Latin tyro who alone might be helped by such a comment, is rather misled than enlightened by it. Three pages are devoted to two notes on the wearing, source, and making of silk (2, 2 and 14, 22) and nearly a page to the dyeing of wool (3, 41). At 18, 20, where the poet calls on the surrounding trees to bear witness to his love, a note on *fagus* states: *de fagi amoribus nihil traditum*. Most of the more interesting of Enk's own contributions to the interpretation of Propertius have already appeared elsewhere, and the reader is often given only a reference to these discussions. It would have been more convenient for the reader if a summary of these discussions had been given; this need not have lengthened the commentary if the other notes had been restricted to what is really pertinent and illuminating.

This edition contains abundant evidence of Enk's long and dili-

gent study of Propertius. Although it offers little that is new or that advances our understanding of Propertius' thought and methods of composition, it will be found valuable for the fullness of the bibliography, critical apparatus, and commentary, and for its convenient summary of Propertian scholarship.

ARCHIBALD W. ALLEN.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

MARC ROZELAAR. *Lukrez. Versuch einer Deutung.* Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 1943. Pp. xvi + 267. 6.50 Dutch florins.

Rozelaar has set himself the task of giving a picture of "the real Lucretius," as his personality evolves from his poem (p. xvi). Having outlined the historical and intellectual situation in which Lucretius found himself (Ch. I, pp. 1-33), the author shows on the basis of linguistic and stylistic data that the poet's is a highly sensitive and passionate nature (Ch. II, pp. 34-82). The subjects dealt with by Lucretius warrant the conclusion that his predominant interest was ethical, while in his spiritual make-up there was a pathological strain (Ch. III, pp. 83-136). Finally, it is maintained that Lucretius embraced Epicureanism in order to liberate himself from fears by which he was haunted. He could not have turned to any philosopher other than Epicurus for salvation (Ch. IV, pp. 137-198).<sup>1</sup>

Except in emphasis and detail, these contentions are hardly new, and Rozelaar, I think, would be the first one to admit this. His primary concern obviously lies with the method and aim of his interpretation (Introduction). Heeding Nietzsche's protest against the mechanical type of literary analysis (p. ix), he adopts the empathic method of Humboldt, Boeckh, Schleiermacher, and Dilthey (pp. xiii f.), and combines it with the insight of modern psychologists (p. x), such as Jung (pp. 215; 223) and others (e.g., p. 217; cf. also p. 212, n. 1). He tries to interpret the poem of Lucretius in such a way that the characteristic features of the poet's personality and of his work are traced to the "psychological entity that forms their basis" (p. xvi).

I have no quarrel with Rozelaar's procedure and intention considered *in abstracto*. I fail to be convinced, however, by his conclusions *in concreto*. Accumulation of arguments sometimes may betray the passion of a writer, yet this can hardly be affirmed of Lucretius, contrary to Rozelaar's claim (p. 56). For as he himself admits at another place (pp. 179 ff.), accumulation of arguments is inherent in the exposition of Epicurean physics. Again, the description of pathological states of the mind may be due to a pathological preoccupation with such phenomena, but I doubt that such an assertion is justifiable in the case of Lucretius (p. 119). Although he has no "professional interest" in medicine (*ibid.*), he is interested in medical data as a philosopher, for whom the nature of the human mind is one of the central issues, and what he says, he copies after

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 201-226 contain the footnotes; pp. 229-267 the translations of such passages from Lucretius as are quoted *verbatim* in the text. With some modifications they are taken from Diels and Binder.



all from Hippocrates (p. 117), an author studied in antiquity by philosophers and laymen alike. Familiarity with the etiology of diseases makes Lucretius neither a physician, nor a patient, nor even a person of frail health (p. 121)—the nature of the human body, too, is a subject of ancient philosophy—, and a poet certainly must not know all the anxieties which he portrays from his own experience (p. 121). Is there not, as especially Dilthey stresses, poetical imagination, poetical vision?<sup>2</sup> And is not Lucretius, according to Rozelaar (e.g., p. 152), above everything else a poet? Or if Lucretius was intent on regaining the health of his soul (p. 144), why should Epicureanism have been the only means to this end (*ibid.*)? Stoicism gave to many the peace of mind for which they were striving, reconciled them to the gods, taught them to live with men by withdrawing from their company, and even to overcome erotic passions, gains that Lucretius is said to have reaped from Epicureanism (pp. 192 f.). The intellectualism of Epicurus seems ill suited to the needs of one who, although at times he may be immersed in "ethereal thoughts" (p. 88) or indulge in the "intoxication of the intellect" (p. 197), is fundamentally unconcerned with intellectual satisfaction (p. 144). Religious enthusiasm, which Rozelaar considers the main characteristic of Stoic philosophy (p. 194), would perhaps have "served him better" (p. 195).

Moreover, there is a tendency on the part of Rozelaar to turn against express statements of the poet. Lucretius does not write for the benefit of others, as he says, but for his own sake (pp. 79 f.); he is didactic only because he is polemical (p. 76). His wish for glory is not to be taken seriously, while his love of poetry must thus be taken (p. 84); depreciation of his poetical instinct is characteristic of Lucretius (p. 85; cf. p. 152). Most important, although the poet celebrates Epicurus as his savior (pp. 144 ff.), he actually was not saved; Epicureanism was not a remedy but a palliative (p. 196). It is true, the last aim of the empathic method of interpretation is "that of understanding the author better than he understood himself."<sup>3</sup> But this famous phrase is the result of the conviction that a work of art contains features of which the poet was not conscious. It hardly applies to data of the poet's life, and in all cases in which the interpreter has but the work of a writer to go on, while personal documents are entirely lacking, it is extremely hazardous to contradict the only evidence that is available.

If one is able to disregard Rozelaar's methodological principles and to concentrate on the analysis of individual passages, he will find interesting and rewarding pages. I mention the interpretation of Lucretius' relation to animals (p. 92), to children (p. 94), the interpretation of the *vis abdita* (p. 129). Taken as a whole, the book, at least in my opinion, fails to make a good case for the cause which it advocates.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN.

<sup>2</sup> For Dilthey's use of these terms, cf. *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* (1924)<sup>9</sup>, pp. 179 ff. Cf. also H. A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey, An Introduction* (1944), pp. 23 ff.

<sup>3</sup> W. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, V (1924), p. 331 (Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik).

MARTIN VAN DEN BRUWAENE. *Études sur Cicéron*. Bruxelles, L'Édition Universelle, S. A., 1946. Pp. 110 [2].

Martin van den Bruwaene has previously published another book on Cicero, *La théologie de Cicéron* (Louvain, 1937). His present work comprises four papers, in the style of lectures but with documentation. In the foreword he says, "Les trois premières ont fait l'objet de communications à la Société pour l'Histoire des droits de l'Antiquité; la quatrième a été lue en leçon publique à la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de Saint-Louis."

The first study has a subject of wider interest than the others, "La dot de Terentia," for in it the author discusses some of the mysterious references in Cicero's correspondence to Terentia's conduct, as well as the background of the divorce and the effect of *cautio rei uxoriae* at that period with regard to the repayment of dowries in cases of divorce. A principal point in the essay is Terentia's *testamentum*, about which Cicero was so concerned. The suggestion mentioned by Tyrrell and Purser (IV, p. 334) is accepted by van den Bruwaene (p. 17, n. 2), although he does not remark upon their pertinent note in IV, p. 321; but he pursues the idea more strongly than did Tyrrell and Purser, who reserved judgment on the meaning of the passage, for the interpretation of it is dependent upon emendation of a crux in the text (*Att.*, XI, 24, 2). The suggestion is that Terentia, involved in business debts, was including in her will provisions in favor of her creditors. Cicero was distressed by the possibility that the document might be unfair to young Marcus and to Tullia, but his anxiety was especially for Tullia who was at that moment being divorced by Dolabella and whose property had not been so carefully safeguarded as had Terentia's. There was another financial complication in that, when Cicero later divorced Terentia, he had to repay her dowry on the basis of real property because the outmoded law governing the repayment of dowries did not take cognizance of "objets domestiques" (p. 22); although it would seem that Terentia, while Cicero was away from Rome because of the civil war, had somehow plundered his moveable (i.e. personal) property, such as his works of art. This was a dishonorable but extrajudicial procedure, and one against which Cicero had no means of redress, even if he had wished to take legal action.

In the above paragraph I think I have fairly presented some of the ideas which van den Bruwaene expounds in his essay. There are several items which render suspect the accuracy of the essay. Although the author refers to Tyrrell and Purser's *The Correspondence of Cicero* in other connections, he does not mention the long footnote which runs along the bottom of pages l-lij in the introduction to their fourth volume, and which makes an effort to present Terentia's side of the divorce, showing that possibly she was not so callous as van den Bruwaene believes. That note also places the divorce of Terentia and Cicero in 46 B. C. (vol. IV, p. 1 places it at the beginning of 46), whereas this essay seems more vague than need be about its date (p. 19) but nevertheless is by some means perfectly certain that Cicero married Publilia in January

45 (p. 20). Digressing for a bit on the question of the date of the divorce, we must admit that the chronology is uncertain. Petersson (*Cicero, a Biography* [Berkeley, 1920], p. 518) says that the divorce was in late 47 or early 46. At any rate, in late 46 we find Cicero considering various candidates for his second marriage (*Att.*, XII, 11), and there is no indication that he is remarrying hastily after his divorce. Roman custom, however, apparently did not frown upon immediate remarriage after a divorce, and Plutarch (*Cic.*, 41) indicates that Cicero did not permit a long interval to elapse: *μετ' οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον*.

It seems, nevertheless, to be reasonably definite that Tullia's divorce was concluded later than Terentia's, although van den Bruwaene, evidently misled by the comments in *Att.*, XI, 23, 3 upon the potential divorce of Tullia and Dolabella, seemingly understands that they had been divorced in the summer of 47 before that letter was written on July 9 (pp. 14 f.). Tyrrell and Purser (IV, p. lii, note 3; and IV, p. 387, which has a note on *Att.*, XII, 5, 4) state that Tullia and Dolabella were reunited in the summer of 46 and were not divorced until late autumn of 46 (*Att.*, XII, 8), which is rather likely since she bore him a son in January of the following year (*Fam.*, VI, 18, 5). There is no explicit passage in Cicero's letters about the reconciliation of Tullia and Dolabella, but some passages hint in that direction (*Att.*, XII, 5, 4; cf. *Fam.*, IX, 7, 2, *Att.*, XII, 8), and it was right at this time (mid-46) that Dolabella and others were studying oratory with Cicero at Tusculum (Tyrrell and Purser, IV, p. xevii; *Fam.*, IX, 16, 7, VII, 33, 2; *Att.*, XII, 7, 2).

It would also seem that van den Bruwaene was carried away by his interest in the legal aspect of the repayment of Terentia's dowry, since there is no reason to feel so sorry for Cicero; the author recognizes (pp. 25 f.) that repayment of the dowry was still under discussion in the second half of 44 (*Att.*, XVI, 6, 3; 15, 5), and Tyrrell and Purser (IV, p. lii, last paragraph of the footnote continued from the preceding page) assert that it was never finally repaid. Before one can put any credit in this idea that Terentia freely possessed herself of Cicero's household goods, there should be some explanation of this request by Cicero in *Att.*, XI, 25, 3 (July 47) which van den Bruwaene does not touch upon at all: "Te oro, ut in perditis rebus, si quid cogi, confici potest, quod sit in tuto, ex argento atque <si> satis multa ex supellectile, des operam." There are possible references to the same topic in two other letters (*Att.*, XI, 23, 3; 24, 2) to which van den Bruwaene refers in regard to other matters but without comment on this point; all three letters date from the summer of 47. One would think that, if Terentia had clandestinely made items of this type part of her estate, there would have been some specific reference to her misdeed beyond the passage in Plutarch (*Cic.*, 41): . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τῷ Κικέρωνι πάντων ἔρημον καὶ κενὴν ἀπέδειξεν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ὀφλήμασι καὶ μεγάλοις.

The second essay, "Les édits et le bon droit dans la pratique de Cicéron," is chiefly aimed at demonstrating Cicero's intimate knowledge of legal matters and his juridical competence. The author discusses two cases of inheritances of which Verres made dispositions contrary to traditional jurisprudence, and he analyzes Cicero's

criticisms thereof. He also shows that Cicero carefully observed the letter of the law, in a fashion perhaps not to his credit, in dealing with the problem of the Scaptius-Brutus loan to the Salaminians of Cyprus. Two statements of van den Bruwaene are striking: one (p. 35), in regard to *aequum*, that "*Aequum* suppose une condition qui n'est pas toujours exprimée, mais apparaît chaque fois que dans un texte judiciaire on examine ce terme avec un peu plus d'attention; elle consiste en la conformité à l'esprit traditionnel romain, au *mos maiorum*"; the other (p. 57), that Cicero was literal-minded in believing that "La loi à elle seule est créatrice du droit, elle suffit."

"La notion du prince chez Cicéron" treats a hackneyed topic. The author declares that Cicero thought of Pompey as a kind of *princeps* before Pompey's return from the East, but that later he felt Pompey to be unequal to the ideal. He emphasizes the quasi-theological aspect of Cicero's concept of the *princeps*; and, mainly on the basis of Polybius, *Hist.*, XII, 27, 8 f. and Cicero, *Rep.*, V, 8 (*Att.*, VIII, 11, 1), he shows how closely that concept was related to Polybius' (and Panaetius') attitude toward Scipio Aemilianus.

"Démosthène et Cicéron" finds many similarities between the two orators in temperament, career, and characteristics of style, yielding the palm to Cicero because he had philosophical talents and was generally more cultivated than Demosthenes.

WALTER ALLEN, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

---

FRANK CARD BOURNE. *The Public Works of the Julio-Claudians and Flavians*. Pp. vii + 76. Princeton, 1946. (Diss.).

This study was presented to the Faculty of Princeton University in candidacy for the degree of Ph.D. in 1941. It consists of an introduction which anticipates the conclusions drawn from the evidence exhibited afterwards in the thesis and of eight chapters—one for each emperor—in which this evidence is displayed. Every chapter is divided into the following sections: A. (General remarks), B. Edifices, C. Commerce and the exploitation of the natural resources, D. Aqueducts and water-supply, E. Building for empire defense, F. *Coloniae*. Wherever possible sections have been subdivided geographically. The introduction is organized according to the same principles.

The collection of material is valuable, especially for the provinces and Italy; less so for Rome because the Chronological Index to Dateable Monuments in Platner-Ashby's *Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, pp. 592-596, provides a convenient guide.

The author says in the foreword that "the evidence for this investigation comes from inscriptions, ancient historical and literary works, and modern archaeological research" (p. v) and "we have endeavoured to include all evidence from literary, inscriptional, and archaeological sources" (p. vi). This claim goes much too far. Archaeological evidence has been used very sparingly. A statement

like the following one is an exception (p. 59 D 3): "Archaeological research has identified as Flavian work on the *Aquae Anio Vetus*, *Marcia*, and *Anio Novus*," and this is followed by a reference to Ashby's *Aqueducts of Ancient Rome* (1935). On the whole, nothing is said as to the state of preservation of any given building. But are not the visible remains of a monument important "sources" for our knowledge of it? Without adding essentially to the bulk of the study, it would have been possible to make it clear whether a building is partially preserved, whether only its site is known, or whether the ancient literary or epigraphical references are all that has come down to us.

The lists include the works of the emperors and of the members of their immediate families, and (for Augustus only) those of his close friends. Therefore, presumably, the *Ara Fortunae Reducis* erected by the Senate in 19 B. C. is omitted. But the *Ara Pacis Augustae* is listed on p. 19 B 32 in spite of its identical origin. To leave out the *Ara Pacis* would have been absurd, though consistent. The mere suggestion shows that, on the contrary, also the other highly official buildings put up by the Senate should have been included, e. g., besides the *Ara Fortunae Reducis*, the Arch. of Augustus at the north-east corner of the Temple of Castor in the Forum Romanum, on which as we have learned recently the *Fasti Capitolini* were inscribed, the *Ara Pietatis Augustae* of 43 A. D., and the Arch of Titus.

On p. 20 B 48 Bourne mentions the organization of a fire department in Rome by Augustus. Would it not have been fitting to record also the division of Rome into fourteen regions carried through by Augustus in 7 B. C. which remained in effect for more than six hundred years (cf. Platner-Ashby, pp. 444-447)? On p. 24 B 15 the installation of the *curatores viarum* in 7 B. C. is mentioned (though without a reference to Suet., *Aug.* 37), yet the creation of the equally important board of the *curatores operum publicorum* is casually noted on p. 16 and neither p. 27 D 6 nor D 21 is a correct statement of Augustus' handling of the *cura aquarum*.

Under Tiberius the *Domus Tiberiana* is omitted, under Nero the *Domus Transitoria*, under Gaius the Ships of Nemi. The *arcus Neroniani* or *Caelimontani* of the *aqua Claudia* should have been specifically mentioned on p. 53 D. The *Porta Maggiore*, most imposing monument of Claudian architecture, is passed over p. 47 D 2, and so are—under Nero—the well preserved substructures of the temple of Divus Claudius of the same style, which are the work of Agrippina (but cf. p. 56 B 16).

While the *templum Pacis* is recorded (p. 56 B 6), the Forum which it adorned is not, vice-versa the *Forum Transitorium* is rightly attributed to Domitian (p. 66 B 18), but the Temple of Minerva, Domitian's protectress, which dominated it, is omitted. The statement on p. 56 B 7 "74 A. D. Colossus of the Sungod erected" is incorrect. As Suet., *Vesp.* 18 indicates, Vespasian only changed the colossal statue of Nero in the vestibule of the *Domus Aurea* into a statue of the Sun. Even more misleading are the two entries, both under Domitian, p. 65 B 11 "92 A. D. Palace on the Palatine completed about this time" and p. 67 B 40 (no date) "Work on Domus Augustana and Flaviania," because they refer to the same large com-

plex of imperial buildings on the Palatine consisting of the *Domus Flavia*, the *Stadium*, the so-called Temple of Divus Augustus and S. Maria Antiqua (cf. now Dorothy M. Robathan, "Domitian's 'Midas-touch'," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII [1942], pp. 132-134 where earlier literature is quoted).

HERBERT BLOCH.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

---

KAREL O. CASTELIN. *The Coinage of Rhessaena in Mesopotamia*. New York, The American Numismatic Society, 1946. Pp. 111; 17 pls.; 3 figs. \$2.00. (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, No. 108.)

Dr. Castelin's monograph is primarily a carefully annotated catalogue of the bronze coins which were struck in Rhessaena during the third century A. D. These coins he divides into two groups: the so-called *vexillum-coins* and the autonomous colonial coinage of the city. The *vexillum-coins* were minted during the reigns of Caracalla, Elagabal, and Severus Alexander (211-235); the autonomous coinage appeared under the same emperors and again under Trajan Decius (249-251). This latter group will perhaps attract the attention primarily of specialists, though it is of interest that the issues under Decius are far superior in workmanship both to those of the earlier period at Rhessaena and to contemporary coins of other mints in the region.

The *vexillum-coins* are more remarkable and apparently even unique. On the obverse they bear the usual imperial portraits and inscriptions. The reverse types vary somewhat, but almost without exception they include a military standard, the *vexillum*. The only inscription that appears on the reverse is, in its fullest form, *LEG III PS*, but despite the fact that Rhessaena is not named on the coins there seems little reason to doubt that it was the mint-city. The nature and purpose of this *vexillum* coinage are not entirely clear. Castelin makes the attractive suggestion that it was a supplement to the local coinage "primarily designed to be used as fractional currency" by the *legio III Parthica* and its veterans (pp. 26, 29-30). This may very well be correct, but it will be noted that the legends on the obverse are in Greek while the official language of the army even in the East was Latin.

The legend *LEG III PS* appears on many of the local autonomous coins, as well as on those bearing the *vexillum*. This Castelin expands as *leg(io) III P(arthica) S(everiana)*. There can be no doubt as to the identity of the legion, but his expansion of *S*, if the signs on the coins are to be read as that letter, is very doubtful. The objection to be answered is not that such epithets did not appear as early as the reign of Septimius (p. 23, n. 43) but that these imperial titles regularly changed at the accession of each new emperor. It seems improbable therefore that the legion should have been called *Severiana* under Caracalla and quite incredible that it should have been so styled under Decius (no. 145, p. 77). There is conclusive evidence that the sister legion *II Parthica* followed the usual practice in regard to its imperial titles.

Castelin has not been content to present a bare catalogue and narrowly conceived numismatic study for others to interpret and use as best they could. He throughout attempts to relate the coins to their historical background and to extract from their study all the information they contain. The interpretation of religious symbols is particularly valuable.

The present monograph is a pleasing example of international collaboration. Professor A. R. Bellinger, in whose hands the Czech author placed his manuscript shortly before communications with Prague were interrupted by the late war, condensed and revised the study in preparation for its publication, and Miss D. H. Cox undertook the task of translating it from the German.

Misprints and the like seem very rare. None noticed by me will occasion any difficulty, except perhaps the omission of Alexander after Severus, p. 10, line 1. The variant spellings Nisibis, Nesibi, Nesibis might possibly confuse a reader not familiar with Mesopotamian place-names.

J. F. GILLIAM.

WELLS COLLEGE.

---

Studies and Documents edited by Kirsopp and Silva Lake, XIV:

The *De Incarnatione* of Athanasius. Part I: The Long Recension Manuscripts by GEORGE J. RYAN; Part II: The Short Recension by ROBERT PIERCE CASEY. London, Christophers; Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945 and 1946. Vol. I: pp. xi + 125. Vol. II: pp. 1 + 86.

Various difficulties peculiar to war-time have delayed the publication of this and other volumes of *Studies and Documents*. In their preface the editors express the hope that it will be possible to issue succeeding volumes with more regularity. For obvious reasons the two parts of Vol. XIV belong so closely together that they cannot be studied or used separately. Since the *De Incarnatione* of St. Athanasius has come down to us in a longer and a shorter redaction, the question of the relationship between the two recensions becomes of fundamental importance. There is a remarkable difference of views between the two editors of the series and Professor Casey while Professor Ryan does not enter into the details of this problem with which he was not specifically concerned. He rather contents himself with referring to Casey's view and with emphasizing that in some instances, one of which is striking (see p. 26), the hopelessly corrupt text of all the Long Recension manuscripts becomes clear and apparently sound through the corresponding passage of the Short Recension. On p. 27 he expresses his opinion more negatively than positively as follows: "The common errors found in all Long Recension manuscripts definitely prove that the Short Recension cannot be a revision of their common archetype, but of a manuscript which either antedated it or, if they were of equal or nearly equal age, was independent of it. Agreements between manuscripts of the Long and Short Recensions, except in cases of crossing, represent the earliest available form of the text."

The points of view of Professors K. and S. Lake and of Professor Casey, however, are almost diametrically opposed and seem to me irreconcilable. While the editors of the collection "still" believe that the Short Recension "must have been the earlier" (Preface, Part I, p. vii) and is perhaps not even the work of Athanasius, but of an Apollinarian contemporary, Professor Casey comes to the following quite different conclusions: (a) that the Long Recension was original; (b) that the Short Recension was a literary rather than a dogmatic revision and that its main purpose was abbreviation; (c) that in view of the absence of important doctrinal changes it must be assigned to the fourth century and from the point of view of its style and matter could plausibly be attributed to Athanasius himself; and (d) that because, in spite of important variations, it was largely co-extensive with the Long Recension, it was of great importance for the text of the latter" (Part II, pp. xi f.). In the case of such a divergence a final decision can be reached, if at all, only through further detailed and careful investigation and interpretation. Thus we have here, in a sense, an interesting parallel to another endless controversy in early Christian literature, the problem of the relationship of the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix and the *Apology* of Tertullian.

The latest edition of the *De Incarnatione* was published by Bishop Archibald Robertson in 1893. In his survey of the printed editions (Part I, pp. 3 f.) Ryan shows why this edition is far from being ideal. Since it is the only relatively recent edition, however, and since it has already become a great rarity and is difficult to obtain, Casey, following Ryan's suggestion, reproduced its text page by page (Part II, pp. 1-86), and both of them used it as a basis for the collations of the manuscripts which in the case of the Long Recension vary in their age from the 10th to the 16th and in the case of the Short Recension from the 10th or, if we include the Syriac translation in the Vat. Syr. 104, from the 6th to the 15th century.

The most important and methodologically most interesting sections of the two parts are I, chs. V-VII, and II, pp. xii-xxiv, in which the manuscripts are not only described but very carefully examined and grouped. These investigations lay the indispensable groundwork for a complete critical edition of the treatise, and I earnestly hope that Professors Ryan and Casey will not stop here but crown their painstaking studies by such an edition which, because of the inadequate attempts made by their predecessors, will have the character and value of an *editio princeps*.

FREDERICK WALTER LENZ.

SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

---

PHYLLIS WILLIAMS LEHMANN. *Statues on Coins of Southern Italy and Sicily in the Classical Period*. New York, H. Bittner and Company, 1946. Pp. x + 72; 15 Pls.; 12 figs.

In this monograph, which was originally presented as a dissertation at the Institute of Fine Arts, New York University, the author attempts to prove that "there are at present ten coin types of Magna



Graecia and Sicily between 480 and 323 B. C. [which] reproduce famous lost statues and constitute focal points about which numerous statues and statuettes may be grouped." Fourteen additional types, which are believed to be probable representations of statues are listed and illustrated in an appendix, but are not considered more fully, since no monumental evidence for the existence of such statues could be discovered.

The ten types discussed are the river gods, Lissos, Hypsas, Krathis, and Krimisos, on the coins of Leontini, Selinus, Pandosia, and Segesta; Apollo on certain coins of Metapontum; a seated Herakles on staters of Croton and a didrachm of Himera; and a type of standing Herakles which is used on the reverse of a fourth century stater issued by Herakleia in Lucania. These types were especially chosen to demonstrate the possibilities of a numismatic approach to sculpture because each is iconographically unique. And, in the author's words, "if a statue of unknown provenance is iconographically or stylistically identical with a coin type, and that numismatic type is unique, struck at a specific time by one, and only one, city, it is logical to assume that statue and coin type alike depend upon a common archetype. Such a coin type not only constitutes a reproduction of a given statue; by virtue of its own unquestionable provenance, it affords the means of attributing closely related sculptures to a given region. . . ."

Though the assumption is logical enough, we remain unconvinced. The stylistic and iconographic relations of the various pieces of sculpture which have been grouped together are impressive, and there is, admittedly, similarity, if not identity, which may be obvious only to the initiated, between the sculpture and the coin type. It is, however, the type on the coin, which the author has chosen to illustrate. The identity between the sculpture and some of the other extant specimens of what is to all intents and purposes the same coin is not always so striking. Since the validity of the entire theory depends upon precise comparison, die variants cannot be ignored or passed over quickly as due to the whim of the engraver. The very existence of variants in what is presumed to be the exact reproduction of a statue—sufficiently exact to permit comparison of minute details—seems to us to weaken materially the initial assumption that the coin type is a reproduction. Consequently, even in those cases in which the arguments on the basis of present evidence are exceedingly strong, one is inclined to speculate on the effect of future numismatic discoveries or research.

The different treatments of the young hunter, or so-called Krimisos, on the coins of Segesta, for example, would seem to demand more comment than they received. Rizzo's suggestions as to the source and development of the not uncommon type, and its use on the coinage of a city "così remota dalle grandi correnti dell'arte" (*Moneta greche della Sicilia* [1946], pp. 289-91), are more convincing. In fact, a topographical and historical consideration of some of these newly proposed art centers contributes much to our skepticism. Granted that a native sculptor might have made a statue of the river god Hypsas; which was erected in a temenos at Selinus about 450 B. C., it is still difficult to believe that the statue of a purely local deity, in such a remote shrine, would have attained such

widespread fame and popularity as to be the archetype of a long series of statues and statuettes, but it is well-nigh impossible to believe; when there is no reason to assume that the original survived the destruction and sack of the city which occurred within less than fifty years. We find it hard, too, to accept the suggestion that the type on the reverse of the Selinus tetradrachm, issued some ten years earlier, is a purely imaginative rendering, while the figure of Hypsas on the didrachm, which could be described in practically the same words ("la sua rappresentazione è simile a quella del Sélinos, tranne che negli accessori" [Rizzo, *op. cit.*, p. 167, no. 15]), if one were not exceptionally perceptive, is considered to be the reproduction of a statue. The base on which Selinus is said to stand on the later tetradrachms, because of the influence of the Hypsas "statue," is certainly nothing more than an exergue line. It is said that an exceptionally plastic rendering and a design not particularly suited to a circular field are prime factors in the recognition of a coin type as the reproduction of a statue. Comparable monumental evidence would seem, however, to be more influential.

Though many well-known works of sculpture are suggested to be of South Italian or Sicilian workmanship through this numismatic approach, possibly the best known is the so-called *Idolino*, which is considered to be stylistically and iconographically related to the figure on the reverse of a stater issued by Pandosia in Bruttium, identified as a reproduction of a lost statue of the river god Krathis. Whether or not one agrees with the assumption that certain coin types are representations of statues and can serve to link known copies of related types in sculpture to the issuing localities, the fresh grouping of these works of sculpture is of decided interest and importance.

SARAH ELIZABETH FREEMAN.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

---

JACQUELINE DE ROMILLY. *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien: la pensée de l'historien et la genèse de l'oeuvre*. Paris, Société d'Édition *Les Belles Lettres*, 1947. Pp. 326.

This elaborately organized study of Thucydides (see the "Table analytique des matières," pp. 323-326) follows closely the purpose stated in the title. It examines the historian's opinions of Athenian imperialism, the extent to which they remained constant during the composition of the *History*, and the method used by Thucydides in his writing. Inevitably, the question of preparation and revision of individual passages arises and leads to a proposed identification of the early and late stages of the work. A piecemeal attack is of little value; hence the comprehensive nature of the book.

An "Introduction générale," specifying the objectives, is symmetrically matched by the "Conclusion générale" (which, however, does not embody the results of the study). The core of the book is divided into three parts; each is embellished with an introduction and a conclusion. Part I falls into two chapters, Parts II and III

into three each. A "Répertoire bibliographique" and two indices, one of passages cited from Thucydides and one of other Greek authors mentioned in the text, are appended.

The first part ("Données générales. L'impérialisme athénien dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide") begins with the causes of the Peloponnesian War and shows that Athenian imperialism, the heart of Thucydides' *History*, was always, to him, the dominating element in the struggle between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. The *pentekontaetia*, Mlle de Romilly feels, is a late addition to the work which reinforces Thucydides' original judgment, as expressed in his ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις. Detailed analysis characterizes specific passages, especially the speeches, as "early" or "late." Thucydides' preoccupation with his main theme ("Thucydide aime la puissance athénienne," p. 93) accounts for his rigorous exclusion of such irrelevant topics as the internal politics of Athens and Athenian imperial methods; his admiration for Pericles inspired some later revision which was meant to underline the genius and the indispensability of Pericles.

Part II ("Les aspects successifs de l'impérialisme athénien") takes up Thucydides' treatment of Pericles, Cleon, Alcibiades, Themistocles, and Cimon. It demonstrates once again the unity of Thucydides' thought and admits a certain amount of rewriting after 404 B. C., although only for the purpose of strengthening and expanding the earlier ideas. But it is impossible, urges Mlle de Romilly, to distinguish a change in point of view or to isolate an "Ur-Thucydides" (p. 195).

Part III ("L'unité de l'impérialisme athénien"), employing the Athenian speech at Sparta (in Book I) and the Melian Dialogue as its texts, reinforces what has been determined in Parts I and II. New to the study is the consideration of the human element (τὸ ἀνθρώπειον), which assumes significance after the death of Pericles, when Athenian imperial policy became more and more imperialistic; but the seeds were always there.

The "Conclusion générale" ("De la politique à la morale") follows the thought of Thucydides into the fourth century where we find the imperial theme in Isocrates, who supported the Panhellenic solution of the great problem of the Greek states. Yet Thucydides is essentially of the fifth century; he could not understand the message of Socrates and he is ignored by Plato. It was Socrates, with his insistence upon moral ethical conduct, who prevailed.

The author's findings are summarized in the Conclusion ("Le seuil de 404") to Part III: "... nous avons été amenés à distinguer, du commencement à la fin de l'oeuvre, une couche ancienne, ayant pris corps sous une forme ou sous une autre avant 404, et une série d'éléments tardifs, postérieurs à 404" (p. 286). Without pretending to identify all these elements, we can with certainty name some of them (e. g., the *pentekontaetia*, the Funeral Speech, all or most of Pericles' last speech, passages in VI and VIII, and the tribute to Pericles in II, 65).

Thucydides, then, remained true to his original judgments; his revisions, which he made as he proceeded and as events unfolded and after 404, did not essentially alter but rather strengthened and improved the expression of his early manuscript. "Il est incapable

de céder aux fluctuations et aux revirements que l'incompréhension de certains philologues a voulu lui attribuer" (p. 293).

With the author's thesis and her conclusions few today will quarrel. Her method is sound and it is only here and there that I question her opinions; these disagreements are minor. Yet I cannot help feeling that she has gone to a great deal of trouble to establish what most historians now accept as the reasonable view. The "scientific" theories of such men as Schwartz, which belong to another century, should be quietly interred; they are strongly reminiscent of the mutilation of Homer which was once so popular. I found myself constantly in agreement as I read the book; as I reached the last page I was still waiting for something fresh and unfamiliar.

Mlle de Romilly has much reading to do. She has probably not had the opportunity to meet Finley's *Thucydides* and his earlier articles, which would have been instructive; the same applies to Gomme's *Historical Commentary*, I. She should, however, have used Wade-Gery's "Thucydides Son of Melesias" (*J. H. S.*, LII [1932], pp. 205-227) on pp. 196-197. The Bibliography is adequate in content but slovenly in form. G. Méautis, *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien* (Neuchâtel, 1939), which I myself have not yet seen, is not listed.

A knowledge of epigraphic progress in the last decade and a half would have eliminated several problems and errors. On pp. 82-83, for example, Mlle de Romilly discusses with some bewilderment the amount of the annual tribute and the size of the assessment of 425 B. C.; she could have saved time and space by consulting Meritt, *Documents on Athenian Tribute*, Chapter IV, and Meritt and West, *The Athenian Assessment of 425 B. C.* A similar ignorance of the epigraphists' contributions appears on pp. 84-85, 173, and 239.

The indices are adequate and the proof has been fairly well read. Typographical errors occur on pp. 66 (n. 3), 86 (n.), 91 (n. 3), 161, 168 (n. 4, two in n. 3), 251 (n. 1), 300 (two), 301 (n. 4), 310 (Note); incorrect Greek accents on pp. 39 (n. 3), 42 (n. 1), 139 (n. 3), 141 (n. 1, two), 233; faulty punctuation on pp. 33 (n. 1), 43 (n. 2), 58, 92 (n. 5), 159, 168 (n. 1), 301 (n. 4, n. 5); an inaccurate reference on p. 19 (n. 3). Stylistically Mlle de Romilly is verbose and tends to be repetitious. Her approach to Thucydides is admirably sane; her book is too long.

MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.

---

ÉDOUARD DES PLACES, S. J. *Le Pronom chez Pindare*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1947. Pp. 114. (*Études et Commentaires*, III.)

The scope and form of this monograph may be described in simple terms. The author devotes a separate chapter to each pronoun used by Pindar, beginning with personal pronouns and concluding with adjectives which may be used pronominally, as ἄλλος and πᾶς. Each chapter is composed of a) a list of all examples (variant and

hypothetical readings are noted), b) a summary, with discussion, of attested forms, c) a summary, with discussion, of constructions, d) a discussion of uses and meanings. A consecutive reading will, therefore, furnish a general description of the pronoun in Pindar as regards forms, constructions, and effects; it will also lead us into controversial matters, and provide new bases for the formation of judgments. Thus, for instance, on the matter of  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  versus  $\mu\upsilon\nu$ , Des Places has listed (p. 22) all instances of  $\mu\upsilon\nu$  without variant,  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  without variant,  $\mu\upsilon\nu$  in better MSS, and  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  in better MSS; and, while the definition of "better manuscripts" may seem, on examination, a little arbitrary, the lists support his conclusion (p. 24) that it is wisest to follow manuscript authority as Bury and Turyn have done, since Pindar seems to have been no more consistent about preferring  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  to  $\mu\upsilon\nu$  than about preferring  $\tau\acute{\upsilon}$  to  $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}$ , and euphony may be involved in principle (see p. 13). We may pass, too, from statistics directly to interpretation; thus, for *Pyth.* 5, 76, Schroeder's  $\epsilon\mu\omicron\iota$  = dative is not favored, since Pindar does not use  $\epsilon\mu\omicron\iota$ , only  $\mu\omicron\iota$ , as ethical or possessive dative (p. 7).

It is amazing, also, how frequently the trail of a pronoun will cross a major crux of Pindar. Sometimes, it is true, this happens through an extension made from the study of the pronoun as such. Thus, the discussions of *Pyth.* 4, 67, *Ol.* 14, 23, *Nem.* 7, 22, etc., involve a quest for the lost or dim antecedent (pp. 27-31). Elsewhere, there are useful summaries of persons addressed through the personal pronoun (pp. 18-19), of the relative transitional to myth (with cases of  $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon$ , pp. 48-50; note also where the transitional relative is *not* used), and of the transitional pronoun of the first person (pp. 10-11). There are a few perilous statements. Des Places adopts Fränkel's statement (no examples given) that Pindar's "Ich" may stand for "Man" or even "Du" (cf. *Gnomon*, VI [1930], p. 16, n. 3); Des Places then applies this to *Nem.* 8, 35  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\eta\ \mu\acute{\eta}\ \pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\ \mu\omicron\iota\ \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\ \eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$  (p. 9). This will not do; we are beginning a direct prayer to Zeus, and the context of 34-38 is continued in a strong first person singular ( $\xi\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\iota\ \dots\ \epsilon\gamma\omega\ \delta'$ ) where "I" means "I." And if in *Pyth.* 2, 96, the last line of the poem,  $\alpha\delta\delta\acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha\ \delta'\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\eta\ \mu\epsilon\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \delta\mu\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\ \mu\epsilon$  means "on" or "Man" (so Des Places), what does the line mean and what is the point? Rather, the pronoun of the first person *plural* may have the impersonal sense, as Des Places takes *Ol.* 9, 106 ("la famille humaine"). As in English, "we" (like "you") can be impersonal, "I" can not.

This study, modest as it is in pretensions and tone, is a definitely important contribution to the study of Pindar. There is much to be learned from it, and much stimulus to thought and reconsideration. The literature on the subject has been carefully taken into account, except that bad communications since the war are responsible for a few gaps in the bibliography.

RICHMOND LATTIMORE.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

ROBERT N. WILKIN. *Eternal Lawyer: A Legal Biography of Cicero*. New York, Macmillan, 1947. Pp. xviii + 264. \$3.

It would take another book to clear up the misapprehensions in this book, which was written with the best of intentions, published by a famous firm, and furnished with a laudatory Introduction by a prominent American Hellenist.

The title is incorrect; it is not a legal biography at all. It gives only a cursory and unsatisfactory account of Cicero's life, with interpolations of praise of the legal profession. The author completely misunderstands Cicero's legal and political career. Not only does the book exhibit a total ignorance of the work which has been published on Cicero's legal activity, but the reader is confronted with such remarks as (p. 91): "Cicero foiled the conspirators and saved the Republic. But in his achievement as consul lay his failure as counsel; when he succeeded as public officer he failed as lawyer." Judge Wilkin persistently refers to Cicero as a "lawyer," which he was not, and reveals that he means "lawyer" in the modern sense when he writes: (p. 41) "He made himself accessible to all classes and types of men except fools and crooks. He heard their grievances and helped them with their problems and declined to accept fee or present for his services"; (p. 40) "At the youngest age allowed by law he was chosen quaestor, and, with only such time intervening as the law required, he advanced successively to the offices of aedile, praetor, and consul. Here we see the lawyer in politics, striving to be effective with the people while maintaining his professional standards"; (p. 67) "Moreover since Cicero was primarily a lawyer and not a philosopher, it was necessary for him to take a part in public affairs. Great lawyers have always been great citizens. Their interest has necessarily extended beyond their professional activities."

Judge Wilkin appears to have read several secondary works in English about Cicero, as well as Plutarch and some of Cicero's writings in translation, but he was conspicuously impressed by Gaston Delayen's *Cicero* (translated by Farrell Symons, New York, Dutton, 1931), an unfortunate effusion of which H. J. Haskell quite properly said in his book *This Was Cicero* (New York, Knopf, 1942, p. 371): "The Delayen, of which the translation appeared in 1931, was crowned by the French Academy; it is difficult to understand why." For purposes of comparison I quote a few passages from Wilkin and Delayen. Wilkin (p. 5): "In the wake of several great political orators was a mob of attorneys who made much of their pretended political influence and used it to their own advantage"; Delayen (p. 29): "In the wake of several great political orators was a mob of lawyers who made much of their pretended political influence and used it to their own advantage." Wilkin (p. 5): "Their rabid speechifying, with which they would defend the worst felons against honest men, won for them the name of 'spouters' or 'barkers'"; Delayen (p. 28): "Their rabid speechifying, with which they would defend the worst felons against the most honest of men, won for them the name of 'spouters' and even 'barkers'." Wilkin (p. 30): "Terentia was not considered one of Rome's beauties, but she had a pleasing face and lively expression. She was described as a typical

Roman girl, with low forehead sharply outlined by black hair, a small, slightly aquiline nose, and very bright black eyes"; Delayen (pp. 67 f.): "Terentia had never been considered among the beauties of Rome, but her pleasing face was charming. . . . She was, indeed, a typical Roman girl, with low forehead, a small, slightly aquiline nose, very bright black eyes, surmounted by perfectly arched brows, . . . ." In his Notes Delayen gives just this as the source of his flight of fancy about a typical Roman girl: "Numerous Latin authors." The implications of his phrasing, it is true, could easily lead a reader to accept it as a literal description of Terentia.

Referring to the period before Cicero's exile, Wilkin writes (p. 122): "To those who urged him to retaliate with violent measures, he had replied, 'Enough of surgery, now for dieting'"; also referring to the same period, Delayen (p. 150): "'Enough of surgery,' he replied to those who urged him to take violent measures; 'nor for dieting'." Delayen cites the proper source, Cicero, *Ad Att.*, IV, 3, but he evidently failed to note that the letter was written in 57 B. C. after Cicero's return from exile. Wilkin (p. 105): "Clodius relied for his defense upon an alibi, declaring that he was at Baiae, the fashionable watering place, during the observance of the mysteries of the Good Goddess. But Cicero swore that he had spoken to him that day in Rome"; Delayen (p. 145): "His integrity made it impossible for him to speak against his conscience, and when Clodius, who relied upon an alibi, declared that he was at Baiae during the mysteries of the Good Goddess, Cicero bore witness that he had spoken to him that day in Rome." All the sources known to this reviewer indicate that Clodius claimed to have been at Interamna (*Ad Att.*, II, 1, 5; *De Domo Sua*, 80; *Pro Milone*, 46; Quintilian, IV, 2, 88; Asconius [ed. Stangl], p. 42; *Scholia Bobiensia* [ed. Stangl], p. 85).

There are numerous howlers in regard to Roman antiquities and historical facts. The author's idea of Roman topography is illustrated by these remarks about the Forum (p. 10): "The space was bordered on the north and east by the Sacra Via, the most famous street of Rome, if not of the world. The most important buildings, the Capitol, the Senate House, and many temples and shops faced upon this open court."

Even in a popular book, it is unpardonable that this distorted exaggeration should be expressed (p. 221): "Cicero believed in private ownership of property, but subject, however, to regulation for the commonweal. He acknowledged the state's interest in natural resources and their conservation, but he definitely rejected communism of property."

WALTER ALLEN, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Adrados (Francisco Rodriguez). Estudios sobre el Léxico de las Fábulas Esópicas. En torno a los Problemas de la Koiné Literaria. Salamanca, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1948. Pp. 285. (*Theses et Studia Philologica Salmanticensia*, II.)

Andrews (S. O.). Postscript on Beowulf. Cambridge, University Press, 1948. Pp. 158. \$3.50.

Bailey (Paul) Jacob Hamblin, Buckskin Apostle. Los Angeles, Westernlore Press, 1948. Pp. 408. \$4.50.

Berry (Virginia Gingerick). Odo of Deuil. De Profectione Lucovici VII in Orientem. Edited, with an English Translation. New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. xlii + 154; 3 illus. \$3.25. (*Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies*.)

Boesch (Bruno), ed. Aus frühmittelhochdeutscher Dichtung, Ein Lesebuch. Bern, A. Francke Ag. Verlag, 1948. Pp. 71. 3.50 Swiss fr. (*Altdeutsche Übungsteile herausgegeben von der akademischen Gesellschaft schweizerischer Germanisten*, Band 8.)

Callahan (John F.). Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. ix + 209. \$3.00.

Cassirer (Ernst), Kristeller (Paul Oskar), Randall (John Herman, Jr.) ed. The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Vives. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. viii + 405. \$5.00.

Castiglioni (L.), ed. L. Annaei Senecae Dialogorum Libri IX-X, De Tranquillitate Animi, De Brevitate Vitae. Pp. xxxvi + 79. 450 lire. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum*.)

Déonna (Waldemar). La Vie Privée des Déliens. Paris, E. de Boccard, 1948. Pp. 200. (*École Française d'Athènes. Travaux et Mémoires*, Fasc. VII.)

Dilworth (Ernest Nevin). The Unsentimental Journey of Laurence Sterne. Morningside Heights, N. Y., King's Crown Press, 1948. Pp. xiv + 115. \$2.25.

English Institute Essays, 1947. New York, Columbia Univ. Press; London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. x + 202. \$2.50.

Friedländer (Paul), with the collaboration of Herbert B. Hoffleit. Epigrammata. Greek Inscriptions in Verse from the Beginnings to the Persian Wars. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1948. Pp. 198. \$5.00.

Greer (Russel M.). Diodorus of Sicily with an English Translation, Vol. IX, Books XVIII and XIX, 1-65. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press; London, William Heinemann, 1947. Pp. xii + 421. \$2.50 (leather \$3.50). (*Loeb Classical Library*, No. 377.)

Hook (Frank S.). The French Bandello. A Selection, edited with an Introduction. The Original Text of Belleforest's *Histoires Tragiques*, translated by Geoffrey Fenton and William Painter, 1567. Columbia, Univ. of Missouri, 1948. Pp. 185. \$2.50. (*Univ. of Missouri Studies*.)

Irazusta (J. A.) Joanixio. Buenos Aires, Editorial Vasca Ekin, S. R. L., 1946. Pp. 281.

Jespersen (Otto). Growth and Structure of the English Language, 9th Edition. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1948. Pp. 244. \$2.50.



Karo (George). Greek Personality in Archaic Sculpture. Published for Oberlin College. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *Humphrey Milford, Oxford Univ. Press*, 1948. Pp. xii + 343; 32 pls. \$4.00. (*Martin Classical Lectures*, Vol. XI.)

Kosch (Wilhelm). Deutsches Literatur-Lexikon. Biographisches und Bibliographisches Handbuch. Zweite, vollständig neu bearbeitete und stark erweiterte Auflage. Bern, *A. Francke Ag. Verlag*, 1948. Pp. 369-464. (Lieferung 5. August 1948. Drama-Esmarch.)

Kotting-Menko (R. H.). Individu en kosmos. Over enige gemeenschappelijke Aspecten van vroeggriekse Dichters en voorsocratische Philosophen. Amsterdam, *H. J. Paris*, 1948. Pp. vii + 94. 4.50 Dutch guilders.

"Mana," Introduction à l'Histoire des Religions, II: Albert Grenier, Les Religions Etrusques et Romaines. Pp. 233. Joseph Vendryes, Ernest Tonnelat and R.-O. Unregau, Les Religions des Celtes, des Germains et des Anciens Slaves. Pp. 235-445. Paris, *Presses Universitaires de France*, 1948.

Mueller (Gustav E.). Philosophy of Literature. New York, *Philosophical Library*, 1948. Pp. 226. \$3.50.

Newmark (Maxim), ed., with Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler: Twentieth Century Modern Language Teaching. Sources and Readings. New York, *Philosophical Library*, 1948. Pp. xxii + 723. \$7.50.

Paratore (Ettore). Apulei, Metamorphoseon Libri IV-VI (La Favola di Amore e Psiche), Introduzione e Teste Critico. Firenze, *La Nuova Italia*, 1948. Pp. 160. 850 lire. (*Biblioteca di Studi Superiori*, Vol. I.)

Parker (Fan). Vsevolod Garshin. A Study of a Russian Conscience. New York, *King's Crown Press*, 1946. Pp. vii + 85.

Payne (William L.). Index to Defoe's Review. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1948. Pp. x + 144. \$4.00.

Pepe (Luigi). Tibullo Minoré. Naples, *Casa Editrice Armanni*, 1948. Pp. xi + 161. 700 lire.

Pfeffer (J. Alan). The Proverb in Goethe. New York, *King's Crown Press*, 1948. Pp. vi + 200. \$3.50.

Pingel (Martha M.). An American Utilitarian. Richard Hildreth as a Philosopher. With Selections from his published and unpublished Works. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1948. Pp. xi + 214. \$3.00.

Ranke (Friedrich), ed. Das Nibelungenlied. Bern, *A. Francke Ag. Verlag*, 1948. Pp. 80. (*Altdeutsche Übungstexte herausgegeben von der akademischen Gesellschaft schweizerischer Germanisten*, Band 9.)

Schücking (Levin L.). Shakespeare und der Tragödienstil seiner Zeit. Bern, *A. Francke Ag. Verlag*, 1947. Pp. 184. 7.50 Swiss fr. (*Sammlung Dalp*, Bd. 45.)

Steward (Julian H.), ed. Handbook of South American Indians, Vol. 3: The Tropical Forest Tribes. Washington, D. C., *U. S. Gov't. Printing Office*, 1948. Pp. 986; 134 figs.; 126 pls.; 8 maps.

Trenker (Sophie). Le Style *kaï* dans le récit attique oral. Bruxelles, *Éditions de l'Institut d'Études Polonaises en Belgique*, 1948. Pp. 152.

West (Robert C.). Cultural Geography of the Modern Tarascan Area. Washington, D. C., *U. S. Gov't. Printing Office*, 1948. Pp. vi + 77; 6 figs.; 14 pls.; 21 maps. \$0.75. (*Smithsonian Institution Institute of Social Anthropology*, Publ. No. 7.)

Wilson (Laurence L.). Apayao Life and Legends. Pp. 195; illus. Printed in Philippines.

Wilson (Laurence L.). Ilongot Life and Legends. Pp. 109; illus. Printed in Philippines.

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXX, 2

WHOLE No. 278

## EPIGRAPHICAL NOTES.

### I. AN ATTIC EPITAPH.

In *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 10258 J. Kirchner published a fragment of a *columella* of Hymettian marble, discovered in the course of the American excavation of the Athenian Agora (Inv. I 2031). The lettering indicates a date in the Imperial period, and the text, as read and restored by Kirchner, runs thus:

--- | --ov | [Σελι]νούνης.

About this restoration the editor obviously felt some misgiving, for he added the comment, "De ethnici supplemento non constat, cum-alias audiat Σελινούντιος, Σελινούσιος."

It is conceivable, but to my mind highly improbable, that a final -ιος has become -is (a very frequent phenomenon in personal names at this period), and that -is has in turn, under the influence of a prevalent itacism, become -ης. Far more likely, however, is the restoration [ἐγ (or ἐκ) Μυρι]νούνης; cf. *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 6912 ἐγ Μυρινούνης, 6914 ἐκ Μυρινούνης, 6915 [ἐ]κ Μυρ[ρι]νού[νης], 6919 ἐγ Μυρινούν[νης], 6923 ἐκ Μυρινούν[νης], 6925 --M]υρινοντ--, where [ἐγ (or ἐκ) M]υρινούν[νης] may be confidently restored. If I am right, the epitaph in question should not figure among those of foreigners buried in Attica, but among those of Athenian citizens, and its appropriate place is at the close of the group of Μυρινούσιοι (6885-6925).

## II. A DEDICATION FROM CYZICIUS IN THE ASHMOLEAN MUSEUM, OXFORD.

Among the inscribed stones presented to Oxford University by Henry Dawkins, brother of James Dawkins (1722-57), D. C. L., of St. John's College, who assisted James Stuart and Nicholas Revett in their measurement of the ancient monuments of Athens and in 1751 accompanied Robert Wood to Palmyra and Baalbek, were three contiguous fragments of a large marble *patera*, found amid the ruins of Cyzicus. The inscription was first published in 1763 by Richard Chardler in his monumental *Marmora Oxoniensia*, II, no. xv. On p. x only five letters (ΠΗΔΕΞ) are given by way of identification, on p. 11 there is a blank space following the number xv, showing that Chandler could make no sense of the text, and on Plate V, no. xv, a woodcut appears giving the whole text as ΠΗΔΕΞΙΤΟΝΗΣΙΝ and showing the lines of fracture running vertically down the stone after E and again after O. In his *Marmorum Oxoniensium Inscriptiones Graecae ad Chandleri Exemplar editae* (pp. xx, 2), published in 1791, and reissued without change in 1887, William Roberts added nothing to Chandler and gave no illustration of the stone. In 1843 the inscription appeared without transcription or comment in *C. I. G.*, 3695, where the stone is described as "fragmentum cylindri marmorei valde exiguae altitudinis,"<sup>1</sup> and it was not until the edition by H. Roehl in *I. G. A.*, 501, dated 1882, that the true nature of the inscription became clear. Roehl described the stone as "fragmentum paterae marmoreae admodum planae, cuius in ambitu titulus incisus est. . . . Lapis denuo ita truncatus est, ut supersint litterae a fine quinque. Has ex meo apographo do, in prioribus septem Chandleri editionem secutus." To his transcription, --πη δεσπώνησιν, Roehl adds the note "i. q. Attice δεσποίναις. Cereri e Proserpinae hanc pateram in usum sacrificiorum dedicasse videtur femina quaedam." In 1905 F. Bechtel re-edited the inscription in *S. G. D. I.*, 5525, in the form ----[ίτ]πη Δεσπώνησιν, characterizing the script as "gewöhnliche ionische Schrift," calling attention to the ending of the dative plural, for which he cites 5409 and 5418,<sup>2</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> The height of the *patera* is 6 cm. and that of the letters 2 cm.

<sup>2</sup> A number of examples of the dative plural in -ησι(ν) found in Attic inscriptions are collected by E. T. Wade-Gery in *J. H. S.*, LI, pp. 80 f.

referring to A. Fick, *Beiträge*, XXVIII, 96, for a discussion of the form Δεσπον- in place of the usual Δεσπουν-. "Die Δεσπόνοι sind," he remarks, "wie Röhl richtig bemerkt, sachlich mit den Δέσπουναι identisch, deren Altar ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀλτῆως stand (Paus. V. 15, 4), formell aber nicht mit ihnen zu vereinigen." Bechtel's restoration -ίπ]πη is very probable, but cannot claim to be certain; the dedicant may have been named, e. g., Ἀερόπη, Ἀντιόπη, Ἀστερόπη, Καλλιόπη, Ροδόπη, Εὐτέρπη, or some compound of -ώπη (Bechtel, *Hist. Personennamen*, 473). In 1910 F. W. Hasluck entered the Ashmolean dedication in his inventory of the inscriptions of Cyzicus and its neighbourhood as "Fragment of marble patera with votive inscription δεσπόνησιν" (*Cyzicus*, p. 276, no. 81; cf. 270 (Δεσποναί?)).<sup>3</sup>

We have seen that in Chandler's time three fragments of the patera survived, bearing in all twelve letters, but that when Roehl copied the inscription only the third of these was exhibited, containing the last five letters. At present the second and third fragments joined together are in the Ashmolean Museum, but the fate of the first remains a mystery; in addition to ΣΠΟ the right-hand tip of the bottom cross-bar of the preceding E is visible on the stone. What robs the inscription of some of its interest and dialectology of one of its minor problems is the fact, unnoticed by any of the scholars mentioned above, that there are clear traces of an iota between the O and the N, though the letter is hard to decipher because the line of fracture coincides in part of its course with the vertical stroke of the iota. We have, then, a dedication made by a woman Δεσποίνῃσιν, the goddesses Demeter and Kore; of the worship of the latter at Cyzicus, the city's principal cult, Hasluck gives an account (*op. cit.*, pp. 210 ff.). So far as I know, the only other examples of the use of this plural to include the Mother and Daughter goddesses are those found in Pausanias' description of Olympia (V, 15, 4 and 10).

Cf. Meisterhans-Schwyzer, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, pp. 120 f. With characteristic inaccuracy H. van Herwerden, *Lexicon Graecum suppl. et dial.*, gives "δεσπόνησι (sic) = δεσποίναις, i. e. Cereri et Proserpinae. Cyzici tit. IA 351," and this entry remains unchanged in the second edition.

<sup>3</sup> The Ashmolean inscription has also been edited or discussed by E. S. Roberts, *Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*, I, no. 148; H. W. Smith, *Sounds and Inflections of the Greek Dialects: Ionic*, pp. 154, 210 f., 365; and O. Hoffmann, *Die Griechischen Dialekte*, III, no. 135 and p. 279.

## III. A BITHYNIAN DONATION-LIST.

In *Inscripfien und Denkmäler aus Bithynien* (Istanbul *Forschungen*, XIV), pp. 54 f., no. 27, F. K. Dörner publishes an interesting, though seriously mutilated, inscription from Nicomedia (Izmit), the discovery of which was recorded in *Arch. Anz.*, 1939, p. 171. On a marble slab, broken at top and bottom and on the left (see the photograph, *op. cit.*, Pl. 19), we have a list of contributions in money or in kind for the purposes of some festival, which had probably some connexion with the gymnasium since the *γυμνασιάρχης* is expressly mentioned in line 5. Dörner's text of lines 6-15 is as follows:

	[-----]	οἶνον με. α'
	[-----]	ολόρου οἶνου με. α'
	[-----]	όρου οἶνου χο. σ'
	[----- Νε]	ικάνδρου * ιε'
10	[----- Φιλο]	τείμου * κε'
	[-----]	ου οἶνου με. α'
	[-----]	οἶνου χο. σ'
	[-----]	ίονος οἶνου χο. σ'
	[-----]	έρβυλίωνος όρκίολον
15	[----- οί]	νον χο. σ'

The gifts of wine amount in three cases (lines 6, 7, 11) to one metretes, in four (lines 8, 12, 13, 15) to six *χόες*, i. e. a half-metretes, those of money to fifteen (line 9) and twenty-five (line 10) denarii, if, as is probable, the sign \* here denotes denarii, rather than drachmae. One donor presents (line 14) an *όρκίολος* (or *όρκίολον*) to be used at the feast.

On line 7 Dörner comments "*λόρου οἶνου* könnte, wenn in *-λορου* nicht die Genitivendung des Vaternamens steckt, mit lat. *lora* und *lorea*, der Nachwein, Tresterwein zusammenhängen." On line 14 he comments thus: "Für einen *οἶνος* (?) *έρβυλίων* finde ich bisher keinen Beleg; möglich wäre, an einen Zusammenhang mit dem aus Athen. I 27c bekannten *έρβουλος οἶνος* zu denken, von dem es heisst: *έν αρχῇ μέν ἐστιν μέλας, μετ' οὐ πολλά δὲ ἔτη λευκός γίνεται.*—*όρκίολος* oder *όρκίολον* = *urciolus* (*orciolus*) nach Glossen = *ξύστης σταμνίσκος.*"

If I understand the inscription aright, the name of each contributor is followed by his patronymic, and the word *οἶνου*, dependent on *με(τερητήν)* or *χό(ας)*, is never accompanied by an epithet indicating the particular brand of wine contributed. If

this is so, we must see in -ολόρου (line 7), -όρου (line 8), -ίονος (line 13), and -ερβυλίονος (line 14) the ends of patronymics. For lines 7 and 8 Ὀλόρου suggests itself irresistibly, and we may conjecture that the two donors, whose names have perished, were brothers. Ὀλορος is a well attested name, borne by a Thracian prince, whose daughter Hegesipyle married Miltiades, the Athenian "tyrant" of the Chersonese (Herodotus, VI, 39, 41), and by his grandson, father of the historian Thucydides (Marcellinus, *Vit. Thuc.*, 2, 11, 16). In line 14 Σ[ερβυλίονος] is to my mind almost certain; in the tribute quota-lists of the Athenian Empire the ethnic Σερμυλῆς (from the city Σερμύλη or Σερμυλία in Chalcidice, south-east of Olynthus) appears in the variant form Σερβυλιῆς<sup>4</sup> at least twice (Meritt, Wade-Gery and McGregor, *Athenian Tribute Lists*, 7 iv 34, 8 ii 29; presumably also in 5, and possibly, though improbably, in 9 iii 4), and personal names formed from ethnics and ending in -ίων (e.g. Αἰτωλίων, Ἀρκαδίων, Θεσσαλίων) are of frequent occurrence (F. Bechtel, *Hist. Personennamen*, pp. 548 f.). The first extant letters of line 13 are, if my reading of the photograph is correct, -ίονος, and here also I would restore Σερβυλ[ίονος] and see in the donor of line 13 a brother of him of line 14. In line 9 Νε[κάνδρου] (or Ν[κάνδρου]) is almost certain, though the names Εἰκάνδρος (*Anth. Pal.*, XI, 332, 1) and [Ε]λίκανδρος (*I. G.*, XI, 1067 b.2) are also found, but the restoration Φίλο[τείμων] in line 10 is very doubtful, for Bechtel (*op. cit.*, pp. 428 ff.) lists sixty-eight other compound names of which -τ(ε)μος is the second element.

It is interesting, though by no means surprising, to find in this inscription two names, Ὀλορος and Σερβυλίον, indicating a Thracian origin, for throughout its history Bithynia was influenced by a constant infiltration, and from time to time by mass-migrations, from Thrace into Asia Minor.

MARCUS N. TOD.

<sup>4</sup> For other examples of the interchange of  $\mu$  and  $\beta$  see Kühner-Blass, *Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*<sup>3</sup>, I, pp. 155, 259; Meisterhans-Schwyzler, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 77. It was not restricted to Thrace, but was perhaps especially characteristic of Thracio-Phrygian speech (P. Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Griechischen Sprache*, pp. 236 f.), as, for example, in Θρά[τ]α Ἀνδράβυδος Μ<α>ρωνίτις (*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 9288), Ἀδραβυτηνός (*ibid.*, 7939), Μενδῖς an alternative form of Βενδῖς (Bekker, *Anecd. Graeca*, 1192), Μενδίδωρος (W. Tomaschek, *Wien. Sitzb.*, CXXXI [1], p. 12), etc.

## LIVY'S USE OF DRAMATIC SPEECH

The speeches inserted by Livy into the body of his history in accord with the practice of ancient historiography have been a fruitful field for scholarship, both in the form of special studies,<sup>1</sup> and as part of comprehensive studies of the historian.<sup>2</sup> Discussions in histories of literature stress this aspect of the *Ab Urbe Condita*<sup>3</sup> and hardly a Livian study of any kind can avoid some reference to it.<sup>4</sup>

As a result of these investigations statistical figures are available as to the number of occurrences and the different types of *oratio recta* found in Livy, and the various purposes to which Livy puts the speeches have been set down, some, to be sure on the basis of inference;<sup>5</sup> there are at hand minute studies of the material contents of 90 of the larger speeches in *or. rect.* and of the rhetorical devices contained in them;<sup>6</sup> a conception has arisen, backed by some measure of proof, that the larger speeches in *or. rect.* are not mere *Schmuckmittel*, serving no greater ends

<sup>1</sup> The most important are: O. Kohl, *Über Zweck und Bedeutung der livianischen Reden* (Progr. Barmen, 1872); W. Soltan, "Der geschichtliche Wert der Reden bei den alten Historikern," *N. J. A.*, IX (1902), pp. 20-31; H. V. Canter, "Livy the Orator," *C. J.*, IX (1913), pp. 24-34; R. Ullmann, *Étude sur le Style des Discours de Tite Live* (Oslo, 1929), *La Technique des Discours dans Salluste, Tite Live et Tacite* (Oslo, 1927) and "Les Clausules dans les Discours de Salluste, Tite Live, et Tacite," *Symbolae Osloenses*, Fasc. 3 (1925), pp. 65-75; and A. Lambert, *Die indirekte Rede als künstlerisches Stilmittel des Livius* (Zurich diss., 1946). The last of these was made available to me through the kindness of the editor of *A. J. P.*

<sup>2</sup> E. g. H. Bornecque, *Tite-Live* (Paris, 1933); H. A. Taine, *Essai sur Tite Live*<sup>5</sup> (Paris, 1888); W. Weissenborn in the *Einleitung* to his annotated edition, I<sup>6</sup> (Berlin, 1873); and J. Bayet in the introduction to the Budé edition, I (Paris, 1944).

<sup>3</sup> E. g. H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Latin Literature* (London, 1936), p. 300; M. Schanz and C. Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, II<sup>4</sup> (München, 1935), p. 312; N. Terzaghi, *Storia della Letteratura Latina*, I<sup>2</sup> (Torino, 1939), p. 476.

<sup>4</sup> E. g. A. Reichenberger, *Studien zum Erzählungsstil des Titus Livius* (Heidelberg diss., 1931); K. Witte, "Über die Form der Darstellung in Livius Geschichtswerk," *Ph. M.*, LXV (1910), pp. 270-305 and 359-419.

<sup>5</sup> Kohl, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Ullmann, *La Technique*.

than those of variety and stimulation, as had been claimed,<sup>7</sup> but have an integral part to play in the composition itself;<sup>8</sup> and many attempts have been made to determine the provenience of Livy's speeches.<sup>9</sup>

Missing, however, until very recently, has been a consideration of the use to which Livy puts what may be called the natural complement to *or. rect.*, namely *oratio obliqua*,<sup>10</sup> in the reporting of speeches, conversations, messages and speech in general;<sup>11</sup> while divergent opinions have been expressed regarding the question of possible changes in Livy's use of the two kinds of *oratio* throughout the extant part of his history.<sup>12</sup> The following

<sup>7</sup> W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1924), p. 360. Cf. also the same author's review of Ullmann's *La Technique* in *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, L (1929), pp. 362-363.

<sup>8</sup> W. Krüger, *Ein Beitrag zur Darstellungskunst des T. Livius* (Jena diss., 1938), p. 39 and note 18.

<sup>9</sup> E. g. H. Hesselbarth, *Historisch-kritische Untersuchungen zur dritten Dekade des Livius* (Halle, 1889); H. Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die 4. und 5. Dekade des Livius* (Berlin, 1863); W. Soltau, *Livius' Geschichtswerk, seine Komposition und seine Quellen* (Leipzig, 1897); Ullmann, *La Technique*.

<sup>10</sup> Lambert's dissertation is, to my knowledge, the first detailed study of Livy's use of *or. obl.* (a similar study, which I have not seen, exists for Tacitus: R. Hanssen, "Zum Gebrauch der *oratio obliqua* in Tacitus' *Historiae* und *Annales*," *Festschrift Oberbibliothekar Wilhelm Munthe* [Oslo, 1933], pp. 348-361). Its value lies in its posing of the problem, its recognition of the fully developed rhetorical character of much of the material Livy presents in *or. obl.* (a hitherto somewhat neglected fact; cf. Lambert, pp. 18-19), and its analysis of the various stages of complexity assumed by the form and the wide range of purposes which it serves.

<sup>11</sup> Casual remarks about Livy's use of *or. obl.* will be found e. g. in Bornecque, pp. 129 and 157-158; S. K. Johnson, "The Style of the Speeches in Livy," *C. R.*, XLIV (1930), p. 241 (a review of Ullmann, *Étude*); Kohl, pp. 3, 9-10, and 19-20; Kroll, *Studien*, p. 360; Schanz-Hosius, p. 314; Soltau, *Geschichtswerk*, p. 16; Witte, pp. 284 and 291.

<sup>12</sup> Ullmann's remark (*La Technique*, p. 196): "En somme on ne peut pas nier que la composition des discours dans les deux dernières décades de Tite Live ne porte la marque d'une certaine hâte dans le travail, bien que le style soit comme toujours soigneusement élaboré d'après les méthodes de la rhétorique" may be compared with that of S. K. Johnson in his review of Ullmann's work ("Speeches in Roman Historians," *C. R.*, XLII [1928], p. 199): "For Livy (I believe) in the fourth decade uses the art of characterization with the greater felicity when he is less bound by rhetorical formality."



pages, therefore, in an attempt to throw further light upon these aspects of the historian's work, present a fresh analysis of what is here termed "dramatic speech" in Livy, i. e., of speech reported, directly or indirectly, for the purpose and with the result of greater vividness and artistry. A more complete and therefore truer picture of the historian's achievement than has been given by previous studies will, it is hoped, be the result.<sup>13</sup>

## I

A few preliminary remarks are necessary. To give an adequate conception of Livian usage in this matter it was essential to select as wide a range of material as was possible without overburdening the data presented by too great a mass of details. It seemed wisest to limit the treatment to a number of books so chosen as to represent Livy's work at different stages of its progress. The books thus selected are I and X, XXI and XXX, XXXIX and XLV.

Secondly, it seemed requisite to fasten upon some criteria for distinguishing between what might properly be called "dramatic speech" and that which is simply a narrative and factual summary of what was or might have been said or thought under the given circumstances.<sup>14</sup> A good example of such a summary is I, 6, 1:

Numitor inter primum tumultum, hostes invasisse urbem atque adortos regiam dictitans, cum pubem Albanam in arcem praesidio armisque obtinendam avocasset, postquam iuvenes perpetrata caede pergere ad se gratulantes vidit, extemplo advocato concilio scelera in se fratris, originem nepotum, ut geniti, ut educati, ut cogniti essent, caedem deinceps tyranni seque eius auctorem ostendit.

This passage may be contrasted with the following, which is

<sup>13</sup> In my dissertation on *Constancy in Livy's Latin* (now in the course of publication) a similar corrective was applied to the belief that linguistically the historian foreshadows Silver Latin in his earlier books, and then, in the later decades, reverts consciously to Ciceronian practices and standards.

<sup>14</sup> Lambert (pp. 31-45) recognizes a difference between "schwache Andeutungen von Reden" and various more rhetorically developed stages of the use of *or. obl.*, but, not being interested in quantitative distinctions, has no reason to develop the point.

evidently not merely a summary but a condensed reproduction of something that might actually have been said. In I, 54, 1 Sextus Tarquinius is represented as participating in public affairs at Gabii and inciting the inhabitants to war against Rome:

inde in consilia publica adhiberi. ubi cum de aliis rebus ad-sentire se veteribus Gabinis diceret quibus eae notiores essent, ipse identidem belli auctor esse et in eo sibi praecipuam prudentiam adsumere quod utriusque populi vires nosset, sciretque invisam profecto superbiam regiam civibus esse quam ferre ne liberi quidem potuissent.

That this is not a verbatim account of what young Tarquin said is proved by the insertion of *identidem* and by the use of the historical infinitives *esse* and *adsumere*.<sup>15</sup> Yet it is just as certainly not akin to the account of Numitor's proclamation and address. In the first passage we have the brief statements containing the bare facts: *hostes invasisse urbem atque adortos regiam*, and then a summary outline of the old king's remarks at the council meeting, given in the form of four accusatives and an indirect question, accompanied by no epithets or other subjective indication of personal interest. In the second passage we may note first the greater structural complexity involved in the use of subordinate clauses and in the use in these clauses of the subjunctives *essent*, *posset*, *sciret*, and *potuissent*, which at once withdraw these words from the realm of Livy's responsibility and assign them to Sextus. Secondly there is an element of vitality which is not hard to identify; at its root is the use of rhetorical devices. Here we have the climactic opposition of *liberi* to *civibus* and two instances of chiasmus: *vires nosset sciretque invisam . . . esse* and *civibus esse . . . ferre liberi*. The dramatic element is implicit also in the use of such coloring words and phrases as *ne . . . quidem* and *profecto*.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> For the use of the infinitive cf. XXI, 53, 6: *haec adsidens aegro collegae, haec in praetorio prope contionabundus agere*, where it follows a quotation in *or. rect.* The use of similar words and phrases to indicate the repetition of a thought or judgment is frequent. Cf. with *identidem* above XXX, 28, 1: *inter haec simul spes simul cura in dies crescebat*, followed by 26 lines of *or. obl.*; XXXIX, 32, 10: *clamitantibus adversariis et maiore parte senatus*, followed by 4 lines of *or. obl.*; and XLV, 19, 9: *adgressus tempestivis sermonibus*, followed by 32 lines of *or. obl.*

<sup>16</sup> For further examples of rhetorically developed instances of *or. obl.* cf. Lambert, pp. 21-30.

Such have been the guiding principles in determining what is and what is not mere summary but living or "dramatic" speech. To be sure, the contrast is not always so appreciable as in these two examples, and there are passages in which opinions may well vary as to whether summary or dramatic speech is intended. It is not, however, of great importance here to establish water-tight compartments, when the main aim is to give a general view of Livian usage.

Thirdly, certain categories had to be devised by which a clear and easily surveyable picture of what it is that we find in Livy could be given. Such a picture will result when the speech material of the six books chosen has been studied from the viewpoints successively of A) the types in which it appears, B) the content matter it contains, C) the speakers to whom it is assigned, D) the circumstances under which it is introduced, and E) the amount and form of the examples thus considered.

Some remarks in explanation of those categories which need clarification are in order before the general picture is presented.

#### A. The Types

The occurrences of dramatic speech in the six books to be discussed fall into five clearly distinguishable groups:<sup>17</sup>

1. *contiones*. For the sake of brevity I shall term *contio* any formal discourse, oration, or speech addressed by an individual to a group with intent to inform, exhort, command, defend or attack, prove or disprove, praise or condemn. Examples from the six books under discussion are: I, 26, 9-11, the plea for mercy addressed to the Roman people by the elder Horatius; X, 21, 14-15, the speech of the consul L. Volumnius *in contione* on the Etruscan war; XX, 40-41, the address of P. Cornelius Scipio to his soldiers before the battle of the Ticinus; XXX, 17, 7-11, the address to the senate of the envoys of Masinissa; XXXIX, 55, 1-3, the reply made by the Transalpine Gauls to the Roman ambassadors; and XLV, 41, the *contio* of L. Aemilius Paulus to the plebs after his triumph. It will be seen that

<sup>17</sup> A useful list, with definitions, of the types of speech that may be expected in an ancient historian is given by G. B. Pighi in his study of Ammianus Marcellinus, *I Discorsi nelle Storie di Ammiano Marcellino* (Milano, 1936), p. 25.

included among the *contiones* are those speeches which Livy does not assign to an individual but to a group, as is the case with ambassadorial speeches and replies of the senate. These are, of course, to be considered as the utterances of an individual, unnamed, as representative for the group. Sometimes Livy so attributes them, as in XXI, 19, 8: *inde est ventum ad Volcianos . . . maximus natu ex iis in concilio respondit* (followed by 7 lines of *or. rect.*); sometimes he assigns them to the whole group, as in XXX, 17, 7: *postero die legatos Masinissae in senatum introduxit. gratulati primum senatui sunt quod . . .* (followed by 12 lines of *or. obl.*):

2. *conversations*. Here are grouped all discussions of an informal character between two or more individuals, whether or not the words of both parties are given. Fully developed conversations, to say nothing of stichomythy, are rare, although not missing entirely.<sup>18</sup> Good examples are the conversation between Lucretia, Collatinus, and their friends in I, 58, 7-10; the amusing scene between the consul Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus and the *lignatores* in X, 25, 5-7; and the extended interview between the consul Sp. Postumius Albinus and the *scortum* Hispala Fecenia in XXXIX, 12, 3-14, 2, in which Postumius speaks 6 times, Hispala 5. More common, however, is the conversation in which each party speaks but once, as in XLV, 36, 2-3 (Ser. Sulpicius Galba and the tribunes of the plebs) and that in which only one party is heard, the other remaining mute, as in XXI, 50, 8-10, where King Hiero converses with the consul Ti. Sempronius Longus, who plays the part of the *πρόσωπον κωφόν*. Also in this group are included what Ullmann regards as regular speeches, but which lack the formal quality required here for listing in that group. An example would be Scipio's *προτρεπτικόν* to Masinissa regarding Sophoniba in XXX, 14, 4-11, where the conversational character of the passage, extending as it does to 24 lines, is clearly shown by the existence of a reply by Masinissa. On the other hand, the interview between Scipio and Hannibal in the same book (XXX, 30-31) cannot be called a conversation, though it does involve only two people, when its formal character is considered.

3. *dicta*. By these are meant the brief statements often

<sup>18</sup> Cf. R. Heinze, *Virgils epische Technik*<sup>3</sup> (Leipzig, 1928), p. 405.

attributed by Livy to an individual or a group, expressive of the emotions of the speaker and usually neither addressed to any one in particular nor expecting an answer. Examples are

I, 7, 2 (Romulus killing Remus): "*sic deinde, quicumque alius transiliet moenia mea*";

X, 5, 11 (the Etruscans fleeing from the Romans): *cum deos pandere viam fugae conclamassent*;

XXI, 12, 4 (Alco of Saguntum of Hannibal's terms of peace): *moriturum adfirmans qui sub condicionibus iis de pace ageret*;

XXX, 15, 7 (Sophoniba, accepting the poison from the hands of Masinissa's messenger): "*accipio*" inquit "*nuptiale munus, neque ingratum, si nihil maius vir uxori praestare potuit. hoc tamen nuntia, melius me morituram fuisse si non in funere meo nupsissem*";

XXXIX, 50, 8 (Philopoemen's dying words): "*bene habet*" inquit;

and XLV, 32, 11 (reported of L. Aemilius Paulus): *vulgo dictum ipsius ferebant, et convivium instruere et ludos parare eiusdem esse qui vincere bello sciret*.

As can be seen from some of these examples, the *dicta* often have an epigrammatical touch.

4. *condensed combinations*. This is an awkward title, and the group to which it refers is an awkward group to handle, yet it is indisputable that Livy often gives artistic form to what is no more than the confused expression of public sentiment, a résumé of discussions in the senate or a summary of thoughts uttered by the same person or persons at various times.<sup>19</sup> As Pighi puts it:<sup>20</sup> "Se infine molte voci sono dallo storico riunite e come sommate insieme, mormorerà nella storia l'opinione pubblica, la fama, la calunnia, l'adulazione; se naturalmente s'uniscono, risonerà il grido, l'acclamazione, la preghiera, il canto." These condensed, artistic summaries of statements made or thoughts held at various times and places by groups or individuals form an elusive category; care must be taken not to confuse them with simple factual summaries of no artistic

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Lambert, pp. 46-49.

<sup>20</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

workmanship.<sup>21</sup> Most of the passages in question here are of limited extent, few running beyond 11 or 12 lines. In the six books considered, I have noted only two that exceeded this limit to any degree. In XXX, 28, 1-7 the various opinions about Hannibal's departure from Italy then current in Rome are given in a total of 25 lines and in XLV, 19, 10-17 there are 33 lines in which the *medicus* Stratius converts Attalus to loyalty towards his brother Eumenes *tempestivis sermonibus*. These summaries are, moreover, apparently uniformly rendered in *or. obl.*, as would be expected. An exception occurs in XXI, 53, 1-5, where the remarks attributed to Ti. Sempronius Longus on the question of attacking Hannibal are given first in 11 lines of *or. obl.*, whereupon Livy switches to *or. rect.* for 5 more lines. That this passage belongs to the category under discussion seems to be proved by the following sentence (6): *haec adsidens aegro collegae, haec in praetorio prope contionabundus agere*. Some further examples will clarify the concept involved in the group:

In I, 25, 1 the Romans and the Albans exhort their respective champions: *cum sui utrosque adhortarentur, deos patrios, patriam ac parentes, quidquid civium domi, quidquid in exercitu sit, illorum. tunc arma, illorum intueri manus*.

X, 6, 10 presents the views of the *patres* on the subject of plebeian priests: *simulabant ad deos id magis quam ad se pertinere, ipsos visuros ne sacra sua polluantur, id se optare tantum ne qua in rem publicam clades veniat*.

In XXXIX, 17, 6-7 we are told about the common opinion regarding the persons responsible for the Bacchanalian trouble: *capita autem coniurationis constabat esse M. et C. Atinios de plebe Romana et Faliscum L. Opicernium et Minium Cerrinium Campanum: ab his omnia facinora et flagitia orta, eos maximos sacerdotes conditoresque eius sacri esse*.

The rhetorical, colloquial, and dramatic elements in each of these passages are obvious.

5. *formulae*. Under this heading are grouped quotations from laws, e. g. I, 26, 6:

*lex horridi carminis erat: "duumviri perduellionem iudicent; si a duumviris provocarit, provocatione certato; si vincent, caput*

<sup>21</sup> See above, pp. 120-1.

obnubito; infelici arbori recte suspendito; verberato vel intra pomerium vel extra pomerium”;

official formulae, e. g. XXX, 43, 2-3:

tum M'. Acilius et Q. Minucius tribuni plebis ad populum tulerunt vellent iuberentne senatum decernere ut cum Carthaginensibus pax fieret . . . de pace “uti rogas” omnes tribus iusserunt;

prayers, e. g. X, 28, 15-18:

devotus inde eadem precatione eodemque habitu quo pater P. Decius ad Vesperim bello Latino se iusserat devoveri, cum secundum sollemnes precationes adiecisset prae se agere formidinem ac fugam caedemque ac cruorem, caelestium inferorum iras, contacturum funebribus diris signa tela arma hostium, locumque eundem suae pestis ac Gallorum ac Samnitium fore, haec exsecratus . . . concitat equum inferensque se ipse infestis telis est interfectus;<sup>22</sup>

and oracles, e. g. I, 56, 10:

ex infimo specu vocem redditam ferunt: “imperium summum Romae habebit qui vestrum primus, o iuvenes, osculum matri tulerit.”

That laws enter into the sphere of dramatic speech is a moot point; still, the similarities with such quotations as prayers and public formulae are so great and their frequency and extent so negligible, that they have been included for the sake of completeness.

6. *messages*. This group also offers difficulties. The first lies in its right to existence, a message in an historical work being at best something third-hand. Yet Livy is artistic here too, and so the letter<sup>23</sup> and the spoken message form a group

<sup>22</sup> I do not include as a true prayer the hardy jest of the consul L. Papirius Cursor, recorded in X, 42, 7: *ab eodem robore animi . . . in ipso discrimine, quo templa deis immortalibus voveri mos erat, voverat Iovi Victori, si legiones hostium fuissent, pocillum mulsi priusquam temetum biberet se facturum*. Livy himself seems to take it at its face value, for he goes on to say: *id votum dis cordi fuit et auspicia in bonum verterunt*. Cf. Weissenborn *ad loc.* and B. G. Niebuhr and M. Isler, *Römische Geschichte*, III<sup>2</sup> (Berlin, 1874), p. 343 (459), note 660.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Pighi, p. 25. In the books under discussion there is only one letter, that of Philip to Demetrius in XXXIX, 47, 5-8, which could be listed as dramatic speech.

comparable to those already outlined.<sup>24</sup> The other is found in the similarity existing in some instances between messages and remarks made by envoys on their own responsibility. These two groups are, of course, quite distinct. In the six books here examined there are few undisputable cases of dramatic messages. The following will serve as illustrations.

I, 23, 5: inde legatum praemissum nuntiare Tullo iubet priusquam dimicent opus esse conloquio; si secum congressurus sit, satis scire ea se allaturum quae nihilo minus ad rem Romanam quam ad Albanam pertineant.

I, 58, 5: Lucretia . . . nuntium . . . mittit ut cum singulis fidelibus amicis veniant; ita facto maturatoque opus esse; rem atrocem incidisse.

X, 39, 8-9: L. Papirius . . . nuntium ad collegam mittit sibi in animo esse postero die, si per auspicia liceret, configere cum hoste; opus esse et illum quanta maxima vi posset Cominium oppugnare ne quid laxamenti sit Samnitibus ad subsidia Aquiloniam mittenda.

XXI, 24, 3-4: oratores ad regulos eorum misit [*sc.* Hannibal], conloqui semet ipsum cum iis velle; et vel illi propius liberrim accederent vel se Ruscinonem processurum ut ex propinquo congressus faciliior esset; nam et accepturum eos in castra sua se laetum nec cunctanter se ipsum ad eos venturum; hospitem enim se Galliae non hostem advenisse, nec stricturum ante gladium, si per Gallos liceat, quam in Italiam venisset.

XXX, 15, 4-6: fidum e servis unum vocat . . . et mixtum in poculo [*sc.* venenum] ferre ad Sophonibam iubet ac simul nuntiare Masinissam libenter primam ei fidem praestaturum fuisse quam vir uxori debuerit; quoniam eius arbitrium qui possint adimant, secundam fidem praestare ne viva in potestatem Romanorum veniat; memor patris imperatoris patriaeque et duorum regum quibus nupta fuisset sibi ipsa consuleret.

XXXIX, 31, 4-5: Calpurnius praetor . . . legatos ad singulas legiones adhortandas propere mittit; docere et monere iubet in illis spem omnem vincendi et retinendae Hispaniae esse: si illo loco cedant, neminem eius exercitus non modo Italiam, sed ne Tagi quidem ulteriorem ripam umquam visurum.

XLV, 5, 6-8: Theondam . . . ad Persea mittunt qui nuntiaret argui caedis Evandrum Cretensem; esse autem iudicia apud sese more maiorum comparata de iis qui incestas manus intulisse intra terminos sacratos templi dicantur; si confideret Evander

<sup>24</sup> Cf. the good but brief remarks on *Botenberichte* in Lambert, pp. 52-55.



innoxium se rei capitalis argui, veniret ad causam dicendam; si committere se iudicio non auderet, liberaret religione templum ac sibimet ipse consuleret.

In discussing the last four categories, especially the last three, I have quoted fully in order to show how great a part the rhetorical and dramatic elements, those which I consider characteristic of dramatic speech, play even where indirect discourse is the medium and where the type of utterance, as in messages and condensed combinations, would at first thought hardly seem to lend itself to such treatment.

### B. The Contents

In the matter of contents we already have Kehl's classification of the 407 speeches in *or. rect.* According to him these are either formulae, anecdotes, speeches by commanders or soldiers in camp or before or after a battle, speeches in the senate or in civic gatherings, speeches dealing with foreign affairs, or miscellaneous items that, as he says,<sup>25</sup> "lassen sich nicht näher bestimmen." I believe a simpler classification will be more conducive to clarity; all instances of dramatic speech, whether in *or. rect.* or in *or. obl.*, fall into one or another of the following four groups (these are listed in the order of their frequency): international politics, internal politics, military affairs, and private and personal matters.

### C. The Speakers

This category is self-explanatory.

### D. The Circumstances

Here it is my intention to classify the matter in *or. rect.* and *obl.* according to the surroundings that give each utterance its background. As in the case of types and contents, Livy in this regard too is conservative, repeating the same situations with little variation and only a few cases of complete atmospheric novelty. The examples examined fall into seven groups:

1. *in castris.* Here are addresses by generals, military conferences, discussions with delegations, scenes from camp life. Included also are two examples which cannot strictly be said to

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

be *in castris*, both from book XXX: 20, 7-9 contains Hannibal's *dictum* as he sails from Italy and 30, 3-31, 9 the interview between Hannibal and Scipio before the battle of Zama. Both, however, seem to belong to this group of military pictures, for Hannibal's ship is but a floating camp, as it were, and the interview in 30-31 takes place between the two camps involved (XXX, 29, 10: *ibi in medio locus conspectus*).

2. *in proelio*. This group is self-explanatory.

3. *apud populum*. This group comprises speech uttered on any occasion at which we see the Roman populace gathered together, not merely formal addresses at *contiones* and *comitia* but also such examples as the reclamations of the nobles at the consular elections in X, 15, 9:

circumstare sellam omnis nobilitas; orare ut ex caeno plebeio consulatum extraheret maiestatemque pristinam cum honori tum patriciis gentibus redderet

and the passage describing the terror caused at Rome by the news of the battle of the Trebia in XXI, 57, 1-2:

Romam tantus terror ex hac clade perlatum est ut iam ad urbem Romanam crederent infestis signis hostem venturum nec quicquam spei aut auxilii esse quo portis moenibusque vim arcerent; uno consule ad Ticinum victo, altero ex Sicilia revocato, duobus consulibus, duobus consularibus exercitibus victis, quos alios duces, quas alias legiones esse quae arcessantur.

In a few cases it is the citizenry of some other state that is brought forward (XXX, 9, 6 and 37, 9 of Carthage; XXXIX, 53, 3-4 of Macedonia; XLV, 5, 3-4 of Samothrace; XLV, 10, 10-11 of Rhodes; XLV, 26, 7-8 of Passaro), but usually it is the *populus Romanus* that the reader sees and hears.

4. *in senatu*. Little need be said in explanation of this class. All statements made at meetings of the Roman senate belong to it.

5. *in concilio*. To this group are assigned remarks made at meetings of governmental bodies other than those of the Roman senate. These Livy himself generally terms *concilia* (I, 50, 2: *multa ibi toto die in concilio variis iactata sermonibus erant*; X, 16, 3: *postulaverunt principum Etruriae concilium*; XXI,

20, 7: *eadem ferme in ceteris Galliae conciliis dicta auditaque*; XXXIX, 35, 5: *Lycortae praetor concilium indicit*), although in the cases of Carthage and Saguntum he speaks of a senate.

6. *apud legationes*. The Romans were constantly sending embassies throughout the Mediterranean world to conciliate, terrify, or otherwise influence its peoples in their favor. Whenever these embassies are not expressly located at a *concilium* or a meeting of a foreign senate, remarks made by and to them are placed in this group.

7. *inter privatos*. This is the most varied of the seven classes, for there is no constant locale, Livy allowing himself the greatest freedom in the selection of the dramatic décor. An example from each book will make this clear. At I, 57, 6-8 occurs the jovial drinking scene in the tent of Sextus Tarquinius at the siege of Ardea, followed at 58, 2-4 by the attack on Lucretia in her bedroom; X, 23 presents the dramatic interlude of the exclusion by the *matronae* of *Verginia Auli filia* from the rites at the *sacellum Pudicitiae Patriciae*; XXX, 7, 9 shows Sophoniba persuading her husband *precibus et misericordia* not to abandon Carthage (no locale given); in XXXIX, 9-12 is narrated in vividly dramatic fashion (largely through conversations) the discovery in Rome of the Bacchanalian conspiracy; and at XLV, 19 we read the arguments by which Attalus is swayed first to betray his brother Eumenes and then to remain loyal to him (no locale given). The trait all examples in this group have in common is that they belong to conversations of a private and personal nature, being usually in the form of dialogues.

#### E. Amount and Form

1. In determining the length of the passages in dramatic speech the standard used is the line length found in the Oxford edition of Conway, Walters, and Johnson, which contains on the average 8 words. As this edition covers only books I-X and XXI-XXX, passages from books XXXI-XLV have been adjusted to this standard.<sup>26</sup> Half or quarter lines are counted as full; one- or two-word lines are not considered.

2. By form is meant the use of *or. rect.* or *obl.*

<sup>26</sup> The Livian passages considered in these tabulations are as follows: I, 7, 2 and 10-11; 9, 3-5 and 14-15; 10, 6; 12, 4-8; 13, 2-3; 16, 6-7;

## II

An examination from each of the viewpoints just considered of the six books selected as representative of the larger bulk of the *Ab Urbe Condita* will present a fairly accurate and complete picture of the way in which Livy employs dramatic speech in the course of the extant books.

---

17, 10; 18, 9; 22, 6-7; 23, 4-5 and 7-9; 24, 2, 4-5, and 7-8; 25, 1 and 12; 26, 4-11; 28, 4-9; 32, 6-13; 34, 9; 35, 3-5; 36, 4; 38, 2; 39, 3; 40, 2-3; 41, 3 and 5; 45, 6; 46, 6-8; 47, 2-5 and 10-12; 48, 1-2; 49, 1; 50, 3-6 and 9; 51, 3-6; 52, 2-3; 53, 6-11; 54, 1; 55, 1; 56, 10; 57, 7; 58, 2-5 and 7-10; 59, 1 and 8-10.

X, 4, 8 and 10; 5, 11; 6, 10; 7, 3-8, 12; 9, 5; 10, 8-10; 11, 11-13; 12, 2; 13, 3-4, 6-7, 10 and 12; 14, 11-12; 15, 9-11; 16, 4-8; 17, 2 and 5-6; 18, 11-14; 19, 1-4, 7-9, 11 and 17; 20, 3-4; 21, 14-15; 22, 2-7; 23, 5 and 7-8; 24, 5-17; 25, 2-3, 5-7 and 13-18; 26, 2-3; 27, 9; 28, 7, 12-13 and 16-17; 29, 4; 33, 3; 35, 6-7, 9-11, 13-15 and 18-19; 36, 8; 37, 8 and 11; 39, 8-9 and 11-17; 40, 11 and 13; 41, 7 and 13; 42, 7; 43, 4; 44, 6-8; 45, 3 and 5.

XXI, 3, 3-6; 10, 3-13; 11, 2; 12, 4 and 6; 13; 16, 3-6; 17, 4; 18, 4-14; 19, 9-10; 20, 5-6 and 8; 21, 3-6; 24, 3-4; 30, 2-11; 34, 2-3; 35, 8-9; 40-41; 43, 2-44; 45, 5-8; 48, 3; 50, 8-10; 52, 4; 53, 1-5; 54, 2-3; 57, 1-2; 63, 6-10.

XXX, 4, 4-5 and 9; 5, 5-6; 7, 9-10 and 12; 9, 6-8; 12, 6-7 and 12-16; 13, 3-7 and 9-14; 14, 4-15, 2; 15, 5-7, 10 and 12; 16, 6-13; 17, 7-13; 18, 3-4; 19, 3; 20, 2-4 and 7-9; 21, 6-9; 22, 1-4 and 6; 23, 1-7; 25, 10; 28, 1-7; 30, 3-30; 31, 1-10; 32, 1-2 and 6-7; 35, 5-9 and 11; 37, 1-6 and 9; 42, 2-10, 15-19 and 21; 43, 2-3, 5-6 and 9; 44, 3 and 5-11.

XXXIX, 4, 3-13; 5, 2-5 and 7-8; 9, 4; 10; 11, 1-2, 4-5 and 7; 12, 1; 12, 3-14, 2; 15, 2-16; 17, 1-3 and 7; 18, 8-9; 19, 4-6; 24, 8-12; 25, 5, 7-13 and 15; 26; 27, 2-29, 2; 31, 5; 32, 11; 33, 6 and 8; 34, 3-8; 35, 6-7; 36, 3-4; 36, 6-37, 17; 37, 19 and 21; 39, 6, 8-9, 11-12, and 14-15; 41, 3-4; 42, 11; 43, 2-3 and 5; 47, 5-6 and 8-11; 50, 8; 51, 9-11; 53, 3-4; 54, 5-12; 55, 1-3.

XLV, 1, 8-9; 2, 4-5; 3, 4-8; 4, 3; 5, 3-4 and 7-11; 8, 1-7; 10, 5 and 10-11; 12, 4-6; 13, 2-7 and 13-17; 14, 1-4; 18, 1-6, 19, 5-6 and 10-17; 20, 8-9; 22-24; 26, 7-8 and 12-14; 31, 7-8; 32, 11; 34, 14; 35, 9; 36, 2-5 and 7-8; 37-39; 41; 42, 8-11; 44, 5-6 and 8-13.

## A. Types

Book	Number of instances in each book						Totals
	I	X	XXI	XXX	XXXIX	XLV	
<i>contiones</i>	16	28	16	30	32	25	147
conversations	10	6	2	8	10	4	40
<i>dicta</i>	11	11	5	6	5	3	41
condensed combinations	9	12	5	9	3	6	44
<i>formulae</i>	14	3	1	2	4	0	24
messages	2	3	1	1	2	1	10
	62	63	30	56	56	39	306

As befits the kind of history that Livy represents, the most frequent type of dramatic speech is, in all the books examined, the formal speech. The low number of them found in book I, is explained by the remote period which the book chronicles, as well as by the importance here of social, legal, political, and religious disquisitions; that in book XXI by its military character.

*Formulae* and messages are almost always in a decided minority. The exception, for *formulae*, is book I, whose antiquarian character calls for their presence in quantity. It will be noticed that they have disappeared by book XLV, when a period but a century and a half before Livy's own time is reached.

The other three types hold a middle ground, varying in number with the exigencies of the tale to be told, but usually present in sufficient quantity to prove the fondness of Livy for these means of varying the manner of his composition. Of special interest is the large number of condensed combinations (second largest for the total of these six books), showing how eager Livy is to give a hearing not only to the voiced utterances of the individual, but also to the feelings of the masses of the people, for in 27 out of the 44 examples examined this class represents the utterances of a group: soldiers, common citizens, senators, and the like. Always these utterances are given an oratorical form that is logical and pleasing, and fits well with the rest of the narrative; yet the vitality introduced by the apparent presence of the people themselves is retained.

Another use made by Livy of this device is the artistic summing-up of what was said by a named individual on various occasions and at various times, so that again a logical, harmonious form

is achieved without renouncing the interest of an apparently dramatic scene.

Livy has well adapted his manner to his material. Formal discourse, compounded reproductions, anecdotal remarks, fragments of conversations, prayers and laws, letters and messages are inserted in their right proportions in what is to be a dignified yet attractive narrative of the history of a great nation.<sup>27</sup>

### B. Contents

Book	Number of remarks on each subject						Totals
	I	X	XXI	XXX	XXXIX	XLV	
International politics	19	6	16	29	25	22	117
Internal politics	15	14	2	2	18	9	60
Military affairs	8	39	12	15	2	2	78
Private matters	20	4	0	10	11	6	51
	62	63	30	56	56	39	306

The last column in the above table gives the clearest picture of relative proportions, for each book has its own peculiarities, which cause apparent lack or excess of certain kinds of subject matter. Thus it is not surprising that book XXI, with the exciting story of the beginnings of the Second Punic War, should show a dearth of interest in domestic politics and private affairs, or that book X, dealing with the struggle against Samnites and Etruscans, should show an abundance of remarks on military subjects. Had a book dealing largely with the struggles between *plebs* and *patres* been included, such as III or IV, domestic politics would be found to be preponderant there. The last column, however, well bears out what has been said of Livy's historical interests:<sup>28</sup> his main emphasis is placed on Rome's relations with foreign nations, a stress on wars being a necessary concomitant of this emphasis; constitutional government and the growth of the state hold less fascination for him;

<sup>27</sup> Livy, *Praef.* 2: *scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos and 3: quae vita, qui mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit.*

<sup>28</sup> Bornecque, p. 23: "Ce programme suppose avant tout le récit des guerres, y compris ce qui les prépare et les négociations qui les terminent; l'histoire intérieure n'intervient guère que dans la mesure où elle exerce une influence sur les opérations."

and matters of personal, biographical nature furnish him with the least material. In this last class book I is unique because of its legendary character. All in all, the subject matter of the passages in dramatic speech is well in accord with that of the whole work.

## C. Speakers

Book	I	X	XXI	XXX	XXXIX	XLV
Number of speakers <sup>29</sup>	36	23	16	23	24	21
Maximum no. of lines given to each speaker	40	122	157	143	111	184
Average no. of lines	10	17	28	22	27	30
Minimum no. of lines	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maximum no. of occasions allowed each speaker	6	10	9	15	14	7
Average no. of occasions	2	3	2	3	2.5	2
Minimum no. of occasions	1	1	1	1	1	1

Two facts are evident from an examination of this table: 1) that a Livian book ordinarily contains a relatively large number of speaking parts (Book XXI, with its stress on military matters, is necessarily an exception); and 2) that this scattering of speaking parts is accompanied by an unwillingness—or is it lack of interest?—on the author's part to let the spotlight fall frequently or for a longer period of time upon the majority of those who are allotted these rôles. A complete tabulation by books of the speakers and the number of lines and occasions to speak granted each of them (which lack of space forbids reproducing here) shows still more clearly how little even the most important personages are allowed to monopolize the stage. Thus the 15 occasions on which Scipio Africanus is brought forward in book XXX are quite *sui generis* in the books examined, for the next highest number, 14 in book XXXIX, is distributed among various foreign groups, mainly Greek envoys, while the third highest number, the 10 granted the consul Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus in book X, is only two thirds of Scipio's number. In most cases the character is allotted a far lesser number of opportunities to speak, and a majority of the characters do not

<sup>29</sup> By "speakers" are meant not merely individuals, such as Tanaquil, King Hiero, an augur; but also groups such as Sabine women, Gallic representatives, Roman soldiers, who are given a collective voice or heard through an anonymous spokesman.

speak more than once. These speakers, individuals as well as groups, appear before the reader, let their voices be heard, and then pass on again, usually never to reappear. Yet in their passing they have given to Livy's history a touch of the multiplicity that exists in life, for all the types of humanity that were encountered in antiquity seem to be present: matrons and harlots, Gauls and Greeks, high officials of Rome and simple soldiers and priests, kings of Asia and Africa; and, in every book, the mass of mankind gives utterance to its hopes and fears, its doubts and beliefs—whether it be the *populus Romanus* in terror at Hannibal's invasion or the army of the Samnites aroused by a *fremitus* concerning the action of the enemy. It seems plain that Livy's interest does not lie in the presentation of rounded character studies, of full-length portraits of any save the most outstanding personalities, such as Scipio and Hannibal, and these in very few instances; the greater number even of Rome's great men figure mainly as minor aids to the furtherance of what is ever uppermost in the historian's mind: the character and destiny of what, as has often been pointed out, is his real hero—the city of Rome.

The number of lines given to a character or a group is in most cases a good indication of the relative importance that character or group has in its book. Thus in book I those who speak more than 20 lines apiece are all among the outstanding personages found in that book: Romulus, the three Tarquins, Tanaquil, Tullus Hostilius. *Formulae* too take up room in this book of antiquarian interest. In book X men like Decius Mus, Fabius Maximus, Volumnius, Papirius Cursor, and Appius Claudius are the heroes who receive the spotlight, while it is appropriate enough in this warlike book that the Roman soldier of the lesser ranks too should be allowed to make himself heard. Book XXI belongs of course to Hannibal, and, after him, to his Roman counterpart, the elder Scipio, but senators and diplomats on both sides are given a large share of dramatic speech. Book XXX, which closes the war begun in book XXI, presents much the same picture, although the romantic story of Sophoniba and her two lovers accounts, and rightly, for some part of the dramatics. In the last two books under discussion, where Livy has definitely left behind him the heroic section of Roman history, we find more and more space being given to discussions and



include 5, of which much is political. Then come military matters with a preponderance of remarks made in anticipation of battles or as a result of them, and last are the more or less anecdotal sections.

It is again interesting to see how each book has its individual character. Books X, XXI, and XXX carry off the military honors, whereas XXXIX and XLV abound in discussions of national and international affairs. Book X is weakest in these, and military matters are almost nonexistent in books XXXIX and XLV. Private affairs would find their best representative in book I were it not for the many conversations included in book XXXIX in connection with the history of the Bacchanalian rites.

The table as a whole shows once again the flexibility and stability of Livy's procedural methods, which combine an accent on the importance of matters of state, diplomacy, and war with a leavening of interesting material drawn from the realms of the less important but perhaps more engaging aspects of history.

#### E. Length and Form

Book	I	X	XXI	XXX	XXXIX	XLV	Average
1. Total no. of lines	2084	1905	1940	1710	1918	1719	1879
2. No. of lines of dramatic speech	380	407	446	501	657	643	506
3. % of 1 accounted for by 2	18.2	21.4	23.5	29.3	34.2	37.4	27.5
4. No. of lines in <i>or. rect.</i>	206	118	308	207	240	407	248
5. % of 2 accounted for by 4	54.2	28.9	69	41.3	36.5	63.3	49
6. No. of lines in <i>or. obl.</i>	174	289	138	294	417	236	258
7. % of 2 accounted for by 6	45.8	71.1	31	58.7	63.5	36.7	51

Two important facts become evident from the above table:

- 1) The percentage of the total number of lines taken up by dramatic speech increases with every book, and the increase

seems to gain momentum as it progresses.<sup>31</sup> Apparently Livy found or created more and more occasions for introducing this device as he grew more experienced in his work. Quite naturally, his sources would supply him with greater quantities of presumably authentic material as his history drew nearer to contemporary times. In view, however, of the liberties Livy takes in revising, expunging, and elaborating speech material in his sources,<sup>32</sup> one must assume that a partial reason for this expansion is his own fondness for dramatic speech as a means of vivifying the course of his narration.

2) There is no such development traceable in the relative amount of *or. rect.* and *or. obl.* contained in the six books examined. In three of them (I, XXI, and XLV) the material in *or. rect.* is preponderant, in one case by as much as 38%; in the other three *or. obl.* is more plentiful, again usually by large margins. There seems thus to be no ground for Kroll's impression that *or. obl.* becomes less frequent in the later books,<sup>33</sup> for it consumes two-thirds of the space given to dramatic speech in as late a book as XXXIX. It is again plain that Livy adapts his methods to his material, increasing or decreasing the weight

<sup>31</sup> The increase from book I to book X (a gap of eight books) is 3.2%; that from book X to book XXI (ten books) is 2.1%; that from book XXI to book XXX (eight books) is 5.8%; that from book XXX to book XXXIX (eight books) is 4.9%; and that from book XXXIX to book XLV (five books) is 3.2%.

<sup>32</sup> Cf., e.g., Witte, p. 284 (with reference to Livy, XXXII, 32, 12 ff. and Polybius, XVIII, 1, 5 ff.): "Die wichtigste Veränderung ist, dass er die bei Polybios nur dem Inhalte nach mitgeteilte Unterhaltung in die oratio recta umgesetzt hat" and p. 291 (with reference to Livy, XXXIX, 34 and Polybius, XXII, 13 f.): "Zu notieren ist die Umwandlung des letzten Teils des Gesprächs aus der indirekten in die direkte Rede"; H. Peter, *Die geschichtliche Litteratur über die römische Kaiserzeit bis Theodosius I und ihre Quellen*, II (Leipzig, 1897), p. 300: "Des Livius übrige Reden können wir zum Teil aus Polybius kontrollieren und ersehen daraus, dass er auch dessen erdichteten Reden gegenüber nach möglichster Selbständigkeit gestrebt hat; er hat kurze eingeflochten, wo Polybios ausführliche, direkte, wo jener indirekte, und umgekehrt, völlig eigene, wo jener nur die Thatsache des Sprechens bemerkt; . . . Auch das findet sich, dass Livius an Stellen, wo Polybios nichts von gehaltenen Reden erwähnt, solche eingereiht hat"; Kohl, p. 21: "Dieser Grad der Selbständigkeit des Livius in den Reden gegenüber Polybios ist natürlich in ausgedehnterem Masse für die anderen Quellen und für die vorangehenden Bücher anzunehmen."

<sup>33</sup> Kroll, *Studien*, p. 360.

placed on the various elements he employs as his subject matter suggests and permits.

### III

It seems appropriate to include here a sketch of the use made of dramatic speech by those of Livy's predecessors and contemporaries in the field of history whose works are extant.<sup>34</sup> The following table, parallel to the one given on p. 137, shows the proportion of Teubner lines<sup>35</sup> given to dramatic speech in selected books of five Greek (Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and Dionysius Halicarnassensis) and three Roman (Sallust, Cornelius Nepos, and Caesar) historians anterior to or contemporary with Livy, together with the percentages of this dramatic speech material occupied respectively by *or. rect.* and *or. obl.*<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Lambert concludes his study with an appreciation of the rôle *or. obl.* plays in Polybius, Sallust, and Caesar, which is excellent in its critical and interpretative approach.

<sup>35</sup> The average number of words per line in the Teubner edition is equal to that in the Oxford edition of Livy.

<sup>36</sup> For Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, Sallust and Caesar a random choice of one book apiece was made. The relatively small number of lines taken from Nepos is explained by the small size of his biographies, the much larger number taken from Polybius and Dionysius by the fact that the sections examined present historical material covered by Livy as well: Books II (Dionysius), XXI (Polybius, III) and XXXIII (Polybius, XVIII). The passages are as follows:

Herodotus, V, 1, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 49, 50, 51, 72, 79, 80, 84, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 105, 106, 109, 111.

Thucydides, IV, 3; 8, 8; 9, 2; 10; 11, 4; 16-20; 22, 1-2; 24, 4; 27, 1 and 5; 28, 1 and 4; 29, 3-4; 30, 4; 36, 1; 37, 2; 38, 3; 40, 2; 46, 5; 48, 1; 50, 2; 59-64; 68, 6; 73, 2-4; 76, 5; 78, 4; 83, 5; 85-87; 92; 95; 97, 2-99; 108; 114, 3-5; 118-119, 2; 120, 3; 126.

Xenophon, *Hellenica*, IV, 1, 4, 6-14, 32-39; 2, 3-4, 11-12; 3, 2; 4, 6, 10, and 17; 5, 9 and 13; 6, 2 and 13; 7, 2 and 4; 8, 4, 5, 9, 14, and 38.

Polybius, III, 11, 5-9; 15, 5 and 7; 21, 6-8; 22, 4-13; 24, 3-13; 25, 3-5 and 8-9; 27, 2-6 and 8-9; 29, 3; 33, 2-4; 44, 10-12; 62, 6 and 10; 63, 2-13; 64, 3-10; 77, 4-6; 82, 6; 85, 8; 98, 6-10; 108, 4-109, 12; 111, 2-10; XVIII, 1, 7-9 and 12-14; 3, 1-9 and 11-12; 4-6, 4; 7, 1, 3-4, and 6; 8, 4; 9, 1-2, 4-5, and 7-10; 11, 4-11; 22, 8; 23, 3-6; 27, 4; 36, 4-8; 37; 38, 3-9; 41a; 43, 9; 45, 1-6 and 9; 46, 5; 47, 1-3; 50, 6-9; 51; 52, 4.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, V, 3, 2; 4; 5; 9, 2-3; 10, 2-7; 11, 2-3; 12, 1-2; 16, 3; 19, 2; 21, 2; 24, 1; 27; 28, 4; 29; 30, 2-3; 31, 3; 32, 2; 33, 1-2; 34, 1 and 3; 41, 5; 43, 2; 45, 2; 50, 3-4; 51, 2; 54, 5; 60, 1; 61, 4-5; 62, 3; 63, 1; 64-65; 66-68; 69, 2-3; 70, 4; 71, 3; 72, 1; VI, 4, 2; 6, 2-9, 6; 10, 1; 14, 3-16; 18-21, 2; 22, 1; 23, 3-24; 26, 1 and 3;

	Her.	Thu.	Xen.	Pol.	Dion.	Sal.	Nep.	Caes.	Liv.
1. Total no. of lines	1947	2368	1378	6492	16,736	2923	934	1074	1879
2. No. of lines dram. speech	419	698	195	716	6,215	692	56	134	506
3. % of 1 accounted for by 2	21.5	24.3	14.2	11	37.1	23.7	6	12.5	27.5
4. No. of lines in <i>or. rect.</i>	384	486	154	256	4,528	505	30	9	248
5. % of 2 accounted for by 4	91.6	69.6	79	35.3	72.8	73	53.6	6.7	49
6. No. of lines in <i>or. obl.</i>	35	212	41	460	1,687	187	26	125	258
7. % of 2 accounted for by 6	8.4	30.4	21	64.2	27.2	27	46.4	93.3	51

Study of this table shows that Livy's practice is unique. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Sallust are close to him in the amount of space they give to dramatic speech, but their division of this amount is totally different in that they all lay far more emphasis than does Livy on the direct quotation. Of these three Thucydides is the nearest to Livy in his proportions. Polybius and Nepos approximate Livy in the relative space they allow for *or. rect.* and for *or. obl.*, but the total amount of dramatic speech they have is far below Livy's. Dionysius approximates

27, 3-28; 30, 2; 32, 1-2; 35-38; 40-41; 43, 2-44; 45, 3; 47, 2-3; 48, 1-2; 49, 3-56; 57, 2-58; 59, 2-65, 2; 66; 68; 69, 2 and 4; 70, 2-72, 1; 72, 3-80; 81, 3-82; 83, 3-88, 3; 89, 3-4; 94, 2; 95, 2; VII, 6, 1; 8, 2; 12, 4; 13, 1 and 3; 14, 3-15, 2; 16, 1; 16, 4-17, 3; 17, 5; 22-24; 25, 2-4; 28-32; 33, 3-34, 1; 34, 3-4; 35, 2-3; 36; 37, 2; 38, 1 and 3-4; 39, 2; 40-46; 48-58, 1; 60-61, 2; 62, 3; 63; 68, 3-6; VIII, 1, 5-2, 5; 4, 2; 5-8; 9, 3-10; 11, 2-3; 13; 14, 3; 15, 1-2; 17, 1; 23-35; 37, 1 and 2; 39, 2-42; 43, 4 and 5; 44, 2; 45, 2; 46-54, 3; 56, 2; 69, 2; 70, 2-5; 71, 5-72, 3; 73, 2-76; 77, 2-78, 3; IX, 1, 4-5; 2, 2; 6, 1 and 5-7; 7, 2; 8, 3; 9; 10, 3; 13, 4; 16, 2; 17, 4; 28, 2 and 4; 29-32; 33, 2; 37, 2 and 4; 43, 2-3; 44, 1-2 and 6-8; 45-47; 49, 3; 51, 4-53; 54, 3; 59, 5; 60, 3-4.

Sallust, *Bell. Jug.*, 8, 1 and 2; 9, 2; 10; 11, 5 and 6; 12, 3; 14; 15, 1; 21, 4; 22, 2-4; 24, 2-10; 25, 5; 26, 1; 31; 33, 4; 35, 10; 38, 9; 49, 2-3; 51, 4; 54, 1; 55, 1; 56, 4; 58, 5; 62, 1; 63, 1; 64, 2-5; 65, 3; 68, 3; 70, 5; 71, 5; 76, 1; 77, 1; 81, 1; 83, 1; 85; 88, 4-5; 97, 1; 102, 2 and 5-14; 104, 5; 106, 3; 107, 1-5; 108, 2; 110; 111, 1; 112, 2-3.

Nepos, *Hamilcar*, 1, 5; *Hannibal*, 2, 3-6; 7, 3; 10, 5-6; 12, 3; *Atticus*, 4, 2; 8, 4; 10, 4; 21, 5-6; 22, 2.

Caesar, *Bell. Gall.*, V, 3, 6-7; 6, 5; 7, 8; 10, 2-3; 26, 4; 27, 2-11; 28, 3-7; 29; 30; 31, 1-2; 34, 1 and 3-4; 36, 2 and 3; 38, 2-4; 41, 3-6 and 7-8; 44, 3; 51, 2-3; 52, 6; 55, 2.

Livy in the total percentage but differs strongly in his proportions. Of Caesar and Xenophon the same thing may be said, save that there the total percentage is below Livy's, whereas in Dionysius it is above.

It will be recognized that in his total percentage of dramatic speech Livy shares the practice employed before him by those historians universally looked upon as consummate artists, avoiding the prolixity of Dionysius as well as the jejunity in matters oratorical of Xenophon, Polybius, Nepos, and Caesar. On the other hand it is clear that his distribution, seen over a total of *ca.* 2000 lines to be about evenly apportioned to both kinds of dramatic speech, is not shared by any of the others, some of whom favor *or. obl.* (Polybius and Caesar), the others *or. rect.* (Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Dionysius, Nepos, and Sallust).

In conclusion it may be said that the results obtained from this investigation fully justify the high regard in which Livy has always (if not universally)<sup>37</sup> been held as a skillful writer in his field;<sup>38</sup> that his use of *or. rect.* and *obl.* is unique in the known annals of ancient historiography up to his time; and that whereas the proportion between the two types fluctuates with the requirements of his subject matter, the general trend is in the direction of ever more copious use of a fertile means for giving dramatic life to the great story of Rome.

KONRAD GRIES.

QUEENS COLLEGE,  
FLUSHING, NEW YORK.

<sup>37</sup> As representative of adverse criticism in antiquity, cf. the opinion of Pompeius Trogus as given by Justinus (XXXVIII, 3, 11): *in Livio et Sallustio reprehendit quod contiones directas pro sua ratione* (Wölfflin's emendation of the MS text; Gutschmid reads *directas pervorsa ratione*, Rühl marks the passage as corrupt) *operi suo inserendo historiae modum excesserint*; of the modern a good representative is Soltau ("Der geschichtliche Wert," p. 23): "Und doch, trotz aller rhetorischen Fertigkeit, trotz mancher geistreichen Wendung, wie inhaltsarm sind diese Reden!"

<sup>38</sup> It would require a detailed comparison of Livy with his sources, say Polybius (trial comparisons in this direction have been made; cf. Lambert, pp. 58-65 and his references), where they are known and extant, or with some historian (perhaps Dionysius) who presents an account parallel to one in Livy, to bring out the full artistic superiority of the Roman writer in this respect.

## THE UNITY OF EMPEDOCLES' THOUGHT.

Of all the philosophers in whose systems inconsistencies have been detected, none seems at first glance to be more deserving of the charge than Empedocles. Yet I believe that there is no basic inconsistency in his philosophy. In this paper I shall first state the problem of the unity of Empedocles' thought, then consider two difficulties in the way of a solution and the effect that not observing them has had, and finally propose and attempt to justify what appears to me to be a reasonable explanation of the problem.

Some of the fragments of Empedocles, as interpreted both alone and with the aid of the *testimonia*, teach or imply the doctrine that all things consist of the four elements—earth, air, fire and water—combined in various proportions under the influence of Love, and that all such combinations are liable to dissolution under the influence of Strife; that since the four elements and Love and Strife are the only things that have a separate and permanent existence, nature can be explained completely in terms of their combinations;<sup>1</sup> and that death is a form of dissolution.<sup>2</sup> Other fragments and *testimonia* clearly teach the doctrine of the transmigration of souls.<sup>3</sup> If the body perishes by dissolution, we may well inquire, how can such a thing as a soul survive to transmigrate? In particular, how can there be a constant substratum of personality to pass from body to body?<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5th ed. by W. Kranz, I (Berlin, 1934), to which references will be given thus: A (referring to Diels' section *Leben und Lehre*, pp. 276-307) 28, 30, 33, 34, 37, 41, 43, 48, 52; B (referring to Diels' section *Fragmente*, pp. 308-374) 6, 8, 11, 12, 17, 21, 26. These references also fit Diels' earlier collection, *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1901) = *Poetarum Graecorum Fragmenta* auctore Udalrico de Wilamowitz-Moellendorff collecta et edita, III, 1, where the contexts are sometimes given with greater fulness than in the later work.

<sup>2</sup> A 34, 43, 48, 52 (Aristotle), 78; B 8.

<sup>3</sup> A 1 (§ 77), 31; B 115, 117, 125, 126, 127, 129, 146, 147. Problems of the interpretation of these fragments are discussed by H. S. Long, *A Study of the Doctrine of Metempsychosis in Greece from Pythagoras to Plato* (Dissertation, Princeton, 1948), pp. 45-62.

<sup>4</sup> Such continuity is indicated by B 117 and 129, and is implied by the power to recall the events of one's previous lives.

Some of the fragments appear wholly materialistic in their attitude and intent, while others are concerned with questions of morality or tabus and have a noticeably idealistic tone.<sup>5</sup> How can such apparently inconsistent views of the world have been held by one man? Was Empedocles a materialist or an idealist?

In trying to answer this question, we must beware of two difficulties, one involving the arrangement of the fragments, the other concerned with the bias of the *testimonia*. We shall consider these difficulties at some length because the failure to be fully aware of their existence has certainly helped to augment the impression of Empedocles' inconsistency.

Empedocles is credited with two principal works: a treatise on the physical world entitled *περὶ φύσεως*, "On Nature," and a treatise on the human soul and its fate after death entitled *καθαρμοί*, "Purifications."<sup>6</sup> Exactly what do we know of the extent and arrangement of these two poems? Diogenes Laërtius<sup>7</sup> assigns 5000 verses to the two poems together, while Suidas<sup>8</sup> assigns 2000 verses to the work on *Nature*. If both statements are correct, then there must have been about 3000 verses in the *Purifications*. Diels<sup>9</sup> has proposed the emendation *πάντα τρισχίλια* for *πεντακισχίλια* in the traditional text of Diogenes, which would reduce the number of verses in the *Purifications* to about 1000 and triple the fraction of that work preserved in fragments.

Diels assigns approximately 346 verses to the poem *On Nature* and approximately 110 to the *Purifications*, which means that we have roughly one sixth of the former work and one thirtieth of the latter, if we assume that the traditional text of Diogenes is correct. If we accept Diels' emendation, however, then we have about one tenth of the *Purifications*. These computations are based on the assumption that Diels has divided the fragments

<sup>5</sup> B 115, 136-141.

<sup>6</sup> On Empedocles' other works see S. Kärsten, *Philosophorum Graecorum Veterum . . . Operum Reliquiae*, II, *Empedocles* (Amsterdam, 1838), pp. 62-74; E. Wellmann, *R. E.*, X (1905), s. v. Empedokles, no. 3, cols. 2508 f.

<sup>7</sup> VIII, 77 = A 1 (§ 77).

<sup>8</sup> S. v. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς Μέτῳνος = A 2.

<sup>9</sup> H. Diels, "Über die Gedichte des Empedokles," *Berl. Sitzungsab.*, 1898, Erster Halbband, pp. 396-415, especially p. 398. Close study of the text of Diogenes has been hampered by the fact that there is no critical edition, a lack of which I hope presently to remedy.

correctly but, as a matter of fact, very few of the fragments can be assigned with any certainty to the work from which they came. Nine of the 111 fragments of the poem *On Nature* are explicitly said to come from that work by the writers who quote them,<sup>10</sup> and nine others can be identified with great probability because we know that the poem *On Nature* was addressed to a certain Pausanias, so that second person singular forms probably refer to him.<sup>11</sup> Of the 42 fragments assigned to the *Purifications* by Diels, only two are cited explicitly.<sup>12</sup> Since Empedocles addressed this work to the citizens of Acragas, second person plural forms enable us to identify three more fragments;<sup>13</sup> and a fourth,<sup>14</sup> which is cited from the third book of the poem *On Nature*, probably is from the *Purifications* too.<sup>15</sup> Thus 24 of the 153 fragments can be apportioned between the two works with something approaching certainty; from there on, the arrangement of the fragments is a matter of speculation. The truth of the matter is that, since an editor of the fragments must arrange them in some order, the most logical method is to gather the fragments concerned with the physical universe in one group and those concerned with religious matters in another group. This method was suggested by Scaliger and has been followed, in one form or another, by Sturz and every subsequent editor.<sup>16</sup> As a method of arrangement it is admirable, but we should be very cautious about making 'statements concerning Empedocles that assume (it may be unwittingly on our part) that Diels' arrangement is Empedocles'. The order of the fragments given by Diels is demonstrably wrong in one instance, for fragment 62 comes from Book II of the poem *On Nature*, while fragment 96 comes from Book I; and he may well be wrong in placing fragment 118, which is concerned with the

<sup>10</sup> B 1, 8, 17, 62, 75, 85, 96, 103, 104.

<sup>11</sup> B 2, 4, 5, 6, 21, 23, 38, 110, 111.

<sup>12</sup> B 112, 113.

<sup>13</sup> B 114, 124, 136.

<sup>14</sup> B 134.

<sup>15</sup> Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, note on B 134.

<sup>16</sup> F. G. (i. e., W.) Sturz, *Empedocles Agrigentinus*, I (Leipzig, 1805), who describes the method and mentions his debt to Scaliger on pp. xxxv f. A bibliography of editions and other works is given by E. Bodrero, *Il principio fondamentale del sistema di Empedocle* (Rome, 1904), pp. 13 ff.



birth of a child, in the *Purifications* instead of with the other fragments on the same subject,<sup>17</sup> which he has put in the work *On Nature*. Be that as it may, Diels' arrangement must not be allowed to produce the impression that there was a dichotomy in Empedocles' philosophy, unless a study of the fragments themselves brings us to this conclusion.

The second difficulty attending a study of the fragments of Empedocles involves the bias of the *testimonia*. We cannot really look at Empedocles with our own eyes, but are reduced by circumstances to a status like that of insects with mosaic vision, for our *testimonia* oblige us to view Empedocles through not one but dozens of pairs of eyes. A detailed study of the doxographic tradition of Empedocles lies beyond the scope of the present paper,<sup>18</sup> but even a summary examination of the *testimonia* yields facts that are of value for our present purpose, and that seem not to have been sufficiently emphasized by previous students.

Our knowledge of Empedocles comes to us, essentially, from two separate sources. On the physical side the tradition derives from the Peripatetic School, beginning with Aristotle and Theophrastus and continuing till the time of the late commentators on Aristotle such as Simplicius.<sup>19</sup> This does not mean that every single *testimonium* and fragment of Empedocles' physical theories is derived from a Peripatetic writer, which would be an extraordinary thing; in fact, the usual compendious writers are well represented: Aëtius, Clemens Alexandrinus, Sextus Empiricus, Hippolytus, Diogenes Laërtius, Athenaeus, Eusebius, and Stobaeus.<sup>20</sup> But a remarkably large number of the most valuable

<sup>17</sup> B 65-70.

<sup>18</sup> An elaborate study of the sources for Empedocles' biography has been made by J. Bidez, "La biographie d'Empédocle," *Université de Gand, Recueil de travaux publiés par la faculté de philosophie et lettres*, 12<sup>e</sup> fascicule (Gand, 1894), pp. 1-104. The tradition for the biography is naturally not the same as the tradition for the doctrines.

<sup>19</sup> Diels cites approximately 76 passages from the *corpus Aristotelicum*, derived from 17 genuine and 5 spurious works; 11 from Theophrastus, including the long passage (A 86) on Empedocles' doctrine of the senses; and from commentators on Aristotle, 33 passages from Simplicius, 5 from Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 4 from Philoponus, and 1 from Olympiodorus—130 passages in all, of exceedingly diverse length and importance.

<sup>20</sup> Diels cites 41 passages from Aëtius, 16 from Clement, 10 from

statements and fragments *does* come from Aristotle and his successors. This strong interest in Empedocles' atomic theory should not surprise us, for Aristotle's own theory of the composition of matter<sup>21</sup> is close enough to the Empedoclean theory to enable Aristotle to use his favorite approach to a philosophical subject: namely, to treat his predecessors as stammering Aristotelians, and show how they gradually approached his own position. This interest in Empedocles, to judge by the provenience of the fragments, apparently remained alive in the Peripatetic School for some centuries.<sup>22</sup>

Empedocles' doctrine concerning the soul, on the other hand, was rather neglected by the Peripatetics. To be sure, it is included in the history of early psychologies with which Aristotle begins his *De Anima*,<sup>23</sup> but there it is merely lumped with the theories of several philosophers, all of whom identified the soul with the power of sensation or regarded sensation as the chief manifestation of soul; and since Aristotle's explanation of the soul was far different,<sup>24</sup> Empedocles' doctrine and others of the same type are quickly dismissed. Our most numerous and informative fragments and *testimonia* concerning the Empedoclean doctrine of the soul come, not from the Peripatetic School, but from the Academy, chiefly from Plutarch<sup>25</sup> and the Neo-Platonists,<sup>26</sup> although Plato<sup>27</sup> too shows great interest in the doctrine of transmigration and has many motifs in common with Empedocles in his treatment of this doctrine.

Thus Empedocles was divided in two in ancient times, as can easily happen to a thinker who undertakes to present a large

Sextus Empiricus, 9 from Hippolytus, 5 from Diogenes, 5 from Athenaeus, 4 from Eusebius, and 4 from Stobaeus. Diels, I, p. 288, lines 21 f., assumes that much of this material comes ultimately from Theophrastus.

<sup>21</sup> *De Gen.* 328b26-338b19. H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy* (Baltimore, 1935), pp. 46-61. Cited hereafter as "Cherniss."

<sup>22</sup> A 39. The complete accommodation of Empedocles' doctrine of the elements to Aristotle's is found in two passages of Aëtius, A 43.

<sup>23</sup> 404b8-15.

<sup>24</sup> *De An.* 407b27-418a6.

<sup>25</sup> Diels cites 59 passages of Plutarch, taken from 21 different works.

<sup>26</sup> Six passages from Porphyrius; three each from Iamblichus and Proclus; two from Theo of Smyrna; and one each from Ammonius, Plotinus, Synesius, and Hierocles.

<sup>27</sup> Plato is cited by Diels five times. See also Long, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-86.

synthesis of all aspects of human experience. If such a thinker attempts to include the data of senses, reason, and intuition in his explanation of the world, and if he attempts to give an account of the physical world and the realm of spirit also, then the scientists may admire his scientific achievements, but are likely to feel it was a pity he had to dabble in such speculative matters as religion, while those whose interests are primarily religious will simply ignore his scientific theories. If we may trust Sorokin's copiously documented history of Western Culture, there have been two chief periods when matter and spirit received equal attention and were not felt to be in a sense antagonistic to each other, the Fifth Century B. C. and the late Middle Ages.<sup>28</sup> Empedocles, it is interesting to note, lived in one of these periods and was eagerly studied by the Arabic scholastic philosophers in the other.<sup>29</sup> In our own time, when it is fashionable to suppose the conflict of religion and science to be irreconcilable, it is not surprising that Empedocles' philosophy is felt to show a striking lack of unity. Empedocles was cut in two by the ancients; and modern scholars seem disposed to leave him in that state while they march between the halves.

Although the doxographic tradition is divided, as we have seen, and although Empedocles' poems are preserved only in fragments, yet I believe that these difficulties are not insurmountable. While the bias of our sources tends to conceal the real unity of Empedocles' philosophy, the Peripatetics on the one hand and the Neo-Platonists on the other reveal enough of that particular side of Empedocles' philosophy which interested each more, so that we can still trace the lines of juncture between the two

<sup>28</sup> P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, 4 vols. (New York, 1937-1941). Vol. II, especially pp. 196-199.

<sup>29</sup> About 900 A.D. Ibn Masarraah brought a document then current under the name of Empedocles from Egypt to Spain. Knowledge of "Empedocles" is still displayed as late as 1127 in the *History of Sects and Religions* of al-Shahrastani. Although "Empedocles" is supposed to have been an Hermetic treatise, yet it is likely that some genuine Empedoclean material was embedded in the work. See M. Horten in *Ueberrwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, II, 11th ed. by B. Geyer (Berlin, 1928), pp. 301-304; the German translation of al-Shahrastani by T. Haarbrücker, *Religionspartheien und Philosophenschulen*, 2 vols. (Halle, 1850-1851), especially II, pp. 90-98; and C. de Vaux in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, IV (Leyden and London, 1934), pp. 263 f.

sides — "two sides" from the point of view of our own times, but not from the point of view of Empedocles.

Confronted by Diels' separation of the fragments of Empedocles into two distinct works, a distinction somewhat reinforced by the Peripatetic atmosphere in which the one group of fragments is preserved and the Neo-Platonic atmosphere of the other group, students of Greek philosophy have resorted to various explanations. Some, of whom Rohde, Zeller, and Schmid<sup>30</sup> may serve as examples, assume that there is a basic inconsistency in the philosophy of Empedocles; that Empedocles never stopped to reason out his philosophy as a whole, but merely recorded all the theories that interested him without, perhaps, even being aware that they are inconsistent.

Others, such as Bidez,<sup>31</sup> Diels,<sup>32</sup> and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,<sup>33</sup> have resorted to a more desperate device to explain the "obvious" inconsistency of the fragments while avoiding the assumption that Empedocles was too dull-witted to perceive it. Empedocles, they say, underwent a great change of outlook in the course of his life; and since both conversion and loss of faith are clearly defined and not infrequent religious experiences, our scholars divide into two parties, in favor of conversion,<sup>34</sup> and in favor of loss of faith.<sup>35</sup> It is equally easy to construct a convincing account of Empedocles' life on either assumption.

Behind these theories there seems to be lurking the suspicion that Empedocles cannot be taken quite seriously as a philosopher because he was emotionally somewhat unstable, and this suspicion is supported by the suggestion that Empedocles was, at least in part, a charlatan. Now, this suggestion apparently derives from Satyrus<sup>36</sup> (whose fondness for piquant details needs

<sup>30</sup> E. Rohde, *Psyche*, English translation of the 8th ed. by W. B. Hillis (New York, 1925), pp. 379, 382 f.; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I, 2, 5th ed. (Leipzig, 1892), pp. 806, 837; W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, I (Munich, 1929), p. 317 and n. 1.

<sup>31</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 159-174. See also W. Kranz, "Die Katharmoi und die Physika des Empedokles," *Hermes*, LXX (1935), pp. 111 ff.

<sup>32</sup> See note 9.

<sup>33</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Die *Kaßappoi* des Empedokles," *Berl. Sitzungsab.*, 1929, pp. 626-661.

<sup>34</sup> Diels, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

<sup>35</sup> Bidez, *loc. cit.*; Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 659 ff.

<sup>36</sup> Satyrus *ap.* Diog. Laërt., VIII, 59.

no emphasizing),<sup>37</sup> and is based, as practically all of Empedocles' biography seems to be, on hasty deductions from his own words.<sup>38</sup> There is really not the slightest evidence that Empedocles was a charlatan, and we must avoid letting that supposition influence our interpretation of his philosophy. If we give up for the moment the traditional conviction of Empedocles' inconsistency, can we combine the fragments dealing with the elements and those dealing with the transmigration of souls in a consistent doctrine that will harmonize with all aspects of Empedocles' teaching and with the history of early Greek philosophy, so far as we are acquainted with it? It seems to me that we can,<sup>39</sup> and I shall now endeavor to substantiate my belief.

For the interpretation of the relationship between Empedocles' two poems there is a passage of particular importance in Simplicius' commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle.<sup>40</sup> Simplicius writes:

He [Empedocles] makes the material elements four, fire and air and water and earth, being invisible, changing in mixture and separation as to abundance and scarcity, but the first principles in the proper sense, by which these are moved, are Love and Strife. The elements must continually be moving reciprocally, at one time being combined by Love, at another time being separated by Strife: so, according to him, the principles are six.

<sup>37</sup> On the interests and methods of Satyrus and other biographers of his time see D. R. Stuart, *Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography* (Berkeley, 1928), Chap. VI.

<sup>38</sup> K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 172-178.

<sup>39</sup> This explanation is similar to that outlined by Cornford in the process of defending his thesis that early Greek philosophy was a product rather than an antagonist of early Greek religion. There is some interest, I believe, in seeing how this explanation can grow out of a study of the fragments and doxographic tradition of Empedocles, as well as out of a study of the history of Greek religion and philosophy. Cornford's published remarks cover only what was strictly necessary for his purpose: F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (London, 1912), pp. 224-242.

<sup>40</sup> A 28 = H. Diels, *Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros . . . Commentaria*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1882, 1895), Vols. IX and X in the series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae, Vol. IX, p. 25, line 21 — p. 26, line 4 = H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, editio iterata (Berlin and Leipzig, 1929), p. 478, lines 1-15.

For in truth in one place he gives a creative power to Strife and Love when he says:

"Sometimes coming together under the influence of Love,  
And sometimes borne apart by Strife's hatred."

Another time he puts them on a level with the four, when he says:

"Then again it [the sphere] separated from one into many,  
Fire and water and earth and the boundless height of air,  
And destructive Strife apart from these, equally poised every  
way,  
And Love among them, equal in length and width."

This passage occurs in Simplicius' long note on *Physics* 184b15, 'Ανάγκη δὲ ἦτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣ πλείους, which takes the form of a very full discussion of the ἀρχαί proposed by the Greek philosophers down to and including Plato. It is usually assumed that the information in these lines, if not the exact words, is taken from the *Physical Opinions* of Theophrastus, since the subject matter and style of the passage resemble those of the explicit quotations from Theophrastus' work contained in Simplicius' commentary.<sup>41</sup> Of the eleven or twelve fragments of the *Physical Opinions* that Diels recovers from Simplicius' *Physics*, four or five are thus identified by their general tone rather than by any statement of Simplicius.<sup>42</sup>

If this passage of Simplicius' *Physics* is really based on Theophrastus, as it seems reasonable to presume, then we must inquire how accurate an account of Empedocles' doctrines we can obtain from it. It requires no extensive study of the fragments of Theophrastus' philosophical works to find that he, like Simplicius and Aristotle himself, was prone to judge the doctrines of earlier philosophers by the standard of Aristotle,<sup>43</sup> although he had made intensive studies of the works of his predecessors,<sup>44</sup> much in the manner of Aristotle's studies of constitutions, on the basis of which he might have adopted a more sympathetic approach to them. Hence, we conclude, Theophrastus' words must be interpreted with caution.

<sup>41</sup> Diels, *Doxographi*, p. 104.

<sup>42</sup> In the Index Nominum of his edition of Simplicius, Vol. X, p. 1447, Diels adds two new fragments of Theophrastus' *Physical Opinions* (neither one of which refers to Theophrastus by name) to those given in his *Doxographi*. He is less certain of one of these fragments than the other: hence the variation in the preceding numbers.

<sup>43</sup> Diels, *Doxographi*, p. 103.

<sup>44</sup> Diels, *loc. cit.*

As a matter of fact, the idea behind this particular interpretation of Empedocles may have been taken from Aristotle himself, for Aristotle, like Simplicius, points out what he considers to be Empedocles' inconsistent use of Love and Strife in *De Generatione* 314a16-17: "... Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, while all the elements—including those which initiate movement—are six in number; ..." <sup>45</sup> And in *Metaphysics* 1075b1-6 we read: "Empedocles also has a paradoxical view; for he identifies the good with Love, but this is a principle both as mover (for it brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of the mixture). Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being, at least, of the two is not the same. In which respect then is love a principle?" In these two passages Aristotle is expressing the same criticism of Empedocles as Simplicius.

We shall now examine the significance of the passage of Simplicius. In it we see Simplicius (or Theophrastus) fighting against the assumption, which was inconceivable to him, that Empedocles regarded Love and Strife as material substances. Yet both Simplicius and Aristotle are forced to concede that Empedocles sometimes speaks of these two elements as material, putting them on the same level as earth, air, fire and water; and indeed, the simplest way to understand Empedocles' conception of the original state of the universe is as a sphere mingled of the four elements and encased in an envelope of Love.<sup>46</sup>

In speaking of Love and Strife as material, we must take care not to present Empedocles' view in a false and exaggerated light. It might be more accurate to speak negatively and say that Love and Strife were *not immaterial*,<sup>47</sup> for Empedocles apparently regarded them as material quite simply, without emphasis and as a matter of course.

The history of philosophy can be regarded, from one point of view, as a gradual awakening to distinctions that at first are completely ignored; then perceived vaguely, discussed, and

<sup>45</sup> The translations of this and the following passage from Aristotle are taken from the Oxford translations of his works.

<sup>46</sup> On the sphere: A 41; B 27-29. The envelope of Love is suggested by B 17 (vss. 19, 20), 35 (vs. 4), 36.

<sup>47</sup> Cherniss, p. 108, n. 444.

gradually clarified until they receive precise formulation; and finally are so readily and generally accepted that they cease to be noticed except when the very fundamentals of thought are being once more analyzed from some new viewpoint. The traditional method of studying the history of philosophy in terms of a series of individuals is likely to obscure this process. So it was with the contrast of *material* and *immaterial* in Greek thought. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the development of the concept of *immaterial*; suffice it to say that it appears to play no part in the speculations of the early Ionian physical school, nor in the thinking of the period that preceded it. Parmenides forced the idea into the open by his paradoxical account of a motionless universe, and thus caused Leucippus and Democritus to use the Void as part of their physical system. In Plato's doctrine of Ideas, the concept of *immaterial* has a clear and important rôle, for the Ideas are often referred to as "unseen" (*ἀδής, ἀόρατος*), or "without body" (*ἀσώματος*).<sup>48</sup> To Aristotle the *immaterial* seems to have been completely obvious, as we shall presently have occasion to indicate. We should not fall into the same error that Aristotle did of assuming that Empedocles was conscious of the distinction, for it is unlikely that he was. In the fragment on the senses, to be considered later, we once more find the six elements on a par with each other, and there seems to be no extant fragment of Empedocles in which Love and Strife can *not* be understood as material.

Yet the realization that Love and Strife are material must not be allowed to obscure the fact that they have somewhat different functions from the other four elements in the mixture, controlling, as they do, the dissolution and gradual reforming of the sphere.<sup>49</sup> In the extant fragments they are not spoken of as ingredients of any particular physical compound, in the way that the other four elements are used.<sup>50</sup> If the distinction of *material* and *immaterial* had influenced the thinking of Empedocles, he would doubtless have spoken of Love and Strife as efficient forces in some sort, just as Aristotle describes them.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>48</sup> See F. Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum* (Leipzig, 1835-1838), s. v. *ἀδής, ἀόρατος*, and *ἀσώματος*.

<sup>49</sup> See notes 68 and 69.

<sup>50</sup> A 51, 78, 86 (§§ 10, 11); B 96.

<sup>51</sup> *Metaph.* 984b23-985b22.



To us, as to Aristotle, it is hard to conceive Love and Strife otherwise, and Empedocles' concepts seem merely fluctuating and imprecise; but we must try to appreciate Empedocles' standpoint.

It may be objected to this interpretation that the second passage of Empedocles quoted by Simplicius does not contain a very clear and decisive example of the material nature of Love and Strife, and—more important—that if Aristotle could have found some explicit lines to prove them material, he would have used them in the passage of *De Anima* to be considered below. Two rejoinders can, however, be made to this objection.

First, Aristotle treats the subjects of the elements and causation in Empedocles (not to mention the other Presocratics) in such a capricious and inconsistent manner and forces passages of Empedocles into the Aristotelian philosophy with such Procrustean vigor and in such defiance of their meaning, that there is no reason to suppose he would exercise great care in the selection of the most apposite example to illustrate his point. Since Aristotle seems to have been quite unsympathetic to the views of other philosophers in his interpretations of them, almost any passage of Empedocles serves his purpose equally well. For example, he suggests in *De Generatione* 315a19-23 that Empedocles really had but *one* element, the sphere, from which all other things were derived, although he speaks elsewhere, as we have seen, of *four* elements, and even of *six*. Again, in the passage from *Metaphysics* 1075b quoted above, Aristotle is analyzing Empedocles' doctrine of the elements in the light of his own theory of the four causes,<sup>52</sup> and is trying to identify Love with *one and only one* of them. Yet elsewhere Aristotle recognizes, at least for purposes of analysis,<sup>53</sup> that a given thing may function in more than one way with respect to something else: for example, the good is present in the universe as organizational principle and as ruler;<sup>54</sup> and the soul, though numerically one, is described as having a variety of functions with respect to the body.<sup>55</sup> *Argumenta ex silentio* would seem somewhat hazardous when applied to a writer whom even the desirability of self-consistency does not prevent from grossly misrepresenting the meaning of others.

<sup>52</sup> Cherniss, pp. 222 f., 226-234.

<sup>53</sup> *Metaph.* 1078a21-23.

<sup>54</sup> *Metaph.* 1075a12-19.

<sup>55</sup> *De An.* 411a24-418a6.

Second, Aristotle took the distinction between *material* and *immaterial* absolutely for granted. He apparently does not discuss this distinction explicitly<sup>56</sup> anywhere in his extant works, although he had excellent opportunities in his refutation of Democritus' and Leucippus' theory of the Void,<sup>57</sup> and in his distinction between ἄλη ἀισθητική and ἄλη νοητή.<sup>58</sup> On this point Aristotle stood squarely on Plato's shoulders, not deeming it necessary to explain a distinction that he felt as obvious. Since, then, we have no explicit discussion of this distinction by Aristotle, accompanied by the usual historical references, what he has to say on the subject appears in the form of *obiter dicta* and must be handled with even greater reserve than his more systematic remarks on other points.

This is true of the two passages cited above. *De Generatione* 314a16-17 stands in a passage where Aristotle is discussing whether coming-to-be is the same as alteration, and where he concludes that philosophers with one ἀρχή must answer Yes, and philosophers with more than one ἀρχή (of whom Empedocles is an example) must answer No. Here the point is not the nature of Empedocles' elements, but their number. *Metaphysics* 1075b1-6 is part of a passage on the relation of the good to the universe, and so is as little concerned fundamentally with the nature of Empedocles' elements as the preceding passage. For these two reasons I believe that the absence of a completely explicit fragment proving Love and Strife material (in terms acceptable to Aristotle and to us) is not so significant as it at first appears.

From the six lines of Empedocles quoted by Simplicius we conclude, in the light of the preceding discussion, that Empedocles regarded the entire physical universe as made up of six elements: earth, air, fire, water, Love, and Strife; with the understanding, however, that Love and Strife were elements with somewhat different functions from the other four.

Other fragments reveal that Empedocles believed the individual objects of nature acquire their various appearances and properties from the relative proportions of the primary sub-

<sup>56</sup> The distinction naturally appears by implication in many passages.

<sup>57</sup> *Phys.* 213b30-214a16.

<sup>58</sup> *Metaph.* 1035b27-1036a13.

stances that they contain.<sup>59</sup> Man too is composed of the six substances. His intellect resides in the blood, which is formed by a mixture of equal parts of earth, air, fire, and water.

This theory of the human intellect is revealed by a passage of Theophrastus' treatise *De Sensu*:<sup>60</sup>

He [Empedocles] speaks in the same way about intelligence and ignorance. Thought is carried on, he says, by means of like things, and ignorance is caused by unlike things, since mind is the same or almost the same as perception. Having enumerated how we know each thing by means of its like, he went on to state that,

"From these all things are fixed and fashioned together  
And with these they think and feel pleasure and pain."

That is why he stated that the blood is the particular seat of the intelligence, for in it the elements are most mingled.

. . . Whoever have the "medium mixture" in any particular part of the body, are skilled in that place: good orators have it in their tongues; good workmen, in their hands.

In the philosophy of Empedocles, Theophrastus is saying, thought is really very like sense-perception:<sup>61</sup> just as we see the fire blazing on the hearth by means of the fire that is within our eyes, so we think about that same fire by means of the fire that forms one quarter of our blood. "Thought is the same, or almost the same, as perception." "The same" because it is carried on by the same method of like-and-like. But Theophrastus is aware that there is a difference, in the philosophy of Empedocles, between mind and perception: perception covers a wider range, for it is carried on by means of all six primary substances.

This latest statement can be verified by a passage of Aristotle. In the account of earlier beliefs concerning the soul that begins the *De Anima*,<sup>62</sup> Empedocles is said to be one of the philosophers who regarded perception as the chief characteristic of *soul*, as distinguished from thinkers like Anaxagoras who identified the soul with the power of originating movement. Here, as in many other passages, Aristotle's interpretation may be distorted,<sup>63</sup>

<sup>59</sup> See note 50.

<sup>60</sup> A 86 (§§ 10, 11). See also A 30, 97; B 105, 107.

<sup>61</sup> Aristotle had said that Empedocles equated the two: B 106 = *De An.* 427a21-29.

<sup>62</sup> 404b7-15 = B 109.

<sup>63</sup> Cherniss, pp. 293-295.

but what he tells us about Empedocles is of the highest value: "Empedocles declares that it [the sphere] is formed out of all his elements, each of them also being soul; his words are,

'By earth we see earth; by water, water;  
By aether we see the divine aether; by fire, destroying fire;  
Love, by Love; and Strife by mournful Strife.'

There are two assumptions implicit in these lines of Empedocles that are worthy of comment. First, that we perceive like by like. This, as Aristotle says,<sup>64</sup> was the common assumption of many of the early Greek philosophers, and he takes considerable pains to refute it.<sup>65</sup> Second, that perception is a purely physical process, for all six elements are presented as on the same level; whence we deduce that the *ensemble* of the six elements (which Aristotle, using his own terminology, calls "soul") is physical too.

Since man's intellect is a combination of the four traditional elements but his sense-perception is carried on by means of a mixture of all six of the primary substances, mind is, in a sense, a subdivision of perception. What relation did this connection between intellect and sense-perception bear to the rest of Empedocles' philosophy? I would suggest that Empedocles regarded the remainder of perception after the removal of mind, a combination of Love and Strife, as the organizing principle of the body and the moral character of the individual man, his personality considered in its ethical aspect. This combination of Love and Strife was, I venture to suppose, the *δαίμων* which transmigrates from body to body, the equivalent of a soul in the terminology of other philosophers—for Empedocles apparently did not use the word *ψυχή* in the sense of "soul."<sup>66</sup> At death the earth, air, fire, and water of the body are separated, thus terminating the functions peculiar to the mind, but the *δαίμων* goes to the place of judgment, and presently is sent back to the world and provided with a new body.<sup>67</sup> The *δαίμων* is not a constant, but a slowly changing variable which, if the man is on the upward

<sup>64</sup> See note 62.

<sup>65</sup> *Op. cit.*, 409b2-18.

<sup>66</sup> The one occurrence of *ψυχή* in the extant fragments (B 138) is, as Wilamowitz says (*op. cit.*, p. 659), in the Homeric sense of "breath of life" or simply "life."

<sup>67</sup> See note 3.

path towards godhood, is gradually losing its element of Strife and finally becomes a god when it consists of nothing but Love. It is the *δαίμων* that provides the constant substratum of personality without which transmigration is meaningless.

This interpretation involves at least one serious difficulty. At death four of the elements are dispersed but the other two, Love and Strife, survive to form the nucleus for the next incarnation. Why, we must inquire, if all six elements are material, can two of them resist dispersion? We get no help from the fragments of Empedocles or the *testimonia* that will enable us to answer this question directly; but I believe that the statement is true nevertheless, and can be shown to be true by a comparison of Empedocles' doctrines of the universe and man, the macrocosm and the microcosm.

Originally the four elements formed a great globe, "the sphere," held together by Love; Strife was on the outside. Strife penetrated the envelope of Love, and caused the elements to begin to withdraw from each other and form various combinations.<sup>68</sup> Thus the world as we know it gradually evolved. The elements have a considerable degree of freedom in making combinations and dispersing once again, but the rapidity and violence of the process is apparently controlled by the proportions of Love and Strife that are present. For a long time Strife is in the ascendancy, but then its power begins to wane. The rapidity of the changes decreases, and finally all the elements once more form the motionless sphere, when Love has completely conquered Strife.<sup>69</sup>

The history of a human life is similar. Once each man was a god, moved only by Love. Then Strife invades the man's life and he falls from his divine state.<sup>70</sup> The four elements are dispersed and recombined again and again as he suffers death and reincarnation, but the proportions of Love and Strife change only slowly. If the man is on the upward path towards godhood, the amount of Love in his composition gradually increases till finally all Strife is expelled and the man becomes a god once more.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>68</sup> A 46; B 30, 31.

<sup>69</sup> A 29, 41, 52; B 17, 26-29.

<sup>70</sup> B 115.

<sup>71</sup> B 146.

The parallelism between Empedocles' account of the universe and his account of man appears to be so great that I believe we are justified in supposing that Love and Strife occupied the same superior position in controlling human life that they are known to have occupied in controlling the course of the universe.

If this interpretation is correct, then there was no basic inconsistency between Empedocles' poem *On Nature* and his *Purifications*, but they were applications of the same theory to the macrocosm and the microcosm respectively. As to the question whether Empedocles was a materialist or an idealist—it now appears that this question is scarcely appropriate when applied to a philosopher whose consciousness of the distinction between matter and spirit was undeveloped. But from our own point of view the question has meaning, and we are now in a position to answer it. Empedocles was both. He is a materialist in so far as he explains nature entirely in terms of the combinations of physical substances; but he is also an idealist in so far as he regards these substances as under a higher control which, while it is not immaterial, cannot be explained, but is the moral order of the universe objectified.

HERBERT S. LONG.

YALE COLLEGE.

## THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE GREEK COMPARATIVE SYSTEM: ITS RHYTHMICAL AND REPETITIVE FEATURES.

The Greek comparative forms, adjectival and adverbial, offer a number of interesting morphological problems, which have attracted the notice of many of the students of the language. I propose here to direct attention to three phenomena which are purely, or mainly,<sup>1</sup> Greek developments, and which it seems to me especially profitable to consider together. The first is the variation of quantity which is seen in the final vowel of *o*-stems before the suffixes *-τερος*, *-τατος*: σοφός, σοφώτερος, but πονηρός, πονηρότερος. Secondly, there is the form of the superlative suffix *-τατος*, of which the final syllable *-τος* replaces the IE. *\*-mos* seen in Skt. *-tamas*, Lat. *-timus*. And thirdly, Greek shows a distinction between the neuter accusative forms of all comparative and superlative adjectives when used with adverbial sense, according to which the comparative uses the singular (σοφώτερον, ἥσσον) and the superlative nearly always the plural (σοφώτατα, ἥκιστα).

### § 1.

Many investigators have sought to explain the quantitative variation of σοφώτερος: πονηρότερος. As is well known, the variation depends on the length of the penultimate syllable of the positive form. I do not claim to have found any new explanation of it, for in my view we do not need one, de Saussure having long ago suggested what is probably the right one. What I would stress is the fact that, whether we agree with de Saussure or not, we are obliged to have recourse at some stage to a rhythmical law or principle.

For one school of thought *-ώτερος* is the regular form for all adjectives: thus Brugmann, *Grundriss* (first edition) II, 1, p. 182<sup>2</sup> and *K.Z.*, XXVII, pp. 590-1, note; Güntert, *I.F.*,

<sup>1</sup> The distinction depends on the view taken of the *-ότερος* / *-ώτερος* alternation: I would regard it as purely Greek.

<sup>2</sup> But Brugmann changed his opinion in the later edition of the *Grundriss* and accepted Wackernagel's explanation of lengthening in composition.

XXVII, pp. 34-5; and Hirt, *Griech. Laut- und Formenlehre*, p. 293, and *Idg. Gramm.*, III, pp. 288-9. The stem of σοφώτερος was an ablative adverb \*σοφῶ, to which was added the suffix -τερος. But forms in -ότερος were also made, direct from the stem. This led to the existence of two series of alternative forms:

- |                    |            |              |
|--------------------|------------|--------------|
| 1) from the adverb | σοφώτερος  | *πονηρώτερος |
| 2) from the stem   | *σοφότερος | πονηρότερος  |

From these only the forms survived which are not asterized, because they satisfied the Greek desire to avoid three following short syllables.

The second school of thought takes -ότερος as regular, being a formation added to the stem as is the same comparative suffix in Sanskrit. In that case -ώτερος has lengthening of the final vowel of the stem, and the need is to explain this lengthening. De Saussure<sup>3</sup> did so by supposing that there was a rhythmical law in early Greek (but not uniformly in the later periods) which prevented the succession of three short syllables. This would apply to a number of other words besides the comparatives here under discussion. On the other hand, Wackernagel, *Das Dehnungsgesetz der griech. Komposita, passim*, and *Altind. Gramm.*, I, p. 313 and II, 1, pp. 130-5, believes in an IE. lengthening of the final syllable of the first member of compound forms, which also affected the final syllable of a stem before a suffix, and explains σοφώτερος on that ground. The basis of this lengthening also would be rhythmical, because it is said to occur before a single consonant, and between two short syllables. Thus both de Saussure and Wackernagel look to a rhythmical law: but that of de Saussure is limited to Greek, while Wackernagel's is put back into IE. on the strength of Sanskrit examples.

To me the latter school of thought seems the more satisfactory, and de Saussure's law preferable to Wackernagel's. In clarification I would only mention here two points. First, the forms (Attic) κενότερος, στενότερος and μανότερος. It is common knowledge that these forms are not exceptions to the rule, because the stems originally contained *r* (\*κενρο-, \*στενρο-, \*μανρο-). Wackernagel, *Dehnungsgesetz*, p. 7, and Schwyzler, *Griech. Gramm.*, p.

<sup>3</sup> "Une loi rythmique de la langue grecque," in *Mélanges Graux*, pp. 737 ff. (= *Recueil des publications scientifiques*, pp. 464-76). This follows the older view of Lobeck.



534, remark that these forms show that the lengthening principle was no longer in force when *f* was lost. But we must remember that other dialects still preserved forms with a long penult, as Ion. *κεινός*, *στευνός*, of which the analogy may have had a restraining influence on Attic. Also lengthened forms are in fact found: Liddell and Scott quote *κενώτερος* (Plato, *v. l.* in Arist.), *στενώτερος* (Hippocr., Arist., *al.*). The analogy of *σοφώτερος* could not always be resisted.

Secondly, on the form of *u*-stem comparatives. Güntert, *I. F.*, XXVII, p. 33, following Hirt, *Griech. Laut- und Formenlehre*, p. 293, makes it a major objection against the rule of lengthening (i. e. in Wackernagel: but this would also apply to de Saussure) that *-v-* is always short in *βαθύτερος*, *γλυκύτερος*, etc., though we should have expected the same lengthening as in *σοφώτερος*. I think that the cardinal fact is that there are only a small number of *v*-stem adjectives in Greek—the total of them in Homer I make to be seventeen, on a rough count. I have found nine with a short penult: *βαθύς*, *βαρύς*, *βραδύς*, *βραχύς*, *γλυκύς*, *δασύς*, *θρασύς*, *κρατύς*, *παχύς*. From these Homer uses comparatives and superlatives in *-ίων*, *-ιστος*, so *βάθιστος*, *βάρδιστος*, *βράσσων*, *γλυκίων*, *κρείσσων*, *κάρτιστος*, *πάχιστος*. Comparatives and superlatives from the other adjectives (*εῦρύς*, *ἡδύς*, *θῆλυς*, *ἰθύς*, *ὀξύς*, *πρέσβυς*,<sup>4</sup> *τρηχύς*, *ώκυσ*) are usually in *-τερος*, *-τατος*; but *ἡδύς* has *ἡδιστος*, and *ώκυσ* has both *ώκύτατος* and *ώκιστος*. It may therefore be that there were not enough *v*-stem adjectives with a short penult for the Greek rhythmical sense to be offended by the preservation here of three successive short syllables. The small group of adjectives in *-v-* was in this way kept homogeneous. There are no comparatives from *ι*-stem adjectives: thus the only other adjective class with a vowel-stem is the very large *ο*-class, and there we would accordingly presume that it was due to the largeness of the group that the same objection was not offered to its repartition into the two sub-classes of comparatives in *-ότερος* and *-ώτερος*.

It should be added here that de Saussure's rhythmical principle may to a certain extent be traced in Greek literary practice. De Saussure, *Recueil*, p. 476, quoted Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, III, 1, p. 105, who wrote that Demosthenes secured greater strength and virility in his language, by avoiding as far as

<sup>4</sup> *πρέσβυς* the positive is not itself found in Homer, but is frequent in later Greek, where it is almost always a noun, not an adjective.

possible the sequence of more than two short syllables. But Blass noted that the same tendency was not observable in other orators. Accordingly de Saussure did not attach special importance to the phenomenon, which he described as "un fait isolé, personnel, littéraire, et voulu." But Wackernagel, *Dehnungsgesetz*, p. 2, would lay less stress on the personal nature of the usage: he claimed that it supports the view that, at certain periods, the Greek language avoided the succession of three shorts. I would myself add, as further evidence tending in the same direction, the remarks made by Longinus, *De Sublim.*, 41, on the bad effect in literary composition of too many short syllables. He makes special mention of the weak and agitated rhythm found in pyrrhics ~ ~, trochees - ~, and dichorees - ~ - ~; and of passages *εἰς μικρὰ καὶ βραχυσύλλαβα συγκεκομμένα*. It may be fair to say that the Greeks were generally sensitive to the effect of the repetition of many short syllables.<sup>5</sup>

## § 2.

I now come to the second of the three features of the Greek comparative system which are being examined, the form of the superlative suffix *-τατος*.

Skt. *-tama-* (the standard secondary suffix for the superlative in Sanskrit) and Lat. *-timus* (*optimus, intimus*) are generally taken to point to an IE. superlative suffix *\*-tm̥mos*. The form *-τατος*, on the other hand, is peculiar to Greek, and it is necessary to explain how it arose.

It is commonly agreed that *-τατος* is an analogical formation. Ascoli, *Curt. Stud.*, IX, pp. 342-60, and especially pp. 349-51, saw the starting-point in the ordinal numerals *δέκατος* and *ἑνατος*, both with the suffix *-το-*. These were divided to give a suffix *-ατο-*, which was applied (a) to other numerals, *ἑβδόματος*, etc., and (b) to particles indicating Place or Degree, with superlative sense, as *ὑπατος*: Skt. *upama-*, Lat. *summus* < *\*sup-mo-*; *ἑσχατος*.

<sup>5</sup> In addition to the two main lines of explanation given above, there is the view that the difference between *σοφώτερος* and *πονηρότερος* is due to some analogy. Thus Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.*, p. 535, hesitatingly suggests analogical remodelling after the pattern of *πρότερος ἀνώτερος*. But even then it is necessary to suppose that the type *σοφώτερος* was preferred to *\*σοφότερος* because of rhythmical considerations. So rhythm comes in after all.

Next, *-ατο-* was added to adjectival and substantival stems as a superlative suffix: μέσ(σ)ατος, νέατος, μύχατος, πύματα; and in certain cases it was so added to an already existing suffixal *-τ-*, thus forming τρίτατος, βέλτατος, φέρτατος, φίλτατος. From these last forms, he argued, *-τατο-* was abstracted as the general secondary superlative suffix; and this was favoured because *-τατο-* made an obvious correspondence with the comparative *-τερο-* preserved from IE.

Ascoli's explanation has in its general outline received subsequent approval.<sup>6</sup> Brugmann, *I. F.*, XIV, pp. 1-9, made further examination of the starting-point δέκατος, with reference to the alternative form seen in Skt. *daçama-*, Lat. *decimus*. Regarding both types of form as having existed in IE., he traced Skt. *daçama-* from *\*dekṃ*, *\*dekṃmos*; and δέκατος from *\*dekmt* (abstract subst. = "Zehnheit"), *\*dekmtos*. Then, following Ascoli with regard to the spread of *-ατο-* to ἵπατος, ἔσχατος, etc., Brugmann rejected the notion of the special rôle played by forms with a suffixal *-τ-*, such as τρίτατος, βέλτατος, in Ascoli's theory. More convincingly, he showed that superlative *-ατο-* was now coupled with comparative *-ερο-* as a suffix for adjectives of Place, e. g. in ὑπερος ἵπατος, ὑστερος ὕστατος. Finally, then, by proportional analogy, on the model of the pair *-ερο-*: *-ατο-*, the old pair *-τερο-*: *\*-ταμο-* was changed to *-τερο-*: *-τατο-*.

The basis of both these explanations lies in the ordinal numeral series, in δέκατος. But the question faces us, is this an entirely sure foundation? For Meillet, in an examination of the ordinals (*B. S. L.*, XXIX, pp. 29-37, "Des noms de nombre ordinaux en Indo-Européen"), invokes the aid of *-τατο-*, the superlative suffix, to explain *-ατο-* in δέκατος! Meillet points out that two hypotheses are available to account for the various forms of the word for "tenth" in the IE. languages: either, as Brugmann supposed, the co-existence of forms in *-mos* and *-tos* in IE.; or else the IE. existence of *-mos*, which was then preserved in Aryan, Italic, and Celtic, and the substitution of *-tos* for *-mos* in Greek, Germanic, and Slavonic at a later epoch. He himself believed that *-tos* came after the period of IE. community, because it is found in the central area of the IE. languages, whereas *-mos* occurs in the languages on the fringes. *-tos* would then be a later innovation. In the case of Germanic and Slavonic he

<sup>6</sup> For other explanations see Güntert, *I. F.*, XXVII, pp. 20-1.

thought that this suffix was favoured by the fact that the word for "ten" (the cardinal numeral) was there signified by the form ending in *-t*; and in Greek, he supposed, because *-τατο*-there corresponded to Skt. *-tama-*, etc.

The argument from the central geographical position of the type *δέκατος* seems a sound one, and should restrain us from putting this form back into the IE. period. It is possible, however, that another ordinal, that for "fifth," had the *-to*-suffix in IE. in the form *\*penq<sup>u</sup>tos*, as is argued by Lejeune (*B. S. L.*, XXIX, pp. 109-16, "Grec: *-το*-, *-ατο*-, *-τατο*-"); and that it was from this numeral that "tenth" acquired *-to*- in Greek, Germanic, and Slavonic. It is hardly likely that *δέκατος* was so formed before the period of primitive Greek, i. e. that Greek, Germanic, and Slavonic show an inherited agreement. It would be still later in the separate history of Greek that there occurred the spreading of *-ατο*- from *δέκατος* which was described by Brugmann, and which eventually led to the formation of *-τατο*- as a regular superlative suffix. It is, then, a mistake to look to superlative, *-τατο*-, as Meillet did, for an explanation of *δέκατος*: on which it may be remarked that, if *-τατο*- was really so early, we might have expected to find some trace of it in Germanic and Slavonic.

But if the history of superlative *-τατο*- can now be regarded as fairly clear, I think that one remark remains to be added on it. This concerns the conditions which favoured the adoption of the suffix as a regular sign of the superlative. It is often, and inevitably, a drawback of explanations of changes in morphology which are based on analogy, that we can see *how* they happened, but that the *why* escapes us. But here, I would suggest, we have not to look far for an answer to the question "why." It is, that the suffix *-τατο*-, with its repetition of *-τ*-, achieved a phonetic effect of emphasis and intensity which was entirely absent from the original *-tamo*-; and was therefore a superior creation. Formerly, indeed, as may be learnt from Ascoli's article (*loc. cit.*, pp. 345-7), it was the common view that *-τατο*- was made simply by the reduplication of an element *-ta*-. Against this Ascoli brought the objections that *-ta*- (or *-to*-) can hardly have stood as a superlative suffix by itself in primitive Greek, and that it would be against the genius of the Greek language to adopt such a simple and mechanical device, more suitable for the infancy

of language. These are valid objections against the theory in that form: but they do not hold if, instead, we take the intensive effect of reduplication as providing the final, vital attraction which led to the adoption of *-τατο-* after other causes had already been at work, and laid open that possibility.

We see similar reduplication for intensive effect in both nouns and verbs in Greek (and IE.): (a) in nouns, as *βάρβαρος*, *παιπάλη*, *τήθη* (Brugmann, *Grundr.*, II, 1, p. 90); (b) in the class of intensive verbs, as *πορφύρω*, *παμφαίνω*, *δηδέχεται* (*ibid.*, II, 2, pp. 846 ff., 942 ff.). Compare also the "popular" gemination of consonants, which is another way of achieving greater intensity. Under this head I have recently (*C. Q.*, XLI, p. 45, note) included *μικκός* and *τυτθός*. So seen, *τήθη*, *τίτθη*, and *τυτθός* can be grouped together as forms with intensification: the first showing reduplication, the latter two reduplication and gemination.

It is also relevant to compare certain forms of the comparative and superlative, both in Greek and related languages, which show a striving after increased effect by the multiplication of suffixes. So *κυντερώτερος* (Pherecrates), *κυντατώτατα* (Eubulus); *πρώτιστος* (Homer, etc.) < \**προφ-* (*πρωφ-*) *-ατο-*, *πρωτο-* + *-ιστο-*; *ἐσχάτω-τερος* *-τατος*; *καλλιστό-τατος*; *ἐλαχιστό-τερος* *-τατος*. Likewise in Sanskrit, where the secondary suffixes are added to the primary to form both comparatives and superlatives "not infrequently" (Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 176): *creṣṭha-tara-*, *-tama-*. Possibly also the regular Latin superlative ending *-issimus* has similar doubling if, as Sommer supposes, it is derived from \**-isto-sḡmios*: that seems the most likely explanation of this peculiar form.

It is therefore not difficult to suppose that Greek was the more ready to adopt *-τατο-* as a superlative suffix precisely on account of the intensive effect of its phonetic repetition.

### § 3.

The third feature of the Greek comparative system which we are to consider is the use of the neuter adjective with adverbial sense: the adjective in general is in the singular for the comparative, e. g. *σοφώτερον* "more wisely," but in the plural for the superlative, e. g. *σοφώτατα* "most wisely."

The use of the singular for the comparative in early and classical Greek is, so far as I know, without exception. I have

found no certain examples to the contrary myself. One passage that I have found in Homer can come into consideration, *Od.*, XVI, 319 *ὑστερα ταῦτα πένεσθαι*: this would better be taken as adjectival, in view of the absence of any other possible comparative adverbs in *-a* in Homer. The only example that I have seen quoted (by Smyth, *Ionic*, p. 439) is Solon, 19, 15-16 (Diehl) *τῇ δ' ἐνάτῃ ἔτι μὲν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δ' αὐτοῦ | πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίῃ*. But this is rather the cognate accusative use of the adjective (*δύναται* being understood).

In the superlative we do not see such uniformity. In Homer the usage is as follows: *ἄγχιςτος* (1 use), *-a* (5); *αἰνότατον* (1); *ἄριστον* (1), *-a* (6); *ἔσχατα* (2); *ιβύντατα* (1); *μήκιστα* (2); *οἰκτίστα* (1); *ὀξύτατον* (2); *πλείςτος* (2); *πρώτιστον* (3), *-a* (12); *πύματον* (2), *-a* (2); *ῥηέτατα* (2); *τάχιστα* (30 + <sup>7</sup>); *ὑστάτιον*<sup>8</sup> (1), *ὑστατον* (3), *-a* (7); *ῥκίστα* (2). There are, then, 16 examples of *-ον*, and 72 + of *-a*. A very large proportion of the examples of *-a* are provided by *τάχιστα*: if we left this word out entirely, the result would be *-ον* 16, *-a* 42. In five cases both *-ον* and *-a* are found from the same word: here the results are

	<i>-ον</i>	<i>-a</i>
<i>ἄγχιςτος</i>	1	5
<i>ἄριστος</i>	1	6
<i>πρώτιστος</i>	3	12
<i>πύματος</i>	2	2
<i>ὑστατος</i>	3	7
	<hr/> 10	<hr/> 32

It is not an unfair summary to say that in Homer the plural forms in *-a* are at least three times as numerous as the singular in *-ον* in the superlative.

Examination of Hesiod, *Op.* and *Theog.*, gives the following results: *πλείςτος* (1); *πρώτιστα* (±); *τάχιστα* (2); *ὑστατον* (1).

<sup>7</sup> I have reckoned all my figures on the basis of the examples quoted in Cunliffe, *Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect*; and these are not exhaustive in the case of some of the more frequent uses. So for *τάχιστα* he quotes 30 examples, and notes that there are others which are not included.

<sup>8</sup> This form has not, of course, a true superlative suffix: but it is such a close derivative of *ὑστατος* that for our purpose it should be reckoned as one.

Here we have 2 examples of *-ov*, and 6 of *-a*: so the forms are roughly in the same proportion as in Homer.<sup>9</sup>

Such are the facts of the position in Greek. When we look at other IE. languages, we can appreciate its peculiarity. First, the use of the *plural* accusative neuter of adjectives to serve as adverbs, whether positive or superlative, is almost, if not completely, without parallel. There are examples of the plural and dual of substantives used adverbially, in Slavonic and Aryan as well as in Greek (*θύρασι, ἀγκάς*): but the only possible parallel to the plural use of adjectives is provided by Italic. Latin has *cetera, multa, pleraque* used adverbially, as in *quiescas cetera* (Plaut.): these forms are taken by Hofmann (Leumann-Hofmann, *Lat. Gramm.*, p. 379) to be in the first place truly native to the language, and not due to Greek influence, because of the earliness of their appearance. Delbrück, *Grundr.*, III, p. 610, prefers to see Greek influence. But even if these forms are genuinely Italic, their type was severely restricted until it developed in Latin poetry under the obvious inspiration of Greek models (as Vergil's *omnia Mercurio similis*).<sup>10</sup> Secondly, Greek is unique in distinguishing between the comparative and superlative, in having (in the older language) always the singular for the former, and most often the plural for the latter.

Delbrück, *Grundr.*, III, pp. 617-18, explains the difference of number in the comparative and superlative adverbs on the ground

<sup>9</sup> I have not included *πρῶτον*, *-a* either for Homer or for Hesiod. This is because I doubt whether *πρῶτος* was felt to be a true superlative: it has neither of the usual superlative suffixes, and there developed by the side of it a derivative form *πρώτιστος*, clearly designed to supply an unmistakable superlative. Both *πρῶτον* and *πρῶτα* are frequent in Homer, but I have not figures of all occurrences: in Hesiod, *Op.* and *Theog.*, I find *πρῶτον* (1), *-a* (5). We may compare, at a much later date, the fact that *-aros*, e. g. in *ἔσχατος*, was not felt as a true superlative suffix (cf. Schweizer, *Gramm. der Pergamenischen Inschriften*, p. 161); and also that, although in classical Greek superlative *-ov* is rare, occurring still less frequently than in Homer, this restriction does not affect *πρῶτον*: so Herodotus has 45 examples of *πρῶτον*, against 59 of *πρῶτα*.

<sup>10</sup> Account must also be taken in Italic of Umbr. *postro*, = "afterwards" (Time) or "backwards" (Place). If this word has *-o* from *-ā*, the Umbrian ending of the acc. pl. neut. of the second declension, then it is clear that Italic possessed the adverbial use of the acc. pl. adjective. But *-o* can also be from *-ō*, and then the form will be abl. sing., the common Italic adverbial case.

of meaning. He says that possibly the action of the verb which is accompanied by a comparative adverb was regarded as single or unified, and of that with a superlative adverb as plural, being made up of a number of different acts. He suggests an analogy from German. There one says "der Tag ist wärmer als die Nacht": both "Tag" and "Nacht" are regarded as complete wholes. But in "der Tag ist um Mittag am wärmsten" the thought is of a series of different degrees of warmth, which is at its highest point at mid-day. To test this theory, let us take the Greek sentence *θεῖ τάχιστα* "he runs most swiftly." Presumably Delbrück would argue that the mind conceives of a number of different speeds of running; and that this sense of plurality causes the plural use in the adverb. But the reply to this must be, that all the emphasis is laid on the fact that it is at one speed only, and that the swiftest of all, that the subject runs: that single speed is especially selected for mention. I find it impossible to see that there is any greater notion of plurality expressed here than in the sentence *θεῖ θᾶ-τον*, with the comparative.

It is hardly surprising that Delbrück's explanation has not been widely accepted, and that, for example, Löfstedt, *Syntactica*, I, p. 64, note, says that it cannot satisfy us. Löfstedt himself offers an alternative: this is, that the superlative used the plural because that conveys greater emphasis. This suggestion arises out of his own treatment of the plural in Latin adjectives (*mira sunt, miris modis* instead of *mirum est, miro modo*), for which he sees the same explanation. If it is correct, it would link up with the account which I offered above for the superlative form *-τατο-*, with its intensive repetition. But it seems to me that Löfstedt's theory fails to find any support from the context of the Homeric passages: and we surely have a right to expect some such support. To take some typical examples, I fail to find any difference of emphasis between the use of *ἄγχιστον* (once, *Od.*, V, 280) and of *ἄγχιστα* (five times, *Il.*, II, 58; XIV, 474; XX, 18; *Od.*, VI, 152; XIII, 80); and the single example of *αἰνότατον* seems to lack nothing in emphasis (*Il.*, XIII, 52 *αἰνότατον περὶ δείδια μή τι πάθωμεν*). If we are to agree with Löfstedt, it follows that we must not only put the date of origin of the distinction



between comparative and superlative back into the pre-historic period of Greek, but also suppose that the original basis of it no longer remained in the Greek consciousness even in Homeric times.

The explanations so far examined have rested on semantic grounds. Wackernagel, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Homer*, p. 88, turns instead to morphology. He points out that some adverbs end in *-a* in the positive: *μάλα*, *ὥκα*, *τάχα*. Their superlatives also end in *-a*, being influenced by the positive forms: *μάλιστα*, *ὥκιστα*, *τάχιστα*. On this analogy, *-a* was adopted generally by the primary superlative forms, making *-ιστα* instead of *-ιστον*. Then, after the model of *-ίον* (comp.) *-ιστα* (superl.), the secondary forms of comparison adopted the same endings, *-τερον* *-τατα*. It should be noted that *μᾶλλον μάλιστα* would be especially suited to serve as a standard, because their meanings "more" and "most" make them the archetype of the degrees of comparison; and also they were used with positive adjectives as an alternative way of expressing comparison.

I would add that in producing this change there was another, complementary factor in the phonetic repetition in superlative *-τατα*: this produced an intensive effect, just as did the substitution of *-τατος* for *\*-ταμος* which was discussed in the preceding section. The explanations, made on the same basis, of these two phenomena in the superlative gain mutual support from each other.

Furthermore, we are now in a position to realise that all the three changes here noted in the morphology of the Greek comparative system, have had a similar end. It is common with us to pay tribute to the euphony of the Greek language: it is perhaps less common to realise to what a great extent this must have been the result of the efforts of those who, especially in the earliest times, spoke and moulded the language. It is true that the causes of most of the changes in the phonetic construction of languages still remain obscure. But rhythmical lengthening, of the kind seen in the Greek comparatives in *σοφώτερος*, etc., is plainly due to a desire for a more satisfying rhythm felt by the users of the language. It may still be open to doubt whether we can tell the

precise way in which the distinctions of length between σοφώτερος and πονηρότερος arose: but whichever explanation is adopted, it is necessary to introduce at some stage a rhythmical ground for the existence of the distinction. We can also see conscious alteration—and, I would say, improvement—of the language in the adoption of the suffix -τατος in the superlative, and of the form -τατα for the superlative adverb. Changes of this sort do not occur haphazardly: here we are especially fortunate in being able to observe their mainspring.

A. C. MOORHOUSE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, SWANSEA.

## THE "SARDINIAN FISH" OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS.

As even the casual student of ancient literature is aware, preserved fish formed an important element in the diet of the Greeks and the Romans, and large processing centers were located in all sections of the Mediterranean region. There were, among others, large manufactories on the island of Sardinia, the highly esteemed products of which were shipped to every corner of the Mediterranean. The unique feature of this fish processing center is that its products acquired such an excellent reputation that "Sardinian" became a generic term for preserved fish of the type and quality of that exported from Sardinia, so that one reads in Oribasius,<sup>1</sup> for example, of "Sardinian fish" from Cadiz, itself an important export center. The only near parallel is the extension of "Sexitan preserved fish," a product of prime quality exported from Sexi in Spain, to the fish from which it was made; but this seems to have been a limited usage, lacking the special ramifications of "Sardinian" and ephemeral in character.

In the light of the important rôle played by the so-called "Sardinian fish" in the classical period among both the Greeks and the Romans, it is curious that no serious attempt has been made to determine what the term means. So far as can be determined, no scholar has made more than a casual, desultory effort to fix the meaning. Even D'Arcy W. Thompson in his recent *A Glossary of Greek Fishes*<sup>2</sup> deals only superficially with the problem. The evidence available in ancient literature has not been systematically exploited, and the significance of the modern names has been largely ignored. But the rôle played by these piscatorial products in ancient times is of sufficient importance to justify a serious attempt to resolve the question.

The basic terms involved here are Greek *σάρδα* and *σαρδέια* (or *σαρδίνος*) and Latin *sarda* and *sardina*, names derived from *Σαρδῷ*, the ancient Greek name for Sardinia, and in a strict sense meaning only "Sardinian." For reasons which will pres-

<sup>1</sup> *Coll. Med.*, IV, 1, 40.

<sup>2</sup> London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1947.

ently become clear, it is important to consider the evidence chronologically.

The earliest reference is a statement by Xenocrates,<sup>3</sup> toward the end of the fourth century B. C., that the *σάρδα* is a large ocean *πηλαμύς* which is of excellent taste when preserved, in pungency surpassing the *κύβιον*, stimulating to the appetite, and easily excreted. Since the *πηλαμύς* was a common tunny, *Thynnus vulgaris* Cuvier, about one year old,<sup>4</sup> Xenocrates must mean that the *σάρδα* is a common tunny rather more than a year old, but not yet full grown. The *κύβιον* which he mentions is, strictly speaking, a die-shaped piece of preserved fish, possibly of pelamid, *Pelamys sarda* Cuvier and Valenciennes,<sup>5</sup> but more probably of common tunny somewhat less than a year old.<sup>6</sup> Here, as occasionally elsewhere, the term may denote the fish rather than the preserve. It appears fairly often in classical authors.<sup>7</sup> Diphilus of Siphnos,<sup>8</sup> writing in the early third century B. C., says that the *σάρδα* is the same size as the *κολίας* and indicates that it was generally preserved. The *κολίας* which he mentions is the coly or chub mackerel, *Scomber colias* Gmelin.<sup>9</sup> This again points to the year-old tunny, which is about the size of an adult coly mackerel. Columella<sup>10</sup> in the middle of the first century A. D. implies that the *sardina* was pickled. Pliny,<sup>11</sup> whose work on natural history appeared about 77 A. D., also indicates that the fish was generally preserved. Galen, writing toward the end of the second century A. D., refers to *σάρδαι* and *σαρδῆναι* as fish especially well suited for salting and pickling,<sup>12</sup> and elsewhere

<sup>3</sup> *Alim. Aquat.*, 34 (exc. Oribasius, *Coll. Med.*, II, 58, 142).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Hist. An.*, 571 a 11; Pliny, *N. H.*, IX, 47; Athenaeus, VII, 303 b; 319 a; Hesychius, s. v. *Θύννον*.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hans Gossen, "Die zoologischen Glossen im Lexikon des Hesych," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin*, VII, Heft 1 (1937), no. 1743.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

<sup>7</sup> E. g., Hicesius, *apud* Athen. III, 118 a; Xenocrates, *loc. cit.*; Pliny, *N. H.*, IX, 48; Martial, V, 78, 5; XI, 27, 3; Oppian, *Hal.*, I, 183.

<sup>8</sup> *Apud* Athenaeus, III, 120 f.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Hist. An.*, 543 a 2; 598 a 24; 598 b 27; 610 b 7; Oppian, *Hal.*, I, 184; Athenaeus, III, 120 f; VII, 321 a; Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXII, 146.

<sup>10</sup> VIII, 17, 12: *putrem sardinem*.

<sup>11</sup> *N. H.*, XXXII, 151.

<sup>12</sup> VI, 746 K.

says that Sardinian *τάριχος* made from *πηλαμύδες* was so famous that this product was generally called *τάριχη σάρδα*.<sup>13</sup> In another passage, he says that the most superior of all salt fish were those which the physicians used to call *σάρδικη τάριχη*, but in his day simply *σάρδα*.<sup>14</sup>

These references, with the possible exception of Galen's comment on *σαρδῆναι*, point fairly definitely to the tunny, more specifically a tunny about one year old, or the preserved product thereof. But when we turn to Epaenetus, who was active about 100 B. C., we find that we are dealing with a different fish. He says<sup>15</sup> that the *χαλκίς* was sometimes called *σαρδίνος*. The precise identity of the *χαλκίς* is uncertain. It is almost surely a member of the herring group, probably the pilchard, *Clupea sardina* Cuvier.<sup>16</sup> Athenaeus,<sup>17</sup> in quoting Epaenetus, goes on to say that Aristotle in the fifth book of his *Historia Animalium* also calls this fish *σαρδίνος*, but he was in error, for Aristotle did not use this term, but *σαργίνος*,<sup>18</sup> which is probably the garfish, *Belone acus* Risso.<sup>19</sup>

The *Edict of Diocletian*,<sup>20</sup> issued in 301 A. D., lists *sardae sive sardinae* at 16 denarii an Italian pound. It also lists rough-scaled sea fish (*piscis aspratilis marini*) at 24 denarii an Italian

<sup>13</sup> VI, 729 K.

<sup>14</sup> VI, 747 K.

<sup>15</sup> *Apud* Athenaeus, VII, 328 f.

<sup>16</sup> Aristotle's allusions to the *χαλκίς* in various passages are so conflicting as to justify a supposition that two different fishes are involved, one of which is probably the pilchard, *Clupea sardina* Cuvier (e. g., *Hist. An.*, 543 a 2; 602 b 28) and the other the dory, *Zeus faber* Linnaeus. Cf. Aubert-Wimmer's *Aristoteles Thierkunde*, I, p. 143; Mair's note on Oppian, *Hal.*, I, 244; and Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 282, and notes on Aristotle, *Hist. An.*, 535 b 17 and 602 b 28. J. P. J. M. Brands (*Grieksche Diernamen* [Purmerend, 1935], p. 183) maintains that the fish is unidentifiable. Gossen (*loc. cit.*, no. 2280) identifies the usual *χαλκίς* as the shad, *Alosa vulgaris* Cuvier and Valenciennes, although not long previously ("Die Tiernamen in Alians 17 Büchern," *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin*, IV, Heft 3 [1935], par. 102) he more loosely referred the *χαλκίς* of Aelian (*Nat. An.*, I, 58) to the "Maifisch." In any event, the fish belongs in the general herring group.

<sup>17</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> *Hist. An.*, 610 b 6.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

<sup>20</sup> Sect. V.

pound, second grade sea fish (*piscis secundi*) at 16 denarii an Italian pound, first grade river fish (*piscis flubialis optimi*) at 12 denarii an Italian pound, second grade river fish (*piscis secundi flubialis*) at 8 denarii an Italian pound, and salt fish (*piscis salsi*) at 6 denarii an Italian pound. The statement of Epaenetus indicates that *σαρδῖνος* was a secondary name of the pilchard or a similar fish, but the identity of the *sardae sive sardinae* of the *Edict of Diocletian* is in some doubt. These may be tunnies of a particular kind, as Max Blümner says,<sup>21</sup> in that case almost certainly common tunnies a little over a year old, or they may be salt or pickled tunnies. The listing of salt fish in the same section does not invalidate the latter interpretation, for the Sardinian product was a distinctive one of high quality that might well be listed apart from ordinary, cheap wares. It is also possible that these are pickled or salt pilchards or similar fish, although the price is comparatively high.

In the cookbook of Apicius,<sup>22</sup> compiled about the third or fourth century A. D., *sarda* positively cannot mean pilchards or any similar small fish, for the bones had to be removed before the fish was cooked. Here it must denote a young tunny, possibly preserved, as in Pliny.<sup>23</sup>

Oribasius, writing in the second half of the fourth century A. D., classes the *σάρδαι* and *σαρδίνας* along with the *πηλαμίδες* and *Σεξίταρά*<sup>24</sup> as fish well suited for preserving<sup>25</sup> and associates the *σάρδαι* of Galen specifically with Cadiz,<sup>26</sup> one of the most important centers of the tunny fishery. Marcellus<sup>27</sup> toward the end of the fourth century indicates that the fish was usually

<sup>21</sup> *Die Maximaltarif des Diocletian* (Berlin, 1893), p. 82.

<sup>22</sup> IX, 431-436.

<sup>23</sup> *N. H.*, XXXII, 151.

<sup>24</sup> This word occurs in a variety of forms. Note Greek *Σαξίταρά* and *Σεξίτινα* and Latin *Saxitanus* and *Sexitanus*. The term usually denotes the salt tunny exported from the Spanish city of Sexi (cf. Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXI, 94; XXXII, 146; Strabo, III, 156; Galen, *Alim. Fac.*, III, 41) or the salt mackerel shipped from there (cf. Diphilus of Siphnos, *apud* Athenaeus, III, 120 e; Galen, *loc. cit.*; Oribasius, *Coll. Med.*, IV, 1, 37, 40; Martial, VII, 78, 1). Here it denotes the fish rather than the preserved product.

<sup>25</sup> *Coll. Med.*, IV, 1, 37.

<sup>26</sup> *Ib.*, IV, 1, 40.

<sup>27</sup> *Med.*, XV, 65.

preserved. Isidore of Seville<sup>28</sup> in the early seventh century definitely identifies both the *sarda* and *sardina* as small fish. The scholiast on Juvenal, 14, 131 apparently equates *sardina* with *lacertus*, thus identifying it as a mackerel.<sup>29</sup> Pertinent lemmas in the *Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum* exhibit marked variability.<sup>30</sup> Here *sardina* is mostly equated with Greek *θρίσσα*, which is possibly the shad;<sup>31</sup> but *sarda* is commonly equated

<sup>28</sup> Orig., XII, 6, 38: *pisiculos sardas sardinasque*.

<sup>29</sup> Greek *σαύρος* "lizard" by extension became a name for the saurel, especially *Trachurus trachurus* Günther. Latin *lacerta* or *lacertus* "lizard" also was applied to a fish, but apparently not the same one. This difference in application is nothing abnormal, for lizard names were extended to a variety of fish (cf. notes 56 and 58 below). The observation of Celsus (II, 18, p. 65, 21 Daremb.) that the flesh of the *lacertus* is hard and makes a very heavy food points to the mackerel or the saurel, while the fact that he speaks of it as typical of the fish from which *salsamenta* were made suggests the tunny or the mackerel. Martial (VII, 78) speaks of the tail of a Saxetan *lacertus* being served, and there is very little flesh in the tail section of a saurel. His epithet "Saxetan," moreover, suggests the mackerel or the tunny (cf. note 24 above). Pliny (N. H., XXXII, 149) says that there were several kinds of *lacertus*. This statement by itself might be interpreted as a reference to the three species of saurel occurring in the Mediterranean (*Trachurus trachurus* Günther, common in the Mediterranean, *Trachurus mediterraneus* Lütken, infrequent in the Mediterranean, and *Trachurus Cuvieri* Lütken, very rare in the Mediterranean); but Pliny elsewhere (N. H., XXXII, 146) defines the *coliae* as the smallest of the *lacerti*, hence by *lacertus* he must mean the mackerel group. Martial (XI, 27, 3 and 52, 7) speaks of the *lacertus* as *tenuis* "slim," an inappropriate epithet for the saurel, but an apt one for the mackerel outside of the spawning season. In the glossaries, *colias* is often given as an equivalent of *lacertus*, *sauros* only rarely. Modern names that go back to *lacertus*, moreover, nearly all denote the common mackerel or the coly mackerel.

<sup>30</sup> Cf., e. g., II, 178, 51; III, 17, 2; III, 89, 26; III, 257, 1; III, 318, 19. It should be noted that these glossaries cover a considerable span of time and are not readily datable.

<sup>31</sup> The problem of the identity of the *θρίσσα* is too complex for full discussion within the confines of the present article. The fish denoted by this name is almost certainly a clupeid, probably the shad, *Alosa vulgaris* Cuvier and Valenciennes, but possibly the closely related *Sardinella aurita* Cuvier and Valenciennes. The name may have included *Alosa fallax nilotica* Geoffrey. For further discussion of the word, cf. Brands, *op. cit.*, p. 156; Gossen, "Die zool. Glossen im Lexikon des Hesych," no. 2122; "Die Tiernamen in Älians 17 Büchern," par. 140; Blümner, *Ed. Diocl.*, p. 82; Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

with Greek κόλεοι or κόλιος (coly mackerel) and Latin *lacerta* (mackerel) and *pelavys* (year-old tunny).

The name *scarda* in Polemius Silvius<sup>32</sup> may denote a marine fish such as the bream or the sea-bass,<sup>33</sup> or may be merely a corruption of *sarda*, influenced by *scarus*, which immediately precedes it in the text.<sup>34</sup> Polemius contributes nothing of value to the present discussion.

Whether any real distinction existed between *σάρδα* and such forms as *σαρδίνος*, *σαρδήνα*, *σαρδίνα* and *σαρδείνα* is difficult to determine. In some instances a difference seems to be intended. For example, Galen speaks of *σάρδαι* and *σαρδήναι*; Oribasius, following Galen's lead, refers to *σάρδαι* and *σαρδίνας*; Isidore mentions *sardae* and *sardinae*; and varicus lemmas in the *Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum* give both *sa-da* and *sardina*, but never in close association in the same lemma. In the passages cited from Xenocrates, Diphilus, and Galen, *σάρδα* almost certainly denotes the tunny, while in those others in which it occurs, at least in the classical period, definition sufficient to fix the meaning is lacking, and nothing more can be concluded than that there is nothing to indicate that it is not the tunny. The earliest appearance of one of the other forms is in Epaenetus, who gives *σαρδίνος* as a secondary name of the χαλκίς. Columella indicates that the *sardina* was pickled, and Galen says that the *σαρδήνα* was very well suited for salting and pickling. Oribasius follows Galen very closely in his comment on the *σαρδίνα*. Isidore identifies the *sardina* as a small fish. In lemmas *sardina* mostly denotes a small fish like the shad.

It is tempting to conclude, despite the paucity of evidence,

<sup>32</sup> *Laterc.*, VIII, 2.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas (*Romania*, XXXV [1906], pp. 190-191) believed that *scarda* was identical with the *scarde* of the interpolator of Aelfric, which is the sea-bass, *Labrax lupus* Cuvier (cf. Barbier, *Revue des Langues Romanes*, XLVIII [1905], p. 194), calling attention to such survivals in northern Italy as *scarda* (diminutive *scardola*) in Lombardy for the common bream (E. Rolland, *Faune populaire de la France* [1896-1914], III, p. 144) and *scardole* in Tessin for the rudd, *Leuciscus erythrophthalmus* Fleming. W. Meyer-Lübke (*Romanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* [3rd ed., Heidelberg, 1935], p. 634) regards *scarda* as the source of French *écharde*, a name for the stickleback, *Gasterosteus aculeatus*.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Schuchardt, *Zeitschrift für romanisches Philologie*, XXX (1906), p. 728.



that *σάρδα* normally denoted the tunny and that the other forms referred to the pilchard or a similar fish. Against this supposition must be weighed the fact that the names often occur in close association in contexts that suggest that they are alternative names for the same fish or refer to very similar fish, not to fish as unlike in size and characteristics as the tunny and the pilchard. It is noteworthy that the *Edict of Diocletian* lists *sardae sive sardinae*, the *sive* probably meaning "also called." The price given, moreover, is nearly three times that allowed for ordinary salt fish. This practically eliminates salt pilchards from consideration and implies that we are here concerned with a single fish of respectable quality, whether fresh or preserved. Similarly, when Galen and Oribasius speak of *σάρδαι* and *σαρδήναι* as fish eminently suited for preserving, we must rule out the pilchard, the shad, and other small fish of the herring family, because, so far as can be determined, there is not a single favorable comment on preserved pilchard, shad, or other member of the family in what has been preserved of the writings of the ancient physicians. The comments of Xenocrates, Galen, and Oribasius, however, imply that they had a good opinion of the dietetic qualities of preserved *σάρδαι* and *σαρδήναι*. By way of contrast, Xenocrates<sup>35</sup> regarded the *θρίσσα* as a fish of bad juice, bad for the stomach, difficult to digest, and of low nutritive value; and Hicesius<sup>36</sup> stigmatized the *θρίσσα* and the *χαλκίς* as chaffy and deficient in fat and juice. Mnesitheus<sup>37</sup> says that the *τριχίς* and *μεμβράς* are flatulent and provide a humid nourishment. These fish all belong in the general herring group, although the precise identification is uncertain. The evidence accordingly indicates that *σάρδα* and its variants both referred to the tunny, or that one referred to the tunny and the others to a very similar fish. The comment of Epænetus interposes the only jarring discrepancy in the classical period. In the late period, Isidore calls them small, which eliminates the tunny, but suggests that both names referred to the same fish. When the evidence of the modern names has been presented, this point can be again discussed.

The evidence of the modern nomenclature is illuminating.

<sup>35</sup> *Alim. Aquat.*, 7.

<sup>36</sup> *Apud* Athenaeus, VII, 328 c.

<sup>37</sup> *Ib.*, VIII, 357 e.

One small group consists of a few scattered survivals of *sarda* as names for the tunny, the mackerel, and certain other large fish, viz., Galician *jardon* for the common tunny, *Thynnus vulgaris* Cuvier, Galician *jarda* for the common mackerel, *Scomber scomber* Linnaeus, Spanish *sarda* and Catalan *sard* for the coly mackerel, *Scomber colias* Gmelin, and Portuguese *sarda* as a general term for the mackerel,<sup>38</sup> as well as Portuguese *sardo* for *Lamna cornubica* Fleming<sup>39</sup> and *sarda masculina* at Messina for *Heptanchus cinereus* Rafinesque,<sup>40</sup> types of sharks.

The great majority of modern descendants of the ancient names, however, refer to small fish of the herring type, more especially the pilchard, *Clupea sardina* Cuvier. This species is called *σαρδέλα* in Modern Greek,<sup>41</sup> and in Italy is almost uniformly known under names which come from *sarda* or *sardina*, viz., *sarda* at Rome, Ancona, Civitavecchia, Messina, and Palermo, *sarde* at Catania, Syracuse, and Taranto, *sardela* at Caorle, Fiume, and Venice and in the Gulf of Trieste, and *sardella* at Bari, Livorno, and Pola.<sup>42</sup> Carus<sup>43</sup> records *sarda* and *sardella* at Palermo, *sarda* and *sardone* at Naples, *sardella* and *sardele* at Adria, *sardella*, *sardela*, *sardele*, and *sardelina* at Venice, *sardon* at Trieste, *sardeinna* at Genoa, *sardinoni* at Cagliari, *sardina* when adult at Nice, *sardenha* when adult at Genoa, and *srdela*, *srdjela*, and *srdjelica* in Croatia. Only at Verona does the usual name (*alosa*) come from another source, and even there such dialectic names as *sardena*, *sardella*, and *sardine* are also current.<sup>44</sup> In Valencia, moreover, the pilchard is known as

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Paul Barbier, "Noms de poissons," *Revue des Langues Romanes*, LVIII (1915), pp. 312-313.

<sup>39</sup> Roland, *op. cit.*, XI, p. 161.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Julius V. Carus, *Prodromus faunae mediterraneae* (Stuttgart, 1885-1893).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Nikolaos C. Apostolidès, *La pêche en Grèce* (2nd ed., Athens, 1907), p. 32; H. A. Hoffman and D. S. Jordan, *A Catalogue of the Fishes of Greece* (*Proceedings of the Academy of Natural Sciences*, Philadelphia, 1892), p. 243.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. *La pesca nei mari e nelle acque interne d'Italia* (Ministerio dell'Agricoltura e delle Foreste, 1931), III, pp. 82, 30, 55, 68, and 76; pp. 46, 88, and 91; pp. 42, 57, 99, and 94; pp. 37, 62, and 79.

<sup>43</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 40 above).

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *La pesca nei mari*, p. 103.

*sardina* (diminutive *sardineta*),<sup>45</sup> *sardina* being the usual Spanish name, and in France it is generally called *sardine*.<sup>46</sup>

But names that come from *sarda* and *sardina* are also applied to the anchovy, *Engraulis encrasicolus* Cuvier, here and there in Italy, viz., *sardone* at Ancona and *sardon* at Caorle, Fiume, Pola, Venice, and in the Gulf of Trieste;<sup>47</sup> and Carus<sup>48</sup> records for Italy *sarda masculina* at Messina and *sardella* at Trieste and for Spain *sardineta* in Valencia and Catalonia.

The shad, *Clupea alosa* Cuvier, similarly is mostly known by other names, but Carus<sup>49</sup> records *sardone* at Rimini, *sardella salvatica* at Fiume, and *srdelja prava* at Spalato. In Modern Greek it is called *σάρδελομάνα*.<sup>50</sup>

The sprat, *Clupea sprattus* Linnaeus, likewise is mostly otherwise denominated, but Carus<sup>51</sup> records *sardina* in Spain, *sarda* at Naples, *sarda fimminedda* at Catania, *sarda frisca* when young at Catania, *sardela* at Venice, *sardellina* at Fiume, and *srdelja oljiga* in Dalmatia. It is also called *sardina* (diminutive *sardineta*) in Valencia.<sup>52</sup>

The modern nomenclature exhibits several noteworthy features. First, there has been a marked shift away from the immature tunny in the direction of the pilchard. The earliest indication of this trend is found in *Epaenetus* in the first century B. C., but it is not clearly distinguishable until the post-classical period. Second, there has been a limited extension from the immature tunny to similar fish and a considerable extension from the pilchard to similar fish. Neither of these trends is observable until the post-classical period. Third, there is no suggestion in the modern names of a distinction of meaning between *sarda* and *sardina*. If such a distinction had existed in the classical period, at least a limited survival would be normal, and the

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Garcia L. Pardo, "Avance de un catálogo de nombres vulgares de la fauna valenciana," *Instituto General y Técnico de Valencia, Anales*, III, no. 14 (1919), p. 19.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Carus, *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *La pesca nei mari*, p. 30; pp. 42, 57, 79, 99, and 95.

<sup>48</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Apostolidès, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>51</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Pardo, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

fact that none exists gives added reason for thinking that none existed in the classical period.

At this point, the evidence indicates that *sarda* and *sardina*, including variants, started out as terms for year-old tunnies of prime quality shipped in preserved form from Sardinia, and then became alternative, secondary names for the fish themselves. This was followed by a limited transfer of application to a small fish of the herring group, probably the pilchard. As the centuries passed, the latter application became predominant, and concurrently there was a spread outwards from both applications to similar fish, more pronounced in the case of the pilchard.

Thus far the picture is reasonably clear. The comments of Barbier<sup>53</sup> on Galician *jardon* introduce an element of confusion into the problem. He says that Galician *jardon* as a name for the common tunny, Spanish *sarda* and Catalan *sard* as names for the coly mackerel, and Portuguese *sarda* as a general term for the mackerel may be compared with Medieval Latin *sarda* and Portuguese *sardao* and *sardagno*, meaning "lizard." As parallels, he refers to survivals of Latin *lacertus* as names for the common mackerel, the use of Latin *saurus* "lizard" as a name for the saurel, and Italian *tarantello* as a name for the young common tunny.

There was indubitably a tendency in classical times to refer to the tunny, the mackerel, and the saurel as "lizard-fish." Young tunnies were sometimes called *σκόρδυλαι*<sup>54</sup> or *κόρδυλαι*,<sup>55</sup> apparently derivatives of a word meaning "lizard."<sup>56</sup> The name

<sup>53</sup> *Loc. cit.* (note 38 above).

<sup>54</sup> Aristotle, *Hist. An.*, 571 a 17 (v.l. *σκόρδυλαι*); *Geopon.*, 20, 7; Hesychius, *q. v.*

<sup>55</sup> Numenius, *apud* Athenaeus, VII, 304 e; 306 c; Strabo, XII, 3, 19; Diphilus, *apud* Athenaeus, III, 120 f; cf. *cordyla* in Pliny, *N. H.*, IX, 47; XXXII, 146; *cordula* in Apicius, IX, 435. Note also Martial, III, 2, 4; XI, 52, 7; XIII, 1, 1, where *cordyla* apparently denotes a mackerel or saurel rather than a young tunny.

<sup>56</sup> Gesner (*Nomencl. Aquat. Anim.*, p. 110) guessed that the fish was so named because of the disproportionate size of its head. Vaniček (*Griechisch-lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, p. 1097) derived the word from a root \**scard-* "spring, leap." Brands (*op. cit.*, p. 178) more soundly regarded it as a feminine specialization of \**scordylos*, which as a substantive denoted a type of lizard, the latter being a derivative of \**scordos* "springing" from an Indo-European root \*(s)ker-

*lacerta* or *lacertus* "lizard" probably denoted the mackerel.<sup>57</sup> Σαύρος "lizard" was the usual name of the saurel.<sup>58</sup>

There is no ascertainable survival of σκόρδυλη or κόρδυλη in the modern nomenclature.

Descendants of *lacertus* commonly denote the mackerel. Thus *Scomber scomber* is known as *lacerto* at Civitavecchia and Livorno, *lacerti* at Genoa, and *strummu lacertu* at Catanzaro;<sup>59</sup> and Carus<sup>60</sup> records *lacerto* at Livorno, *laxerto* at Genoa, and *lanzardo* at Venice. *Scomber colias* bears the dialectic name of *lacierto* at Bari,<sup>61</sup> and Carus<sup>62</sup> records *lacierto* at Naples, *lacerto* at Gaeta and Scilla, *lucardo* at Rimini, and *lanzardo* at Venice and Trieste. Only infrequently have names in this category been applied to other fish, e. g., *laciertu* at Bari and Molfetta for *Trachurus trachurus*<sup>63</sup> and *laga-to* or *lagarto do mar* in Portugal for *Saurus lacerta* Risso.<sup>64</sup>

As for σαύρος, in Greece today the usual name for *Trachurus* sp. is σαυρίδι.<sup>65</sup> W. Meyer-Lübke<sup>66</sup> regards the Latinized form *saurus* as the source of Sicilian *sauru*, Provençal *saurel* (source

"spring." Σκόρδυλη thus is a diminutive formation meaning "little leaper." In Aristotle κόρδυλος is a generic term for the salamander, and Barbier (*loc. cit.*) is therefore probably correct in associating κόρδυλη with κόρδυλος, which he identifies as a type of water lizard.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. note 29 above.

<sup>58</sup> This name must originally have denoted another fish, possibly the skipper, *Scombresox Rondeletii* Cuvier and Valenciennes, as indicated by Gossen in his article in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *R.-E.*, and still maintained in more recent articles ("Die zool. Glossen im Lexikon des Hesych," no. 1856; "Die Tiernamen in Älians 17 Büchern," par. 105). Brands (*op. cit.*, p. 175) identifies the σαύρος as one of the *Carangidae* and explains the extension of the name σαύρος "lizard" to this fish as possibly due to the breast fins, the only point of resemblance in form, or to the coloration and the row scales which some species have along the sides. It is practically certain, however, that later it became a general term for the saurel.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *La pesca nei mari*, pp. 55 and 62; p. 60; p. 53.

<sup>60</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>61</sup> Cf. *La pesca nei mari*, p. 36.

<sup>62</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Carus, *op. cit.*

<sup>64</sup> Cf. R. T. Lowe, "A synopsis of the fishes of Madeira," *Zoological Society of London, Transactions*, II (1837), p. 188.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Apostolides, *op. cit.*, p. 19; Hoffman-Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

<sup>66</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 631.

of French *saurel*), Catalan *sorell* (source of Sardinian *surellu* and *suredde*, *sugerello* on Elba, Spanish *jurel*, and Galician *xurel*). Barbier,<sup>67</sup> assuming a direct extension of the name from the lizard to *Trachurus trachurus* because of a similarity in form, without any intermediate stage, divides the Romance names into two groups, those from Latin *saurus* and those from Latin *süber*, \**süberus*. As examples of the first group he cites *sauru* in Sicily, *sauro* at Rome, *surellu* and *suredde* in Sardinia, *sorell* in Ivezza, and *saurel* in the Narbonnaise. With *süber*, \**süberus* he associates *süber*, *süberus*, a term for the cork-tree, *Quercus suber*, and explains this as an extension of the name of the cork-tree to *Trachurus trachurus* because of the fish's yellowish or golden shades, its bright coloration. In this latter group he puts such names for *Trachurus trachurus* as Venetian *suro*, Italian *sugarello* (*sugharello* on Elba), *suvereou* in Var and B.-du-Rhone and *severeou* in B.-du-Rhone, and *sieurel* in the Provence. To his examples in the first group may be added such current names for *Trachurus trachurus* as *suro* at Ancona, Caorle, Fiume, Pola, Venice, and in the Gulf of Trieste, *sauro* at Bari, Civitavecchia, and Syracuse, *sauri* at Catania and Syracuse, *sauru* at Messina and Palermo, *sauru verace* at Catanzaro, *surellu* at Cagliari, and *sorello* at Livorno.<sup>68</sup> Carus<sup>69</sup> records such names as *suro* at Venice and Trieste, *sauro* and *sauriello* at Naples, *sauro bianco* at Messina, *sauru* at Catania, *surellu* at Cagliari, *su* and *sorello* at Genoa, *sulo*, *sula*, and *sulacchielli* at Gaeta, *saurella* on Malta, *šur* and *šurin* in Croatia, *saurel* in France, *xurel* and *jurel* in Spain, *sorell* in Valencia and Barcelona, and *sorall* in Mallorca and Ivezza. *Trachurus mediterraneus* is known today as *sauru mavaru* at Catanzaro and as *sauru niru* at Palermo and Messina,<sup>70</sup> and Carus<sup>71</sup> records the latter name as previously current at Messina.

It is puzzling that Barbier should have become so preoccupied with his lizard interpretation of certain Romance fish names

<sup>67</sup> "Noms de poissons," *Revue des Langues Romanes*, LIII (1910), pp. 50-51.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *La pesca nei mari*, pp. 33, 42, 58, 81, 98, and 96; pp. 37, 56, and 86; pp. 46 and 88; pp. 68 and 76; p. 52; p. 40; p. 63.

<sup>69</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *La pesca nei mari*, p. 52; pp. 76 and 68.

<sup>71</sup> *Op. cit.*

that he failed to give consideration to the rôle played by classical *sarda* and *sardina*, for his articles are generally characterized by scholarly thoroughness. The omission possibly is attributable to the lack of previous discussion of this point. Probably it simply did not come to his attention. It was necessary to review his hypothesis in some detail, however, despite its lack of complete validity, so that his evidence might be duly weighed. The true explanation, in the light of all the evidence available, is not entirely simple, but wholly logical; and it is clear enough by now that Becker-Göll<sup>72</sup> was only hazarding a guess, and a poor one at that, when he said that in ancient times the terms *σάρδα* and *σαρδέλαι* denoted chiefly the anchovy, which is more abundant in the Mediterranean than the pilchard, which led A. E. Brehm<sup>73</sup> to make the mistake of concluding that the pilchard was not very well known in ancient times. Reinhold Strömberg<sup>74</sup> merely perpetuates this old error when he says that these names may originally have denoted the anchovy or the pilchard or both; E. de Saint-Denis<sup>75</sup> misses the point when he identifies the *sarda* as *pélamyde sarde* (*Pelamys sarda*); and Hans Gossen<sup>76</sup> ignores the evidence when he refers the *σάρδα* to *centrolophus pompilus* L. on the basis of habitat.

What actually occurred must have been somewhat as follows. The island of Sardinia very early became an important center for the export of preserved fish, mostly salted. The quantities shipped must have been large and the market extensive, and the products were of unusually good quality. Possibly also the advertising methods of the Sardinian exporters were more advanced than those of their contemporary competitors. At any rate, the term "Sardinian" became a hall-mark of quality, and by extension was applied to the preserved fish of other centers when the product was of the same type and quality. By a further

<sup>72</sup> Gallus, III, p. 136.

<sup>73</sup> Tierleben, 4th ed., III, p. 259.

<sup>74</sup> "Studien zur Etymologie und Bildung der griechischen Fischnamen," Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift, XLIX (1943), No. 2, p. 86.

<sup>75</sup> "Quelques noms de poissons en latin classique," Les Études Classiques, XII (1943), p. 136.

<sup>76</sup> "Zoologisches bei Athenaios," Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin, VII (1939), p. 260.

extension in a different direction, the term was also applied to the actual fish most commonly processed at the Sardinian manufactories. This trend was expedited by the simplification of *τάριχη σάρδα* and *σάρδιση τάριχη* to *σάρδι*, upon which Galen comments. In the classical era no other fish was preserved in such large quantities as the tunny, which was abundant in the general vicinity of Sardinia, and no other fish common in that locality yielded a preserved product of commensurate quality. Even without the explicit statements of ancient authors, therefore, one would conclude that the term "Sardinian," when used of the fish rather than the preserved product, referred to the tunny; and the evidence found in classical authors is sufficient to establish that it almost certainly denoted tunnies about a year old. But other fish must certainly have been processed at the Sardinian manufactories, including considerable quantities of pilchards and similar small fish, which provided salt wares of poor quality, largely consumed by the poor. And since these were products of the Sardinian industry, it was natural for the term "Sardinian" to be applied to them, but to only a limited extent, since their quality was no better than that of similar salt wares of other centers. Predominantly, therefore, the term "Sardinian" denoted year-old tunnies in the classical era.

Upon turning to the later authors, one finds evidence of a gradual shift of application of the term in the direction of the pilchard. The cause of this phenomenon can only be guessed. Perhaps it is attributable to a decline in the standards maintained by the Sardinian tunny fishery, so that "Sardinian" no longer connoted superior preserved tunnies.

By the modern period the shift from the tunny to the pilchard was nearly complete, and one finds that not only do most of the primary names of the pilchard go back to *sarda* or *sardina*, but only occasionally do even secondary names of other fish come from that source. In most of these latter instances, moreover, the names are those of small pilchard-like fish such as the shad, the anchovy, and the sprat. The outward spread of application from the pilchard obviously began late and has been limited. As for the tunny, it is only rarely that one finds even a secondary name that goes back to *sarda* or *sardina*, and the spread of application to similar fish has been very limited.

In view of what probably occurred, it is reasonable to believe



that Galician *jardon* "common tunny," Galician *jarda* "common mackerel," Spanish *sarda* and Catalan *sard* "coly mackerel," and Portuguese *sarda* "mackerel" should be regarded as survivals of Latin *sarda* "tunny" rather than be associated with Medieval Latin *sarda* "lizard," as Barbier does. It is true, as he says, that there was a tendency in ancient times to refer to the tunny, the mackerel, and the saurel as "lizard-fish," and a similar tendency is manifest in the modern nomenclature, as well as survivals of the ancient names. But it is inconceivable that names as well established as Latin *sarda* and *sardina* should have disappeared from usage and have been replaced by names from a Medieval Latin name for the lizard, especially in view of the fact that linguistically the modern names can be traced to classical *sarda* as plausibly as to Medieval Latin *sarda*.

To summarize, in the classical period the so-called "Sardinian fish" primarily was the year-old tunny, secondarily the pilchard or a very similar fish. In the course of time there was a marked shift of application in the direction of the pilchard. Thus by a paradoxical freak of semantics, a name which once denoted a fish of moderate size came in time to denote a totally different small fish.

ALFRED C. ANDREWS.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI.

## NOTE ON A DIGRESSION OF THUCYDIDES (VI, 54-59).

In VI, 53 Thucydides describes how the Salaminia came to Sicily to summon Alcibiades and others back to Athens to meet charges of impiety and implication in the affair of the Hermae. This official action by the Athenians is explained in the two sentences which follow, both introduced by γάρ:

Because, after the expedition set sail, the Athenians continued their investigation of the incidents of the mysteries and the Hermae, and without any testing of the informers, but accepting everything they were told and maintaining an attitude of suspicion, they started to arrest and imprison perfectly honest citizens on the word of worthless informants, thinking it more expedient to investigate first and find the truth afterwards instead of letting a man go without examination when he appeared to be innocent and when the complaint against him was due to the criminal design of an informer. Because, having learnt by report that the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons became more severe in its closing stages and furthermore that it was put down not by themselves and Harmodius but by the Spartans, the *demos* was in a continual state of fear and regarded everything with suspicion.

Then follows another γάρ clause (chap. 54):

τὸ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ Ἀρμοδίου τόλμημα δι' ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν ἐπεχειρήθη, ἣν ἐγὼ ἐπὶ πλέον διηγησάμενος ἀποφανῶ οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους οὔτε αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῶν σφετέρων τυράννων οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν λέγοντας.

How is this third γάρ clause an explanation of what has gone before? How is the state of alarm of the people, who recall the Peisistratid times, explained by the statement that the incident of Harmodius and Aristogeiton arose out of a love affair (the true facts of which are not generally known and will therefore now be told at greater length)? Many Thucydidean digressions are introduced by γάρ, and Classen thinks it sufficient explanation to point this out. But γάρ is used only when the digression explains a previous statement or incident; as, for example, the digression on the Athenian rise to power in the Pentecontaetia explains the Spartan fear of further Athenian expansion (I, 88-89). Hence the critics who suppose that Thucydides inserted

this digression on Harmodius and Aristogeiton purely in order to refute the current version of the story are forced to regard the digression as irrelevant and the use of γάρ as not strictly logical.<sup>1</sup>

In fact, however, the protest of Thucydides about the general ignorance of the true story has obscured the main issue. All the difficulties and contradictions which disturb the critics disappear once one realizes that the object of Thucydides is to show the parallel between the increased severity and fear of revolution on the part of Hippias (as a result of the private and not strictly political outrage of Hipparchus' murder) and on the part of the Athenian *demos* (as a result of the equally private and non-political affair of the Hermae). His intention to emphasize this parallel is shown by his choice of almost identical terms in comparing one situation with the other:

τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ δι' ἐρωτικὴν λύπην ἢ τε ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ ἡ ἀλόγιστος τόλμα ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα περιδεοῦς Ἀρμόδιῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι ἐγένετο. τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις χαλεπωτέρα μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ τυραννὶς κατέστη, καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας διὰ φόβου ἤδη μᾶλλον ὢν τῶν τε πολιτῶν πολλοὺς ἔκτεινε καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἅμα διεσκοπεῖτο, εἴ ποθεν ἀσφάλειάν τινα ὁρῶν μεταβολῆς γενομένης ὑπάρχουσάν οἱ (59, 1-2).

Then follows the account of his overthrow and his subsequent flight to Sigeum, to Lampsacus, and finally to Darius, and his part in the Marathon campaign:

ὦν ἐνθυμούμενος ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μνησκόμενος ὅσα ἀκοῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἤπιστατο, χαλεπὸς ἦν τότε καὶ ὑπόπτῃς ἐς τοὺς περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν λαβόντας, καὶ πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ πεπραχθαι (60, 1).

<sup>1</sup> Many critics have regarded this excursus as the most irrelevant of all the excursuses of Thucydides. E. Schwarz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (2nd ed., Bonn, 1929), pp. 180-86, thinks that Thucydides did not himself intend it to be inserted at this point at all and that its presence here is due to his "editor." Cf. also M. Hirsch, "Die athenischen Tyrannenmörder in Geschichtsschreibung und Legende," *Klio*, XX (1926), p. 131, K. Ziegler, "Der Ursprung der Exkurse des Thukydides," *Rh. M.*, LXXVIII (1929), p. 59, and G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age*, p. 425. H. Berve, *Thukydides* (Frankfurt, 1938), p. 28, seems to think that the logical reason for the excursus should not be pressed and that its dramatic value in its context is more important than its pertinence; he says that "a complicated process of thought" is necessary to establish its relevance, but does not explain what he means.

Both Hippias and the *demos*, certainly, had some justification for their fears and suspicions, as later events proved, but the incidents which intensified their alarm were not really outbursts of political feeling; the murder of Hipparchus was not a political murder, as Thucydides points out on three separate occasions (54, 1; 54, 3; 59, 1), and the tyrants had not given general grounds for political discontent (54, 5); and the outrages of the mysteries and the Hermae were not really political outrages but merely interpreted as such by the people (27, 3). Also, curiously enough, the actual details of what took place on each occasion were not generally known. The argument of Thucydides, therefore, is as follows: The Athenians, remembering how the murder of Hipparchus had caused Hippias to take special precautions, took warning themselves from the outrages of the mysteries and the Hermae (because the murder of Hipparchus, which quite rightly alarmed Hippias, was a private outrage like the Hermae affair). Also, as events turned out, the sequel was similar. The reign of terror, caused by fear and suspicion, drove the opposition in each instance to seek help from Sparta in planning a revolution against the party in power.<sup>2</sup>

Why does not Thucydides make the point more clearly? It is not a question of infelicitous expression or obscurity, but

<sup>2</sup> H. Münch, *Studien zu den Exkursen des Thukydides* (Heidelberg, 1935), who discusses the Peisistratid excursus at some length (pp. 66-82), denies its irrelevance and insists on taking the γὰρ of 54, 1 in a strictly causal sense. He explains Thucydides' thought as follows: The reason why the Athenians so particularly feared tyranny was because it had taken foreign intervention to get rid of it; *nor was it surprising that the Harmodius attempt at revolution failed*, because it was undertaken originally not from political motives, but as an act of private revenge (the italicized words representing an ellipsis such as often has to be supplied with γὰρ clauses).

The weakness of this interpretation is that it confuses fear of revolutionary conspiracy (whether tyrannical or democratic) and fear of tyranny as an institution; and it is the former fear, not the latter, that is described in 53, 3. And Münch appears not to notice the parallel between the fears and suspicions of Hippias and those of the *demos*, which can only be explained by the similarity of the danger which faces them both—namely, a revolution. So he falls back on the solution that Thucydides is trying to show how any political plan (the Sicilian expedition just as well as the conspiracy of Harmodius) can fail through the prevalence of passion over reason—a piece of sententiousness more worthy of Theopompus than of Thucydides.

simply that he expects his readers to recognize the general parallelism of the two reigns of terror and how they started; it was evidently a matter of common knowledge, and a hint was all that was required. What was needed, however, was an authentic account in detail of the incidents which started the terror, since the details were not generally known. Hence the digression on Harmodius and Aristogeiton; unfortunately Thucydides did not know the true facts about the mysteries and the Hermæ, and could not supply the details here.

LIONEL PEARSON.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

## NOTE SUR L'INSCRIPTION AMPHICTIONIQUE

*I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1126.

La plupart des recueils épigraphiques<sup>1</sup> reproduisent la loi amphictionique dont seul l'exemplaire gravé à Athènes en 380 avant J.-C.<sup>2</sup> nous est parvenu. La pierre est au Musée du Louvre; une photographie en a été publiée dans un article<sup>3</sup> qui, consacré à l'établissement du texte, a permis d'éliminer quelques fausses lectures ou interprétations. Il ne sera peut-être pas inutile<sup>4</sup> de rappeler deux gains qui paraissent assurés. D'abord,

<sup>1</sup> *C. I. G.*, 1688; Michel, 702; *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1126; *S. I. G.*<sup>3</sup>, 145; Schwyzler, 325, etc. Voir ci-après la note 3.

<sup>2</sup> La date rigoureuse fournie par l'intitulé athénien (ligne 1: [Π]υθίο ἄρχοντος ἐ[πὶ] τῆς Ἰπποθ[ω]νίδος τριτῆς [πρυτανείας]) n'est applicable en toute certitude qu'à l'ἀναγραφὴ du document.

<sup>3</sup> Georges Daux, *Rev. Arch.*, 1935, I, pp. 205-219, et planche I. On trouvera là une bibliographie plus détaillée. Plusieurs passages de l'inscription ont été peints en rouge au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle probablement, ou au début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, et la photographie porte les conséquences de ce travail parfois arbitraire; par exemple, ligne 19, le lapicide ayant corrigé en Ω l'avant-dernière lettre du groupe ΠΑΣΣΩΝ, gravée d'abord par erreur Α, les traces de peinture rouge feraient lire, sur la planche, ΠΑΣΣΑΝ, alors que la pierre ne laisse pas de doute; etc.

<sup>4</sup> On verra par les deux notes suivantes que des remarques essentielles de Bourguet sur notre loi sont restées ignorées depuis 1905. J'ai constaté récemment, dans l'excellent choix de Marcus N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, II (1948), une omission du même ordre; au no. 204, à propos du serment de Platées (édité par L. Robert),

ligne 4, le *ghost-word* \*εγχερα, encore enregistré en 1927 par le *Greek-English Lexicon* de Liddell et Scott,<sup>5</sup> n'a aucun droit à l'existence et doit faire place à [o]ῖ κερδανῶ ([O]ΥΚΕΡΔΑΝΩ, et non ΕΙΧΕΡΑΑ[NA]). D'autre part à la ligne 14 ce n'est pas d'ânes, τὸς ὄνος (τοὺς ὄνους), ni de prix (ῶνους), qu'il est question, mais de peuple, τὸ ἔθνος; où la pierre porte ΤΟΕΘΝΟΣ, on avait lu ΤΟΞΟΝΟΣ: fausse leçon d'un type classique en paléographie.

Plusieurs passages cependant demeurent obscurs. L'un d'eux offre l'occasion d'une correction certaine, qui, de conjecture, est devenue, devant la pierre, lecture, comme il arrive souvent. Rien ne montre mieux l'autorité des déchiffrements fautifs, une fois surtout qu'ils ont été enregistrés dans une transcription en minuscules; Fr. Blass, E. Bourguet, moi-même, nous avons accepté tour à tour, ligne 10, le texte suivant:

M. N. Tod a omis l'article *Rev. Arch.*, 1941, I, pp. 176-183; j'y montrais: 1° que ταξιλοχος (ligne 25 de l'édition Tod) est inacceptable et qu'il faut écrire ταξιπαχος (lecture vérifiée sur la pierre dès 1941, à ma demande, par des membres de l'Ecole française); 2° que, ligne 40-42, il fallait rétablir, au lieu de: καὶ πόλις ἥ μὴ ἀπόρρητος εἶη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, πόρθοιτο· καὶ φέροι ἥ μὴ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀφορς εἶη, la coupe de mots et l'accentuation suivantes: καὶ πόλις ἥ-ἡ ἀπόρρητος εἶη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, πορθοίτο· καὶ φέροι ἥμῃ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀφορς εἶη. D. W. Prakken, dans un article paru ici-même (*A. J. A.*, LXI, pp. 62 sqq.) pendant la guerre et dont je n'ai eu connaissance qu'en 1941, a proposé également cette seconde correction, mais, utilisant une suggestion de L. Robert, il a inséré des mots superflus: il écrit καὶ <καρπὸς> φέροι <γῆ> ἡ 'μῃ, alors que l'emploi absolu de φέρω est courant, et que ἡ ἐμῇ (sc. γῆ) n'est pas moins normal (voir, e. g., Thuc. VI, 78). Pour en finir avec le texte du serment de Platon une vérification sur la pierre, en 1941, a montré que la forme ἐργόμενος (ligne 37 de l'édition Tod = ligne 17 du serment) a bien été gravée telle quelle: les difficultés marquées *Rev. Arch.*, l. l., p. 176, n. 3, à propos de ce mot, subsistent donc.

<sup>5</sup> Erreur corrigée en 1940 dans les *Addenda et Corrigenda*: "s. v. εγχερα, delete the article, cf. *Rev. arch.* 5 (1935). 215." E. Bourguet, dès 1905, avait condamné cette lecture (*L'administration du sanctuaire pythique*, p. 153), et proposé [ε]γκερδανῶ (qui serait un hapax également, mais de saine formation); les remarques de Bourguet ont échappé à Kirchner (*I. G.*<sup>2</sup>, et *S. I. G.*<sup>3</sup>, où est citée la page 142, mais non la page 158 du livre de Bourguet), ainsi qu'à Schwyzler (dans son choix dialectal). Je ne comprends pas comment Blass (cf. Baunack, *S. G. D. I.*, II, p. 645) a pu lire un E en tête du groupe; cette fausse leçon résulte-elle bien d'un déchiffrement? ou plutôt n'est-elle pas une conjecture qui, par négligence de plume et omission de crochets de restitution, s'est installée dans le texte?

line 9 -----[ὄρκος γραμματέος· ὑπίσχομαι τῶν γ]-  
 line 10 εγραμμένων μὴ ἀπογραφῆν, ἀλλ' ὃν κατὰ τοὶ ἱερομόμονες  
 κε[λευσέοντι ----]

Pour κατὰ il n'y a aucune difficulté à interpréter κατὰ τὰ (attique καθ' ἃ), malgré les formes féminines ἄν et ἄς du pronom relatif aux lignes 16 et 40, et malgré le double τ des lignes 17 (κατὰ τ[ὸ] πέλεθρον), 41 (κατὰ τὰν αὐτῶ), et 47 (κατὰ τὰ πάτρια); on lit d'ailleurs, ligne 11, κ[α]τὰν δίκαν;<sup>6</sup> et, d'une façon générale, l'incohérence dialectale et orthographique est grande dans ce texte amphictionique gravé à Athènes.

Mais comment construire ὃν κατὰ? En réalité au lieu de: ΑΛΛΩΝ, il faut lire: ΑΛΛΟΗ. Il est aisé de vérifier cette conjecture sur la stèle; la quatrième lettre, ronde, a provoqué une érosion du marbre, mais aucune trace de pattes n'oriente vers Ω; quant à la cinquième lettre, c'est certainement un Η. On écrira donc:<sup>7</sup> [ὄρκος γραμματέος· ὁμνυμι τῶν γ]εγραμμένων μὴ ἀπογραφῆν ἄλλο ἢ κατὰ τοὶ ἱερομόμονες κε[λευσέοντι ----]. Le secrétaire jure de ne procéder à aucune ἀπογραφὴ sans instruction formelle des hiéromnémons.

Sur le sens probable de cette clause et sur l'ensemble de la loi nous espérons revenir bientôt dans un livre intitulé *Une tentative d'organisation internationale dans l'antiquité: l'Amphictionie pyléo-delphique*.

GEORGES DAUX.

<sup>6</sup> Cette lecture, due à E. Bourguet, qui l'a publiée dès 1905 (l. l.) a été méconnue dans toutes les éditions postérieures de la loi, qui ont continué à imprimer κ[α]τὰν δίκαν.

<sup>7</sup> Le détail de cette restitution pourra être modifié en fonction d'éléments qu'il est inutile d'énumérer ici; le mouvement de la phrase n'en sera pas changé.

## REVIEWS.

W. W. TARN. *Alexander the Great*. Vol. I, Narrative. Pp. xi + 161. Map. \$3.50. Vol. II, Sources and Studies. Pp. xiii + 477. Map. \$6.50. Cambridge University Press, 1948.

These two magnificent volumes are typical of the work of the great scholar who, among the first in modern times, set the Hellenistic Age in its proper perspective and recovered its founder from a mass of misinformation, the very same scholar who was in fact the first to rescue the Greeks of Bactria and India from oblivion (an entire epoch of history), a feat that may well rank as the greatest example of historical research in our day. We are dealing here with two very different books, a biography and a monograph. The first volume gives the narrative in compendious form and may be purchased separately, "as a straight-forward narrative may appeal to a class of readers who do not want anything further." That it is popular, however, hardly means that it lacks authority; it consists in the main of Tarn's two chapters in *Cambridge Ancient History*, Vol. VI, but the text has been corrected and to a considerable degree rewritten, and the conclusions are those of a scholar who has worked and thought long on Alexander. Fortunately, Tarn's "general view of Alexander remains unchanged." The first two chapters describe the conquest of Persia and the far East. They are utterly and solidly sound. The third and last chapter discusses Alexander's personality, policy, and aims. There are pages here which are passionate and inspired and exemplify the finest historical writing. Fundamentally, one's understanding of Alexander and his character revolves around certain great issues, and since my own point of view is so often the precise opposite of Tarn's I shall postpone my comments until the second volume, where he discusses them more fully.

It is clear from what I have said that the length of this first volume is what a biography of Alexander should be, short (148 pages of text); Alexander has only a tenuous connection with the first third of Wilcken's biography (background) and the last third (results, a summary of the Hellenistic Age). Tarn quite correctly says, "No apology is needed, in my view, for stressing an individual man rather than streams of tendency or the mass mind or other 'idols of the cave.'" He also states in the Preface that "the history of Alexander has never received much help from new material, such as inscriptions; it depends chiefly on the examination and interpretation of literary texts." This is profoundly true; and a review, therefore, must rigorously examine the handling of the elusive and confused sources. It is not that the final truth will emerge—discussions of Alexander, unfortunately, can rarely be put to a jury, as Tarn once remarked to the British Academy on a great occasion—but rather that the publication of these two monumental works of scholarship provide the opportunity to bring further along, albeit in a limited and small way, our understanding of Alexander. In that spirit I present my observations.



*Military matters.* It is incorrect to say that at Ecbatana Alexander "sent home the Thessalians and all his Greek allies" (p. 54, and on the next page, "Parmenion's cavalry had gone home") without adding Arrian's statement (III, 19, 6) that not a few volunteered to reënlist. The point is important, because it shows Alexander creating an *imperial* army after the conclusion of the Panhellenic war (and we shall need these Thessalian volunteers twice again). It is not true that Alexander received "no reinforcements" in India (p. 107, n. 2). Curtius (IX, 3, 21) says that on the return to the Acesines Memnon arrived from Thrace with 5,000 cavalry, and besides these 7,000 infantry from Harpalus. Diodorus (XVII, 95, 4) also speaks of heavy reënforcements at this time. If this fact had not slipped Tarn's attention, he might have written differently (p. 99) about Alexander at the Hyphasis (Beas), where mutiny stopped him, as he thought, just short of Ocean. Tarn says that Alexander "could not have gone much farther in any case; half his army was on communications with Taxila, and he was using Porus' troops for garrisons"; "by the time he reached the Beas he must have practically shot his bolt . . . the mutiny was really a blessing in disguise" (II, p. 169). It was doubtless the knowledge that these reënforcements were on the way, however, that kept Alexander going, and their arrival made possible the descent of the Indus river-system instead of a direct march home, as the men wished; the new troops explain why "the actual clash of wills ended in a draw" (p. 100).

It is not quite correct to say that "Alexander's losses are usually just propaganda figures" (p. 17) and that Persian "losses are throughout unknown" (p. 25). I once added them up in Arrian, taking only the precise figures; and after excluding the losses at Issus, Gaugamela, and the Hydaspes (which so appealed to fancy) I found that in eleven years of fighting across a continent Alexander lost just under one-seventieth as many men as did the enemy. At the fierce cavalry engagement at the Granicus, supposing that Darius had only 8,000 of the reported 20,000 Greek mercenaries, Alexander lost just over one-seventieth as many men as did the enemy. The figures for this battle can be controlled in part, because it is certain that Alexander lost only 25 Companions, since their statues were set up at Dium. Alexander's losses were generally minimized and the enemy's magnified, for obvious reasons, but it looks as if the ordinary figures (not those for the great battles) were kept with some accuracy. It does not follow that the figures necessarily come from the Royal Journal (p. 25), a source which Tarn does not always understand. Nor is it correct to suggest (p. 25) that the size of Darius' army at Issus can be used as a general indication of the military potential of the Persian empire. Tarn's first two references to Curtius (p. 26) show merely that Darius' army was small because of the terrain and that on a broader plain "fresh Persian reserves" would be available (that is, Darius had brought only a part of his army into Cilicia); the third reference can mean, and I think does, that Alexander's army was larger only than the *foremost* Persians.

*Chronology.* On the basis of Plutarch (37, 3), Tarn keeps Alexander in Persepolis till "spring 330" (p. 54). This creates various problems in the only serious chronological difficulty in the entire ex-

pedition. Alexander, for example, must now reach the Paropamisadae in "spring 329" (p. 65), though Arrian (III, 28, 1) gives winter as the season. Tarn therefore says that Alexander "apparently never took winter quarters at all in the winter of 330-329 B. C." But Strabo, confirming Arrian's implication, says that he did (pp. 724-5) and built a city (Alexandria of the Caucasus); its foundation, a sensible project for a long halt, is known from Arrian and others. To solve the problem, it is only necessary to cut down somewhat the length of Alexander's stay at Persepolis, and Plutarch's statement, it may be added, is surrounded by worthless anecdote.

*New opposition to Alexander.* Until the book under review induced me to track the Thessalian volunteers through Arrian, I had not realized, nor has anyone realized, how serious were the years in Bactria-Sogdiana for Alexander. In connection with the "murder" of Parmenio, which I shall discuss later, Tarn says (p. 64) that "six years passed before he [Alexander] had to strike again" (that is, on his return to Mesopotamia). Arrian (III, 29, 5) tells us that at the Oxus (soon after leaving Bactra and just before the Jaxartes) Alexander sent home the Macedonian veterans past service and the Thessalian volunteers. Why old Macedonians and all Thessalians? By rare good fortune Coenus gives us the reason in his reply to Alexander at the time of the mutiny on the Hyphasis:<sup>1</sup> "You did well in sending back home the Thessalians at once from Bactra, perceiving that they no longer had heart for labors" (Arrian, V, 27, 5); that is to say, Parmenio's troops had been disloyal or mutinous, an alarming situation. (The incorporation of Asiatic troops in the army not much later, a fine example of Alexander's imperial attitude, apparently sprang from a real need.) But Alexander's problems did not end there. We learn from Arrian (IV, 4, 3) that Aristander resolutely refused to say that the omens were favorable for crossing the Jaxartes. A mere seer would not have dared oppose Alexander alone. Since Callisthenes is responsible for all our references to Aristander, it is as clear as these matters often are in the Alexander-history that there was prominent and sustained opposition to Alexander—a reading of Plutarch, 53 confirms the impression of a Callisthenes long hated by Alexander—which not much later he destroyed in the person of Callisthenes. Tarn wonders why Callisthenes, who had earlier praised Alexander in extravagant terms, should have reversed himself and opposed his attempt to introduce prostration at the famous banquet at Bactra. The reason, he says (p. 80), "has been debated ever since, without much result." The days in Bactria-Sogdiana, which included the murder of Cleitus and the conspiracy of the Pages, were momentous for Alexander, in various ways, and they may even help to explain why he sought deification.

Before we leave Callisthenes, I doubt that "some time after 330 he had sent to Greece for publication his history of Alexander, so far as it had gone" (p. 77), unless Tarn's words can be stretched

<sup>1</sup> Part of Tarn's argument (II, p. 290, see below) against the genuineness of these speeches at the Hyphasis is that "the statement that the Thessalians were sent home from Bactra is wrong" (i. e., Tarn has missed Arrian's earlier statement and thought that they had been sent home from Ecbatana, see above).

to mean that Callisthenes' history extended into the year 327, an important fact; its significance is that Callisthenes' history in that event doubtless included an account of the banquet at Bactra in 328.

*The mass marriages!* It is not true that on the return to Susa "10,000 of the troops married their native concubines" (p. 111), "that unique event in history" induced by Alexander (II, p. 329). It is clear from Arrian (VII, 4, 8; cf. Plutarch, 70, 2) that Alexander gave presents to those who had *already* married, or taken up more or less permanently with a girl, or however you wish to express it. It was only their economic condition (whatever their other status) that was changed at Susa.

*The mutiny at Opis.* When Alexander proposed at Opis to send home veterans past service, the entire army mutinied, says Tarn (p. 115) on the authority of Curtius, because they "took this to mean that he intended to transfer the seat of power from Macedonia to Asia." Even if Alexander did intend to do this and even if the soldiers had guessed it, it is not likely that they mutinied for the sake of a great principle; they would be motivated, rather, by an immediate personal problem, such as the realization of the hopes expressed on the Hyphasis (a return home). Arrian's explanation (VII, 8, 2) is that "the veterans thought they were despised by Alexander and deemed to be quite useless for military service." Arrian, of course, does not make sense, because the veterans must have been delighted with the thought of going home at last. Justin (XII, 11, 5) doubtless has it right when he says that the younger men insisted that they be allowed to go, too. If matters had reached the point where the younger soldiers could lead a mutiny, was not Alexander faced with a situation—long simmering, perhaps—that demanded all his skill, even, possibly, a recourse to deification (see below)? (Before we leave Justin, I might remark that Tarn's list, II, p. 125, of three or four examples of possible "bread in the intolerable deal of sack," which does not include the passage above, may be further increased; XII, 15, 1-2 and 12 have affinities with the Royal Journal.)

The second volume, *Sources and Studies*, is a monograph, also of great distinction. As Tarn remarks in the Preface of the first volume, this "is the main part of the work." It is divided into two Parts, with some Addenda at the end.

*Part I.* The volume opens with a long study of the so-called "Vulgate" and its sources. The startling conclusion is "that there never was any such thing as an Alexander-vulgate or 'Cleitarcean vulgate,' exhibited by Diodorus, Curtius, and Justin" (p. 132). Cleitarchus was not on Alexander's expedition and is therefore a secondary writer. His book is not earlier than 280 B. C. and was hostile to Alexander, rather than glorifying him, as we had supposed. We have always thought, moreover, that the order in time of Cleitarchus, Ptolemy, and Aristobulus was as named, but actually it was the reverse. With Cleitarchus established, Tarn turns to Diodorus XVII, which contains two distinct portraits of Alexander—one basic and favorable (Aristobulus), the other unfavorable (Cleitarchus). In addition, Tarn says (p. 128) that Diodorus' chief source as far as Issus was another writer whom he calls the "mercenaries' source"—a well-informed individual who gave the point

of view of the Greek mercenaries in Darius' service. If true, and Tarn as always is very persuasive, this is of signal importance. I can only point out that I have now found other possible affinities with the "mercenaries' source" in Plutarch, 17, 3; 18, 3; 20, 4. It is not correct to say (p. 73) that Diodorus "disposes of Alexander between Halicarnassus and Cilicia in six words," for there is a considerable account (XVII, 28, 1-5) of Alexander in Lycia among the Marmareis. If it is true that the mercenaries, and therefore their writer, "were not concerned with Alexander's proceedings in Asia Minor prior to his arrival in Cilicia," then it is curious that we have the story of the Acarnanian physician, Philip, which shows Alexander's "confidence in his friends" (I, p. 24). To be sure, the locale of the story is Cilicia, but as a non-military item it would not have been known to the "mercenaries' source." Why then did Diodorus choose to tell it, and yet omit the dramatic stories which also "bear strongly on Alexander's character, Mount Climax and the Gordian knot" (he "could have got information elsewhere," pp. 72, 73)? The whole subject needs further study.

Tarn then analyzes Curtius. He, too, gives two portraits of Alexander. The main one is the Peripatetic picture of Alexander, a thoroughly good king as far as Darius' death, but after that a cruel tyrant ruined by his own Fortune. The other source is Cleitarchus, but Curtius also uses the "mercenaries' source." Justin, an incredibly bad writer, and Callisthenes, who was (because of his execution) the unconscious cause of the Peripatetic picture, are then noticed. When the generation that knew Alexander died out, says Tarn, a favorable portrait of him did not appear for centuries, because literature was largely in the hands of the hostile Greeks. It was that widespread antipathy which had caused Ptolemy to write his book in the first instance; his history and Aristobulus' helped Arrian rehabilitate the real Alexander.

This extraordinary and brilliant reconstruction must be correct, in its main outline at least, and will rank as one of the most significant contributions to our knowledge of the Alexander-history. It is difficult to convey an impression of the labor and learning involved. Beyond the scope of Tarn's work lies another and a greater problem, the relation of all the Alexander-historians to one another, for there is no denying that the portrait and coloring of each individual writer is set within a common basic frame for the period of the expedition as far as the final departure from Bactra and for the period from the descent of the Hydaspes to the end; in between (roughly, India), the frame is unsteady. All this is to be explained by the availability, in one way or another, of the Royal Journal to our extant historians, or to the lack of it. Since Tarn has restored Aristobulus to his proper sequence, as the first of the Alexander-historians (Callisthenes excepted), I wonder whether the basic account for the central division (India) may not derive ultimately from Aristobulus. It would now be of capital importance if some one could show that Ptolemy, writing at Alexandria where all literature was quickly known, had read Aristobulus.

*Part II.* The last two-thirds of the volume contain 25 learned Appendices, packed with information, which discuss Alexander's Macedonian troops (a valuable analysis) and other military prob-

lems;<sup>2</sup> the cities of Asia Minor and Alexander's foundations; various historical items, such as the Gordian knot;<sup>3</sup> the speeches in Arrian and other documentary problems; personal problems, such as Alexander's attitude to sex; and, finally, the "main problems": Alexander's deification; the embassies to Babylon; Alexander's supposed plans and the "world-kingdom"; brotherhood and unity. This last Appendix should be widely read, for it contains the best statement on the subject by the scholar who first established, and beyond any doubt, the fact of Alexander's great dream of the brotherhood of man, the most important thing about him. Tarn's knowledge is vast, his reading extensive, and the contributions are of the highest importance. Instead of summarizing them—which is impossible, anyway—I would like to say a word about some of the matters which are fundamental to our understanding of Alexander.

*Parmenio.* The world of scholarship has regarded the condemnation of Philotas as judicial, but not so the execution of his great father, Parmenio, which, says Tarn (I, p. 64), "was plain murder, and leaves a deep stain on Alexander's reputation." Here we have Alexander's most important single act. My position has been that the Macedonian law (or custom), preserved by Curtius, which held that in a trial for treason the relatives of a condemned person were also put to death, removes the death of Parmenio from the classification of murder and puts it automatically in the same judicial category as Philotas'. Tarn speaks (p. 270) of the source of Curtius' statement (VI, 11, 20) as "certainly trustworthy." Curtius says in effect that during the trial of Philotas, but before sentence, those related to Parmenio, mindful of the Macedonian custom, began committing suicide, so that Alexander suspended its operation; Philotas was then condemned by the army, Parmenio also, apparently on the strength of an incriminating letter. Let us agree with Tarn that the incriminating letter was never written and that Parmenio was not condemned by the army; nor does the suspension of the law before Parmenio's death affect the argument. The only question is whether, amid inconsistencies and false statements, Curtius has happened to preserve something true about an important custom. Tarn remarks (p. 272) that "inconsistencies in Curtius are common enough," and since the whole story goes to seven chapters Curtius has plenty of room in which to indulge himself, and in the course of his story, as Tarn says, makes a contradictory remark which proves that "he has quite forgotten his own statement about an incriminating letter." Although I am not impressed by anything in Curtius except his statement concerning an ancient custom—as Tarn says (p. 107), Curtius is "our invaluable source" on this

<sup>2</sup> The Macedonian cubit is established as being between 13 and 14 inches; thus the longest spears used by Alexander's men were from 13 to 14 ft. (p. 170), and not 18 ft. as generally supposed. The short Macedonian (bematists') stade, as worked out by Tarn, shows that Arbela was 35 miles from Gaugamela (I, p. 51), not 60, which there (but not everywhere) reduces somewhat Alexander's speed of movement.

<sup>3</sup> Tarn shows (p. 264) that Alexander untied the knot and did not cut it. Perhaps, however, the legend promised dominion only over Asia Minor (Curtius III, 1, 13 proves that by "Asia" he means only Asia Minor).

subject—my proof (as such things so often go in the Alexander-history) is rooted in Arrian. Arrian is innocent of Curtius' knowledge concerning the Macedonian custom, as Tarn observes, but he has missed a corroborative statement in III, 27, 1-3. When Philotas was put on trial, a friend named Polemo fled, and Polemo's brother Amyntas was arrested—the two brothers were horsemen and the dearest of all Philotas' friends, says Curtius. People considered Amyntas guilty because of Polemo's flight, says Arrian, but if Arrian had known of the Macedonian custom might he not have written differently? And since Polemo was soon acquitted of complicity in the conspiracy, why did he flee in the first place? Was it because he thought the custom might operate against friends as well as relatives? Curtius, in quoting the custom, says that the cavalry and nobles feared just that. (Curtius also gives the custom at VI, 10, 30-32; and VIII, 6, 28 in connection with the Pages' conspiracy.)

One would like to know more about the reasons why Parmenio, "Philip's man" (I, p. 55), was left behind at Ecbatana. There are two passages in Arrian, the significance of which has never been noticed, that may throw light on both the earlier and the later picture, though they refer to the period after Ecbatana. Just as he was leaving Ecbatana, Alexander "ordered Parmenio to take the Greek mercenaries, the Thracians, and all the other horsemen except the Companion cavalry (thus including the Thessalian volunteers), and march by the land of the Cadusians into Hyrcania" (Arrian, III, 19, 7). When Alexander reaches Hyrcania (the Caspian area), however, there is no mention of Parmenio. But in III, 25, 4 Arrian says that Alexander received various reinforcements from Media, including "the Greek mercenary cavalry and the Thessalian volunteers." Alexander has left Hyrcania and is in Parthia; the plot of Philotas lies just ahead. Here are troops left behind at Ecbatana for the purpose of marching to Hyrcania with Parmenio; neither they nor Parmenio went to Hyrcania; immediately after Alexander's departure from Hyrcania the troops join him. Had Parmenio been guilty of disobedience?

*Alexander's deification.* Tarn handles the vast and complicated subject of Alexander's deification with great skill. 1. Ammon. "Wilcken proved . . . that he [Alexander] did *not* go to Siwah in order to be called son of Ammon, but *merely* to consult the oracle about the future [my italics], the oracle being regarded as very sure; and that nobody ever knew, and we do not know, what passed when he entered the inner shrine, the oracular responses given by some Greek writers being inversions. That is to say, in my own words . . . that the priest met and greeted him; and as Alexander had already been crowned Pharaoh at Memphis and as such had become, like every other Pharaoh, the son of Amon-Re, the priest of Ammon, if he did come out to greet the new Pharaoh, had no option but to address him as son of Ammon" (pp. 347 f.). This is certainly the correct explanation of what went on at the oracle. I have underlined certain words above which give the reasons for Alexander's wish to make the trip (his desire to learn about the future); nowhere else does Tarn give the reasons (not even in Vol. I, p. 43, where Cyrene's offer of alliance is merely recorded).

Alexander had various reasons for making the hazardous journey; but the key is to be found in his unusual and difficult route—he took neither of the regular routes from Cyrene or Memphis (Tarn's only comment is that "this fact enabled his journey to be worked up into an adventure")—and it is this which must be explained. He went to Ammon, I believe, because he could couple it with, tack it on to, something more important. The underlying reason for the expedition was military; the man who had crossed the Danube and was to cross the Jaxartes for similar reasons wished now to confirm that the Libyan desert was in reality a frontier. Since this general fact could have been determined by any route at all, Alexander, in choosing to go along the coast, must also have had a particular objective. We read in Diodorus (XVII, 49, 2) that "in the midst of the journey" envoys from Cyrene met him and offered alliance. Only then was he willing to quit the coast for the oracle (the turning was at Paraetonium, Arrian, III, 3, 3). One would like more details, but perhaps we are fortunate to have this much, in view of the way the trip was buried under stories. 2. Bactra. Here Tarn tries "to account for the fact that at Bactra he [Alexander] thought of becoming the god of his Empire as a help to carrying out his policy of fusion. . . . Something . . . has to be sought which put the idea of deification firmly into his head; and there can be little doubt what it was. Isocrates had written to Philip that if he conquered the king of Persia nothing would be left for him but to become a god; and Alexander, who had not only read Isocrates' *Philippus* but was following his advice in another matter, could not fail to have known of this. That is one thing; the other is Aristotle's famous remark about . . . the 'god among men' . . . Isocrates and Aristotle were referring to *politics*, and nothing but politics. . . . At Bactra, in the interests of his own policy of fusion, he made a preliminary attempt at becoming the god of his Empire; it failed completely" (pp. 365, 369). That Alexander tried for political reasons to become a god is surely the correct explanation of the extraordinary scene at Bactra, though the ancient evidence convinces me that deification was to be limited to Greeks and Macedonians (Arrian, IV, 10 f.; prostration had no implications of divinity for the Persians). But if Isocrates and Aristotle had put the idea of deification firmly in Alexander's head, why did he wait so long? I prefer Tarn's statement of two decades ago in *Cambridge Ancient History*, VI, p. 399: "What first put the idea into his head is uncertain." Since the idea came out at Bactra, however, the cause is doubtless to be found amid the things that had been happening in Bactria-Sogdiana (though I do not suggest that he forgot completely what he had learned as a youth). During the winter of 329-28 at Bactra Alexander first clearly expressed his plan of "world conquest" (see below). Next summer he took the dramatic step of adding Asiatics to his army (Arrian, IV, 17, 3). A few months later he ordered that 30,000 native youths should be taught the Greek language and trained in the use of Macedonian weapons (Arrian, VII, 6, 1; Plutarch, 47, 3). Early the next year came the (political) marriage to Roxane (Arrian, IV, 19, 5). Here are revolutionary ideas for the empire, some of them already translated into reality. Why should not the Great King of the former Persian

empire now regularize his relation to the Hellenic world? His solution was to be deification and, remembering Philotas and kindred matters (see above), it was to include the Macedonians with the Greeks. 3. 324 B. C. Here Tarn shows clearly and conclusively that, on the return to Mesopotamia, Alexander's "request for deification . . . was a limited *political* measure for a purely political purpose, and nothing else" (p. 371). He is also persuasive that the request was "limited to the cities of the League of Corinth" and "did not (so far as is known) extend to the Greek cities of Asia Minor." A large part of Tarn's argument is that Alexander requested deification so that the decree affecting the exiles in Greece could be enforced without doing violence to the Covenant of the League. He says (p. 370) that "the Covenant bound Alexander the king but did not, and would not, bind Alexander the god, and he could therefore set it aside without losing self-respect. To us this may seem a quibble, but no one can say it was a quibble to him, or that his careful observance throughout life of the outer forms of religion meant that they were nothing to him." Since, however, Alexander "had all the power he wanted," why did he hit on deification to justify its use? "He had not the right to use it; and to be a god gave him a juridical standing in the cities which he could not otherwise have got." This seems to me well put. It is not known, however, that the request for deification came before the exiles decree, and in any case I wonder if Alexander was thinking primarily or exclusively of Greece. Would it not be better to say that he was thinking in broad terms of the inhabitants of the Greek cities of the League, "who were not even his subjects" (p. 372), wherever they might be—that he had in mind not only the exiles and other problems of Greece, but also more immediately the sort of question which the mutiny at Opis raised? That same question, in less serious form, may have been in his mind when he made the proposal originally at Bactra.

*Alexander's plans.*—Diodorus, XVIII, 4, 2-5, gives the supposed Memoranda found among Alexander's papers on his death; they involve grandiose schemes of construction, the conquest of the entire Mediterranean basin, the interchange of peoples between Europe and Asia, etc. Tarn's Appendix, which is not very different from his earlier article (as he himself states in the Preface), opens with the words (p. 378), "The question is whether these plans are Alexander's, or a late forgery." They are, as he says and as I have always said, fantastic and false, but he oversimplifies the issue on another page (p. 372), when he says that "before it is possible to talk of Alexander's plans for world-dominion, some one has got to refute my demonstration, based on evidence, that his supposed plans in that behalf are a late invention; this has never been done, and I greatly doubt if it can be." It does not necessarily follow, however, that, just because the Memoranda of Diodorus are false, Alexander never had plans for world-dominion. In Bactria, to take an important example, Alexander told Pharasmanes that he now had a "desire of conquering the Indians; after he had subdued them, he would possess the whole of Asia" (Arrian, IV, 15, 5-6). I realize that by "Asia" Alexander meant "the Persian empire, its regular meaning" (p. 398, n. 5). But as Tarn says in another connection



(I, p. 87), "in the far East the 'world,' like 'Asia,' only meant the Persian empire." We can never fully understand Alexander until we have decided this question. In Bactria Alexander reveals for the first time his ambition to conquer the world, the world, that is to say, that really mattered for him then. But success and a larger world brought other ideas, still Asia to be sure, but an Asia that extended to the very frontiers of western Europe. At the Hyphasis Alexander told his mutinous men, "From the Persian Gulf our expedition will sail round to Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles. From the Pillars all the interior of Libya will be ours, and so the whole of Asia" (Arrian, V, 26, 2). That in a nut shell is the argument for Alexander's hope of world-dominion, and obviously it has nothing to do with Diodorus' Memoranda. But in a previous Appendix Tarn has considered the speeches of Arrian, and concerning the one at the Hyphasis he says (p. 287), "The speech cannot be separated from Coenus' reply; the two speeches are meant to be a pair, and a similar pair is given by Curtius. But Coenus made no speech, for he was not there; he had been left behind on communications at the Acesines (Arrian, V, 21, 1), perhaps already a doomed man, and it was on the Acesines that he died soon after. This means that Alexander's speech is suspect from the start." Coenus, however, was not then a doomed man, for Alexander had left him behind, not on communications, but to move the food along. He was expected to follow and to collect more food, as we see a trifle later in Arrian (V, 21, 4), "Alexander advanced through the whole country as far as the Hydraotes, leaving garrisons in the most suitable places, in order that the troops with Craterus and Coenus might safely traverse the greater part of the country in their search for provisions." Coenus, obviously, joined Alexander and gave his speech,<sup>4</sup> as Arrian says he did; and on the return he died, not at the Acesines, however, but at the Hydaspes (Arrian, VI, 1, 1 and 2, 1), and as Arrian remarks was buried with less than customary magnificence.<sup>5</sup> One of the most wonderful things about Alexander was his capacity for development. He was able to outgrow the intellectual narrowness of his teacher Aristotle, as Tarn has brilliantly shown, and the final Appendix, I repeat, should be read;

"Since Tarn admits that the speech does at least "profess to be . . . 'the sort of things' which Alexander said"—and since in my first footnote I have demonstrated the incorrectness of another of his points—I shall not run through his arguments, some of which are valid, against parts of the speech; the part I have quoted is sound, for Africa was often included when speaking of the continent of Asia.

<sup>4</sup> Curtius, IX, 3, 20, in the sentence previous to Coenus' death, speaks of the return to the Acesines; but in the next sentence after his remarks on Coenus, he says the fleet had been built, as ordered, and was afloat in the river; this is the Hydaspes, as further references to Nicaea and Bucephala prove; in the remainder of the chapter, and in the first sentence of the next, they sail down the Hydaspes. The Royal Journal did not survive for the period leading up to Coenus' death. Alexander's shortage of money at this time is confirmed by Plutarch, *Eumenes*, 2, 2-3. (I have not remarked on occasional misprints—e.g., Mitylene and Mytilene, Thrapsacus—but it may help a reader to know that something has happened to the Index for I, p. 143, where some of the names, over a dozen, are referred to p. 142.)

moreover, familiar as Alexander was from early youth with his western neighbors and their strife with states across the Adriatic, he was also able to conceive of his physical world in terms larger than those of the Persian empire.

As one who has spent much of the past twenty years learning from Dr. Tarn, I would like to add my voice to that of others in sending across an Ocean, which Alexander may or may not have planned to see, heartiest congratulations and best wishes to one of the great of our world.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

---

JOHN S. CREAGHAN, S.J., and A. E. RAUBITSCHKE. Early Christian Epitaphs from Athens. Woodstock, Md., Theological Studies, 1947. Pp. v + 54; 10 pl. \$2.50.

This monograph, published with the aid of a grant from the Maryland Province of the Society of Jesus, is a reprint of the study as it was originally published in *Hesperia*, XVI (retaining the pagination of *Hesperia*), with the addition of a Foreword by Benjamin D. Meritt.

As Meritt points out, "the Christian community [of Athens] has left but few traces of activity during the first five centuries of its existence. The records of scholars, bishops, apologists, and martyrs who studied, worked, or died in Athens are incomplete and have been transmitted, for the most part, through secondary sources. The general character of these accounts gives importance to the few, and otherwise insignificant, original monuments of that period: the early Christian epitaphs."

Surveying the early Christian inscriptions of Athens, the authors present an account of the successive publications and studies of these texts, and provide a minute examination of vocabulary, formulae, abbreviations, symbols, spelling and pronunciation, guide lines, and shapes of the stones. A concordance of the publications of the early Christian inscriptions of Athens is provided, listing about 170 texts.

The authors re-publish twenty-three previously published early Christian epitaphs of Athens (Nos. I-XXIII) which have been in need of correction, and present for the first time most of the early Christian texts which were found during the excavations of the Agora (Nos. 1-34). The texts published and discussed in this study, they believe, belong approximately to the fifth century after Christ (p. 13). None of the texts bears a date.

Most of the previously published texts provide merely the names of the deceased. No. VI is the epitaph of Dionysios, *συντάκτρις*, a slave of the proconsul Ploutarchos who was governor of Greece probably in the fourth century. No. XI is a fragment of a dedication to St. Andrew. No. XV records a reader in a church. Nos. IX, XII, XIX, and XX invoke curses or impose fines on persons who may violate the tomb. No. XIX has hitherto been considered to be Christian, but the authors point out that the preserved text contains no trace of Christianity and that the letter forms belong to

the second or early third century after Christ. No. XX is the epitaph, probably of the early fifth century, of a Roman soldier, Flavius Majorinus, who belonged to the Herulian Corps.

Most of the new texts likewise provide only the names of the deceased. No. 5 is the epitaph of Andrew, a reader of the Church of St. Agathokleia; one of the oldest churches of Athens. No. 15 imposes a fine on any violator of the tomb.

The majority of the texts are written in the familiar language of such epitaphs. No. XIX may contain a reference to an *ἐντομὴς*, which appears to mean, specifically, a tomb that has been excavated or dug. No. 31 may contain the term *μητῶρον* used as the equivalent of *οἰκητήριον* or *οἶκος αἰώνιος*.

The Christian inscriptions of Greece had been, relatively, neglected, until the appearance in 1941 of the initial fascicule of the *Corpus der griech.-christl. Inschr. von Hellas*, which comprises about one-half of the texts of the Isthmos and Corinth. The work of Creaghan and Raubitschek supplies a useful collection of material for the further study of the Christian inscriptions of Greece. The authors are to be congratulated on the painstaking attention to epigraphic detail with which they have edited their texts. Their account of the previous publications of the early Christian inscriptions of Attica will be welcomed by scholars who in the future have occasion to deal with the subject.

A few supplementary observations may be offered. Abbreviations employed here are: *AAES*, III = *Publ. of an Amer. Arch. Exp. to Syria*: III, *Gr. and Lat. Inscr.*, by W. K. Prentice; *IGLSYR* = *Inscr. gr. et lat. de la Syrie*, by L. Jalabert and R. Mouterde; *PAES*, III, A and B = *Syria: Publ. of the Princeton Univ. Arch. Exp. to Syria*: III, *Gr. and Lat. Inscr.*, Sec. A, by E. Littmann, D. Magie Jr., and D. R. Stuart; Sec. B, by W. K. Prentice; *RIGCAM* = *Rec. des inscr. gr. chrét. d'Asie Min.*, fasc. I, by H. Grégoire.

On p. 13, discussing abbreviations and their possible use in dating the early Christian epitaphs of Athens, the authors write, "Among the few dated inscriptions of the fifth and early sixth centuries, mention may be made of an Attic text of ca. 410 A. D. . . ., of an inscription from Sardis dated in 459 A. D. . . ., of an epitaph from Corinth, convincingly dated in 514 A. D. . . ., and of a tombstone from Thessaly of ca. 540 A. D. . . ." This sentence requires amplification. It can hardly be read in what appears to be its literal sense, viz. that few inscriptions of the fifth and early sixth centuries of the Christian era are dated. The *RIGCAM*, fasc. I, contains six texts dated between ca. 424 and 535-6. The list of dated texts of Gerasa (published by C. B. Welles in *Gerasa*, ed. by C. H. Kraeling [New Haven, 1938]) enumerates twelve inscriptions dated between 440 and 535. The list of dated inscriptions in the Index of *PAES*, III, A shows twenty-five texts dated between 400 and 533. The Index of *PAES*, III, B shows ninety texts dated between 401 and 533/4. One might suppose that the authors meant "the few dated inscriptions of Greece" were it not for the text of Sardis which they mention (*RIGCAM*, 322 = *Sardis*, VII, 1, no. 18). One might suppose that they meant "the few dated epitaphs" were it not for this same inscription of Sardis, which is not an epitaph. Another inscription of Sardis, incidentally, is dated in 535 or 536 (VII, 1, no. 20). Perhaps the authors meant "the few dated inscriptions which contain

abbreviations," but even this is difficult to understand since a number of the dated Syrian inscriptions (plus, e. g., *Sardis*, VII, 1, no. 20) contain abbreviations of one kind or another.

On pp. 12-13, in connection with the lettering of the early Christian epitaphs of Athens, the reader will find it of interest to refer to the tables of epigraphic scripts in the inscriptions of Gerasa drawn up by Welles (*Gerasa*, pp. 358-367). It is also of interest to compare the three quite different scripts used in three mosaic inscriptions of Antioch, one dated A. D. 387, the second (undated) made about the same time, and the third dated 420/1-429 (*Antioch*, II, pp. 38-42; cf. another mosaic inscription of Antioch, *Antioch*, III, p. 84, no. 111).

An ambiguity exists on p. 12. Discussing the ligature of *omicron upsilon*, in which the fork of *upsilon* is set on top of *omicron*, the authors write that "its lack of occurrence among the pagan inscriptions may be significant." Whether this means that the ligature does not occur among the pagan inscriptions of Athens, the pagan inscriptions of Greece, or pagan inscriptions in general, is not clear. In any case the ligature is found as early as A. D. 69-96: M. Avionah, "Abbr. in Gr. Inscr.," *Q. D. A. P.*, IX (1940), Suppl., p. 119.

On p. 14, discussing the various ways in which the cross is represented on the Christian inscriptions of Attica and of Greece, the authors remark that the appearance of crosses in groups of three "may possibly have some relation to the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity." This is very plausible. It would be interesting to consider whether the group of three crosses may have been considered to be a representation of the *trisagion*; an inscription of Syria has crosses interspersed among the words of the formula in such a way that there appears to be a cross for each section of the *trisagion*: *PAES*, III, 1103 = *IGLSYR*, 482; cf. *AAES*, III, 6, with Prentice's commentary; *AAES*, III, 322 = *IGLSYR*, 289; *PAES*, III, 1164 = *IGLSYR*, 410; *AAES*, III, 34 = *IGLSYR*, 598.

No. VI. In commenting on the Ploutarchos who is honored in a Megarian inscription, the authors write that "he is called a descendant of proconsuls and prefects (*ἀπ' ἀνθυπάτων καὶ ὑπάρχων*)." The phrase quoted normally is used to indicate that the person so described is an ex-proconsul and an ex-prefect: P. Koch, *Die byz. Beamtentitel* (Diss., Jena, 1903), p. 67; *RIGCAM*, 247, with commentary; *AAES*, III, 305 = *IGLSYR*, 348; *PAES*, III, 1114 = *IGLSYR*, 502. There appears to be an ambiguity in the suggestion made as to the date of the Ploutarchos mentioned in No. VI. The authors note that "we know the names of four, possibly of five, proconsuls of Greece who held office during the last thirty years of the fourth century. . . . It may be that Ploutarchos should be added to this list." This would appear to mean that Ploutarchos is perhaps to be added to the list of proconsuls who held office during the last thirty years of the fourth century. However, in a footnote appended to the last sentence quoted, the authors add that "This observation is confirmed by L. Robert (*per ep.*) who dates Ploutarchos in the reign of Constans." At first sight this seems to mean that M. Robert confirms the observation that Ploutarchos is to be added to the list of proconsuls who held office during the last thirty years of the fourth century; but this of course cannot be true because M. Robert dates

Ploutarchos in the reign of Constans, A.D. 337-350. Apparently M. Robert's confirmation should be taken to apply merely to the fact that Ploutarchos is to be added to the list of the known proconsuls of Greece of the fourth century.

No. XI. The editors do not indicate, in their transcription, whether they consider that the first part of the inscription is missing, though they note that the stone is broken at the top. It is, however, evident that the beginning of the inscription has been lost. One may suggest that the text is to be restored, *mutatis mutandis*, somewhat after the fashion of the dedicatory inscription to St. Michael and St. Andrew at Aegiale, *A. J. A.*, VII (1891), p. 531 = *RIGCAM*, 211.

No. XVI. The second line of this fragment reads TONKYPIN, the second *nu* being incomplete. The editors write that "the uninscribed space at the left apparently indicates that we have the beginning of two lines, and the raised band at the right makes it clear that the inscription did not continue to the right. The same impression is gained from the peculiar spelling of Κύριον in the second line, obviously due to the engraver's desire to write the complete word in the available space." While this explanation of the form κύριον may be true in this instance, one must also take into account that this spelling represents the common disappearance of *omicron* from the endings of masculines terminating in -ιος and neuters terminating in -ιον, a phenomenon which reaches its final development in modern Greek. This begins in the third century of the Christian era and becomes frequent in inscriptions, papyri, and literary texts: S. B. Psaltes, *Gramm. der byz. Chroniken* (Göttingen, 1913), pp. 43-48. It may be suggested that in the first line of this fragment, ENEN is the end of a verb, and the next letters, KE, represent καί.

No. XIX. On ψαλίς meaning vault, see J. Sauvaget, *Alep* (Paris, 1941), p. 61, n. 160; H. Vincent and F.-M. Abel, *Jérusalem* (Paris, 1912-1926), II, p. 237 (quotation from Photius, II, 2); *AAES*, III 76 = *IGLSYR*, 531 (ψαλίδιον).

No. 14. While the proposed restoration, Κυμ[ητήριον] | Σχολ[αστικ] | οῦ, is very likely correct, consideration should also be given to the possibility that the letters KYM are the beginning of a proper name such as Κυμνίων, which occurs in an epitaph of Korykos (*MAMA*, III, 548), in which case *scholastikos* would be the title rather than a proper name.

No. 31. On μητᾶτον see also J. B. Bury, *The Imp. Admin. System in the Ninth Cent.* (London, 1911), p. 111; Const. Porphy., *De Cer.*, I, 37 (28) = I, p. 146, 10 ed. Vogt (not cited in Sophocles' *Lexicon*); an inscription of Ghour in Syria published by R. Mousterde, *Syria*, IX (1928), p. 167. The substitution of *au* for *η* is attested by *PAES*, III, 728.

Users of the book should consult the important observations on it made by J. and L. Robert in their "Bulletin épigraphique," *R. E. G.*, LXI (1948), p. 151, no. 61.

GLANVILLE DOWNEY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,  
DUMBARTON OAKS RESEARCH LIBRARY AND COLLECTION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. H. THIEL. *Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times*. Pp. ii + 456. Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company (N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Mij.), 1946. 25 guilders.

The author, in a brief, disarming preface, forestalls a great part of possible adverse criticism of this book by describing it as a "humble pioneers' work" intended to "prepare the way for historiography"—specifically, for a complete history of Roman sea-power under the Republic. He further points out that the book was written in 1942-44, while he was in constant danger from the Germans, who had already held him for a time as a hostage and had him discharged from his public functions. Finally, he tells us that the English is his own, supervised and corrected by his wife. All of these facts must naturally be taken into account in forming an opinion of the book.

Its contents are chiefly a detailed study of the strength and the rôle of the Roman navy in the Second Punic War (Chapter II) and in the Second and Third Macedonian Wars and the war with Antiochus (Chapter III). Chapter I is a lively discussion of "land-lubber" and "sea-dog" and a demonstration that in spite of their navies and naval victories, the Romans were by nature, and never ceased to be, land-lubbers. The fourth and final chapter is a separate essay on the appearance and disappearance of the boarding-bridge (*κόραξ*, *corvus*: Polybius, I, 22, 3-10) during the First Punic War. He calls attention to the puzzling fact that this device, in spite of its remarkable effectiveness in battle, was apparently used only at Mylae and Ecnomus and abandoned after 255 B. C. His convincing explanation is that the *corvus* was always a clumsy apparatus which made the quinquereme topheavy, and that when the Romans were compelled to rebuild their navy after their very heavy losses in the storms of 255 and 253 (Polybius, I, 37 and 39), they first abolished the *corvus* and then in 242 began building ships on an improved model which was more maneuverable and hence, while even less able to carry a *corvus*, made the use of one unnecessary.

The portions of the book dealing with the various wars all follow the same scheme: (1) discussion of the number of ships available to each of the two powers; (2) discussion of the personnel of the Roman navy; (3) discussion of the nature of the Roman command—legates, duumvirs, or (pro)praetors and (pro)consuls and their terms of office; (4) a detailed analysis, year by year, of all the events of the war in which the navy had a part; and (5) a general summary, with conclusions drawn from the preceding discussions. In the case of the Second Punic War this scheme is expanded by repeated discussions of the numbers of the opposing navies because the war was so long-drawn-out, with frequent losses and much building on both sides.

These chapters are on the whole extremely good. That they are not better is partly the fault of the nature of the evidence, partly of the circumstances under which the work was composed, and partly of the author's sometimes perhaps too exuberant delight in his theme. The language is a truly remarkable achievement; but the publishers

should none the less have done considerably more editorial work on it. The presence of occasional archaisms or colloquialisms, to be sure, and such failures of idiom as lead the author always to speak of "diverting" offensives and "surprising" attacks are not only forgivable but add a certain piquancy to the style. One feels, too, that the author has verve and humor; but on the other hand, the repetitiousness (note e.g. the long passage on p. 233 repeated verbatim from pp. 208-09), resulting no doubt from the necessity of piece-meal composition, and the overuse of "miserably," "utterly," "shameful," "sorely," "sadly," "infinitely," "perfectly," "alas," "dreadful," "yielded bitter fruit," and similar expressions make wearisome reading because of the impression which they leave of longwindedness and hyper-emotionalism. A more serious editorial oversight is the incompleteness of the index, which has, for example, no entries at all for "trireme," "quinquereme," "lembus," or other types of vessels mentioned in the text, and omits pp. 14 and 23 from the references under "Slaves." Systematic search would doubtless reveal other examples. The inconsistency which permits λέμβοι and lembi; πρίστεις and pristēs, *quadrireme* and *tetreres*, and the like to be used side by side leads to confusion when *naves tectae*, *naves constratae*, *cataphracts*, *naves apertae*, "armoured ships," and "open ships" all appear without explanation. Were the *tectae* armoured (and in what sense?) or merely decked? Or conversely, were the *apertae* "open" in the sense of being without decks or without armor?

These are, however, minor blemishes, though avoidable, and perhaps surprising in a book as costly as this one. They do not detract from the real value of the book. The author is master of the sources, both primary and secondary. In unravelling the contradictions or obscurities of the ancient authors, he shows patience, ingenuity, and penetration. He considers without prejudice the accounts of Livy's annalistic sources, and extracts from them at least probabilities. In dealing with the work of modern scholars, he is generous with praise, good-humored in disagreement, though the "hypercriticism" of some of them is his *bête noire*. His discussion of the *corvus* was mentioned above; and his demonstration on pp. 378-79 that Eumenes' naval assistance to the Romans in 168 was notably less than in the preceding three years—almost non-existent, in fact—seems to afford an interesting corroboration of Polybius' report (XXIX, 8, 5) of Eumenes' negotiations with Perseus, according to which Eumenes offered to withdraw from the war himself and secure Perseus a four-year truce with the Romans for a price of 500 talents. (Polybius' whole account of Eumenes' conduct at this period, however, makes it difficult to concur with Thiel in describing the Senate's subsequent attitude toward Eumenes as one of "seemingly quite unreasonable suspiciousness and resentment.") Thiel's comments (pp. 55-56) on the vital economic importance to the Romans of their naval supremacy during the war with Hannibal and (pp. 293-361) on the "strategy working at a distance" of the Roman navy in Asiatic waters in the Syrian War will suffice as further examples of stimulating observations on individual topics.

That there may be differences of opinion about certain features of the book goes without saying. One point which seems quite

unconvincing to this reviewer is the assumption, operative from the beginning, which is stated in so many words on p. 201 (and defended at length on pp. 267-68) that "it was always their [the Romans'] habit to begin a new war with the ships lying in the docks since the preceding one. . . ." So he asserts (p. 35, note 11) that the Roman navy in 218, at the outbreak of the Hannibalic war, consisted of ships built in 242, just before the end of the First Punic War, and argues (p. 264) that the fleets of the Syrian War (192-189 B. C.) and (pp. 267-68) the Third Macedonian (171-168 B. C.) and Third Punic Wars (149-146 B. C.) were composed of ships built in 214 and 208 during the Second Punic War. This appears to be all but impossible. Warships of ages ranging from 16 to 68 years must surely have been an extremely bad risk, especially when one recalls that Nicias in his letter to the Athenians (Thucydides, VII, 12, 3-5) says that his ships are becoming unseaworthy after only two years of service. The examples of famous individual ships, such as the flagships of Perseus and Philopomen, on which Thiel depends in part as evidence for the possibility of his thesis (pp. 251, note 263, and 267-68), in fact prove nothing about what would happen to whole fleets; and the evidence adduced by Kromayer is of much the same sort.<sup>1</sup> Besides the eighty-year-old flagship of Philopomen, which, as Thiel reminds us from Livy (XXXV, 26), fell to pieces at the first encounter, Kromayer's evidence consists of only two items. The first (Caesar, *Bell. Civ.*, II, 23, 3) states that in 48 B. C. the young Lucius Caesar had a squadron of ten vessels which . . . *ex praedonum bello subductis P. Attius reficiendas huius belli causa curaverat* and which were accordingly 19 years old. The second (*Bell. Alex.*, 13, 1) is the report that the Alexandrians, after the loss of their regular fleet (*Bell. Civ.*, III, 111, 3) resorted, among other measures, to refitting some old ships *in occultis regiae navalibus, quibus multis annis ad navigandum non erant usi*. Aside from the fact that *multis annis* is a very relative term, both of these citations plainly concern only small groups of ships (Kromayer, *loc. cit.*, p. 481 and notes 82-83, estimates the entire squadron which the Alexandrians raised by refitting the old ships and calling in all the vessels stationed in the mouths of the Nile *exigendi portorii causa* at about 44 ships, of which only 27 were quadriremes or quinqueremes) which were pressed into service to meet an emergency. The very fact that their age is emphasized seems to point to the abnormality of using ships as old as these. Moreover, Thiel contradicts himself on this point. On p. 17 he says: "If it had been a short time [between wars], there were still ships available, however neglected they might be; but if the interval had been long, the natural consequence was, that at the beginning of the new war . . . practically there did not exist a Roman navy at all!" and on p. 264, regarding the availability of ships built in 217-208 for service in 192, ". . . in the first place, very few Roman warships had perished during the second Punic and the second Macedonian war; secondly, it is true, no doubt, that a great number of Roman men of war had been continually on active service during both of them, but we must not forget that ships wear

<sup>1</sup> Thiel, p. 35, note 11; J. Kromayer, "Die Entwicklung d. röm. Flotte v. Seeräuberkrieg d. Pompeius bis z. Schlacht v. Actium," *Philologus*, LVI (N. F. X), 1897, p. 432 and note 17.



sooner away when they are lying in the dockyards in a neglected state (as used to be the case at Rome in times of peace) [italics mine] than while being on active service"; but on pp. 267-68, in arguing that no new ships were built during the Syrian War, he says, "Now then, though the Romans of the second century were very slack as far as the building of new ships was concerned, they certainly used to *repair* in a careful way the old vessels they had; and after all an old hulk can almost be transformed into a new ship, provided we do not take the notion of repairs in a too narrow sense . . ." and then goes on to beg the question in regard to the Syrian War by concluding, ". . . then [if new ships were actually built] the fault of Roman naval policy would not have lain in neglecting the launching of new ships, but in the fact that they didn't send more ships to Asia in 191 and 190, though besides the 50 new ships *numerous old ones would have been disposable for this purpose* [italics mine]." It appears much more probable to this reviewer that the Romans, however disinclined to nautical activity, nevertheless maintained as much of a fleet as they thought they needed by continual small-scale construction for replacements, than that they were able, in the face of that same indifference to their navy, to perform the feat of keeping seaworthy for periods of 20 years and more idle fleets of a hundred to two hundred vessels. If the ships were left at anchor in the warm waters of the Mediterranean, so favorable to the growth of marine life, it would have been a heart-breaking task for the maintenance crews to keep ahead of the barnacles, weeds, and ship-worms; and if they were hauled ashore, the hot, dry Italian summers would soon have had them gaping like lobster-pots. And how revolting to Roman *frugalitas* it would have been to make the necessary expenditures to maintain a useless fleet! Perhaps the Roman habit of destroying or giving away to allies whole fleets of ships surrendered by a conquered enemy—a habit to which Thiel calls attention several times, occasionally with some puzzlement (pp. 17 and note 38, 182 and note 522, 250, 309 and note 459, 370, and 411-12)—is to be explained as resulting from a determination on the part of the Romans not to burden themselves with the upkeep of surplus ships.

On the other hand, in the very incomplete state of our information about Roman maritime affairs, which Thiel rightly emphasizes, the building of ten or a dozen ships in one year or another is hardly likely to be reported to us; and there were plenty of occasions when such construction might have been necessary. There were the expeditions against the Illyrians in 229-28 and 220-219 and a whole series of minor activities listed by Thiel (pp. 415-431)—Cato's naval expedition to Spain in 195, campaigns against pirates in Liguria, Illyria, and Istria from 181 to 176, and the suppression of a revolt in Sardinia and Corsica in 177, besides which there may have been others not known to us.

It seems not improbable, too, that when a war threatened which might involve the need of ships, the rate of naval construction was quietly accelerated; but this leads to another point on which Thiel's views need clarification. He is convinced that Roman policy was imperialistic from very early times (on p. 422 he concedes that in 311 B. C. "scarcely one Roman statesman could think of an imperialistic policy of conquest outside Italy"); and he recurs to this

theme frequently, but without a consistent viewpoint. Sometimes it is "the Romans" who are to blame (pp. 133 and 386), sometimes "the senate," in spite of popular opposition, or "the Roman government" (pp. 100-3; 137-38; 153-54; 202, note 6; 222; and 277), sometimes a party within the Senate (Scipio, pp. 144-45), while he admits that the only object of the First Macedonian War was to prevent Philip from sending aid to Hannibal (p. 133). Nevertheless, he is puzzled over Roman lack of preparation for these aggressive wars (p. 386): "In my opinion it is certainly true that in most of the great wars waged by the Romans they themselves were the assailants . . . ; but it is very remarkable that notwithstanding this undeniable fact they often were not ready to wage a war they had deliberately provoked themselves." The question whether Roman policy in the third and second centuries B. C. was consciously directed toward imperialistic conquest is of course a much-debated one, and in the nature of things will probably never be permanently decided; but observation of modern states governed by majority rule ought to make this whole situation less of a mystery. Obviously, whole nations do not provoke or avoid wars, but the representatives of whichever body of opinion happens to be dominant at a given time. There is also some room for individual magistrates to act according to their own personal convictions and on their own initiative; and until the outbreak of war commits the nation irrevocably, there is always the possibility that majority support will swing from the party in power to the opposite point of view. Responsible magistrates will accordingly make whatever preparations are within their competence and seem to them necessary; but differences of opinion in the nation and even within the party will nearly always keep these measures within modest limits until the actual declaration of war makes drastic steps inevitable. So it was in the United States, both in popular opinion and in Congress, before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor; and so I believe it was in Rome.

A characteristic feature of the book is the author's penchant for lecturing everyone concerned with operations on how much better everything could have been done. Examples are common; one will suffice (pp. 85-86): "If Bomilcar with his 130 ships had thoroughly blockaded the Tarentine citadel . . . and had starved it into surrender, if in this way he had made the harbour useful for Hannibal, if thereupon he had destroyed Laevinus' squadron in the Greek waters and landed considerable Macedonian forces at Tarentum, perhaps the war might as yet have taken a favourable turn for Carthage. But Bomilcar was a born do-nothing." The Romans, Philip, Perseus, and Antiochus are all similarly and impartially chidden for their failures in taking advantage of their opportunities; but the author is particularly severe with the Carthaginians and convinced, it would seem, that because of their low morale, which he assumes as a fact, they practically let the war go by default. Actually, of course, we know nothing of the thousand and one factors on the Carthaginian side that must have influenced their war potential and their strategy and tactics—their sources of ship-timber, the state of the food supply and public health, relations with Syria, Egypt, the Libyans and Numidians, even the weather. There is every probability, for example, that apparent Punic inaction was the result of

delays or severe losses caused by storms of which we have no record. This lack of data therefore enjoins still more caution in dealing with the affairs of Rome's adversaries than with those of Rome.

Starr's book on the Roman navy under the Empire<sup>2</sup> appeared too late for Thiel to use. If it had been available to him, Starr's remarks (pp. 66-74) on the civil status of the crews would probably have caused him to modify his belief that slaves were commonly used. Naval service was of course *militia*, too, like service in any other branch of the armed forces, even though (as likewise at Athens) it was the branch in which the poorest citizens were enrolled. I cannot agree with Thiel that Polybius, VI, 19, 2-3 means that the proletarians furnished the *marines* for the navy, for the original reason for excluding them from the infantry (from which they continued to be excluded until the time of Marius) was their economic inability to provide themselves with arms and weapons. Hence they must have formed a part of the crew, precisely as the freedmen did. As for slaves, they were excluded from all *militia* in all periods except in times of desperate crisis. Then, as the sources all indicate, they were regularly purchased by the state and freed, thus becoming freedmen before enlistment, or set free after a brief period of service.

In spite of the foregoing objections and reservations, Thiel's work is still sound and valuable. Even at their most speculative his comments are stimulating; and without the aid of the inscriptions, coins, and papyri which are so useful to historians of Rome in later times, he has reconstituted as well as existing sources permit the strength and distribution, year by year, of the fleets of Rome and her allies and enemies, and has discussed with acumen the influence of naval, military, and internal factors on each other and on the general course of events. In doing so he has gone far toward correcting a common tendency to underestimate the rôle of naval activities in Roman affairs generally and especially in Rome's success in subduing the Mediterranean world. One awaits with interest the promised complete history of Roman sea-power in the time of the Republic.

ROBERT O. FINK.

KENYON COLLEGE.

---

DAG NORBERG. Beiträge zur spätlateinischen Syntax. Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri; Leipzig, Otto Harrassowitz; Haag, Martinus Nijhoff; Cambridge, W. Heffer & Sons, 1944. Pp. 136. Kr. 7. (*Arbeten utgivna med understöd av Vilhelm Ekman's universitetsfond*, Uppsala, 51.)

In these interesting and stimulating Beiträge Dr. Norberg has given us a worthy companion piece to his *Syntaktische Forschungen auf dem Gebiete des Spätlateins und des frühen Mittellateins*. In the eleven chapters which make up the volume, chapters only loosely connected by the common thread of syntactic interest, he continues his exploration of a hitherto little-worked field—the syntax of

<sup>2</sup> Chester G. Starr, Jr., *The Roman Imperial Navy* (Cornell University Press, 1941).

popular late Latin speech. His purpose in every chapter is to throw light either backward on classical Latin syntax or forward on Romance idioms by a most painstaking examination of the evidence of numerous late Latin texts, in comparison very often with legal or literary documents of Old French or Old Provençal.

In this book he shows the same qualities as in his earlier work: extreme carefulness, close reasoning, objectivity, a sense of history. To Norberg the Latin language is *one*—from its earliest beginnings (even in the Common Italic stage), to latest Latin and early Romance.

Of greatest interest to the classicist is chapter I ("Der sog. Akkusativ der Beziehung"). In this fascinating study, some twenty pages long, the author shows how evidence hitherto unnoted may illuminate one of the most vexed questions of Greek and Latin syntax. Among the syntactic uses of the accusative form none, according to Brugmann, has presented to scientific interpretation so much difficulty as that usually called the accusative of specification or, in Latin grammar, the Greek accusative. The origin and development of this usage goes back to linguistic prehistory. Moreover, in the later Indo-European languages it has no immediate analogue; and, as Brugmann says, "Der moderne Indogermane kann daher hier nur schwer die besondere Art des Kasus nachempfinden."

In the late Latin texts that Norberg has been exploring, however, we can actually observe how an accusative of specification could grow up, and thus can gain a firmer ground for judgment of its nature. In a brief review of this construction in Latin literature of the classical and early postclassical periods, Norberg draws the conclusion that only the object accusative with middle verbs of putting on and taking off clothes was original and popular. The occurrence of this accusative in the Iguvian Tables, VI b 49: *perca arsmatiam anouihimu* "virgam imperatoriam induimino (= induitor)" shows that it was Common Italic, and so guarantees the authentic character as a native Latin idiom of such examples as Plautus, *Epid.*, 223: *quid erat induta? an regillam induculam an mendiculam?*

The whole later development, which took place under Greek influence, was, according to Norberg, poetic and literary. But in the late Latin and early Romance folkspeech there was a tendency, quite independent of artificial poetic diction, to form anew an accusative of specification. This new evidence seems to lend support to the view of Brugmann that in the origination of such an accusative the so-called *σχήμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος* played a great rôle.

Brugmann's idea has been challenged, especially by R. Blümel, who in several essays in *Indogermanische Forschungen* developed at great length (one article alone runs to 96 pages!) an alternative theory of an "Akkusativ des bestrichenen Raums" in the Indo-European *Ursprache*. Within the compass of a review it would be out of place to give even a cursory account of the conflict among the embattled German philologists in which the Swedish scholar now intervenes with his folk-Latin phenomena. A brief survey, however, of some of the more striking usages which Norberg has culled may be of general interest.

In late Latin folkspeech, he reports, "epexegetic apposition" occurs rather often. His earliest example is cited from Chiron, whose Latinity is well known to be "vulgar." In Chiron, 386:

*defricabis eum manibus, totum corpus* we can still distinctly feel the epexegetic nature of the second object. Through the fact that the pause before the *Teilobjekt* disappeared, there followed however a revaluation and stereotyping of the construction. So probably in the following examples: Greg. Tur., *Franc.*, 10, 14 (p. 423, 17): *puerumque, qui praeibat cum lumine, nescioquid commotus pugno cervicem ferit*; Fred., *Chron.*, 4, 52 (p. 146, 25): *quem Bertharius . . . aevaginato gladio ad ostium cubiculi capo (= caput) truncavit.*

In late legal diction this usage is especially frequent. See, e.g., *Lex. Sal.*, 29, 1: *Si quis alterum* (instead of *alteri*) *manum vel pedem debilitaverit*; *Edict. Rothari*, 337 (p. 77, 1): *Si quis caballum alienum aurem aut oculum excusserit*; *Lex Alamann.* (*Mon. Germ. leg. sect.*, 1, 5), 57, 29 (p. 122, 7-9): *Si quis alium contra legem tunderit caput, liberum non volentem, cum 12 solidis conponat.*

The *Volkstümlichkeit* of the construction is shown by the fact that it appears again in Old French, *Aiol*, 10182:

*Quant Aiols (nom.) li cortois peut ses fieus encontrer,  
Plus de .vii. fois les baise les bouces et les nes.*<sup>1</sup>

From these and similar examples Norberg concludes that the use of a verb with two objects, one denoting a living being, the other a part of him, was common in late Latin and continued to live in Romance. He regards it as certain that it is from this double accusative that we must start in order to explain the construction of such an example as *Lex Alamann.*, 57, 55 (p. 126, 12): *Si autem interiora membra vulneratus fuerit*. Here a borrowing of the Greek accusative of poetic diction is hardly to be thought of. The language of these laws stands very close to popular speech and is quite free from poetic influence. Rather what we have here is a new use of the accusative, growing out of the retention in the passive of the second accusative in such a phrase as *vulnerare aliquem interiora membra* and having quite the same function in the sentence as the old accusative of specification.

This "popular" accusative, newly created in late Latin from the double accusative, had a most interesting development in several of the Romance languages. So in Old French, *Octavian*, 4992:

*Chascuns (nom. sing.) fu lies d'un lien  
Les mains et les pes molt forment.*

Here Norberg derives support from Schultz-Gora (a Provençal specialist) who declares that we must explain this instance by assuming an active expression *lier aucun* (acc.) *les mains et les pes*. Schultz-Gora, however, being apparently unfamiliar with Brugmann's theory, tries to separate this accusative of the part from the accusative of specification. Norberg maintains, rightly I think, that they cannot be separated.

<sup>1</sup> So the MS. As Norberg points out, Foerster in his text changes *les* to *lor*, but in his commentary he rightly retains the manuscript reading ("Hdsch. hätte ich nicht ändern sollen") and compares *Venus la Deesse*, 206 b: *si la baisa le pie*.

For the construction cf. Homer, *ρ*, 39: *κύσσε δέ μιν κεφαλὴν τε καὶ ἄμφω φάεα καλά*.

An illuminating example of this construction, cited both by Norberg and by Schultz-Gora, occurs in *F. Candie*, 10058:

*Veez lo la armé sor cel destrier gascon,  
Covert d'un blanc dyaspre, teste, col et crepon.*

Here, as Schultz-Gora remarks, *teste, col et crepon* represents "nichts weiter als eine Zerlegung des *destrier* (battle horse) in einzelne Teile, welche deshalb im Akkus. stehen, weil *destrier* diesen Kasus aufweist." But this conception, as Norberg retorts, assumes that in the active one could say *covrir cel destrier teste, col et crepon*, *destrier* serving as the object of the whole, *teste, col et crepon* as the object of the part. It is then perfectly natural that in the passive the accusative of the part remains unaltered: *uns destriers coverz* (nom.) *teste, col et crepon* (acc.). Norberg concludes, "Der erstarrte Teilakkusativ ist aber, was Schultz-Gora nicht beobachtet hat, mit einem Akkusativ der Beziehung identisch und kann gerade mit den Worten 'am Kopfe, Hals und Kreuz' übersetzt werden."

This usage seems to connect with a series of examples which Schultz-Gora has collected from Old Provençal, where we have similarly a substantive without the article standing in the accusative before a perfect participle, as in *cap ras*, *cap tondutz*, *testa tondutz*, *cap trencatz* "am Kopf geschoren," *cap corbs* "mit dem Kopfe gebeugt," *pe pelutz* "am Fusse behaart," etc. In these we have unquestionably a real accusative of specification, which Schultz-Gora is inclined to attribute to the influence of the great Roman poets. But Norberg points out acutely that we have in late Latin prose such constructions as *aliquem caput truncare* in Fredegarius and *aliquem caput tondere* in *Lex Alamann.*, 57, 29. From these, he believes, were easily formed the passive expressions *caput truncatus* and *caput tonsus* which lived on as *cap trencatz* and *cap tondutz*.

To complete the parallelism with the successive steps of the prehistoric development as Brugmann envisaged it, we find that Old Provençal also took the next step, in which the accusative of specification stands with an adjective, as in *boca durs* "hartmäulig," *coa ros* "am Schwanz rot," "Rotschwänzchen." So in a striking example in *La Vida de Sant Honorat* (Raymond Féraud, ed. A. L. Sardou, p. 130):

*Le donzell cavalca un destrier que fom boca durs*  
(*boca* acc., *durs* nom.).

To conclude his study, Norberg has found traces of the same popular re-creation in Old Italian. Imitation of Latin is hardly responsible for such an instance as Giuliani, *Delizie del volgar toscano*, I, 239: *gittate un quattrivello a me poverino, tutto storpiato le gambe*. Out of the double accusative *storpiare alcuno le gambe* grew the accusative of reference *storpiato le gambe*. This colloquial accusative of specification the mediaeval Italian poets took up and developed further under the influence of Latin poetry, as in *una donna lo cor cangiata* (*Poeti del primo secolo della lingua italiana*, I, 201, cf. perhaps Virg., *Aen.*, I, 658: *faciem mutatus et ora*) or in the lovely chiasmic arrangement Tasso, *Ger.*, 12, 23: *Vergine, bianca il bel volto, e le gote vermiglia*. Norberg thinks it less probable

that the poets would have taken this construction bodily out of classical Latin, had they not found a support for it in their own vernacular. A difficulty that stands in the way of a complete demonstration of his hypothesis is the fact that in dealing with the interesting examples which he has gathered from Old Provençal and Old French we have not an unambiguous accusative case but a *casus obliquus*, which, as Norberg himself concedes, may sometimes be better interpreted as the successor to a Latin dative. On the whole, however, our author seems to have made a good case for the possibility of the growth of an accusative of specification from the double accusative with active verbs. Blümel's statement: "Ableitung des Bereichsakkusativs aus dem Akkusativobjekt des Teils ist nicht möglich" (*I. F.*, XXXIII, p. 85) seems arbitrary and too sweeping.

In chapter II ("Die Vermischung aktivischer und passivischer Ausdrucksweise und der Gebrauch des Akkusativs als Subjektskasus") we learn that the frequent use of the accusative as subject is not due to the sheer barbarism of late Latin authors. Aside from cases where the accusative form is merely graphic (as in *pecuniam* for *pecunia*), this usage arises chiefly from a mixture of active and passive constructions. Such anacolutha occur occasionally even in the most classic authors.<sup>2</sup> Bold and harsh as the construction seems in *Itin. Anton. Placent.*, 9 (p. 165, 16 Geyer): *nam multos languores sanantur in ipsis locis ubi cadit ipse ros*, it becomes more tolerable when we realize that the passive construction *multi languores sanantur* and the active *multos languores sanat ipse ros* (cf. p. 166, 4: *est ibi fons aquam habens dulcissimam, quae . . . sanat multos languores*) were both at once present to the mind of the speaker.

Chapters III, IV, and V are entitled "Zum Gebrauch des Genitivs, Mass-, Zeit-, und Ortsbestimmungen statt eines Nominativs," and "Einige erstarrte nominale und pronominale Formen." From these studies of various confusions or contaminations one gains the impression that clear, logical thinking is not *volkssprachlich*. Of noteworthy interest, particularly to Romance philologists, is the discussion (pp. 56-60) of the origin of French *que* (relative and conjunction).

In chapter VI ("*Sibi solus, sibi decimus* u. dgl.") the author traces in intricate detail and with fascinating precision the steps by which such an expression as *sibi decimus* or *sibi tertius*, a *terminus technicus* of juridical language equivalent in meaning to "selbdritt," *αὐτὸς τρίτος*, etc., developed into Old French *soi disme, soi tierz*.<sup>3</sup> The whole chapter is an excellent specimen of Norberg's method of work. Of linguistic interest is the occurrence in these late Latin laws of dative forms *ti, si* (for *tibi, sibi*) formed by creative analogy in popular speech after *mi* (from *mihī*). *Mi, ti, si* still live in Rhaetia, Italy, and other parts of Romania.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See, e. g., Cic., *Tusc.*, 3, 16.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. his criticism (p. 65) of the current practice among Romance philologists of proceeding from the Old French form and assuming a Latin idiom to explain it. "Das einzig richtige Verfahren (says Norberg) dürfte hier wie sonst sein, zuerst die lateinische Konstruktion und dann die romanische Weiterentwicklung zu untersuchen."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. E. Kieckers, *Hist. latin. Grammatik*, II, 128. Kieckers, however, seems to be unaware of the existence of Latin forms *ti, si*, and apparently assumes only inter-Romanic creative analogy.

Chapter VII ("*Suprascriptus, praedictus, praesens* und andere Partizipia statt demonstrativer Pronomina") deals with an idiom peculiar to the language of chancery and official documents. Little noted hitherto on the part of grammarians and lexicographers, this special use has not only become established in the official style of modern languages but has also penetrated to the language of literature. The author's own *précis* of this chapter is worthy of quotation:

"Dieser Gebrauch der Partizipien, die 'obengenannt' bedeuten, lebte in der Kanzlei der Langobarden, der Merowinger, der Karolinger und in den späteren mittelalterlichen Kanzleien weiter und war ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der stereotypen Form, in welcher man amtliche Schreiben verfasste. Von der mittelalterlichen lateinischen Kanzleisprache wurden dann die neueren Sprachen stark beeinflusst, wenn man sie schriftlich zu fixieren suchte. Besonders bemerkenswert ist im Italienischen der Gebrauch von Partizipien wie *antescritto, predetto, prefato, sopraddetto, soprascritto*, die nicht nur im Kurialstil, sondern auch in der höheren Literatur vorkommen. Vgl. z. B. Dante *Parad.* 26 *Coila predetta conoscenza viva Tratto m'hanno del mar dell'amor torto*; *Vit. Nuov.* 29 *E compiuta n'avea questa soprascritta stanza*; 22 *secondo l'usanza della sopradetta cittade*; 34 *innanzi ch'io gli dessi il soprascritto sonetto.*"<sup>5</sup>

In chapter VIII ("Verbindungen von Präpositionen mit Adverbien und Präpositionen") Norberg discusses with a wealth of detail a phenomenon which appears in the preliterate period but attains increasing importance in late Latin. The earliest examples are for the most part pleonastic in character. Since *ab, in, de* were originally adverbs, the words *abhinc, ibi, ceterum*, etc. stand on the same level as pleonasm of the type *hinc ex proximo* (Plaut., *Men.*, 790), *ibi in ipso loco* (*Peregr. Aeth.*, 2, 2), which occur in Latin of all periods.

In late Latin, especially in sources which reflect popular speech, we find a multitude of new combinations, important for Romance, such as *ab ante, de post, in contra*, etc. In these, purely pleonastic strengthening plays no such rôle. The components have usually quite different meanings and the chief part in bringing them together is played by creative analogy. Regularly formed expressions such as *in occulto, in privato* lead to new formations like *in occulte, in private*. So perhaps on the analogy of *in commune* was formed the compound adverb *in simul*, which still lives on in Italian *insieme*, French *ensemble*. So *desuper*, itself formed on the analogy of the older *insuper*, gave rise to Old French *desor*; *de sursum*, which arose by analogy from *desuper* and is mentioned as a barbarism by Quintilian, is the source of French *dessus*; and *de subtus* of Italian *di sotto*, French *dessous*.

Eventually, as *de* gradually lost its separative force, becoming static in meaning, a tendency arose to use it as a kind of prefix to local adverbs of this sort. Thus *denante* (from *de in ante*) gives rise to Italian *dinanzi*; *de abante*, becoming *davante*, to Italian *davanti*. Then, as in *davante* the preposition *de* was no longer easily discernible, another *de* was prefixed, giving *de davante* (cf. French *de devant*). To these illustrations, cited among others by Norberg,

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Norberg's statement (p. 69 *ad fin.*): "Besonders steht es noch aus, klarzumachen, welche Rolle die mittellateinische Kanzleisprache für das Entstehen der romanischen Schriftsprachen spielte."



the reviewer would like to add the interesting Rumanian adverbial phrase *de dinainte* "from before" i. e. *de de-in-ab-ante!* This would seem to represent the apogee of the compound adverb.

Chapter IX ("Zur Geschichte der Partikel *-que*") brings together from many late Latin texts examples both of the leaving off of *-que* in compounds such as *quicum* (for *quicumque*), *quis*, *unusquis*, and *uter* (for *quisque*, *unusquisque*, and *uterque*) and of the pleonastic addition of *-que* especially to pronominal words. So arose such unclassical pronouns as *idemque*, *isque*, and even *suusque* and *tuusque*. Norberg explains both phenomena as due to the fact that the particle *-que*, which in general was foreign to popular speech, in the late period became stereotyped, and so also *statimque* and *iamque* for *statim* and *iam*. An important usage of this type is the occurrence, very common in the medieval period, of *tam—quamque* or *tam quamque et* instead of *et—et*. Cf. Paul. diac., *Hist. Lang.*, 6, 49 (p. 182, 4): *imagines tam Salvatoris quamque eius sanctae genetricis*.

In view of the numerous syntactical confusions treated by Norberg in earlier chapters, it hardly surprises the reader to find in chapter X ("Zum Gebrauch der korrespondierenden Partikeln") that late Latin authors frequently used *sive—sive* instead of *aut—aut*, *aut—aut* for *sive—sive* or for *utrum—an*, and even *utrum—an* for *aut—aut*. The most interesting usage cited in this chapter is the late and rare correspondence *vult—vult*, e. g. *Edict. Rothari*, 195 (p. 47, 12): *illa potestatem habeat de duas vias: vult ad parentis reverti, vult ad curtem regis se commendare*. Such examples show that the same forces which in the prehistoric period created the conjunction *vel* were still active in this late time.

The eleventh, and final chapter of the *Beiträge* ("Vermischtes zu den Negationen") deals mainly with various types of illogicality in the use of negatives, each of which is carefully analyzed and explained. In general it may be said that one explanation can cover most of these locutions—the fact that the mainspring of language is not the love of logic (dear as that is to schoolmasters) but, as Whitney says, "the desire of communication." This explains what Norberg calls "die volkstümliche Häufung der Negationen." So also it is the basis of the idiomatic use of a redundant negative in subordinate clauses dependent on a verb of negative meaning, as for instance *negare* in the following example (*Mon. Germ. poet.*, IV, p. 503):

Ter negavit Petrus,  
Christus ut non novetur.

This idiom is of course richly developed in the Romance languages, cf. Spanish *No puedo yo negar, señor D. Quijote, que no sea verdad* (*Don Quijote*, I, 49).

Dag Norberg works like an artist. His painstaking attention to apparently minute details till in the end he develops the whole linguistic picture in its living reality reminds one of the work of a painter such as Meissonier.

EDITH FRANCES CLAFLIN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

ERIK J. KNUDTZON. *Bakchiastexte und andere Papyri der Lunder Papyrussammlung* (PLundUnivBibl 4). Lund, Håkan Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1946. Pp. 139; 8 pls. 10 kr.

In *Bakchiastexte* Knudtzon has published as his doctoral dissertation fourteen papyri from the collection in the University of Lund. The documents are carefully transcribed and edited with a full commentary, indices, and eight photographs. Seven of the texts concern the priesthood of Bacchias, a village in the Fayûm. Knudtzon was particularly interested in this priesthood, and in Excursus 1. he has made a detailed study of its membership, attempting to identify the individual priests, many of whom have identical names, and to make a genealogical table of their family relationships. In Excursus 2. he has examined the evidence for the *εἰσπρατικόν* and has concluded that it was a tax imposed annually on the priests. The final section is a short history of Bacchias, with particular attention given to its cults and priesthood. A useful list of all the papyri which concern the village is included.

The temple documents from Bacchias published here are part of a find which appears to have come from the archives of the temple of Soknobraisis in that village. The find was divided into at least three separate groups. Four of these papyri were printed by A. Bataille in *Études de papyrologie*, IV (1938), pp. 197-204 (reprinted in 1939 as nos. 11-14 in *Les Papyrus Fouad I*), and in the same year eight more from the collection in Lund were published by K. Hanell in *Bulletin de la Société royale des Lettres de Lund*, 1937-1938, V (cited in Knudtzon's publication as PLundUnivBibl 3). After Hanell's publication, additional Bacchias texts were found in the Lund collection and are now published by Knudtzon in *Bakchiastexte*. This last group has further been reprinted without commentary in *Bulletin de la Société royale des Lettres de Lund*, 1945-1946, III. A third group of twelve is in the collection at Yale University and will appear in *Yale Classical Studies*, X. Knudtzon had at his disposal photographs of these unpublished papyri and made use of them in editing his texts and particularly in making his study of the members of the priesthood. It is by no means certain that more texts will not come to light in these three collections or elsewhere.

Before the appearance of these texts from the archives of the temple of Soknobraisis, little was known about the cults at Bacchias. The archaeological excavations of the site by Grenfell and Hunt in 1895-1896 revealed only one temple which stood in the center of the village, and in this temple were found two papyri which mentioned a crocodile god, Soknokonnis, and one naming the Dioskouroi. We now have texts which reveal not only that there was a temple of another crocodile god, Soknobraisis, but that several other Egyptian gods were also worshipped in Bacchias—Pnepheros, Isis, Boubastis, and Ammon. It is difficult to determine which god was the chief god of the village and whether, as Knudtzon thinks, there was actually only one temple building in the village, dedicated to Soknobraisis, to which shrines of other gods were attached. In examining the evidence, Knudtzon has purposely made little use of the unpublished Yale texts. Two of them (*P. Yale*, inv. nos. 363 and 902 + 906) are essential to a study of the relationship of the gods, their temples

and priesthoods. They are joint annual reports submitted to government officials by the priesthoods of the two temples (*ιερά*) of Soknokonnis and Soknobraisis. The two gods have an almost identical amount of temple furniture and almost the same number of priests. There is no indication that one god is inferior to the other. Knudtzon argues for one temple in which Soknobraisis was the chief god, first, on the basis of the archaeological evidence; second, because the priests of Soknobraisis refer to their temple as "the temple of the village," as if there were no other; and finally, because Soknobraisis appears so many more times in the texts than Soknokonnis. These arguments are not entirely convincing. One cannot exclude the possibility that there were other temples; the archaeological excavations were superficial and hasty. Nor should one attach too much importance to the phrase, "the temple of the village," in the opening formulae of several texts. Knudtzon himself points out that the priests often used inexact, neutral expressions, such as "Souchos" for "Soknobraisis." Although the majority of the texts in the group do concern Soknobraisis, there may well have been other archives kept by the priests of Soknokonnis.

The seventh of Knudtzon's texts (first century A.D.) shows that Isis and Boubastis had priests in Bacchias. Isis was worshipped in the temple of Soknobraisis, as we learn from the second text (188 A.D.), in which a priest of Isis appears at the end of a list of priests of Soknobraisis. Boubastis, like Isis, may have been worshipped in the same temple, but the evidence which Knudtzon produces is doubtful. He would change Hanell's reading of *πρεσβ(υτέρου)* *ι[ε]ρ[έ]ων* *ι[ε]ρ[ο]ῦ* *Σοκ[νο]β[υ]β[υ]βάσσεως* . . . in lines 4-5 of *P. Lund Univ. Bibl.*, 3, 2 (republished as his fifth text by Knudtzon) to *πρεσβ(υτέρου)* *ι[ε]ρ[έ]ων* *ι[ε]ρ[ο]ῦ* *[Βου]βάσσεως* . . . To judge from a photograph of this difficult text furnished me by Knudtzon, the reading is not certain. Nor can one be satisfied with his explanation that the new reading indicates not that there was a presbyter of the priests of a temple of Boubastis, but that the name of Boubastis was a mistake made in drawing up the document by a priest who was attached to the cult of Boubastis in the temple of Soknobraisis.

Pnepheros, a third crocodile god, appears from the evidence to be inferior in position to the other gods. He is known only from the inventories of the temple furniture of Soknobraisis and Soknokonnis, each of which contained a small gilded wooden shrine of Pnepheros (*P. Yale*, inv. nos. 363 and 902 + 906).

The ninth of Knudtzon's texts concerns linen sent for the burial of a sacred bull at Memphis by two priests at Bacchias. One of them is described as "priest of Souchos, of the temple in the village of Bacchias" and the other as "priest of the temple of Ammon in the same village." The first is no doubt correctly identified by Knudtzon as a priest of the temple of Soknobraisis. But one cannot accept so readily his conclusion from the second phrase that there was no real temple of Ammon, but that Ammon was worshipped in the temple of Soknobraisis.

Several of the longer texts in this publication are of particular interest. The first one is the latest of a series of documents dating from 171 to 198 A.D. which concerns the struggle of the priests in Bacchias to avoid forced labor on the dikes. They had appealed

repeatedly to various officials and attempted to gain exemption from this obligation. The appeal of 198 is directed to the highest administrative official, the prefect, and it reveals that at that time although the priests did claim exemption from working *in person* on the dikes, they were not freed entirely from responsibility for the liturgy; they paid a head tax of eight drachmae instead. They complain to the prefect that although they had paid this tax, they had been fined 120 drachmae for not performing the labor.

The second of the texts is also of considerable interest. It is a *γραφὴ ἱερέων καὶ χειρισμοῦ* from the temple of Soknobraisis, dated 188. The papyrus was in four fragments, one of which was published earlier by Hanell as *P. Lund Univ. Bibl.*, 3, 7. Knudtson has now recovered the complete text. This text and *P. Yale*, inv. nos. 902 + 906 are the only two completely preserved *γραφαὶ ἱερέων καὶ χειρισμοῦ*. The identification of the various musical instruments among the temple furniture in Knudtson's commentary is particularly interesting. *P. Yale*, inv. no. 363 (116), however, disproves his suggestion that the number of lampstands and the number of musical instruments corresponded to the number of priests. For in the Yale text there are many more priests than lampstands and musical instruments.

The seventh of Knudtson's texts is a complete, well-preserved copy of the same text as *P. Fouad*, inv. no. 189, which is fragmentary. It concerns the *ἐπιστατικὸν ἱερέων* paid by the priests of Bacchias during the reign of Augustus. Of particular interest is the concluding statement of the komogrammateus, that because of the decrease in the number of priests, the tax was to be borne by all the inhabitants of the village on a basis of mutual security. Knudtson seems to think it probable that the number of priests of Soknobraisis may have decreased at that time to about fifteen, the number found in the texts of 170-200 A. D. even though, as he himself points out, the total amount paid for the *ἐπιστατικὸν ἱερέων* is abnormally high for so few priests. *P. Yale*, inv. no. 363, however, reveals that in 116 Soknokonnis had at least twenty-two priests, and Soknobraisis may have had at least that many, for *P. Yale*, inv. nos. 902 + 906 shows that in 171 the priesthood of Soknobraisis was the larger of the two.

The eleventh text, of unknown origin, concerns the cult of the Dioskouroi. It gives an itemized account of expenses paid for a festival and lists the contributing members and the amount paid by each. The twelfth is a magic text of the fourth century A. D. No. 13 is a third century A. D. report of a theft from a granary made to the commanding officer of a watch station. The last of the texts is an account of private expenses (late third century).

Comparison with the photographs shows that Knudtson's reading of the papyri has been painstaking and exact. In only a few lines can the reviewer question the reading or suggest an improvement. In line 14 of the second text, *πρεσ(βύτερος)* is doubtful, but I can suggest nothing better. In line 16 of the same text thirty (λ) is read as the age of Peteuris, son of Mysthes, but almost certainly it is seventy (ο). This reading is of some interest. For Knudtson had concluded from a comparison of the list of priests in this text (188) and *P. Yale*, inv. nos. 902 + 906 (171) that within seventeen

years there had been a complete change in the membership of the priesthood. In the earlier Yale text there is a Peteuris, son of Mysthes, age fifty-four. If the correct reading in the Lund text is "seventy" and if one assumes a mistake of one year made in keeping the record of the priest's age at sometime during the seventeen years, Peteuris may be identified as the lone survivor of the earlier priesthood. In the fifth text Knudtzon reads line 11 as δὲ Ἐρ(μοφίλου) βασ(ιλικού) [γρ(αμματέως)?] ἐπαγο(μένων) ε. A better reading is perhaps δι' Ἐρ(μοφίλου) Με(σορή) ἐπαγ(ομένων) ε. The photograph published in the forthcoming *Yale Classical Studies*, X, will show that Knudtzon's list of priests of Soknobraisis for 170-171 A.D. (p. 83) drawn from *P. Yale*, inv. nos. 902 + 906 should be corrected. He gives Petechon as the father of Ammonios, the first priest. Probably Petis is better. The father of the seventh priest is Aines, not Aies. The name of the tenth priest and of his father is Petseiris, not Peteuris. Knudtzon has mistaken ἰδ[ελ]φός following the name of the thirteenth priest, Petsouchos, for A...phis, the name of his father. As a result, Petesouchos is not fitted into his proper place in the genealogical table as the brother of Orsenouphis but appears unattached in the upper right hand corner of the page. It is difficult to distinguish between  $\mu$  and  $\nu$ ,  $\alpha$  and  $\theta$  and sometimes  $\alpha$  and  $\delta$  in this Yale text. My readings of the priests' age differ in five cases from those given by Knudtzon on page 83: 29 (not 21), 33, 40, 41, 46, 54 (not 44), 64, 69, 21 (not 24), 69 (not 61), 61, 64, 69 (not 61), 22.

Knudtzon is to be congratulated on his excellent edition of these fourteen papyri. American readers will be impressed by the fact that this handsome, carefully printed publication was released by the press within about two months of the time it was sent in by the author.

ELIZABETH H. GILLIAM.

---

FRANCESCO ARNALDI. *Da Plauto a Terenzio, I: Plauto*. Napoli, Loffredo, 1946. Pp. vii + 323.

In a book long and often repetitious, but rich in interesting suggestions, the author gives us an introductory chapter (pp. 1-30) on Livius Andronicus, Naevius, Plautus' life, and the nature of New Comedy; this is followed by eleven chapters which present a detailed analysis of the twenty extant plays of Plautus; a short concluding chapter sums up the author's findings on the originality of the comic playwright. Five plays (*Menaechmi*, *Miles gloriosus*, *Aulularia*, *Pseudolus*, *Poenulus*) are deemed worthy of separate chapters; other comedies are grouped together because of their similarity (e.g., *Stichus*, *Epidicus*, *Persa*, *Curculio*) or because they are adapted from the same Greek poet (e.g., *Casina* and *Rudens*) or because they fall into the same chronological period (e.g., *Truculentus* and *Captivi*). Although Arnaldi admits that exact conclusions concerning chronology cannot be reached (p. 310), in general he discusses the plays in what he considers to be their approximate chronological order, from the earliest extant plays (*Menaechmi*, *Miles*, *Asinaria*) to the

*Truculentus* and the *Captivi* at the end of Plautus' career. His treatment of each play includes a consideration of plot, character, metrical effects, and humor, with numerous and often lengthy quotations from the text to illustrate and support his views. There are many comments scattered throughout the work both on Plautus' probable relation to his Greek models and on his originality, especially with regard to the musical elements in his plays; much space is devoted to the structural problems of several comedies (e. g., *Miles*, *Stichus*, *Poenulus*, *Casina*, *Pseudolus*) and to a rather thorough examination of the theories of Leo, Fraenkel, and Jachmann concerning these comedies.

Many of the author's conclusions follow conventional lines of Plautine criticism; others are hypothetical and less easy to accept. Arnaldi frequently points out where Plautus keeps the sentimental tone or the psychological truth of the original, and also where he coarsens, enlivens, and enriches his model by means of song and dance, farcical situation and grotesque characterization. A few of his generalizations may be cited: not only the *Cistellaria*, *Bacchides*, and *Stichus* are based upon Menandrian originals, but also the *Aulularia*, *Pseudolus*, and *Poenulus* (pp. 144 f., 151 f., 191). The *Aulularia* represents the acme of Plautus' imitation of Menander (p. 157); the *Pseudolus* is a masterpiece, a rhythmical and musical fantasy in the poet's creative vein, and the leading characters, Ballio and Pseudolus, reveal Plautus' natural and original manner at its best (pp. 29, 160, 311); the *Mercator* is the least Roman and most thoroughly Greek of all the plays (p. 240), but the *Cistellaria* is the most faithfully Menandrian (p. 109). The opening of the *Asinaria* is Greek in tone and seems rather Terentian, cf. pp. 46 f.: "nella 1<sup>a</sup> scena Demenete sembra fratello spirituale del Micione degli *Adelphoe*." Greek also in tone and faithful to the original are *Mil.* III, 1 (the Periplectomenus-scene), the beginning of the *Stichus*, and *Epid.* 648-654, a much discussed passage (pp. 90 f.). The richness and variety of Plautine lyric are excellently displayed in the *Rudens* (p. 236), and the *Mostellaria* is "uno dei capolavori della commedia nuova, della *palliata*, e di Plauto, poesia dell'inaspettato, del contraddittorio, delle labili apparenze" (p. 239); the *Truculentus* is the most vulgar of the comedies, conspicuous for its coarse realism, but rich in rhythmic and linguistic effects (pp. 286, 291 ff.); the *Captivi*, his most moral play, reveals Plautus yielding to new tendencies; it is a masterpiece of translation and marks the transition to Caecilius Statius (pp. 301 f., 311); although Plautus has increased the comic effect by giving greater importance to the parasite, he has not lost the spirit of the original (p. 307). There is much excellent characterization in Plautus, but it is usually found in minor characters, e. g., Alemena (*Amphitruo*), the sisters in the *Stichus*, Periphanes (*Epidicus*), Periplectomenus (*Miles*), not in the protagonists, who lack humanity and psychological depth but have a compensating quality: "una terza dimensione fatta di letizia comica o farsesca, di agilità ritmica e linguistica, di saporosa vivezza espressiva" (p. 143); there is one exception—Euclio, who dominates the *Aulularia* from beginning to end.

With all its good points, Arnaldi's book has a basic weakness which, in due fairness to his readers, this reviewer cannot ignore. Obviously Arnaldi is not writing for the general public; there is far

too much technical discussion on the chronology of the various plays, far too much emphasis in both text and footnotes on the various meters used by Plautus in his lyric songs, and far too much space devoted to an examination of the theories of Leo, Fraenkel, and Jachmann. But if, as seems self-evident, he is writing primarily for classical scholars, why no reference to any work on Plautus after Jachmann? Why is it that the scholarly work of America, England, Holland, and France is ignored? There is a serious flaw that weakens the value of his work and makes much of what he says unnecessary. Although Arnaldi accepts contamination for the *Miles* ("il più tipico, complesso e tanto nell' insieme che nei particolari, più sicuro esempio di contaminazione di tutto il teatro latino," p. 67), he disagrees with many of the conclusions of Leo, Fraenkel, and Jachmann on other plays, and again and again he criticizes the philological method of modern German scholars for their love of lost perfection, their philhellenism, their over-valuation of New Comedy (cf. p. 27), their lack of proportion (p. 145), their scholarship, too rational, too minute, too scientific (p. 222), their desire to restore the lost originals rather than to understand and evaluate the spirit and originality of Plautus (p. 207). But is this attitude new? Harsh, Beare, Enk, and others have been saying the same thing for more than a decade, and many of the theories of contamination which Arnaldi discusses at length and refutes have already been rejected by most modern critics. Even the *Miles* is by no means the certain example of contamination that Arnaldi believes (cf. Duckworth, *C. P.*, XXX [1935], pp. 228 ff.; Haywood, *A. J. P.*, LXV [1944], pp. 382 ff.).

Arnaldi seems correct in considering the *Cistellaria* the most Menandrian of Plautus' comedies, but he does not know the name of the Menandrian original and wrongly gives to the *lena* the name Syra (p. 112), an old conjecture to explain the reading of Festus, *in Syr.* or *in Syn.* That the original of the *Cistellaria* was Menander's *Synaristosae* was suggested by Prehn in 1916 and proved by Bischoff and Fraenkel in 1932 (cf. *C. P.*, XXXIII [1938], pp. 276 f.). Similarly, Arnaldi discusses the dreams in the *Mercator* and the *Rudens* and refers to the views of Marx, Leo, and Fraenkel (pp. 252 ff.), but ignores all later treatments, including that by Enk in his edition of the *Mercator*. Even more serious is Arnaldi's disregard of recent scholarly work on the chronology of the plays and the development of Plautus' art, especially that by Sedgwick, Hough, Enk, and Buck. Arnaldi dates the *Menaechmi* before 215 B. C. on the basis of lines 408 ff. (this is Enk's date also, but cf. Buck, *A Chronology of the Plays of Plautus*, pp. 72 f.). Thus the *Menaechmi* becomes the earliest extant play, and its technical perfection and elaborate use of metrical effects (pp. 32, 310) make it impossible for Arnaldi to draw any decisive conclusion about Plautus' development. If, with Sedgwick, Hough, Buck, and others, we place the *Menaechmi* later in the poet's career, a clear development can be seen in the use of song and dance, in an ever-increasing freedom in his treatment of the originals, and in the addition of humorous and Roman elements. The whole picture of Plautine dramaturgy is distorted if the *Menaechmi* is placed before the *Asinaria*, *Mercator*, *Miles*, and *Cistellaria*, plays which are undoubtedly early and more closely resemble their originals in form and spirit.

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXX, 3

WHOLE No. 279

## CALLISTHENES AND ALEXANDER.

The execution of Callisthenes by Alexander has had more effect on our tradition about the Macedonian conqueror than perhaps any other single episode. Alexander might kill as many of his stepmother's relations as he chose; he might murder his father's staunch general Parmenion, or Clitus who had saved his life at Granicus; he might even mutilate and torture Bessus, the Persian regicide; exterminate the Lyncestian princely line, and remove a dangerous rival from the scene in his cousin Amyntas, whose throne Philip had usurped. There would be no Macedonian or Persian writer able or willing to make an effective protest. But the Peripatetic school could not be expected to sit idly by when the nephew of Aristotle fell a victim to the royal displeasure. Had Alexander lived longer he might have found some way to silence this hostile tradition through intimidation or diplomacy; for Alexander was sensitive to Greek public opinion and intelligent in dealing with it. His own death, however, and the turbulent times that ensued unleashed a war of propaganda with Cassander courting Peripatetic support, while Olympias and the friends of a united empire encouraged an idealized treatment of Alexander.<sup>1</sup> Two extreme types emerged,

<sup>1</sup> The effect of Callisthenes' death on the Peripatetic school is clearly indicated by the following statement in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* (III, 21; see Felix Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B [Berlin, 1929], 124, T<sup>1</sup>9b):

Theophrastus, bewailing the death of his comrade Callisthenes . . . says Callisthenes fell in with a very powerful and fortunate man, but one who did not understand how to use his good fortune.

One product of this controversy was the mendacious account of Alex-



Alexander the Tyrant and Alexander the Civilizer; and both are still with us. Neither can be dismissed out of hand, but they do have in common the fact that each is a judgment after the event on Alexander the Conqueror, and that each suffers from oversimplification. It is here that Callisthenes is peculiarly important. He belongs to the earlier period, when Alexander was feeling his way; and more than anyone else he represents Alexander's own attempts to win the approval of the Greeks in the period before his military supremacy was assured. The rift between him and Alexander gives us a glimpse of a new royal policy in the making. Consequently the relations between the two men have broader implications than a mere clash of personalities. They can be understood, however, only by careful consideration of Callisthenes' early life and background.

When Alexander left for Asia in 334 B. C., Callisthenes' reputation was already established. This is the kernel of fact in the pompous remark attributed to Callisthenes, that he had gone along to make Alexander's reputation, not his own.<sup>2</sup> Callisthenes owed his education and literary interests as well as his connections with the Macedonian house to his kinsman, Aristotle.<sup>3</sup> Of his earlier life we know little, except that he was born in Olynthus;<sup>4</sup> but there is every reason to believe he was already under Aristotle's care when that philosopher left Athens for Assos in 348 or 347 at the invitation of Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus.<sup>5</sup> It would be hard to find an environment more instructive for the young scholar. He would have been dull indeed had his imagination not been stirred by a sojourn so near ancient Troy,

ander's death by means of a poison prepared by Aristotle at the instance of Antipater, and so deadly that it had to be transported in a horse's hoof! Cf. Diodorus Siculus, XVII, 118; Curtius Rufus, X, 10, 14-17; Justin, XII, 15; Plutarch, *Alex.*, 77; Arrian, *Anab.*, VII, 27.

<sup>2</sup> See Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 10, 2.

<sup>3</sup> See Suidas, s. v. Καλλισθένης Δημοσίμων. Plutarch says Callisthenes was related to Aristotle through his mother, Hero (*Alex.*, 55). Cf. Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II D (Berlin, 1930), p. 411; also see his "Callisthenes," No. 2, in *R.-E.*, X, col. 1675.

<sup>4</sup> Suidas, *loc. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> Cf. F. M. Cornford in *C. A. H.*, VI (1927), p. 334, and D. E. W. Wormell, "The Literary Tradition concerning Hermias of Atarneus," in *Yale Class. Stud.*, 1935, p. 58. Cornford begins Aristotle's visit to Assos after Plato's death in 347; Wormell puts it in 348.

and it is not surprising that Callisthenes became distinguished as a student of Homer. But Assos had more to offer. The genuineness of Plato's Sixth Letter has been triumphantly vindicated,<sup>6</sup> and we now know that two of Plato's pupils there, Erastus and Coriscus, were attempting to put their master's political ideas into practice.<sup>7</sup> Xenocrates, the future head of the Academy, had also gone to Assos with Aristotle, apparently disgusted, like the Stagirite, with the choice of Speusippus as successor to Plato.<sup>8</sup> Hermias, himself, was a useful man to know. He had probably studied at the Academy,<sup>9</sup> and was certainly a friend of learning. He also had a close connection with Philip of Macedon, and represented Macedonian interests in northwest Asia Minor during the period when Artaxerxes was busy reconquering Egypt.<sup>10</sup> Theopompus, jealous of Hermias' confidential standing with the Macedonian court, wrote a scandalous letter to Philip attacking the character of his rival.<sup>11</sup> After three years at Assos Aristotle left to teach for a brief interval in Mitylene on the island of Lesbos, and from there he was brought by Philip to tutor Alexander in 343, when Alexander would have been thirteen years old.<sup>12</sup> In Macedonia Callisthenes would

<sup>6</sup> See Wormell, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* Plato's letter was addressed to Hermias, Erastus, and Coriscus. He urges them to read his letter together at frequent intervals and to treat it as their "covenant and binding law"—as Wormell translates *συνθήκη καὶ νόμος κύριος*.

<sup>8</sup> See Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 334. Wormell believes Callisthenes also met Theophrastus at Assos (*op. cit.*, p. 75). Theophrastus is called a "companion" of his by Cicero (*Tusc.*, III, 21).

<sup>9</sup> Wormell, *op. cit.*, p. 59, discusses the evidence, which consists of Plato's remark that he had not yet met Hermias (*Epist.* VI, 322e) and of Strabo's statement that Hermias was Plato's student (XIII, 1, 57). Wormell favors the view that Hermias visited the Academy during Plato's absence.

<sup>10</sup> See Wormell, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

<sup>11</sup> All that is certain is that Theopompus wrote it before the death of Philip, in 336. Jacoby had already suggested that it might have been written while Hermias still lived (*F. Gr. H.*, II B, 115, F 250 for the text; II D, p. 390 for the commentary). Wormell has a convincing argument explaining Theopompus' hatred of Hermias in terms of local Chian politics (*op. cit.*, pp. 67-71), and he comes to the conclusion that the letter must have been written between 343 and 341.

<sup>12</sup> See Cornford in *C. A. H.*, VI, p. 334; Wormell, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

probably have come to know the young Alexander as a fellow student,<sup>13</sup> though it is probable that he was somewhat Alexander's senior.

It was during this period, perhaps in 341, that Aristotle and Callisthenes were shocked to hear of the arrest and execution of Hermias of Atarneus by King Artaxerxes, assisted by the treachery of Hermias' guest friend, the notorious Mentor of Rhodes.<sup>14</sup> D. E. W. Wormell, building on the work of Jaeger and Wilamowitz, has come very near proving that Aristotle held a memorial service for Hermias, and that Callisthenes' encomium of Hermias was written for that occasion.<sup>15</sup> He also shows how Callisthenes' encomium incidentally refuted the calumnies of Theopompus.<sup>16</sup> So far as we know, this was Callisthenes' first literary effort.

It was also Aristotle who directed Callisthenes' interests towards history, or rather antiquarianism. A Delphic decree (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup>, 275) to be dated somewhere between 334 and 331 B. C. gives directions for setting up a register of the winners in the Pythian Games, and also orders honors to be given Aristotle and Callisthenes, clearly for their work on the list of victors.

<sup>13</sup> This seems likely, but the only ancient author who says definitely that Callisthenes and Alexander were fellow students is Justin (XII, 6, 17), not a very satisfactory source. But it is unlikely that Callisthenes can ever have been Alexander's teacher, as some ancient writers suggest (e. g. [Dio Chrys.], *Or.* LXIV, 20; II, 153, 22, v. Arnim, found in *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, T 11a; and Seneca, *Suas.*, I, 5 found *ibid.*, T 13). Probably this is to be explained as part of the anti-Alexander propaganda. It would be even worse for him to have murdered his teacher than his fellow student.

<sup>14</sup> See Wormell, *op. cit.*, p. 58 and n. 2. Diodorus Siculus tells us (XVI, 52, 5) that Mentor not only deceived Hermias, but that afterwards he beguiled Hermias' subordinates by a lying message sealed with Hermias' ring.

<sup>15</sup> See Wormell, *op. cit.*, pp. 61; 76 f. He rejects Jacoby's suggestion that the encomium was written in answer to Demosthenes (*F. Gr. H.*, II D, p. 416). Demosthenes, unlike Aristotle and Callisthenes, was delighted at the news of Hermias' fall (Wormell, *op. cit.*, p. 58, where Demosthenes, *Phil.*, IV, 31-32 is quoted). Nor did Hermias' death prevent Theopompus from launching another violent attack on his memory. Jacoby (see *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 115, F 291 for the text, and II D, p. 358 for the commentary) dates this in 341, the very year of the tragedy. Wormell prefers a later date, ca. 324 (*op. cit.*, p. 67 and n. 17).

<sup>16</sup> Wormell, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

One of the undisputed facts about Callisthenes is that he did write an account of the Phocian (or Sacred) War.<sup>17</sup> Such an account would be certain to interest Philip, and may have been written with a view to royal patronage, for it was the Phocian War that had brought about Philip's intervention in Greek affairs.

But Callisthenes had also written a general history of a longer period. In Diodorus Siculus we read: <sup>18</sup>

Callisthenes the historian began his history . . . with the year peace was made between Artaxerxes and the Greeks (i. e. 387/6 B. C.). He wrote ten books covering a period of thirty years, and he ended his work with the seizing of the Temple of Delphi by Philomelus the Phocian.

This history, the *Hellenica*, made Callisthenes' reputation, but he had also written other treatises before he joined Alexander. The number of these, their titles, and the fragments of Callisthenes that should be assigned to each have been differently estimated by the two editors of the fragments of the Greek historians, Müller and Jacoby.<sup>19</sup> For our purposes it will be sufficient to discuss a few of the fragments with a view to characterizing Callisthenes' interests in general, without concerning ourselves with the provenience of each passage.

There is a special interest in his references to natural science, both because of Callisthenes' Aristotelian background and because of Alexander's own predilections. We are particularly fortunate in having testimony from three different authors for Callisthenes' views on the causes of the annual Nile flood.<sup>20</sup> This exasperating question had been tormenting the Greeks for generations. Even Herodotus presents four different theories on the subject,<sup>21</sup> giving his own support to the idea that each year

<sup>17</sup> See Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, T 25 from Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, V, 12, 2.

<sup>18</sup> Diodorus' Sic., XIV, 117, 8.

<sup>19</sup> The fragments collected by C. Müller, with a Latin translation, added to Dübner's ed. of Arrian (Paris, 1846), with title *Scriptores Rerum Alexandri Magni*; Callisthenes appearing on pp. 1 ff. of this supplement. The Alexander historians are found in F. Jacoby's *F. Gr. H.*, II B (Berlin, 1929), with Callisthenes' fragments on pp. 631 ff., and the commentary in II D (Berlin, 1930). Callisthenes is No. 124 in Jacoby.

<sup>20</sup> For the texts see Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, F 12a, b, c.

<sup>21</sup> See Herodotus, II, 20-25; see also W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Com-*

the Etesian winds blow the sun back from the coast, thus drying up the sources of the Nile. Then in June the winds shift, permitting the return of the sun, and allowing the parched upper reaches of the Nile once more to flow abundantly. Callisthenes' explanation is much more sophisticated, and illustrates the scientific advance since Herodotus' day. Callisthenes holds that the flood proceeds from the heavy Ethiopian rains, and he also explains this precipitation in terms of moisture-laden clouds forced to discharge their cargo upon reaching the Ethiopian mountains.<sup>22</sup> The idea that clouds shed water when forced to rise by formidable mountains is a standard one in our period, and was used to explain why the southern slopes of the Elburz Mountains were barren, while the northern slopes were covered with lush vegetation.<sup>23</sup>

Callisthenes' explanation was not the only one current at the time, if we are to believe Arrian. For Arrian tells us that Alexander's expedition disproved the view that the Indus River was the source of the Nile!<sup>24</sup> By a peculiarly malevolent circumstance not only was Callisthenes deprived of all credit for his excellent deductions about the Nile, but a later expedition which proved his general theory was also discredited, and the riddle of the Nile had to be solved over again in the nineteenth century. It is probable that a Ptolemaic expedition lay behind the *De inundatione Nili* falsely attributed to Aristotle.<sup>25</sup> The agreement between its results and the well-known views of Callis-

*mentary on Herodotus* (2 vols., Oxford, 1912), I, pp. 169 f., for an excellent discussion of the passage.

<sup>22</sup> See Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, F 12a, c.

<sup>23</sup> See Kiessling's article, "Hyrkania," *R.-E.*, IX, col. 455; see also Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXI, 43.

<sup>24</sup> Arrian, *Anab.*, VI, 1, 2.

<sup>25</sup> Jacoby argues at some length to show that this work, the *De inundatione Nili*, was not the work of Aristotle, but that it incorporates the results of an actual expedition, probably under the Ptolemies (see "Kallisthenes," No. 2, *R.-E.*, X, cols. 1688-1689). He also points out that Callisthenes' account need not depend on the results of an expedition sent by Alexander to explore the Nile, because Callisthenes' explanation was one of those already suggested before Alexander's day (see *F. Gr. H.*, II D, p. 420 *init.*). Tarn, however, evidently believes Aristotle did write the *De inundatione Nili*, for he says that Alexander probably sent no expedition up the Nile because Aristotle already knew the cause of the annual inundation (see *C. A. H.*, VI, pp. 378-379).

thenes apparently led some blundering rhetorician to concoct the story that Callisthenes and Alexander had penetrated the Ethiopian Mountains.<sup>26</sup> This was such a manifest absurdity that it led to disbelief both in Callisthenes' theory and in the actual autopsy.

Seneca has preserved Callisthenes' account of another natural phenomenon, the overwhelming of two Achæan cities by the sea.<sup>27</sup> This event apparently took place in the year 373/2 B. C., and the cities remained thenceforth buried beneath the Gulf of Corinth. In commenting on the catastrophe Callisthenes evidently developed a fairly elaborate theory on the causes of earthquakes. The theory is ingenious, given the premises of fourth century science, and it has been compared with Aristotle's own views.<sup>28</sup> However, Callisthenes' attempt to relate this calamity to the appearance of a fiery comet, and also his use of the incident to justify Homer's epithet for Poseidon as the "Earth Shaker," strike us as bizarre; but ancient taste was not offended. The philosophical bent of the Greek scientist frequently led him to an arbitrary grouping of unrelated data. So far as the poets are concerned, especially Homer, there was always a tendency to explain their statements as embodying scientific truths, in a way that suggests the ingenuities of some nineteenth century biblical scholars.<sup>29</sup>

The fragments also reveal Callisthenes as a man of wide antiquarian interests. He takes pride in telling us the name of the messenger who warned Agesilaus that Epaminondas was planning a surprise attack;<sup>30</sup> he discusses the exact size of the Spartan regiments at Tegyra;<sup>31</sup> and he tells us of the mainte-

<sup>26</sup> For this statement see Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, F 12a.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, F 19.

<sup>28</sup> Jacoby (*ibid.*, II D, p. 422) cites Will (*Kallisthenes' Hellenika* [diss. Würzburg, 1912], pp. 102 ff.) on this subject. The work is not accessible to me.

<sup>29</sup> E. g. Strabo, following Posidonius, gives Callisthenes' views on the overflow of the Nile. He goes on to say that Callisthenes got his information from Aristotle, Aristotle from Thrasyalces of Thasos, Thrasyalces from someone else, and that someone from Homer (XVII, 1, 5). All this because Homer refers to the Nile as "Zeus-sent" (*Od.*, IV, 477)!

<sup>30</sup> See *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, F 26.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, F 18.

nance voted Aristides' grand-daughter by the Athenian people.<sup>32</sup> He also explains how a river got its unusual name;<sup>33</sup> and that the Delphians used a *Beta* where other Greeks used a *Pi*.<sup>34</sup> He also passes along a wordy little anecdote about Spartans besieged by Arcadians.<sup>35</sup> Little bits of information of this kind fascinated Callisthenes. He showed a special interest in omens,<sup>36</sup> and he is well posted on details about Greek oracles.<sup>37</sup> His use of epic poetry to determine the month and day of the Fall of Troy<sup>38</sup> typifies the attitude of his own time. It does not distinguish him as unusually credulous.

That Callisthenes was pleased with Alexander's invitation may be taken for granted. In one way or another he had been cultivating his Macedonian connections for years. But he is unlikely to have stood in any great personal awe of Alexander, whom he had known as a fellow student at Mieza. Alexander's patronage was valuable, but his personal reputation was still overshadowed by that of Philip. Alexander's successes so far had been local, and there was no reason in 334 B. C. why Callisthenes should have any inkling of the great days ahead. Agesilaus, too, had gone out to Asia as a new Agamemnon against a new Troy, only to return later to face a Greek revolt instigated by Persian gold. Alexander had no surplus in his treasury;<sup>39</sup> he had no fleet except that of his lukewarm Greek allies; and he was up against a Persian king with capable Greek advisers and a purse long enough to buy all the mercenaries he needed in the Greek market. But Callisthenes did have two good reasons for accompanying him, one personal and the other patriotic. He had something of Aristotle's universal curiosity. Here was an opportunity to supplement his study of Homer and the other

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, F 48.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, F 49.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, F 40.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, F 13.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, F 20; 21; 22a; 23, 24. He also reported prophetic dreams, see F 27.

<sup>37</sup> See *ibid.*, F 11; 14a, b; 49. Callisthenes' special interest in oracles was pointed out by C. Müller, *Scriptores Rerum Alexandri Magni* (Paris, 1846), p. 8.

<sup>38</sup> See Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, F 10a, b.

<sup>39</sup> Onesicritus goes so far as to say Alexander was heavily in debt. See Plutarch, *Alex.*, 45.

poets on the names of strange peoples and places,<sup>40</sup> and also to obtain information on natural science.<sup>41</sup> The other reason concerned his native Olynthus, destroyed by Philip. Might not Callisthenes hope to do for Olynthus what Aristotle had done for Stagira?<sup>42</sup>

The other Greeks who joined Alexander were probably just as unmindful of the fact that they stood on the brink of a new era. It was not until after Gaugamela, at the very earliest, that there would have been much sympathy with Aristoxenus' view that the odor of Alexander was unlike that of other men.<sup>43</sup> But we would very much like to know more about Alexander's behavior towards the Greek men of letters as well as their day-by-day relations with one another and with the high ranking Macedonians. It is doubtful whether Alexander had much leisure time during the early phases of the campaign, while Memnon still lived, or even while Darius was still able to field an army. But the king did have an extraordinary capacity for organizing the work of others and getting the most out of his subordinates. He was able to keep the reins in his own hands by means of written reports made to the royal Chancellery.<sup>44</sup> Greek opinion

<sup>40</sup> We are told that Alexander made use of Callisthenes and other scholars to correct the text of the *Iliad* on the basis of local information about peoples and places in Asia Minor. See Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, T 10, from Strabo, XIII, 1, 27.

<sup>41</sup> We hear of data sent by Callisthenes to Aristotle from Babylon. *Ibid.*, T 3.

<sup>42</sup> See Plutarch, *Alex.*, 53. Jacoby argues against this on the ground that the story about Callisthenes and Olynthus is merely a doublet for that of Aristotle and Stagira ("Kallisthenes," No. 2, *R.-E.*, X, col. 1676. See also Plutarch, *Alex.*, 7). But it would have been surprising had Callisthenes *not* been concerned about Olynthus. Hieronymus of Cardia, another court historian, was shocked at the destruction of his native city, and the famous Eumenes tried earlier to influence Alexander in favor of Cardia. See my "Hieronymus of Cardia," *A. H. R.*, LII (1947), pp. 690-691. I cannot subscribe to Jacoby's view that Callisthenes was moved by strong Pan-hellenic feeling, perhaps influenced by Isocrates ("Kallisthenes," No. 2, *R.-E.*, X, cols. 1694-1695). He offers no evidence to support the assertion that Pan-hellenic feeling was stronger among the lesser Greek states.

<sup>43</sup> See Plutarch, *Alex.*, 4. Plutarch goes on quite seriously to attempt a scientific explanation of Alexander's "very sweet smell."

<sup>44</sup> For the work of the Chancellery, see Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Munich, 1926), I, pp. 42 ff.; and for



was so important that there can be small doubt that Alexander went over Callisthenes' work before each installment was sent back to a waiting world.<sup>45</sup> The Greek literati must have made an incongruous group in Alexander's camp, and were probably regarded by the Macedonians with a contempt that was fully reciprocated. If we may judge by the remaining fragments of Ptolemy, there was scant interest in the cultural amenities on the part of the average Macedonian nobleman.<sup>46</sup> But in the earlier stages they too, like Alexander, would have had little opportunity to make their prejudices known to the Greeks.

As time went on, and Alexander became more sure of himself, purely military matters did not occupy quite so much of his time. For relief he called more and more on the resources of his Greek literary entourage. In his student days he had undeniably absorbed a taste for Greek letters which must have annoyed some of his Macedonian followers. It is in this spirit that we should appreciate the anecdotes told about Alexander—of his typically Greek interrogation of the Indian wise men;<sup>47</sup> of his letter to Aristotle complaining that in publishing his philosophical works he had deprived his students of their monopoly of learning;<sup>48</sup> of his capping verses with Callisthenes.<sup>49</sup> The point is not that these and similar anecdotes may all have been spurious, but that Alexander was the kind of person about whom they were told.

But the restless spirit of Alexander was no more content with the society of cultivated Greeks than with that of his fellow Macedonians. There could be no genuine exchange of ideas

the requirement of written reports, see also Hugo Bretzl, *Botanische Forschungen des Alexanderruges* (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 198-199.

<sup>45</sup> Jacoby is surely right in maintaining that Callisthenes' work was sent back in installments ("Kallisthenes," No. 2, *R.-E.*, X, col. 1687).

<sup>46</sup> It is possible of course that the recovery of further fragments of Ptolemy's work might change this impression. An echo of the Macedonian feeling reaches us in Curtius Rufus' theatrical account of Philotas, when that haughty nobleman, on trial for his life, finds it necessary to defend himself also for preferring Greek ways to those of his native Macedon. See Curtius Rufus, VI, 10, 23.

<sup>47</sup> See U. Wilcken, "Alexander der Grosse und die indischen Gymnosophisten," *Berl. Sitzungsab.*, 1923, pp. 150-183.

<sup>48</sup> See Plutarch, *Alex.*, 7.

<sup>49</sup> Plutarch gives several instances (*ibid.*, 53-54).

between Alexander and his Greek dependents. Perhaps it was this that drove him into combining the two groups, playing on their mutual antagonisms.<sup>50</sup> The atmosphere on such occasions must have been stifling. Greek literary men were reduced to intellectual fawning, vying with one another in winning Alexander's approval, while the Macedonians would sit in gloomy silence, jealous of Alexander's Greek friends and suspicious of their glibness. The wine which circulated freely at such gatherings was sometimes all that was needed to bring hidden jealousies to the surface, or to reveal the barbarian always lurking behind the mask of Alexander the Civilizer.

Before discussing these episodes a word will be necessary about the quality of our sources. There is very little doubt that Arrian has written the most reliable account of Alexander which we still possess,<sup>51</sup> while the so-called *vulgate*, underlying Diodorus Siculus, Justin, and Curtius Rufus, is definitely inferior.<sup>52</sup> Plutarch occupies a somewhat medial position, for almost everything was grist for his mill. He used sources that were excellent and others that were unspeakably poor.<sup>53</sup> Now the value of Arrian depends on his statement that he used chiefly Ptolemy and Aristobulus.<sup>54</sup> Both men accompanied Alexander, and

<sup>50</sup> The question of rivalry between individuals and groups in Alexander's expedition, and the part played by the king in encouraging it, deserves separate treatment. Here it may be sufficient to refer to the feud between Eumenes and Hephaestion. See Arrian, *Anab.*, VII, 14, 9, but especially see Plutarch, *Eum.*, 2.

<sup>51</sup> See W. W. Tarn in *C. A. H.*, VI, p. 352, note.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* See also Laistner's review of *Alexander the Great: The Meeting of East and West in World Government and Brotherhood* (by Charles A. Robinson, Jr. [New York, 1947]), in the *A. H. R.*, LIII (1948), p. 311. Georges Radet frequently stresses the importance of the Clitarchan authors (i.e. the *vulgate*). See his *Alexandre le Grand* (Paris, 1931), pp. 295; 338.

<sup>53</sup> See J. E. Powell's "The Sources of Plutarch's *Alexander*," *J. H. S.*, LIX (1939), pp. 229-240. Cf. U. Wilcken, speaking of the Clitus episode, where he says (*Alexander the Great*, transl. by G. C. Richards [New York, 1932], p. 166):

"Probably the most trustworthy account is that of Plutarch, which seems to go back to some good and ancient authority in which the facts were plainly stated."

<sup>54</sup> Arrian says that when Ptolemy and Aristobulus disagree, he prefers Ptolemy, because it would be dishonorable for a king to tell lies (*Arrian, Anab.*, I, introduct.).

Ptolemy at least enjoyed his confidence.<sup>55</sup> But while Ptolemy is an excellent source on military matters, and on the general chronology, he is not critical of Alexander, and he is not above altering the facts where he conceived it to be to his interest to do so.<sup>56</sup> Alexander was buried in Egypt, and his cult was directly connected with Ptolemy's claims to the throne.<sup>57</sup> Consequently Ptolemy is not interested in presenting a life-like portrait of Alexander as an individual. If we may also infer from the extant fragments that Ptolemy was not much interested in literary discussion, we can readily see that Alexander's drinking parties would have been passed over in silence or else presented in a colorless way. Under these circumstances we are forced to rely on Plutarch and even to make what use we can of occasional hints in the *vulgate*; Arrian too has value, but it is usually the value of sources other than Ptolemy or Aristobulus.

One last word of caution is necessary. The episodes about to be described all involve speeches at a drinking party, and if only for that reason must be used with circumspection. The symposium was a recognized literary genre, and in the description of entertainments actually given by Alexander we may well expect to find embellishments, even pure fiction along conventional lines.

We may begin with the Clitus affair which occurred out in Bactria, perhaps in the fall of 328.<sup>58</sup> It divides itself into two parts, the symposium proper where Clitus was killed, and the subsequent remorse and consolation of Alexander. Arrian tells us that Alexander neglected the feast day of Dionysus, sacrificing instead to the Dioscuri, and holding a celebration in their honor. Conversation turned to a comparison between Alex-

<sup>55</sup> He was exiled by Philip along with other intimate friends of Prince Alexander's. Cf. Plutarch, *Alex.*, 10; Arrian, *Anab.*, III, 6, 5.

<sup>56</sup> His embellishment of the account of Alexander's journey through the desert to Siwah may still be detected. See Arrian, *Anab.*, III, 3, 5. Aristobulus also introduced similar though different improbable details, *ibid.*, III, 3, 6.

<sup>57</sup> Perhaps the best discussion is that of U. Wilcken, "Zur Entstehung des hellenistischen Königs Kultes," *Berl. Sitzungsab.*, XXX (1938), pp. 298 ff. For Ptolemy's concern over the burial of Alexander, see W. W. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VI, p. 467.

<sup>58</sup> Following Ulrich Wilcken (*Alex. the Great*, p. 166). Arrian is rather vague as to the date. (*Anab.*, IV, 8, 1).

ander's achievements and those of heroes who had been deified; Philip's deeds were also mentioned disparagingly. Then Clitus, who had been drinking heavily, made an angry speech praising Philip, and giving the lion's share of the credit for Alexander's deeds to the Macedonian soldiers. Alexander lost his temper, eventually running Clitus through with a spear.<sup>59</sup> This account is most unsatisfactory. There seems insufficient reason for Clitus' outbreak and for the towering rage of Alexander. When we read on in Arrian we learn that Aristobulus gave no details at all, but merely said that Clitus was entirely to blame.<sup>60</sup> Arrian is not following Aristobulus, then. The motivation may have come from Ptolemy. This would suit the perfunctory handling of the literary argument. Also, the notion that Dionysus, god of wine, had been offended and therefore caused the whole affair sounds like the sort of solution that would appeal to Ptolemy, because it avoids the question of motive. This might serve as an official explanation, and as such it may even have been popularized by Callisthenes, but it does not satisfy us as adequate. The whole scene is wooden and unconvincing. Turning to Curtius Rufus we get an entirely different impression.<sup>61</sup> The dialogue is extremely lively. Here Alexander himself boasts of his own great deeds. Clitus' anger is more than justified. But Alexander is clearly the conventional tyrant of later tradition. Diodorus Siculus' account has disappeared, but it probably followed the same pattern as that of Curtius Rufus.<sup>62</sup> Justin is very brief, but writes in a similar spirit.<sup>63</sup> It may be noted in passing that neither Justin nor Curtius says anything about an offended Dionysus, or about men who later obtained divine honors. When we read Plutarch, however, we are on different ground.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 8, 1-8.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 8, 9.

<sup>61</sup> Curtius Rufus, VIII, 1, 20-52.

<sup>62</sup> Diodorus Sic., XVII, 83 ends with the punishment of Bessus, while the following chapter alludes to a queen, evidently the Cleopis (Cleofis) of Justin (XII, 7) and Curtius Rufus (VIII, 10, 22). Thus our text of Diodorus leaves out the whole story of the *proskynesis*, the Conspiracy of Hermolaus, and the punishment and death of Callisthenes, as well as the Clitus episode. The way he highlights Clitus' deeds at Granicus (XVII, 20 *ad fin.*) indicates how he would have treated the murder of Clitus.

<sup>63</sup> Justin, XII, 6.

<sup>64</sup> See Plutarch, *Alex.*, 50.

Plutarch gives the feast of Dionysus due prominence, so that he cannot be following the unreliable tradition of the *vulgate*. But unlike Arrian his motivation for the quarrel is convincing psychologically. As the drinking progressed, a poem was recited ridiculing the generals for their recent defeat at the hands of the barbarians. The defeat was a real one, duly recorded by Arrian.<sup>65</sup> It requires little imagination to see that a satirical attack on Macedonian leaders for the edification of a mixed audience of Greeks, Macedonians, and barbarians, and in the presence of Alexander himself, must have aroused deep resentment. Plutarch tells us that this resentment was felt particularly by the older men. Clitus made himself their spokesman.<sup>66</sup> He rebuked the singer for ridiculing better men than those who were laughing, but men who had suffered from bad luck. Then Alexander entered the conversation in a rather unpleasant way. He said that in passing off cowardice as bad luck, Clitus was really excusing himself. Clitus forgot where he was, and reminded Alexander that his "cowardice" had at least been instrumental in saving the king's life. Plutarch's Alexander then turned to his Greek friends and asked them whether Greeks among Macedonians were not rather like demigods among wild beasts.<sup>67</sup> Could anything have been more exasperating to a Macedonian of Philip's generation? It is also natural to ask whether this cat and mouse treatment of Clitus fits in with the usual idea of a drunken Alexander. Clitus continued his abusive language, whereupon Alexander threw an apple at him, and his friends led him away. When Clitus broke loose and returned to quote a barbed line from Euripides, the king killed him with a spear, and the Greeks who were present probably saw the pertinence of Alexander's earlier aside.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>65</sup> The incident is described in detail, see Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 5, 2-6, 3.

<sup>66</sup> Plutarch, *Alex.*, 50. It is interesting that Justin too is careful to distinguish Clitus as an *old* man (XII, 6). It was natural that Philip's veterans should resent the changes made by Alexander and look back to the good old days.

<sup>67</sup> Plutarch, *Alex.*, 51.

<sup>68</sup> Plutarch's account rings true. Details may be suspected, however, e. g. Clitus' gift for literary repartee. But it remained for Justin (i. e., Clitarchus) to generalize from a few instances and make Alexander lament the fact that he was as much an object of terror to his friends at a feast, as to his enemies in the field (XII, 6).

Alexander was horrified at what he had done, and for three days he refused food and continued to berate himself for the murder of his friend.<sup>69</sup> Finally the king was restored to a sense of his present obligations. But our authorities do not agree on the details, or on the official explanation for his conduct. Even Arrian has two versions. According to the first, presumably that of Ptolemy, the soothsayers stated that Dionysus caused Alexander's wrath because his sacrifices had been neglected. Then Alexander was persuaded to eat by his friends, and he promptly offered sacrifice to Dionysus.<sup>70</sup> This sounds official. But Arrian's alternative account says that it was Anaxarchus the sophist who brought Alexander to his senses. He laughed him out of his despondency, proving on the analogy of Zeus, that the "king can do no wrong."<sup>71</sup> Curtius Rufus paints a highly emotional scene in which Alexander apostrophizes the corpse of his friend. The neglect of Dionysus is also mentioned, and Alexander resolves to die. This resolution he abandons when a number of his followers burst into his tent in a body, beseeching him to live. The Macedonians decreed that Clitus had been killed "legally" and would be denied burial unless Alexander decided otherwise.<sup>72</sup> Justin adds the significant detail that Callisthenes had great influence in soothing Alexander.<sup>73</sup> Plutarch describes Alexander's grief in similar terms. His friends became alarmed and forced their way into the presence of the king. Then Aristander, the soothsayer, explained by means of his art that the incident had been foreordained, and Alexander began to take notice. Callisthenes and Anaxarchus were then brought in.

<sup>69</sup> Arrian (*Anab.*, IV, 9, 4) and Curtius Rufus (VIII, 2, 10) agree on the three days. Plutarch (*Alex.*, 52) gives a day and a half, and Justin (XII, 6) says that Alexander's resolution to end his life, "even lasted during the ensuing days."

<sup>70</sup> Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 9, 5.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 9, 7-8.

<sup>72</sup> Curtius Rufus, VIII, 2, 11-12. The passage is redundant. Curtius says: "Quem ut armigeri corporisque custodes ad moriendum obstinatum esse cognoverunt, universi in tabernaculum inrumpunt . . ." Elsewhere Curtius uses either *armigeri* or *corporis custodes* to describe the Royal Bodyguards, of whom there were only seven. *Universi* and *inrumpunt* suggest a much larger number. On the Bodyguards see Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosop. Grund.*, I (Munich, 1926), p. 25.

<sup>73</sup> Justin, XII, *ad fin.*

Callisthenes comforted Alexander with appropriate words, and Anaxarchus spoke in terms so like those used by Arrian's Anaxarchus as to make it almost certain that Plutarch and Arrian were following the same source though not directly.<sup>74</sup> Who can that authority have been? Not Clitarchus—for Justin and Curtius Rufus, who follow Clitarchus, say nothing about Anaxarchus' advice; not Aristobulus, for Arrian says Aristobulus put the blame entirely on Clitus;<sup>75</sup> not Ptolemy, for Arrian introduces this episode in his variant account. There remains the distinct possibility that the source was Callisthenes. As a student of Homer he would have enjoyed the part played by Aristander, and some parallel between the "wrath of Achilles" and the "wrath of Alexander" would have suggested itself to him—and would also have been approved by Alexander as satisfactory publicity. No matter who may have written the original account, the reference to Callisthenes as one of Alexander's comforters does indicate that cordial relations existed between the two men even at this late date.<sup>76</sup>

We turn next to the most significant episode of all, the attempt of Alexander to introduce the *proskynesis*. Examination shows that two quite different issues have been confounded more or less completely in our sources—the *proskynesis* and the question of deification. The former was a ceremonial of the Persian court which Alexander, as the successor of the Persian kings, hoped to make uniform practice for Macedonians and Persians alike.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Alex.*, 52 with Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 9, 7-8.

<sup>75</sup> Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 8, 9. Also Aristobulus says Alexander did not drink to excess (*ibid.*, VII, 29, 4).

<sup>76</sup> It may be noted that Anaxarchus, so prominent in Plutarch and Arrian, is not mentioned by the Clitarchan authors (i. e., Curtius Rufus, Diodorus Siculus, and Justin) until after Callisthenes' death. They all represent him as persuading Alexander to enter Babylon against the inspired advice of the Chaldaeans. See Curtius Rufus, X, 4; Justin, XII, 13; Diodorus Sic., XVII, 112. For further discussion and references see Schwartz, "Anaxarchos," No. 1, *R.-E.*, I, col. 2080; Jacoby, "Kleon," No. 8, *ibid.*, XI, cols. 718-719.

<sup>77</sup> It is not to be denied that Miss Taylor (L. R. Taylor, "The 'Proskynesis' and the Hellenistic Ruler Cult," *J. H. S.*, XLVII [1927], pp. 53-62) added something to our understanding of the *proskynesis* considered from the Persian point of view. But her revival of Schnabel's hypothesis (P. Schnabel, "Die Begründung des hellenistischen Königs-kultes durch Alexander," *Klio*, XIX [1923-51], pp. 113-127) that the

Its practical value was obvious, if the whole-hearted cooperation of the barbarians were to be secured for the new regime. To the Macedonians—and to the Greeks—the custom was foreign and therefore unwelcome. It implied servility rather than impiety. Alexander's request late in his reign that he be acknowledged as the Son of Zeus was of an entirely different character. It was intended simply for the Greeks, not for his subjects as a whole—and not for the Macedonians.<sup>78</sup> No Persian would be expected to acknowledge Alexander's divinity. Among the Greeks this idea would probably prove popular rather than offensive.<sup>79</sup> And in point of fact it might well serve to legalize Alexander's embarrassingly extra-constitutional position in the Greek world.<sup>80</sup>

*proskynesis* is connected with the worship of Alexander has not generally been accepted (cf. A. D. Nock, "Notes on Ruler-Cult I-IV," *J. H. S.*, XLVIII [1928], pp. 21 ff.; W. W. Tarn, "The Hellenistic Ruler Cult and the Daemon," *ibid.*, pp. 206 ff.; L. R. Taylor, "The Daimon of the Persian King," *ibid.*, p. 6; L. R. Farnell, "Hellenistic Ruler-Cult: Interpretation," to which is added a note by W. W. Tarn, *ibid.*, XLIX [1929], pp. 79 ff.; G. H. Macurdy, "The Refusal of Callisthenes to drink the Health of Alexander," *ibid.*, L [1930], pp. 294 ff.). It is clear that Alexander intended this innovation only for Asia—not for Macedonia or the Greeks (see U. Wilcken, *Alex. the Great*, pp. 168-169). Farnell's explanation of the *êvria* ("hearth") on purely Greek grounds is particularly convincing.

Tarn's account of what happened at Bactra (*C. A. H.*, VI, pp. 398-399) is not accepted here. While rightly emphasizing Callisthenes' part in preparing the way for Alexander's deification, Tarn, wrongly in my opinion, connects this with Alexander's decision to introduce the *proskynesis*. No one has done more than Tarn to show that the two matters were quite separate. But he believes Alexander deliberately planned to have Greeks and Macedonians perform a ceremony that would suggest deification to them.

<sup>78</sup> See U. Wilcken, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

<sup>79</sup> The spontaneity of the worship of Alexander, later, has been shown by U. Wilcken ("Zur Entstehung des hellenistischen Königs-kultes," *Berl. Sitzungsab.*, XXX [1938], pp. 298-321, especially p. 304). So far as Demosthenes was concerned, Alexander's request for recognition brought forth not pious indignation, but a jest (see Hypereides, *Contra Demosthenem*, XXXI, 10, and A. D. Nock, "Notes on Ruler-Cult I-IV," *J. H. S.*, XLVIII [1928], p. 21).

<sup>80</sup> Convincingly argued by Eduard Meyer ("Alexander der Grosse und die absolute Monarchie," reprinted in *Kleine Schriften*, 2nd ed., I [Halle, 1924]), this view was accepted in its essentials by W. S. Ferguson ("Legalized absolutism en route from Greece to Rome," *A. H. R.*, XVIII



The fragments of Callisthenes themselves suggest that he was already preparing Greece for the reception of a new god in Alexander,<sup>81</sup> and some Greek writers rebuke Callisthenes for that reason.<sup>82</sup> It is interesting that Callisthenes is supposed to have discussed at some length the differences between honors properly bestowed upon gods and those granted to living men.<sup>83</sup> The distinction itself; but particularly the arguments used suggest Roman influence. We are reminded of Caesar, whose recognition as "Divus" after his death was accompanied by signs of celestial approval, and of Caligula who forced his own worship on the Romans as "Deus." In all probability there never was a debate over deification in Alexander's court. As an issue it could only have become important after the return from India when the problems of a permanent form for the empire could no longer be postponed. And at that time Callisthenes himself was dead. Later writers, anxious to damage Alexander's reputation, resorted to the familiar device of an eristic dialogue. Perhaps the famous contest between Right Reason and Wrong Reason in Aristophanes' *Clouds* occurred to them, with Alexander in the rôle of the young and impressionable Pheidippides. As the martyr of the Peripatetic school Callisthenes was naturally cast as Right Reason. The choice of an opponent was not so obvious, and nothing better illustrates the fanciful nature of the whole episode than the appearance of Cleon in one account and Anaxarchus in the other.<sup>84</sup>

The confusion among later writers between Alexander's claims to be the Son of Zeus and his attempt to force the *proskynesis* on his Greek and Macedonian followers is reflected in Curtius Rufus. According to him Alexander gave a banquet to which

[1912], pp. 29 ff.; and *Greek Imperialism* [Boston and New York, 1913], pp. 127-128; 139-140).

<sup>81</sup> The evidence is clear. See Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, F 14a, b (on the visit to Siwah and Alexander's acknowledgment as Son of Zeus); F 31 (on the strange behavior of the Pamphylian Sea, which bowed before Alexander); F 36 (Alexander's praying the gods to help him at Arbela if he were really of divine descent).

<sup>82</sup> E. g., Timaeus (cited by Polybius, XII, 126) and Philodemus (II. Κολακ., I, 24, text in Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II B, 124, T 21).

<sup>83</sup> E. g. see Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 11, 2 ff.; Curtius Rufus, VIII, 5, 14 ff.

<sup>84</sup> For Cleon as the protagonist see Curtius Rufus, VIII, 5, 10; for Anaxarchus see Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 10, 6.

he invited not only his chief Macedonian and Greek friends, but also members of the Persian aristocracy. It had been arranged in advance that Alexander would withdraw, and that in his absence Cleon would broach the question of divine honors. Cleon's speech is a triumph in the art of misrepresentation. He tells us that the Persians accepted their kings as gods, a manifest untruth, and he explains their doing so in terms based on the Roman empire.<sup>85</sup> Allusions to Greek mythology and an appeal to the guests to prostrate themselves before Alexander conclude his hybrid remarks. Callisthenes' reply is given at greater length, but it also sounds a false note. Most of his argument deals with the impropriety of acknowledging Alexander as a god during his lifetime, though he also objects to foreign innovations, particularly to the adoption by the victors of the customs of the vanquished.<sup>86</sup> When Alexander reappeared, a Persian prostrated himself before the king. Polyperchon mocked the Persian. Alexander lost his temper and threw Polyperchon to the ground. He then jeered at the prostrate nobleman for doing himself what he had ridiculed in the Persian. Even a barbarian who had been exposed to Aristotle would have behaved better than that! It sounds a little like the way Caligula would handle a knotty problem in diplomacy.

In Arrian also we find two separate scenes, the first without Alexander, where the question is debated before a group of Greeks, Macedonians, and Persians; and the second where Persians prostrate themselves before Alexander while Macedonians mock.<sup>87</sup> The chief differences are that in Arrian Callisthenes' antagonist is Anaxarchus, and that Callisthenes' remarks are given more space. Unlike Curtius, however, Arrian also gives a variant account of what happened. Alexander drank from a cup which was then taken to one of the guests. He in turn drank, prostrated himself before the king, and then received a kiss. When the cup came around to Callisthenes he drank without performing the *proskynesis*. Alexander, engrossed in

<sup>85</sup> His reason for a Persian emperor worship is very Roman: "... non pie solum, sed etiam prudenter reges suos inter deos colere: maiestatem enim imperii salutis esse tutelam" (Curtius Rufus, VIII, 5, 11).

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, 5, 14-20.

<sup>87</sup> The first scene: Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 10, 5-11, 9; the second: *ibid.*, IV, 12, 1-2.

conversation with Hephaestion, failed to notice the omission. But when Callisthenes came up for his reward, a certain Demetrius told Alexander what had happened and the king refused to salute Callisthenes. The latter resumed his place with the remark, "I leave the poorer by a kiss!"<sup>88</sup>

We are fortunate in being able to identify and supplement this account in Arrian from Plutarch. Plutarch also tells about the passing of the cup; he adds the detail about propitiating the "hearth"; and he cites Chæres of Mitylene as his authority.<sup>89</sup> Chæres is an ideal witness. As Alexander's Master of Ceremonies<sup>90</sup> he would certainly have an eye for detail. Plutarch also tells us that Hephaestion accused Callisthenes of going back on his promise when he neglected to perform the *proskynesis*.<sup>91</sup>

With this evidence before us it is fairly easy to see what happened. Had Alexander planned a debate on the *proskynesis*, which is very unlikely, he certainly would not have invited the Persians. Instead, realizing that such an innovation would have to be handled with tact, he conferred with his friend, Hephaestion, asking him to sound out a few leading individuals in advance. Callisthenes' clumsy effort to satisfy his conscience without provoking Alexander must have come as a complete surprise, and it made the whole idea of the *proskynesis* appear ludicrous. Alexander could ill afford to appear in such a light, so the plan had to be dropped. But Hephaestion, who knew Alexander better than anyone else, lied to save his own skin, and said that Callisthenes had agreed to the ceremony in advance.<sup>92</sup>

The situation had become intolerable. Alexander would never

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 12, 3-5.

<sup>89</sup> For the significance of the "hearth" see L. R. Farnell, "Hellenistic Ruler-Cult: Interpretation," *J. H. S.*, XLIX (1929), pp. 79 ff. For the passage see Plutarch, *Alex.*, 54. Miss Macurdy has shown that the story of Callisthenes' refusal to drink unmixed wine for fear that in pledging Alexander he might fall in need of Asclepius, is genuine, but not to be connected with the *proskynesis* (G. H. Macurdy, "The Refusal of Callisthenes to drink the Health of Alexander," *J. H. S.*, L [1930], pp. 294-297).

<sup>90</sup> Plutarch calls him Alexander's *εισαγγελεύς* (*Alex.*, 46).

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>92</sup> See Jacoby, "Kallisthenes," No. 2, *R.-E.*, X, cols. 1679-1680—where he gives excellent reasons for disbelieving Hephaestion.

forgive Callisthenes for what he must have regarded as presumptuousness. Yet Callisthenes was writing a running account of the campaign for the Greek world. It would hardly do to remove him by an act of violence. Alexander still could not afford to disregard Greek popular opinion, especially as he had made up his mind to invade India. The Spartan war, though settled effectively at Megalopolis three years before, had left its legacy of ill will, and Greece in general was suffering from a food shortage.<sup>93</sup> This was not the time for a display of royal bad temper. Alexander controlled himself and awaited a more favorable opportunity. Meanwhile we can be sure that no mention of the *proskynesis* fiasco would find its way into Callisthenes' history.

The interval between this episode and the arrest of Callisthenes for complicity in the Hermolaus conspiracy must have been brief. Our sources do not permit us to control the order of events so far as the history of Alexander and his intimate circle is concerned. Writers like Ptolemy and Aristobulus, on whom Arrian depends in his more felicitous passages, probably ignored what to them was after all merely a tempest in a teapot. Plutarch, who followed a variety of authors whose worth is very uneven, does not attempt chronological precision,<sup>94</sup> yet it is Plutarch who gives us our only clues on Alexander's relations with Callisthenes. It is tempting to assign remarks about Callisthenes in the fifty-third and fifty-fourth chapters of his *Alexander* to this interval.<sup>95</sup> What sources was Plutarch following? We have already seen that he makes use of Chares for the *proskynesis*, in chapter fifty-four. Earlier in the same chapter Plutarch cites Hermippus as his authority. Now Hermippus was one of the Alexandrian biographers, a pupil of the celebrated Callimachus, which would put him towards the end of the third

<sup>93</sup> The food shortage lasted from 330-326 and caused distress in Athens. See W. W. Tarn in *C. A. H.*, VI, p. 448.

<sup>94</sup> To have followed a strictly chronological order would have been to violate the spirit of ancient biography as shown in the *Peripatetics*. See Duane R. Stuart, *Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography* (Univ. of Calif. Press, 1928), pp. 187-188.

<sup>95</sup> Jacoby does assign Callisthenes' two speeches praising and then reviling the Macedonians to this period ("Callisthenes," No. 2, *R.-E.*, X, col. 1681).

century B.C.<sup>96</sup> He was directly influenced by the Peripatetic school, whose importance for biography and for the tradition hostile to Alexander has been emphasized by W. W. Tarn.<sup>97</sup> Hermippus made a practice of citing his authority,<sup>98</sup> and Plutarch gives us a Callisthenes anecdote on the basis of a report made to Aristotle by Callisthenes' "reader" (*ἀναγνώστης*), Stroebeus.<sup>99</sup> This story will be discussed presently, but there are other details in chapter fifty-four for which Plutarch does not give his source, but which there is no *a priori* reason to reject. Let us consider the circumstances.

It is probable that Callisthenes gained a certain amount of popularity for his attitude on the *proskynesis*, a popularity that must have been all the more welcome because it was so entirely unexpected. The Macedonian nobles, little though they cared for Alexander's Greek friends, cared even less for Persian ceremonial, and they probably treated Callisthenes with a condescension which went to his head. Happy and pleased with himself he brought out stinging little quotations from the poets, particularly Euripides; and apparently Alexander replied in kind.<sup>100</sup> To Callisthenes this would have seemed simply learned amusement to which the Greeks had long been accustomed. He may have known of the Homeric quip the Athenian Demades is supposed to have hurled at Philip flushed with success and wine after the Battle of Chaeronea.<sup>101</sup> Philip swallowed his resentment. But, as Eduard Meyer, once wrote, "Alexander was of different stuff from his father."<sup>102</sup>

<sup>96</sup> See Duane Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-165.

<sup>97</sup> See W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilisation* (2nd ed., London, 1930), pp. 255-256. D. E. W. Wormell (*op. cit.*, p. 80) is convinced that Hermippus is also our source for the tradition in favor of Hermias.

<sup>98</sup> Duane Stuart, however, implies that Hermippus was not above citing fictitious authorities. See his *Epochs of Greek and Roman Biog.*, p. 177.

<sup>99</sup> Plutarch, *Alex.*, 54. The anecdote concludes the previous chapter. It seems unfair of Tarn to refer to Callisthenes as "the man who, Aristotle said, had no sense," without adding the rest of Aristotle's remark (*C. A. H.*, VI, p. 400).

<sup>100</sup> Jacoby ("Callisthenes," No. 2, *R.-E.*, X, col. 1681) appears a little too skeptical in rejecting this material out of hand.

<sup>101</sup> See Diodorus Sic., XVI, 87.

<sup>102</sup> Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, 2nd ed., I, p. 279.

Callisthenes' days were numbered, but he was probably the last one to suspect that Alexander could bring himself to murder his old boyhood associate. A more worldly man would have avoided the pitfall prepared for him by Alexander. There is certainly no reason to doubt this incident, recorded by Plutarch on the authority of Hermippus and Stroebeus.<sup>103</sup> The setting, once more, is a drinking party. Callisthenes was present, and by request he made an impromptu speech in praise of the Macedonians which brought him an ovation. Alexander then remarked that it was easy to speak on such a subject, but that a true test of his ability would be found in his speaking *against* the Macedonians. Callisthenes rose like a trout to the fly. His indictment left nothing to be desired, but the Macedonians were first shocked, then enraged. Alexander merely said drily that Callisthenes had given a convincing demonstration, not so much of his eloquence as of his hatred. The episode does not place Alexander in an attractive light. For him to resent Callisthenes' obstinacy is understandable, but the resort to trickery against a guileless antiquarian who was there at his own invitation leaves a bad taste in the mouth.

The inevitable denouement was not long postponed. Hermolaus and his confederates, young Macedonians assigned to watch over Alexander, were discovered to have plotted his death.<sup>104</sup> They were tortured and confessed their guilt, but they steadily refused to implicate Callisthenes.<sup>105</sup> Nevertheless, Callisthenes was put under arrest and later executed. There should be no doubt of Alexander's guilt. Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Chares were all in a position to know the facts. Yet each has a different account of the death of Callisthenes.<sup>106</sup> Ptolemy says he was guilty and that he was hanged after being tortured. Aristobulus says he was guilty, but that he was carried along with the army in fetters, and then died of disease.<sup>107</sup> Chares tells us he died seven months after his arrest, being very fat and suffering from

<sup>103</sup> Plutarch, *Alex.*, 53. Jacoby has no doubts here ("Kallisthenes," No. 2, *R.-E.*, X, col. 1681).

<sup>104</sup> See Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 13, 7.

<sup>105</sup> See Plutarch, *Alex.*, 55.

<sup>106</sup> Discussed by Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, II D, pp. 413 f.

<sup>107</sup> Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 14.

the lousy sickness, and that Alexander had been holding him for public trial in the presence of Aristotle.<sup>108</sup> Arrian says naïvely that even writers who knew the facts contradicted one another on Callisthenes' death.<sup>109</sup> But let Alexander speak for himself. Plutarch not infrequently cites letters of Alexander, a collection of which was evidently still current in his day. While not all of them were genuine there is much to be said on grounds of general probability for the two letters he attributes to Alexander following the conspiracy of Hermolaus.<sup>110</sup> The first was sent off immediately to Craterus, Attalus, and Alcetas, and in it he says that while the pages have confessed under torture they swore no one else had been involved in the plot. The second letter was written at a later date to Antipater. This time Alexander accuses Callisthenes. He says the pages have been executed by the Macedonians, but "I shall punish the sophist and those who sent him . . . as well as those who shelter my enemies in the cities."

The punitive policy envisaged in this letter was never carried out. When Alexander did return to Babylon four years later he asked only that all Greek cities take back their exiles and acknowledge him as the Son of Zeus.<sup>111</sup> That Alexander was cruel and vindictive cannot be denied; that was the savage in him. But like Tsar Peter he learned by his mistakes. It is probable that even had he lived out his normal span there would have been no more incidents like the murder of Callisthenes; not because Alexander's character had changed, but because he had come to have a better sense of what he might and what he might not safely do.

TRUEDELL S. BROWN.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES.

<sup>108</sup> Plutarch, *Alex.*, 55.

<sup>109</sup> Arrian, *Anab.*, IV, 14, 3.

<sup>110</sup> Both in Plutarch, *Alex.*, 55. For discussion of the genuineness of Alexander's letters, see Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosop. Grund.*, I, p. 44, n. 2.

<sup>111</sup> For the decree on the exiles see Diodorus Sic., XVIII, 8, 4. For Alexander's request to be acknowledged as Son of Zeus, see A. D. Nock, "Notes on Ruler-Cult I-IV," *J. H. S.*, XLVIII (1928), pp. 21 ff.

## REPETITION IN THE HOMERIC HYMN TO APHRODITE.

The criticism in the last century and a half of the longer Homeric hymn to Aphrodite provides an interesting and instructive chapter in the history of classical philology. When Hermann in 1806 described the hymn as "carmen Homeri nomine dignissimum," he was, in effect, summing up the verdict of the scholars of the eighteenth century.<sup>1</sup> In the following century, however, the hymn was very generally damned by the German philologists.<sup>2</sup> G. Bernhardt found the poem deficient in invention and originality.<sup>3</sup> W. Windisch stressed what he considered to be excessive dependence upon Homer.<sup>4</sup> T. Bergh<sup>5</sup> and K. Sittl<sup>6</sup> both considered the composer of the hymn to be a poet of the most limited competence. A. Baumeister,<sup>7</sup> B. Suhle,<sup>8</sup> A. Gemoll<sup>9</sup> and A. Ludwig<sup>10</sup> all find in the frequent repetitions

<sup>1</sup> G. Hermann, *Homeri Hymni et Epigrammata* (Leipzig, 1806), p. 252. Compare also A. Matthiae, *Animadversiones in Hymnos Homericos* (Leipzig, 1800), p. 66, "Hymnus in Venerem ceterorum hymnorum longe suavissimus ac melitissimus est." For references to earlier appraisals see A. Teske, "Die Homer-Mimesis in den homerischen Hymnen," *Greifswalder Beiträge zur Literatur- und Stilforschung*, Heft 15 (Greifswald, 1936), p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> An exception is R. Thiele, *Prolegomena in Hymnum in Venerem* (Diss. Halle, 1872), p. 17. Outside of Germany the hymn never lacked admirers. Thus Wm. Mure (*A Critical History of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece*, II [London, 1850], p. 346) repeats Matthiae's praise in virtually identical terms and J. P. Mahaffy (*A History of Classical Greek Literature*, I [New York, 1880], pp. 132-133), M. Croiset (A. and M. Croiset, *Histoire de la Littérature Grecque*, I [Paris, 1887], p. 590), and Andrew Lang (*The Homeric Hymns* [London, 1899], p. 40) all pay their respects to the genius of the hymn's composer.

<sup>3</sup> *Griechische Literatur*, II\* (Halle, 1877), p. 223.

<sup>4</sup> *De Hymnis Homericis Maioribus* (Diss. Leipzig, 1867), p. 41.

<sup>5</sup> *Griechische Literaturgeschichte* (Berlin, 1872), p. 767.

<sup>6</sup> *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur bis auf Alexander den Grossen* (Munich, 1884), p. 198.

<sup>7</sup> *Hymni Homerici* (Leipzig, 1865), p. 251, and on *H. Ven.*, lines 30, 51, 113.

<sup>8</sup> *De Hymno Homérico Quarto* (Programm Stolp, 1878), p. 23.

<sup>9</sup> *Die Homerischen Hymnen* (Leipzig, 1886), p. 259.

<sup>10</sup> *Homerischer Hymnenbau* (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 260-261.



in the poem and in the so-called "borrowings" evidence of "Erfindungslosigkeit." In our day, however, the hymn has again a host of friends. To Messrs. Allen, Halliday and Sikes it is "brilliant literature," a judgment with which the writer agrees.<sup>11</sup> But this change of opinion is rather the result of the triumph of the inherent artistic greatness of the poem than of any advance in critical theory. The earlier strictures have been almost totally ignored, as perhaps they deserved to be.

This disregard of older criticism has, nonetheless, an unfortunate aspect. However erroneous their conclusions may be, some of the Nineteenth Century studies abound in acute observation. Suhle's obscure *Programm* may serve as an example. This critic commits all the crimes in the book. Because the hymn abounds in Homeric formulae,<sup>12</sup> he accuses its composer of excessive dependence on Homer, neglecting the fact that there is no real evidence whatever for dating the hymn later than the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Because the hymn repeats frequently both its own words and general epic formulae, he calls it bad, and because it is bad it is late, and again because it is late it is bad, a series of *non sequitur's* with a circular tail. To support his view that the hymn is late (the period of the Feisistratids, or even of Sophocles) he draws parallels in vocabulary and inflectional forms with Pindar and the Attic tragedians. None of the parallels amount to much, as Suhle himself admits, yet, he thinks, collectively they are impressive, forgetting that forty zeroes still add up to zero.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *The Homeric Hymns*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1936), p. 349. Cf. W. Schmid in Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, I (Munich, 1929), pp. 239 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Collected by H. Trüber, *De Hymno in Venerem Homericum* (Diss. Halle, 1903). Compare also J. R. S. Sterrett, *Hymni Homerici* (Boston, 1881), *passim*; Windisch, *op. cit.*, p. 37; and Teske, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Another of Suhle's arguments for dating the hymn late runs as follows (*op. cit.*, pp. 26-27). There are parallels in language between the hymns to Aphrodite and to Demeter (true). Therefore one of the poets must have copied the other (false). The poet of the hymn to Aphrodite is a bad poet (false). The poet of the hymn to Demeter is a good poet (true). It is unthinkable that a good poet would ever imitate a bad poet (false). Ergo the author of the hymn to Aphrodite must have imitated the hymn to Demeter (false). As the hymn to Demeter, by the consensus of scholarly opinion, is to be dated to the time of the Feisistratids (very doubtful), the hymn to Aphrodite must

It is an easy thing to score cheap triumphs over scholars who wrote before the concepts of the mixed nature of the epic dialect, of the digamma as a variable and "floating" sound, and of the formulaic technique of composition, had been developed and defined, and it is with no such purpose in mind that I call attention to Suhle's paper, but rather because in it, for the first time as far as I know, attention was called to an important distinguishing trait of style of the hymn to Aphrodite.<sup>14</sup> The composer of the hymn repeats himself continuously. Words, phrases, and whole lines, once used, come up time and time again, sometimes close together. This characteristic, pointed out by Suhle, is in large part responsible for his, and other scholars', attribution of poverty of invention to the poet of the hymn. But repetitiousness, though it may, need not argue poverty of invention in poetry. A certain amount of repetition in verse form is fundamental to all poetry. Repetition of sound, consonance or assonance, as in rhyme, is fundamental to many modern verse systems and a common feature of Greek poetry. Repetition of idea,—though not essential to poetry, in this differing from the music of our Western tradition, Gregorian chants excepted,—is frequently exploited by poets as a developmental and structurally unifying device.<sup>15</sup> It is my purpose in this paper to look at some of the repetitions in the hymn to Aphrodite, to analyze them from the formal and functional points of view, and to suggest formal and functional categories of repetition which will be valid for the hymn. Such a process should, surely, precede critical evaluation.

The first repetition noted by Suhle is the occurrence of the word *ἔργον* five times in lines 6-15.<sup>16</sup> This he considers an

belong to a period subsequent to the time of the Peisistratids (undoubtedly false). I have discussed the metrical evidence for dating this poem in "The Early Greek Hexameter, Part I," to appear in *Y. C. S.*, XII.

<sup>14</sup> Strictly speaking he was anticipated in this observation by Baumeister (*loc. cit.*). Nonetheless Suhle was the first to stress repetition as a characteristic of the style of the hymn.

<sup>15</sup> See F. W. Jones, "The Formulation of the Revenge Motif in the *Odyssey*," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXII (1941), pp. 195-202; G. M. Calhoun, "Homeric Repetitions," *Univ. Calif. Publ. Class. Phil.*, XII, 1 (1938), where the analogy of musical with Homeric composition is treated; J. T. Sheppard, "Zeus-Loved Achilles," *J. H. S.*, LV (1935), pp. 113 ff., and "Great-Hearted Odysseus," *J. H. S.*, LVI (1936), pp. 36 ff.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

example of clumsy workmanship, a judgment with which Allen, Halliday and Sikes seem reluctantly to agree.<sup>17</sup> But let us look at the use made of this word in the poem. It first occurs in line 1:

Μοῦσά μοι ἔννεπε ἔργα πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης.

\**Εργα* here corresponds to the *Μῆνιν* of the first line of the *Iliad* or to the \**Ἀνδρα* of the first line of the *Odyssey*. The first six lines of the hymn contain a statement of its theme, love, and a description of Aphrodite's power over gods, men and all living creatures. Line 6:

παῖσιν δ' ἔργα μέμνηεν ἔϋστεφάνου Κυθερείης,

re-echoes line 1 both in the repetition of the word *ἔργα* and in the noun-epithet combination, *ἔϋστεφάνου Κυθερείης*, which corresponds to *πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης* in verbal pattern and meaning, though the poet has taken care to vary the actual words which he uses. This echoing of line 1 in line 6 serves two functions. It marks off line 6 as the end of a well defined introductory section of the poem and stresses, by repetition, the poem's central subject. By its prominent place in line 1 and by its repetition, in both cases associated with Aphrodite, the word *ἔργα* has acquired, in addition to its primary symbolism, i. e. the dictionary meaning valid for the age, a secondary symbolic value, i. e. physical love. This secondary meaning will inevitably be suggested whenever the word appears in the poem, no matter how it is used.<sup>18</sup>

Following the brief introduction come three short hymns to Athena, Artemis, and Hestia, who alone, of all living creatures, are not subject to Aphrodite. Taken collectively, these hymns constitute what Professor Greene calls a "solitary idea."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 349, "There may be inelegance in the repetition of *ἔργον* five times in vv. 1-15, but this and similar blemishes, collected by Suhle, do not justify his preposterous verdict *permediocris poeta*."

<sup>18</sup> It is noteworthy that in every other hymn in the collection a god or goddess is named as the immediate subject. Only in this hymn are the "works" of the deity particularized as the theme. Thus in the first line the poet stresses the symbolical value of the concept of Aphrodite, not her existence as a flesh-and-blood goddess. Throughout the hymn there is constant reference to this central theme, and neither the story nor decoration is allowed to stray from its function of illuminating this theme.

<sup>19</sup> T. M. Greene, *The Arts and the Art of Criticism* (Princeton, 1940), pp. 138 ff.

Their inclusion in a hymn to Aphrodite was a remarkably bold stroke of genius. Standing, as it were, near the edge of the composition, this group of three majestic figures, by significant differentiation and contrast, endows the whole composition with added vitality. As symbols of sexlessness, the three goddesses serve as a foil which makes more vivid the expression of the central theme.

In the first of these three hymns, lines 7-15:

- Τρισσὰς δ' οὐ δύναται πεπιθεῖν φρένας οὐδ' ἀπατῆσαι·  
 κούρην τ' αἰγίοχοιο Διὸς γλαυκῶπιν Ἀθήνην·  
 οὐ γάρ οἱ εὐαδεν ἔργα πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης,  
 10 ἀλλ' ἄρα οἱ πόλεμοί τε ἄδον καὶ ἔργον Ἄρης,  
 ὑσμῖναί τε μάχαι τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ ἔργ' ἀλεγύνειν.  
 πρώτη τέκτονας ἄνδρας ἐπὶ χθονίους ἐδίδαξε  
 ποιῆσαι σατῖνας καὶ ἄρματα ποικίλα χαλκῷ·  
 ἣ δέ τε παρθενικὰς ἀπαλόχροας ἐν μεγάροισιν  
 15 ἀγλαὰ ἔργ' ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θεῖσα ἐκάστη,

the word *ἔργον* occurs no less than four times. In line 9 the last four feet are identical with the last four feet of line 1. But notice also the first two feet. Between *Μοῦσά μοι ἔννεπε* and *οὐ γάρ οἱ εὐαδεν* there is an almost exact correspondence of vowel for vowel. There is irony in this, this use by the poet of a practically identical sequence of sounds to appeal to the Muse to tell him of the "works" of golden Aphrodite and to state that Athena would have nothing to do with these same "works." In line 10 *ἔργον* is used meaning war—*ἔργον Ἄρης*—and in line 11, in the same metrical position, deeds of prowess,—*ἀγλαὰ ἔργ'*. Once more the phrase *ἀγλαὰ ἔργ'* appears, together with *ἐδίδαξε*, the last word of line 12, to form the first half of line 15. Here *ἔργα* refers to those domestic tasks of women with which Athena is concerned. This use of a word, in lines 10, 11, and 15, with well-established connotations, in this case a word which describes the theme of the poem itself, in circumstances where those connotations do not apply, is a form of play on words, analogous to the pun or paradox, a type of allogical word-play which is an important element of technique in poetry of many periods. Here the clash of connotations is used, effectively, in my opinion, to stress the fact that Athena's "world"—a world of earnest and provident husbandry and of noble deeds of war—is very different from that of Aphrodite. In other words the contrast between the "solitary

idea" and the main body of the composition is sharpened by the paradoxically effective device of using the same key words in both.

After line 15 *ἔργον* occurs two other times in the poem; once in the first line of the little hymn to Hestia (line 21), where it recalls line 10, and once in line 122. Aphrodite is telling Anchises how Hermes carried her off:

Πολλὰ δ' ἔπ' ἤγαγεν ἔργα καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

*Ἔργα* in this case means steadings, pastures, and meadows. It recalls, of course, the *ἔργα* of line 1, just as *καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων* recalls line 3, but its function differs somewhat from the function of its repetition in lines 10-15. There the tension between the radically opposed connotations of the word provided point to the repetition. Here the word *ἔργα* suggests the theme of the hymn, love, as an overtone, an enriching additional complication of poetic meaning which does not do battle with, but supplements, the "local" meaning of the term.

The repetitions of the word *ἔργον* are only the first of many sets of repetitions which Suhle found objectionable. In trying to account for them I have used up a fair amount of ink, woven various theories, and suggested several distinct functions. Such a procedure may well be criticized as being excessively subjective and so, before discussing further specific instances, or the relevance of repetition to larger questions of style, it would be well to define what types of repetition are possible in the hexameter.

A type of repetition which is basic to the hexameter form is, of course, the repetition of the hexameter itself considered as a quantitative unit of sound, consisting of six dactylic or spondaic feet. Such repetition is a fundamental aspect of the generic form and need not concern us here.

The hexameter has, moreover, a characteristic internal structure which can be realized by a limited number of verbal patterns. The individual verbal patterns can themselves be objects of repetition. Professor Fränkel noticed that in Callimachus the metrical word-type ~ ~ ~ ~ ending in position 10, i. e. with the fifth foot (a relatively rare element in Callimachus, occurring on the average only four times in 100 lines) tended to occur in groups. It would be found three or four times in a short passage of, say, 10 or 15 lines and then not be seen again for perhaps a

couple of hundred lines.<sup>20</sup> But this echoing of verbal pattern goes much further than Professor Fränkel realized and is not confined to rare usages which, for the moment, are accepted as normal, repeated two or three times, and then dropped again. *Every* line stands in a positive relationship to its immediate predecessors and either re-echoes the structure of one or more of them or deliberately varies their structure. In Homer the poet's desire for unity or variety in his verbal line-patterns is frequently the deciding factor in his choice of formulae.

This tendency of lines to correspond with their predecessors in structure can perhaps most simply be illustrated from metrical word-types which end the line. In the hymn to Aphrodite (293 lines) 46 lines end with a word of 8 *morae*, i.e.  $-\sim-\sim$  or  $---\sim$ , or one line in 6.4. Of these 46 cases 13 are in three short passages totaling only 15 lines in all (117-121, 243-245, 261-267). Of the remainder 14 are in adjacent lines or in pairs with one line intervening. Similarly the type  $\sim\sim--$ , or its spacing-filling equivalent  $--\sim$ , ends the line 58 times, or once in every five lines. But of the first 25 lines of the hymn 12, or nearly half, end with a word of 6 *morae*. The poet is clearly playing on the structural theme set by the first line.<sup>21</sup>

The third type of repetition found in the hexameter is repetition of sound, assonance or consonance.<sup>22</sup> A single sound, vowel or consonant, may be repeated, pairs of sounds, syllables, groups of syllables (either exactly or only their vowels or consonants), words, phrases, lines, or even relatively long passages. Each of these units of repetition may in turn be divided into two cate-

<sup>20</sup> H. Fränkel, "Der kallimachische und der homerische Hexameter," *N. G. G.*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 1926, pp. 202-203, note 1.

<sup>21</sup> The correspondence of word limits is an important poetical element only in those verse systems in which stress is *not* basic. On the general problem of the rôle of word limits in poetry see J. Mukařovský, "La phonologie et la poétique," *Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague*, IV (1931), pp. 285-286.

<sup>22</sup> Assonance is the repetition of vowels, consonance the repetition of consonants. Neither rhyme nor alliteration are profitable terms for the study of Greek poetry; rhyme because its function in modern verse systems is so radically different from the use of end-line assonance in Greek poetry that to use the term for the latter is an unfortunate extension in meaning; alliteration, the repetition of the first sound of stressed syllables, because the rôle of stress in Greek versification cannot be defined.

gories. First, repetition may be within a line or in positions which are not metrically equivalent in different lines. Second, repetition may occur in metrically equivalent positions. Our English rhyme is a type of syllabic repetition of this last sort, highly conventional both in form and function. Apart from the number of repeated sounds and their position in the rhythmical units, repetitions may be classified according to the number of repetitions. Is a given unit of repetition repeated once, or many times? A still further classification, though not, perhaps, a very useful one, can be made according to the order of the repeated sounds. Sounds may be repeated in their original order, in chiasmic order, or in any number of combinations of the two.<sup>23</sup>

Frequently structural repetition is combined with sound repetition; e. g., *H. Merc.*, 89-90:

τὸν πρότερος προσέφη Μαίης ἑρικυδέος υἱός·  
ὦ γέρον, ὃς τε φυτὰ σκάπτεις ἐπικαμπύλος ὦμος

and *H. Ven.*, 22-23:

Ἰστίη, ἣν πρώτην τέκετο Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης,  
αὐτίς δ' ὀπλοτάτην βουλῇ Διὸς αἰγυόχοιο.

Hitherto repetition has been discussed from a purely formalistic point of view. The categories suggested, while they have some utility for purposes of description, are not useful for the analysis of poetic technique without some further consideration of the poetic function of repetition. Two aspects may be distinguished. Every poem is a series of sounds. Repetition of a sound or series of sounds, in a poem viewed as pure sound, contributes to the "tone color" of a passage and to tonal form and unity. This is an aspect, but only one aspect, of every repetition. The raw material of poetry is not pure sound, but meaningful, symbolic sound and therefore every repetition has also an intellectual aspect.<sup>24</sup> This, of course, is apparent when a word or

<sup>23</sup> These formal categories of sound repetition are further discussed in *Theory of Literature* (New York, 1949), pp. 159-164, by Austin Warren and René Wellek. I am greatly indebted to Professor Wellek for criticism of this paper and for information about the methods used in literary scholarship by the Russian Formalists, whose work is inaccessible to those who know no Russian.

<sup>24</sup> This is not the place to discuss this point, a fundamental one for the student of the artistic use of language. For a brief statement of the

phrase is repeated, but is equally true of the repetition of single syllables or even sounds. Because repetitions have this semantic aspect, they are deeply involved in the whole meaning complex of the passage in which they occur. This poses serious methodological problems. Each repetition, to the extent to which it is integrated into the particular semantic context of a poem, partakes of the essential particularity of the work and hence resists functional classification. It would be possible, but not very profitable, to compile statistical data for the occurrence of repetition in the different texts on a purely formalistic basis. To employ numerical criteria in comparing literary texts in their functional use of repetition is impossible. We must use subtler, perhaps more subjective, methods. Each case must be interpreted in its context. This will inevitably bring disagreement, but that is no excuse for avoiding the investigation of an important aspect of poetic style, nor does it indicate that no substantial results for the understanding of the poets' technique will emerge.

Repetitions resist functional classification of the mutually exclusive type. We can, nonetheless, distinguish various "meaning" functions of repetition. Any specific repetition may fulfil one or several of these functions.

The first functional category of repetition I will call *thematic* repetition. Thematic repetition may be defined as the repetition of a syllable, word, or phrase which clearly describes, or has reference to, some aspect of a major or minor theme of the poem. The first occurrence of the unit of repetition is usually in the first few lines. Subsequent occurrences fulfil two functions. Apart from serving to advance the story, i. e. their "local" function, they serve, by recalling the earlier occurrences, to remind the listener or reader of the relevance of the particular or specific event being narrated to the basic, timeless, general theme with which either the repeated unit was associated in its first appearance or which is inherent in its meaning.

position adopted by the writer, see Professor Roman Jacobson, "Ueber den Versbau der Serbokroatischen Volksepen," *Archives Néerlandaises de la Phonétique Expérimentale*, VIII-IX, p. 136. Professor Henry Lanz's effort to draw a sharp line between sound and sense in poetry (*The Physical Basis of Rime* [Stanford University, 1931], p. 293) has been successfully refuted by Professor W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. in "One Relation Between Rhyme and Reason," *Modern Language Quarterly*, V (1944), p. 337.



The hymn to Aphrodite is remarkably rich in this type of repetition. The first three lines provide words and phrases which occur time and again throughout the poem. The *ἔργα* of line 1 has already been discussed. *Ἀφροδίτη* in its various cases occurs 14 times, always at the end of the line. Although this word is "localized" in this position in the epic tradition, this is not an unavoidable repetition. Any number of traditional periphrases were available to the poet and we must conclude that he repeated the word *Ἀφροδίτη* so many times because he felt that the repetition, far from being a blemish, served a positive function.

The word *ἡμέρος* appears in line 2 in a relative clause modifying Aphrodite, *ἣ τε θεοῖσιν ἐπὶ γλαυκὺν ἡμερον ὥρσε*. In line 45 the tables are turned:

τῇ δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γλαυκὺν ἡμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ

and again, eight lines further on:

Ἀγχίσεω δ' ἄρα οἱ γλαυκὺν ἡμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ.

Four lines later (line 57) the word occurs again,—*ἐκπάγλως δὲ κατὰ φρένας ἡμερος εἶλεν*. When the goddess has landed on Ida and is making her way through the forest glades to the standing of Anchises, all the savage beasts of the woods come fawning on her and she is pleased in her heart as she sees them:

καὶ τοῖς ἐν στήθεσσι βάλ' ἡμερον, οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες  
σύνδνο κοιμήσαντο κατὰ σκίοεντας ἐναύλους (lines 73-74).

When Aphrodite has told Anchises her fictitious tale and has asked him to communicate with her parents, who will provide a dowry, she says:

ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσας δαίνυ γάμον ἡμερόεντα (line 141),

and two lines later comes

Ὡς εἰπούσα θεὰ γλαυκὺν ἡμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ.

"Sweet desire" is quite clearly an important aspect of the general theme of the poem and the seven appearances of the word *ἡμερος* keep this aspect before the mind of the reader.

The secondary theme of the poem, as often in literature where the central subject is love, is mortality, old age and death. This

is brought out both in the central myth and in subordinate episodes. Aphrodite has forced the gods and goddesses to love mortals and thus makes them parents of children who will die (line 51). Zeus in turn forces Aphrodite to love a mortal man, to her shame. But she will not have Anchises to be her husband, for soon pitiless old age, man's inevitable lot, will be upon him (line 244), and in this connection she tells the story of Tithonus, who was granted immortality but not perpetual youth, and so shriveled up until he could do nothing but babble on forever. Toward the end of the poem comes the description of the nymphs who occupy a middle ground between gods and men. They are loved by the Silenoi and Hermes, take part in the choruses of the gods, and are, to be sure, long-lived, but they come into existence with noble trees and when at length the trees wither and their bark peels off and their branches fall to the ground, the nymphs, too, must die.<sup>25</sup>

Thematic repetition plays a large part in the development and realization of this theme. The subject of mortality is prefigured in the *φύλα καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων* of line 3. This first occurrence is itself a structural repetition of the *ἔργα πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης* of line 1, repetition which brings out well the contrast of ideas, "deeds of golden Aphrodite" and "tribes of men who must die." The adjective *καταθνητός* occurs 12 times, 6 with *ἄνθρωπος* (5 gen. pl., lines 3, 122, 192, 200, 281, once dat. pl., line 52), 3 with *γυνή* (lines 39, 50, 250, all dat. pl. at end of line) and three times as a substantive in the first half of the line (lines 46, 51, 110). Once, where the notion of mortality is out of place, the formula *καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων* is varied to *χαιμαγενέων ἀνθρώπων* (line 108) and twice it is shortened to *θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων* (lines 35, 149).

<sup>25</sup> Schmid (*loc. cit.*, see note 11), following the majority of the nineteenth century editors, held the description of the nymphs to be "grundlos," but it is no flaw in the unity of a poem if a section which clearly illuminates a fundamental theme, as the description of the nymphs certainly does, stands in an oblique or tenuous relationship to the specific story in which it is incorporated. The nymphs here are the third member of a triad consisting of Ganymede, who possesses immortality and perpetual youth, Tithonus, who possesses immortality but not perpetual youth, and the Nymphs, who are mortal, but who never grow old (*ἀγήραοι*). Cf. H. Trüber, *op. cit.* (see note 12), p. 11. On the principle of triadic structure, seen here and in the hymns to Athena, Artemis, and Hestia (lines 7-33) see E. Drerup, *Homerische Poetik* (Würzburg, 1921), pp. 438 ff.

It has been demonstrated that the first three lines of the hymn to Aphrodite state the basic themes of the hymn and, in addition, establish phrases which, by their repetition, serve to develop the themes stated. In the fourth line is introduced a subsidiary theme, the *θηρία πάντα*, wild beasts who, like the flowers of the hymn to Demeter, are not mere ornament but have a symbolic value. The wild animal motif is developed to great effect (lines 4, 18, 68-74, 123-4, 159-160) but without recourse to thematic repetition, or rather such units of repetition as there are (cf. lines 74 with 124, 70 and 71 with 159) do not appear in the first statement of the theme.

One possible objection should be met in discussing thematic repetition. It may be held by some readers that, since the poet of the hymn to Aphrodite composed in formulae, as did Homer, repetitions of significant phrases are merely the inevitable result of the formulaic technique of composition and hence no artistic importance or aesthetic function should be attributed to them. Such a point of view appears to me to be inadequate. There is no doubt whatsoever that the formulaic technique of composition was, as Parry has shown, evolved to meet the needs of oral poets who must compose long poems without benefit of paper and ink, and sometimes, perhaps, extemporaneously, but to go on and assume, as Parry seems to, that the composing of hexameters was a mechanical matter, that there is no art of the formula, is ridiculous.<sup>26</sup> It is the old "causal fallacy," the arbitrary reduction of what is essentially an artistic phenomenon to non-artistic causes. In the case of the hymn to Aphrodite the thematic repetitions are all formulae well known to those who worked in the epic tradition. They are, however, so closely related to the themes of the poem and of such frequent occurrence that there can be no doubt that the poet,—whether with or without consciously formulated purpose is irrelevant to our present enquiry,

<sup>26</sup> Parry's point of view is summed up in his papers, "Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-Making," Part I, *H. S. C. P.*, XLI (1930), pp. 73-148, and Part II, *H. S. C. P.*, XLIII (1932), pp. 1-50. See also his "The Traditional Metaphor in Homer," *C. P.*, XXVIII (1933), pp. 30-43.

For criticism of Parry's position, with which the writer agrees, see G. M. Calhoun, *op. cit.* (see note 15) and "The Art of Formula in Homer," *C. P.*, XXX (1935), pp. 215 ff., and S. E. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer* (Berkeley, California, 1938), pp. 14-20.

—exploited these repetitions for the elaboration of his theme and that these manifold echoes and ensuing overtones were used to remind the reader continually of the general relevance of the specific incident in question and thus contribute to the value and artistic integration of the whole.

Scholars are rightly skeptical of those who think that they have discovered the "real" meaning of a poem, whether of Pindar or Shakespeare, by pseudo-cryptographic means or by placing a disproportionate emphasis on certain repeated syllables. I do not hold to the view that the analysis of repetition will reveal any meaning which is not otherwise apparent. Not all themes are developed with the aid of repetition and not all repetitions are thematic. The function of thematic repetition is ancillary. It is an aid in the expression of that which the whole poem expresses. Well used, as in the hymn to Aphrodite, it can contribute much to the development, clarification, and elaboration of the various themes of the work.

The units of thematic repetition are, by definition, closely integrated with the total meaning context of the poem. The meaning of the poem as a whole could be guessed from the repeated phrases alone. The next aspect of the function of repetition which I should like to consider is the organizational use of repetition, its place in marking the divisions and clarifying the arrangement of the composition. From this point of view the degree of integration of the units of repetition with the total meaning of the poem is irrelevant. The repeated elements may be key words or purely stereotyped phrases. In the hymn to Aphrodite they are usually thematic.

In discussing *ἔργον* above reference has already been made to the way line 6, by its repetitions from line 1, rounds off the introductory section of the poem. With line 7:

τρισσὰς δ' οὐ δύναται πεπιθεῖν φρένας οὐδ' ἀπατῆσαι

begins the section devoted to the three austere goddesses. This section is concluded with line 33:

τάων οὐ δύναται πεπιθεῖν φρένας οὐδ' ἀπατῆσαι

which, by repetition, both marks the end of one part of the poem and is, in a sense, resumptive. With line 45 the story begins:

τῇ δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γλυκὺν ἱμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ.

The following seven lines contain a digression in which the reasons of Zeus are given. Then comes:

*Ἀγχίστω δ' ἄρα οἱ γλυκὺν ἱμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ.*

Here the function of the repetition, apart, of course, from its thematic aspect, is almost purely resumptive rather than conclusive.

This structural, organizational effect need not depend on the repetition of words or phrases. If the units repeated are not far apart the effect can be obtained by syllabic assonance combined with repetition of line structure. Thus, when Aphrodite reveals herself as a goddess, Anchises addresses a short prayer to her beginning:

*ἀλλὰ σε πρὸς Ζηνὸς γυνάξομαι αἰγώχοιο* (line 187),

which is concluded three lines below with:

*γίγνεται ὃς τε θεαῖς ἐνάζεται ἀθανάτησι.*

Here the effect of the syllabic assonance between *γυνάξομαι* and *ἐνάζεται* is enhanced by the circumstances that they are both the same part of speech, both of the same metrical shape (— — —), both occur in the same position within the line, and both come between a noun and its modifier. One aspect of the function of this particular repetition is organizational, its use to conclude the prayer.

Apart from their purely utilitarian value for getting on with the story, so strongly stressed by Parry, this organizational function is surely an aspect of the use of repeated formulaic lines to introduce and conclude speeches, and of formulae of address. Our poet, like Homer, makes full use of such traditional lines. Compare lines 107-108 with lines 191-192, and line 143 with lines 155 and 291.

A function of repetition which is perhaps related to this organizational use is seen in cases where a speaker recapitulates, in the same words, the significant matter of the preceding speech, e. g., lines 145-148, or where a general description of the poet is repeated as the observation of a character; e. g., lines 82 and 85. This use is, however, essentially dramatic and is not specifically characteristic of the hymn to Aphrodite.

The units of repetition studied in our analysis of the thematic and organizational functions of repetition have been for the most part words, phrases, or even whole lines, i. e. units large enough, and possessing a sufficiently specific symbolic value, so that their effect will "carry." A line, or even a word, if the word be a key word, will be felt as a repetition even though many lines intervene between occurrences. The slighter types of repetition, e. g., of verse structure without syllabic assonance, or of a single syllable, have, naturally, a much more limited "carrying range." They are, furthermore, exceedingly various both in form and function. For their study I have, therefore, elected to analyze all the repetitions in a short passage rather than to attempt to analyze them by categories, selecting examples from throughout the hymn.

The passage so selected (lines 33-52) follows the appearance of Athena, Artemis, and Hestia.

- τῶν οὐ δύναται πεπιθεῖν φρένας οὐδ' ἀπατῆσαι·  
 τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐ πέρ τι πεφυγμένον ἔστ' Ἀφροδίτην  
 35 οὔτε θεῶν μακάρων οὔτε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.  
 καί τε παρὲκ Ζητὸς νόον ἤγαγε τερπικεραύνου,  
 ὅς τε μέγιστός τ' ἐστί, μεγίστης τ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς·  
 καί τε τοῦ εὔτε θέλοι πυκινὰς φρένας ἐξαπαφούσα  
 ῥηϊδίως συνέμιξε καταθνητῇσι γυναιξίν  
 40 Ἥρης ἐκλελαθοῦσα κασιγνήτης ἀλόχου τε,  
 ἢ μέγα εἶδος ἀρίστη ἐν ἀθανάτησι θεῇσι,  
 κυδίστην δ' ἄρα μιν τέκετο Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης  
 μήτηρ τε Πείη· Ζεὺς δ' ἄφθιτα μῆδεα εἰδὼς  
 αἰδοίην ἄλοχον ποιήσατο κέδν' εἰδυίαν.  
 45 Τῇ δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γλυκὺν ἱμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ  
 ἀνδρὶ καταθνητῷ μιχθήμεναι, ὅφρα τάχιστα  
 μῆδ' αὐτῇ βροτέης εὐνῆς ἀποεργμένη εἴη  
 καὶ ποτ' ἐπευξαμένη εἴπη μετὰ πᾶσι θεοῖσιν  
 ἥδ' ὅν γελοιήσασα φιλομμειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη  
 50 ὥς ῥα θεοὺς συνέμιξε καταθνητῇσι γυναιξὶ  
 καί τε καταθνητοὺς νύκτας τέκον ἀθάνατοισιν,  
 ὥς τε θεὰς ἀνέμιξε καταθνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν.

Lines 33, 34, and 35 all end in a word of 6 *morae* which begins with α. In lines 34 and 35 this produces the same collocation of ideas which was noticed in lines 1 and 3, "Aphrodite"—"Mortal men." The threefold repetition of π in line 33, picked up by the π's and φ's of line 34, perhaps should be considered solely as a phenomenon of the sound-stratum of the poem, i. e. of the poem

viewed as pure sound, but the play on the syllable *ων* in line 35, prefigured by the *τάων* and *τῶν δ' ἄλλων* of lines 33 and 34, clearly has, apart from its important contribution to the tonality of the line, a sense function, as does the recurrence of *θ* in the same line. The contrast of ideas, "gods" and "men," is sharpened by the use of similar sounds to describe them.

Lines 36-38 exhibit an ABA structural pattern. Both lines 36 and 38 begin with *καί τε* and end with a word of 8 *morae*.<sup>27</sup> In line 37 the superlative adjective *μέγιστος* is repeated, thus emphasizing the idea it contains. Furthermore every other word in the line is composed of letters found in *μέγιστος* or *μεγίστης*, apart from the *ρ* of *ἔμμορε*.<sup>28</sup> *ἐξαπαφούσα* of line 38 reëchoes, structurally, the *τερπικεραύνου* of line 36, but it also echoes the *ἀπατῆσαι* of line 33. The syllabic assonance, *απα—απα*, in the same metrical position, reinforces the similarity of meaning. *Ἐξαπαφούσα* is in turn picked up by *ἐκλεαθοῦσα* in line 40,—a case of sound repetition in a non-equivalent metrical position. The syllabic assonance between these three words, which all belong to the same semantic sphere, helps to establish the deceitfulness of Aphrodite, and therefore of love, as a local motif in the poem.

In line 39 the adjective *καταβνητῇσι* echoes the *θνητῶν* of line 35 and is in turn played upon by *κασσιγνήτης* and *ἐν ἀθανάτῃσι* in lines 40 and 41. In the case of line 41 the assonance and structural and syntactic repetition, *καταβνητῇσι γυναιξίν—ἐν ἀθανάτῃσι θεῇσι*, serves to point up the contrast of ideas as in lines 1 and 3 and, within a single line, in line 35.

Line 42 closely parallels line 22. Lines 42 and 44 both begin with molossic words (---) which have an identical final syllable (compare lines 11 and 13) and which both belong to the same general sense area. Lines 43 and 44 both end with forms of the participle of *οἶδα*, thus providing a verbal counterpart to the divine harmony of the Olympian royal couple.

With line 45 a new paragraph begins. This line restates a

<sup>27</sup> On the repetition of *καί τε* Baumeister (*op. cit.*, p. 255) writes, "Particulæ *καί τε* ter repetitæ brevi spatio interiacto, v. 30, 36, 38 certe inopiam quandam ingerii produnt." But this is to fail to recognize a favorite configuration of this poem. Cf. lines 1 and 3 and comment on lines 39 and 41, 42 and 44, and 50 and 52 below.

<sup>28</sup> For a discussion of this line from the metrical point of view see my "Early Greek Hexameter" *Y. C. S.*, XII.

fundamental theme, the "sweet desire" of love. In line 46 we have again the key word *καταθνήτός*, in this case in the first half of the line. Once more, as in the case of its appearance in line 39, it starts off a train of repetitions, but this time they are structural as well as syllabic. This is the first occurrence in the poem of a word which starts within the first foot and continues to the caesura of the third foot. There are twelve such words in the hymn. Four of them occur here in the space of 6 lines (46-51).

Lines 46-52 are dominated by the sounds of the "thematic" word *καταθνήτός*. Notice the six occurrences of the letter *η* in line 47, the choice of *φιλομμειδής* rather than *πολυχρύσον* as an epithet for Aphrodite in line 49, and the appearance of *καταθνήτός* itself once more in lines 50, 51, and 52, in each case balanced within the line by a word for an immortal containing the letter *θ*. In line 51 we have the same contrast of ideas, supported by assonance, *καταθνήτός*—*ἀθάνατος*, within a line which we noted above in lines 39 and 41, but there these same adjectives were in equivalent metrical positions in different lines. Line 50 repeats the last three-fourths of line 39 without change and line 52 is identical with line 50 except for the chiasmic change of gender and of the prefix of the verb. (The change from *συνέμιξε* to *ἀνέμιξε* has bothered some editors. Allen, Halliday and Sikes defend the change as dictated by variety. The best defense lies in the consideration of the syllable which immediately precedes the verb in each case. We have *θεοὺς συν-* and *θεὰς ἀν-*.) One effect of this complex patterning of sounds in lines 50-52 is to give body to the irony of the passage.

In this rather unsystematic and far from complete catalogue of repetitions in the passage selected we have noticed certain aspects of the use of assonance and structural echoes. One question asked was: "To what extent are the units of repetition integrated into the total meaning context of the passage?" Although it would be a mistake to think that sound in poetry can ever be entirely divorced from its symbolic "sense" function, some cases of repetition, e. g., of the *π*'s in line 33, seem to be almost purely phenomena of tonality with little reference to the development of meaning. In other cases, most conspicuously in the case of thematic repetition, the opposite is true. Here we can distinguish between cases where the units of repetition belong to



the same semantic sphere; e. g., *ἡπατήσας, ἐξαπαφούσα, and ἐκλεα-  
θοῦσα*, where the function of the repetition is to emphasize and  
elaborate the common symbolism of the repeated sound units,<sup>29</sup>  
and cases where the units repeated belong to opposite semantic  
spheres, e. g., *καταβλήτησι γυναιξίν* and *ἐν ἰθανάτῃσι θεῇσι*, where the  
function of the repetition is ironical, to point up the contrast.<sup>30</sup>  
However, any categories which we may devise in an attempt to  
analyze the artistic effect of repetition or the interactions between  
words must be highly tentative and cannot be expected to be more  
than crude aids to our understanding. The subtle echoes in the  
language of this hymn are an integral part of the poet's technique  
—that much we can assert—but they are only partially amenable  
to analysis in conceptual terms. Ultimately their manifold  
elaboration and complexity may be apprehended in full only by  
intuitive insight. This is not to minimize the value of the  
attempt at analysis, however, which must be made, particularly  
in view of the many erroneous doctrines which have been held  
on the subject of repetition in the past.

The hymn to Aphrodite has been called the most "Homeric"  
of the hymns both by its admirers<sup>31</sup> and, with a somewhat  
different meaning given to the term, by its detractors.<sup>32</sup> Win-  
disch and others have demonstrated the remarkable extent to

<sup>29</sup> Professor Wimsatt (*op. cit.* [see note 2c], *passim*) on the basis of  
his studies in Pope states as a general principle that rhyme is good in  
proportion to the degree of clash in meaning between the rhyming  
elements. The rhyme of noun with noun or participle with participle  
is flat. However true this may be of end-line assonance in the period  
of Pope, this principle is not valid for the less strictly conventional  
assonance of Greek poetry. Parallels in meaning are frequently sup-  
ported by close parallels in sound, in the odes of Pindar as in the Hymn  
to Aphrodite, and cannot be dismissed as prosaic.

<sup>30</sup> Where the unit of repetition is a word, the repetition usually, but  
not always, belongs to the class of repetitions within the same semantic  
sphere. Where the word involved has radically different meanings,  
either inherently as in the pun, or given it by different modifiers, the  
contrast may be the point of the repetition. Cf. on *ἔργα* (= both "love"  
and "war") above.

<sup>31</sup> Hermann, *loc. cit.*; Matthiae, *loc. cit.*; Teske, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 ff.;  
Mure, *loc. cit.*; Lang, *loc. cit.*: "quite the most Homeric in the collec-  
tion"; the Oxford editors (*The Homeric Hymns*, p. 350): "there is not  
room for originality in a style which follows the Homeric language so  
closely, but credit is due to the artist who caught the spirit of epos."

<sup>32</sup> Windisch, *loc. cit.*

which the hymn is composed of lines, half-lines, and phrases which also occur in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*<sup>33</sup> while Fietkau's tables prove the relative rarity of non-Homeric words in the poem.<sup>34</sup> These studies of Windisch and Fietkau, however, prove only that the composer of the hymn to Aphrodite drew from the same traditional store of formulae as did Homer for his raw material, not that he is in any way Homeric in his use of this raw material, and, in fact, the elaborately repetitive style of the hymn, with its richly textured pattern of sound and sense relationships and its constant reference by means of sound symbolism, from the specific to the general, is the very antithesis of the Homeric simplicity, directness, and clarity.

This can be illustrated by a comparison. At the end of the so-called "lay of Demodocus" Ares and Aphrodite, freed from the snare in which they were trapped, go off, he to the Thracians and she to Cyprus:

ἥ δ' ἄρα Κύπρον ἵκανε φιλομειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη,  
 ἐς Πάφον· ἔνθα δέ οἱ τέμενος βωμός τε θνῆεις.  
 ἔνθα δέ μιν Χάριτες λούσαν καὶ χρίσαν ἐλαίῳ  
 365 ἀμβρότῳ, οἷα θεοὺς ἐπενήνοθεν αἰὲν ἔοντας,  
 ἀμφὶ δὲ εἵματα ἔσσαν ἐπήρατα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι. (θ 362-366).

In her disgrace the goddess finds consolation in fine clothes and perfume and in the ministrations of her hand-maidens, the Graces. The passage is simply and beautifully composed and is marked by characteristically Homeric psychological insight. The technique is dramatic. We are told nothing of Aphrodite's feelings of shame. Her actions convey everything.

In the hymn, too, Aphrodite goes off to Cyprus. On her way to meet Anchises on Ida she stops off at her temple in Paphos to make herself attractive:

τὸν δὲ ἔπειτα ἰδοῦσα φιλομειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη  
 ἤρασάτ', ἐκπάγλως δὲ κατὰ φρένας ἵμερον εἶλεν.  
 ἐς Κύπρον δ' ἔλθοῦσα θνώδεα νηὸν ἔδυνεν  
 ἐς Πάφον· ἔνθα δέ οἱ τέμενος βωμός τε θνώδης·  
 60 ἔνθ' ἥ γ' εἰσελθοῦσα θύρας ἐπέθηκε φαεινάς.  
 ἔνθα δέ μιν Χάριτες λούσαν καὶ χρίσαν ἐλαίῳ  
 ἀμβρότῳ οἷα θεοὺς ἐπενήνοθεν αἰὲν ἔοντας,  
 ἀμβροσίῳ ἔδανῳ, τό ῥά οἱ τεθνωμένον ἦεν (H. Ven. 56-63).

<sup>33</sup> See references in note 12 above, and Windisch, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>34</sup> H. Fietkau, *De Carminum Hesiodicorum atque Hymnorum Quatuor Magnorum Vocabulis non Homericis* (Diss. Regimont, 1806).

Both poets use the same traditional phrases for describing a goddess at her toilet.<sup>35</sup> It is interesting to contrast the differences in their method of using this material. The *Κύπρον* of *θ* 362 occurs earlier in the line and is prefixed by *ἐς* (*H. Ven.* 58), producing parallelism with the beginning of the following line. Instead of *ἔκανε* the poet of the hymn uses the participle *ἐλθοῦσα*, which recalls the *ἰδοῦσα* of line 56 and prefigures the *εἰσελθοῦσα* of line 60 and, possibly, the *θεοὺς* of line 62. Because his subject came earlier the poet can, in the second half-line, introduce the theme of fragrance and achieve the fine assonantal collocation *ἐλθοῦσα θνώδεα*. Note also the four *ν*'s of this line. *H. Ven.* 59 is identical with *θ* 363 with one important exception: *θυῖεις* has become *θνώδεα* so that it will repeat the *θνώδεα* of line 58 and prefigure the *τεθνωμένον* of line 63 and the *εὐώδεα* of line 66. Between *θ* 363 and 364 (= *H. Ven.* 59 and 61) the poet of the hymn has inserted another traditional line (*H. Ven.* 60 = *Ξ* 169). By so doing he has achieved identical first words for lines 60 and 61 and a repetition of the sequence *ἐλθοῦσα θν*—of line 58. The poet may also have been attracted by the four *θ*'s of this line, a sound which, by now, has become associated with the idea of fragrance. Lines 61 and 62 are identical with *θ* 364, 365, but after line 62 the poet introduces a line (= *Ξ* 172) which begins with a variant of the same word with which 62 begins<sup>36</sup> and repeats once more the sounds *θνω* (in *τεθνωμένον*).

Let us assume for the moment that *H. Ven.* 58-63 is based on *θ* 363-365. The poet has made additions and alterations. The effect of these changes is to give the passage in the hymn to Aphrodite 6 consecutive lines which, in pairs, begin with sub-

<sup>35</sup> It is, of course, possible that the poet of the hymn to Aphrodite copied *θ* 363, 364, 365 (= *H. Ven.* 59, 61, 62) and *Ξ* 169, 172 (= *H. Ven.* 60, 63). In our present state of knowledge, however, it is much safer to assume a traditional origin for both of any two repeated passages. Cf. Calhoun, *op. cit.* (see note 15), p. 4, "I shall maintain definitely that the burden of proof rests upon those who hold that a repeated passage is not a formula, and that the cases in which we may hope to find the 'original' instance of a repetition must be relatively few." Professor Calhoun had in mind repetitions within the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but the dictum applies equally well to repetitions between any of the early hexameter texts.

<sup>36</sup> *ἀμβρόσιω* and *ἀμβροσίω* probably were identical in meaning for the poet. Cf. Allen, Halliday and Sikes, *ad loc.*

stantially the same word, and the every-other-line assonance *ἰδοῦσα*—*ἐλθοῦσα*—*εἰσελθοῦσα*—*θεοῦς*. Furthermore the idea of fragrance, already present in the *Odyssey* (*θυήεις* and *ἀμβρότω*), is developed by repetition to be the dominating theme of the passage. For the one appearance of *θυήεις*, *θυώδεα* is substituted and it or its cognates appear four times (lines 58, 59, 63, 66) while *ἀμβρότω* (line 62) is repeated in the *ἀμβροσίῳ* of the following line. If we look at this passage from the point of view of the compositional arrangement of the whole hymn, the poet is here developing a subordinate aspect of his general topic, the relationship between sex and scent, so well known to perfume manufacturers, and it is perhaps for this reason that he elaborated to such an extent the simple and straightforward description in the *Odyssey*.

Such a style in which sounds continually recoil upon one another and in which words are frequently used with a double reference would not be appropriate to the epic. It would seem intolerably turgid and the sharp outlines of action and of description would be blunted.<sup>37</sup> But such a style is appropriate in composing hymns. To demonstrate that the same method of composition can be proper in one work, improper in another, I must have recourse to the most general considerations of the fundamental nature of the hymn and epic genres.

The basic manner of treatment in the epic is dramatic.<sup>38</sup> The epic describes for their own sakes, and on an heroic scale, the results in action of human emotion and desire. "Wrath" as a general concept is not the subject of the *Iliad*, but the specific wrath of Achilles or, more particularly, the results in action of that wrath. The wrath and its consequences are events in history and are set in a temporal framework.

<sup>37</sup> Repetition of every type is common in Homer. Very frequent are repetitions of which the most important aspect is their contribution to tonality and what I have called "organizational" repetition. On thematic repetition see the papers of Jones and Sheppard referred to in note 15 above. The difference is one of quantity. The texture of the epic style is less closely packed with repetition. But this difference is basic. Compare W. B. Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1936), p. 128, "Homer . . . avoids all but the most elementary puns, plays upon words, and verbalism in general, which depend upon vagaries of meaning."

<sup>38</sup> Here, and in what follows, I must once more acknowledge my debt to Professor Greene (*op. cit.*, pp. 179 ff.) for terminology.

The basic manner of treatment in the *Works and Days* of Hesiod, on the other hand, is reflective. Despite the flimsy dramatic framework (the trial and the admonitions to Perses) the subject of the poem is an abstract and timeless aspect of human life, i. e., justice, with which is closely associated, in Hesiod's mind as in Benjamin Franklin's, careful husbandry. This "eternal" theme is developed by direct precepts and short fables. Emphasis is throughout on its normative nature, not on particular results.

The basic manner of treatment in the Homeric hymns is a unique synthesis of the dramatic and reflective manners. The gods in the hymns are not merely superior mortals, as they so often become in Homer, but each is thought of as an embodiment of one or more aspects of human life, i. e., vegetable increase, knavery, love, etc. In so far as the subject of a hymn is a god or goddess who serves as a symbol for some such abstract, timeless theme, the hymn is composed in the reflective manner of treatment, but in so far as this timeless theme is developed by a story with a temporal sequence of events, and in so far as this story is then narrated for *its own sake*, the manner of treatment is dramatic. Hymns vary in the extent to which one or another manner of treatment predominates.

The repetitive style of composition is too static for the dramatic manner of treatment, but was constantly employed in Greek poetry where a "timeless" theme was being developed.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore in a hymn in which the theme is developed by a story, repetition serves a special function. The perfection of the hymn form is found in the perfect synthesis of the dramatic and the metaphysical, the temporal and the timeless. It is a function of repetition, particularly of what I have called thematic repetition, to assist in this synthesis by exploiting the power of sound to conjure up images in the mind. The frequent repetition of sequences of sound which are associated with some aspect of the

<sup>39</sup> We may compare *H. Hom.* X, also to Aphrodite, which contains in 3 of its 6 lines the adjective *λεπτός* and the ABAAB arrangement of lines of *H. Hom.* XIV. Cf. also the play on *πᾶς* in the hymn with which the *Phaenomena* of Aratus begins, the play on *ῥεῖα* and the diphthong *ει* in *Works and Days*, 5-8. The lyric proem to Zeus of Terpander (*P. L. G.*, III<sup>4</sup>, p. 8) contains three verbal pairs, not to speak of additional syllabic assonance, in a total of only 20 syllables.

central theme, throughout the narration of particular incidents, serves to invite the listener to consider the relevance of the particular incident to the general theme. This repetition will, inevitably, on occasion hinder the flow of the tale, but this is a sacrifice which must be made for the larger purpose and meaning of the poem.

I have tried to show that repetition, far from being a blemish, is an integral part of the technique of the hymn style. Its use in the hymn to Aphrodite has contributed to making this hymn perhaps the most perfect in the collection from the point of view of formal unity, the synthesis of the temporal and timeless aspects of the theme and its development, and the subordination of every episode to the central plan of the work.<sup>40</sup>

Historically the style of the hymn to Aphrodite is significant as an example of the use of the formulaic technique of composition for purposes radically different from the purposes of epic style. Modern critics who castigate the repetition in the hymn do so for the same reason which leads them to criticize repetition in Homer. They are unconsciously using as a canon modern norms of composition where these norms do not apply. But comprehension of the Homeric technique in the use of formulae does not itself explain the repetitions in the hymn to Aphrodite. The hymn and the epic are distinct genres, each with its own characteristic conventions and aims. The use of repetition in the hymn to Aphrodite is much more elaborately developed as an aid in expression than in the epic. This more consciously elaborate development serves well the reflective, religious, philo-

<sup>40</sup> I do not want to appear to overstress the rôle of repetition in achieving this unity. However important an element in the "aesthetic surface" of a poem repetition may be, its function in the expression of artistic content is, as I have said, ancillary. Much more important is the ambivalent position of Aphrodite herself, who both symbolizes, and is the victim of, love, and the rigid discipline which leads the poet, to reject all matter irrelevant to his theme, e.g., the origin of specific cults or the association of the goddess with a particular locality. This purity of the theme led many scholars in the last century, who, seemingly, did not consider love an adequate subject for a poem, to assume that the hymn was written in honor of some princely descendant of Aeneas (a view most recently expounded by J. Humbert in the Budé edition of the hymns [Paris, 1936], p. 144), a referent which is not needed, is not in the poem, and which, were it in the poem, could only detract from its perfection.

sophic purposes of the composer of hymns, purposes which are quite distinct from the dramatic aims of Homer. The stylistic differences between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and the hymn to Aphrodite are thus, in a sense, a function of the differences in genre and type of subject matter.

Starting from the sound observation of Suhle to the effect that the style of the hymn to Aphrodite is remarkably repetitious, —a fact which underlies much of the adverse criticism of the poem during the last century,<sup>41</sup>—an attempt has been made to analyze systematically the use of repetition in the hymn. Purely formal categories of repetition were suggested but their value for the purpose of aesthetic analysis was held to be slight. On the other hand it was found to be impossible to devise functional categories of repetition of the either/or type. Nevertheless it was found possible to distinguish certain aspects of the use of repetition. These were, 1) the pure sound aspect, the effect of repetition on the tonality of the work; 2) the "organizational" aspect, the use of repetition to conclude a section within the work or to resume the narrative after a digression; and 3) the meaning aspect. Under this last heading cases were distinguished where the units of repetition were more, or less, closely integrated into the total meaning context and where the units of repetition belonged to the same, or to the opposite, semantic spheres. A comparison with Homer revealed that the technique of repetition is much more elaborately developed in the hymn to Aphrodite than in the epic, particularly of units of repetition which are in their meaning closely integrated into the total context of the poem. This difference, it was suggested, is a function of the difference in genre. Hymns are composed in what is a synthesis of the metaphysical and dramatic manners of treatment while the epic is purely dramatic.

H. N. PORTER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

<sup>41</sup> It is perhaps not altogether fanciful to see a connection between the eclipse of the reputation of the Hymn to Aphrodite and the publication of the preface to *Lyrical Ballads*. The Romantic concept of originality, which led to a rejection of the Eighteenth Century poetic diction, was also conducive to a misunderstanding of Greek poetic diction, a misunderstanding which is still widespread, particularly in studies of the early lyric poets.

## SOPHOCLEAN "ORTHODOXY" IN THE *PHILOCTETES*.

To the student of Greek thought this title may appear paradoxical, for it is doubtful that orthodoxy was a Greek phenomenon. Nevertheless, this concept or something like it has become attached to the tragedies of Sophocles. The greatest cliché in Sophoclean criticism is that Aeschylean thought is "theological," the Euripidean is "philosophical," and the Sophoclean is neither. There has been a continuous line of development from the biographical fact that Sophocles was pleased with life to the critical judgment that he was not concerned with the religious and philosophical implications of tragedy.<sup>1</sup>

There are different forms of this false idea. Some contain elements of truth. But no one of them and no combination of them describes Sophoclean thought adequately and precisely. Of course the most common notion is that the dramatist was serenely conventional and conservative.<sup>2</sup> This is sometimes carried to the absurd extreme of suggesting that his plays contain no deep thought.<sup>3</sup> On the other side, more serious attempts to understand his thought have led in two different directions. According to one version, belief in the nothingness of human existence is the prevailing religious feeling,<sup>4</sup> whereas more commonly ad-

<sup>1</sup> For the relationship of these two things, see C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford, 1944), pp. 356-8.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, J. W. Mackail, *Lectures on Greek Poetry* (London, 1910), pp. 155-6; C. H. Moore, *The Religious Thought of the Greeks* (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1925), p. 100; T. B. L. Webster, *An Introduction to Sophocles* (Oxford, 1936), p. 54; P. W. Harsh, *A Handbook of Classical Drama* (Stanford Univ., 1944), p. 94.

<sup>3</sup> There is an incredible picture of Sophocles as a real "pagan" in N. P. Vlachos, "Some Aspects of the Religion of Sophokles," *Reformed Church Review*, ser. 4, X (1906), p. 190: "His whole religious system,—if system it can be called,—is hopelessly superficial. And this accords well with the little we know of his personality: a man of sound physical constitution, of cheerful temperament, and of epicurean proclivities, a genial companion, easy-going and anxiously guarding the happy medium between the two extremes of the too-much and the too-little,—such is not the stuff religious prophets are made from."

<sup>4</sup> This view reaches an extreme in Schmid-Stählin, I, 2 (Munich,



vanced is the view that his attitude is primarily optimistic. The latter conception is particularly insidious. It has a certain amount of justification on the surface, yet it produces ideas which misrepresent not only Sophoclean thought but also Greek thought as a whole. Consider the following statement: Sophocles "represented the past, the present, and the future, the providence and government of God, and the character and destiny of men, idealized but not distorted or discolored, just as they were mirrored in the pure and tranquil depths of his own harmonious nature."<sup>5</sup> This sweet religiosity has very little to do with Sophocles. Even when the idea is treated with some restraint, there is danger in emphasizing the tranquillity and imperturbability of Sophocles.<sup>6</sup> Since tragedy is primarily concerned with the various forms of evil which affect human existence, the state of imperturbability is not *per se* conducive to the creation of drama which can properly be called tragedy.

Against the ingrained tradition that the dramatist's ideas are conventional and superficial, there has been long-overdue revolt in recent years. One real contribution is a Harvard Phi Beta Kappa Prize Essay which demonstrates the poet's critical thinking concerning the concept of *ἀρετή*.<sup>7</sup> Bowra's recent book presents Sophocles' dramatic material as a body of substantial thought, although it has some limitations in my opinion.<sup>8</sup> And P. H. Epps has in general terms expressed militant opposition to the view that Sophocles was conservative.<sup>9</sup> The traditional appraisal of these tragedies must be thoroughly reexamined if

1934), p. 310 where it is said that before the Sophoclean gods, "sinkt der Mensch tief in den Staub." Such an idea is quite un-Sophoclean.

<sup>5</sup> W. S. Tyler, *The Theology of the Greek Poets* (Boston, 1867), p. 267. See also J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (Edinburgh, 1908), p. 173; W. W. Hyde, "Sophocles' Place in Greek Tragedy," *Classical Studies in Honor of John C. Rolfe* (Philadelphia, 1931), p. 141.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, A. and M. Croiset, *Histoire de la Littérature Grecque*, III (2nd ed., Paris, 1899), p. 232 and W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I (2nd ed., Berlin and Leipzig, 1936), p. 346.

<sup>7</sup> J. A. Moore, *Sophocles and Areté* (Cambridge, 1938).

<sup>8</sup> For one thing, Bowra emphasizes the piety of Sophocles without examining adequately the philosophical basis of his religious attitude. There is a tendency to represent Sophoclean thought as being like that of Theognis.

<sup>9</sup> "Sophocles: Mere Conservative or True Seer?," *Studies in Philology*, XLII (1945), pp. 427-39.

their high quality is to be understood. The *Philoctetes* is an important part of this problem because it embodies the poet's ideas at a stage of full development and contains ideas which have produced serious misconceptions.

It is illuminating to survey the various theories suggested concerning this play, particularly in the older, less familiar literature of programs and dissertations which have contributed to accepted opinions.<sup>10</sup> Most noteworthy is the correspondence between the interpretations of this particular play and the generic ideas just described. According to some, the *Philoctetes* is not a tragedy at all:<sup>11</sup> it is a psychological study, a play of intrigue, a romance, or pleasant fiction. If this view is considered inadequate, as of course it is, the alternative has been to explain that the play is intended to justify some kind of moral order. In the various interpretations along this line of thinking, there is imputed to Sophocles a kind of thought which is essentially moralistic: namely, the *Philoctetes* shows that individual interests must be sacrificed to the common good;<sup>12</sup> or that disease causes neglect of social responsibilities from which only the gods can rescue a man;<sup>13</sup> or simply that divine will is to prevail.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Those here cited are available in the Princeton University Library.

<sup>11</sup> J. P. E. Greverus, *Würdigung der Tragödie Philoktet des Sophokles in ästhetischer Hinsicht nebst einigen Bemerkungen über den griechischen Text* (Progr. Oldenburg, 1840), p. 8; M. Zavaddal, *Wodurch wird die Überlieferung, das Sophokles den Philoktetes im höchsten Greisenalter geschrieben, im Stücke selbst bestätigt?* (Progr. Mitterburg, 1887), p. 7; Mackail, *op. cit.*, p. 163; J. Herzer, *Sophokles' Philoktet. Uebersetzung nebst Einleitung zur aesthetischen Würdigung des Dramas, und mit Anmerkungen zur Textkritik* (Progr. Zweibrücken, 1906), p. v; H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study* (London, 1939), p. 305.

<sup>12</sup> K. Schwenck, *Ueber des Sophokles Philoktetes* (Progr. Frankfurt am Main, 1844), pp. 3 and 13 where we find the incredible view that Odysseus appears as a man should be in relation to his "Vaterland"; J. A. Schäfer, *Sur le Philoctète de Sophocle* (Progr. Meseritz, 1867), pp. 10-11. There are many echoes of this idea, such as the notion that Philoctetes is only a martyr for the common good, found in N. Wecklein, *Ausführlicher Kommentar zu Sophokles Philoktet* (Munich, 1913), pp. 31-2.

<sup>13</sup> J. E. Rieder, *Über den sophokleischen Philoktet* (Progr. Herberstein, 1852), p. 18.

<sup>14</sup> J. La Roche, *Über die Grundidee des Philoktet von Sophokles*

Other variations are that the play hinges on the victory of piety,<sup>15</sup> that it shows the victory of truth over lies,<sup>16</sup> or—observe the un-Greek tone here—that it introduces the concept of loving one's enemy later fulfilled in Christianity.<sup>17</sup> In any interpretation, the most crucial question is the significance of Heracles' appearance as *deus*. This appearance has been called arbitrary and needless, or a concession to the audience accustomed to Euripides' use of the device, or justifiable in order to reconcile the drama with accepted myth and to effect poetic justice. One scholar solved the problem by declaring the exodos spurious.<sup>18</sup> Still another suggestion—typical of much modern criticism because it disregards the historical fact that we are dealing with drama of the fifth century B. C.—is that the *deus* may "figure a change of heart which has taken place in Philoctetes" through a kind of exorcism.<sup>19</sup> Actually, of course, proper interpretation will neither explain the *deus* away in this fashion nor invest the appearance of Heracles with un-Greek religious meaning.

In general, the subject matter of the *Philoctetes* has produced the view that social and religious values are here elevated in spite of the individual's status, and that Sophocles puts through a conventional solution which depreciates the thought and character developed in the body of the play. In this kind of thinking about Sophocles, there is often at least a strong undercurrent of feeling that his ideas are uncritical and unphilosophical just because they are founded on religious belief. This is where comparison with Aeschylus and Euripides comes strongly into play, because Sophocles does not attack theological issues directly, in the Aeschylean manner, nor does he set himself

(Progr. Graz, 1856), pp. 1 and 14; L. Campbell, *Sophocles*, II (Oxford, 1881), pp. 360-1.

<sup>15</sup> R. Herkenrath, *Die Handlung in Sophokles' Philoktet und ihr Bühnengott Herakles* (Progr. Feldkirch, 1917), p. 31. This is also essentially the idea of Bowra, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-306.

<sup>16</sup> H. Abeken, *Die tragische Lösung im Philoktet des Sophokles* (Berlin, 1860), p. 8.

<sup>17</sup> W. H. Kolster, *Ueber den Philoktet des Sophokles* (Progr. Itzehoe, 1844), p. 16.

<sup>18</sup> A. Patin, *Ästhetisch-kritische Studien zur Sophokles* (Paderborn, 1911), pp. 110-17.

<sup>19</sup> E. Wilson, "The Wound and the Bow," *The New Republic*, CIV (1941), p. 551.

against religious views philosophically as Euripides often does. However, this is not equivalent to saying that Sophoclean thought is characterized by insensitivity to basic philosophical issues. Analysis of the intellectual content of the *Philoctetes* should help to clarify this very fundamental point.

Clearly the basic orientation of our play is toward the problem of Philoctetes' evil condition. This primary issue emerges gradually. In the prologue, Neoptolemus is confronted with a choice between the demands of patriotism and the demands of honesty. The nobility and moral sensitivity of his nature appear clearly. Some naïveté and inadequate understanding are also revealed. For example, he is moved by the argument that he will achieve fame if he can forget his scruples for a day. His only reaction to the plight of Philoctetes is to argue that such an incapacitated opponent can easily be taken by force (91-2).<sup>20</sup> The conflict is simply between Odysseus' utilitarian view that the end of patriotic service justifies the means of using stratagem and Neoptolemus' instinctive feeling that Philoctetes should be dealt with openly. We shall presently see how this issue is broadened and deepened. The moral question of honesty flows out into the religious and philosophical question of Philoctetes' suffering and of justice.

This larger issue is initiated in the prologue when pitiful signs of Philoctetes' condition are discovered and when Odysseus describes the victim's disease and the violence of his pain (7-11).<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the responsibility for dealing with the issue is placed firmly upon Neoptolemus in the parados where he, now left in charge by Odysseus, gives orders to his uncertain men. There is also suggestion of the high responsibility which will fall upon the young man, for the tragic issue involved in his experience with Philoctetes is intimated. Neoptolemus now for the

<sup>20</sup> References are to the Oxford edition of A. C. Pearson.

<sup>21</sup> This description is colored by the statement that Philoctetes was abandoned under orders of Odysseus' superiors because his cries of pain interfered with the conduct of ceremonies. It is important to note the implication that Philoctetes' state is religiously impure. This is the kind of easy answer which Odysseus imposes upon Neoptolemus. There is no time for thought about this now. All attention is concentrated upon the immediate question of how the political mission is to be accomplished.

first time uses his imagination to depict Philoctetes' painful existence (162-8). The victim's lot mystifies the chorus.

But Neoptolemus replies that the suffering of the man is no cause for wonder. Heaven has so willed, that Troy may not fall until the appointed time (191-200). This is a very flat answer. In this unexamined form, it sounds like the kind of "orthodoxy" which the critical tradition attributes to Sophocles. However, if Sophocles were not concerned with the issue of Philoctetes' suffering and of justice, or if the view which Neoptolemus expresses were regarded by Sophocles as an adequate answer, there would be little purpose in the subsequent development of the tragedy which probes this issue deeply. We shall see that Neoptolemus is led to think more inquiringly than this.

He is quite unprepared for the greatness of Philoctetes. He has been led to think of Philoctetes impersonally, as an obstacle to his mission which somehow must be circumvented. But Philoctetes' high quality immediately appears. Especially important for their effect upon Neoptolemus are the fundamental patriotism of Philoctetes, his love for Achilles, and his knowledge of the young man's upbringing. And above all, he appeals strongly as a human in distress by his shame for his wild appearance, his hunger for the sound of a friendly voice, and excited flood of questions when he learns that the strangers are Greeks. Neoptolemus is brought one stage nearer to the actual experience of Philoctetes who recreates his emotions when he awoke to find himself deserted (276-84) and describes his pitiful life on the island.

The effect of his story is marked by the chorus' expression of pity (317-18). But Neoptolemus is more concerned with describing his own pretended mistreatment. His tale is told artfully and with compcsure. The hypocrisy of his role is accentuated by the spirited recrimination of his "enemies" and the pretense of reluctance to rehearse his mistreatment (329). There must be some uncomfortableness for him when Philoctetes learns that Achilles has died, and is uncertain whether to listen to Neoptolemus' story or to lament the dead; to this Neoptolemus replies that Philoctetes has enough to mourn in his own sufferings (339-40).

In Philoctetes' mind, the belief that he and Neoptolemus

have common enemies establishes a personal relationship between them. The self-sufficiency compelled by his experience is softened by increasing trust in Neoptolemus. Further evidence of his out-going humanity is revealed in his curiosity concerning the fate of individuals in the Greek army, and in his grief for the dead. Coupled with this is bitterness that noble men die, while evil live, and pessimism because the gods seem to promote this order of things. He concludes (451-2):

ποῦ χρὴ τίθεσθαι τὰυτα, ποῦ δ' αἰνεῖν, ὅταν  
τὰ θεῖ' ἐπαινῶν τοὺς θεοὺς εὖρω κακοῦς;

Notable here is the philosophical depth of his feeling and thought. There is implicit a desire to believe, a desire to praise the ways of the gods. But he finds them evil. This is the spirit of the questions which Sophocles is probing in this tragedy.<sup>22</sup>

The test of strength between the natures of the two men now begins in earnest. Neoptolemus attempts to force Philoctetes to leave the island by saying that he must return to Scyros. Philoctetes impassionately begs that they take him along, although he is pitifully aware that he is no pleasing passenger; he argues that Neoptolemus' reputation is at stake. This direct plea for mercy ends with a kind of warning that Neoptolemus must save him in view of the fact that human life is unstable and mutable (501-6). This is to say that Neoptolemus must view Philoctetes' predicament philosophically, as being in the nature of human life.

The two men move to examine the cave before their departure,

<sup>22</sup> A completely different interpretation of this passage is advanced by Bowra, *op. cit.*, p. 295: Philoctetes "is on the way to doubting the justice of the gods, like the impious man condemned in the *Agamemnon*. He is almost guilty of one of the three forms of impiety noted by Plato, that the gods exist but do not care for men. . . . The more pious members of the audience would feel a shock of disapproval." In my opinion, this is grave misunderstanding. Characteristically, the Greeks were not self-conscious about such attitudes as that of Philoctetes here; had they been, they would not perhaps have made such great contributions to the history of thought. Moreover, although this attitude of Philoctetes is finally resolved in the play, the significant thing is that Sophocles presents Philoctetes' skepticism as a natural, thoughtful reaction to his evil experience, and develops a solution which is philosophical rather than, let us say, "evangelical."

but are interrupted by the appearance of the merchant. Here for the first time in the play, the prophecy of Helenus is reported in some detail. Philoctetes learns of the prediction that Troy cannot be taken without him, but there is no mention of the fact that his disease will be cured. His reaction to the thought of being returned to Troy is violent. If Neoptolemus had hoped that Philoctetes might later be won over to this by persuasion, he is now better advised. Only deception or force are possible means to this end. For Philoctetes, the belief that he and Neoptolemus now share imminent danger cements their personal relationship.

As Neoptolemus' experience approaches its climax, we may review the development thus far. Philoctetes has been delineated as a man worthy of respect. The effect of his suffering is revealed in his recrimination of the Atreidae and Odysseus, his desire for retribution, his suspicions. There is a spirit of deep questioning in him. There is an indurate quality. But he has endured and has maintained his intellectual vigor. He shows breadth of sympathy, affection, even tenderness toward Neoptolemus. There is an eager spirit and sensitivity to kindness.

This nature is having a profound effect upon Neoptolemus. There arises a strong conflict between Philoctetes' claim for just treatment and the demands of public interest in accord with the divine will that Troy shall now fall. The patriotic feeling of Neoptolemus remains strong, but the assumption that only the success of the political mission matters has been severely challenged. Natural ambition for glory is seen to conflict with his increasing sense of responsibility toward an afflicted fellow human. His original scruple against deceit upon the basis of principle alone is deepened. It now appears that the moral issue comprehends more than the question of whether to act with honesty or with deceit as a means to an end. The question of honesty has become the question of justice. And the evil of Philoctetes' suffering exists under an order of things in which the gods rule. Thus the moral issue of justice is ultimately a religious issue. And yet, over against this greater understanding in Neoptolemus stands the fact that the gods will that Troy now fall. Neoptolemus will soon cry (908): *ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δράσω.*

In treating the scene which contains Philoctetes' paroxysms of

pain, it is important to combat the notion that he here shows weakness. The view that a tragic hero should not cry out in pain has been influenced by Cicero's remarks about the Philoctetes of the Roman play: "Num igitur fortem virum, num magno animo, num patientem, num gravem, num humana contemnentem potes dicere aut Philoctetam illum. . . ." <sup>23</sup> This attitude has its proper value in the Stoic philosophy, of which Cicero is here the proponent, but it is quite inadequate by itself as a critical principle applied to tragedy, especially Greek tragedy with its quality of directness, and specifically the *Philoctetes* which depicts pain honestly. It is not in the nature of tragedy to scorn *humana*. Such matters must of course be treated with dignity, and the dignity of Philoctetes is certainly sustained in this scene. He attempts to conceal his pain and resists as long as he can. Even in this condition he is alert to the problem of safeguarding the bow, and binds Neoptolemus with the promise that he will not relinquish the weapon. Philoctetes maintains control of the situation, gives directions to Neoptolemus, describes how his attacks of pain soon pass into exhausted sleep, even prays that the bow will not cause Neoptolemus any trouble, exacts the promise that he will not be deserted—and sinks to the ground in exhaustion.

This intense suffering expresses in immediate, physical terms the evil which is basically the subject of this tragedy. That is the real significance of Philoctetes' cries. We are given to see what Philoctetes has to endure, and to understand its effect upon his nature. The dramatic mechanics of this phenomenon consist in its effect upon Neoptolemus. Throughout the tragedy he has been brought ever closer to understanding Philoctetes' predicament. He now sees its physical manifestation. He is slow to understand what is happening. His pity is deep (755 and 759-60). Yet the mission is very much on his mind. He answers Philoctetes ambiguously (775 and 779-81). Philoctetes suffers more pain and appeals for death. Neoptolemus is silent, but when prodded says simply (806): ἀλγῶ πάλαί δὲ τὰ πρὶ σοὶ στένων κακά. His responsibility to Philoctetes is rising in sharper opposition to his hope of glory, and loyalty to the Greek army.

<sup>23</sup> *Tusc. Disp.*, II, 14, 33; cf. II, 23, 55: *Philocteteus ille clamor*.



When Philoctetes awakens, events move swiftly. His deep gratitude, courage, and humility are more than Neoptolemus can bear. He has been unfaithful to his nature. He attempts to explain that his purpose in taking Philoctetes to Troy is two-fold: first, to save him from his evil; and second, to sack Troy with him (919-20). It is important to note that there is now greater depth in his purpose: through association with Philoctetes, the range of his experience has been extended. He has come to understand Philoctetes' experience and is driven to reach a decision which will enable him to treat Philoctetes justly. There is now a balance between his concern for Philoctetes and his feeling of patriotic responsibility.

This balance is upset in the two stages of the action which follow. First, Philoctetes' claim upon Neoptolemus is powerfully reiterated. When Neoptolemus refuses to restore the bow, Philoctetes bursts forth in a magnificent tirade against his deceit, and appeals to his pity and honor. The young man replies by again admitting the pity which has been growing in him (965-6). Philoctetes begs, before the gods, that Neoptolemus show pity and avoid reproach (967-8). Neoptolemus cries out in desperation (969 and 974); Odysseus now appears.

In this, the second stage, the dilemma confronting Neoptolemus is illuminated by the opposition of Philoctetes' case and Odysseus' attitude. The latter speaks roughly to Neoptolemus; he admits that he sponsored the deception, and threatens violence. He attempts to plead that he is fulfilling the will of Zeus. With spirited dignity Philoctetes reproaches him for having corrupted Neoptolemus. The gods will punish him, if justice is their concern (1035-6). Odysseus refuses to make a serious reply. His creed is opportunism and victory.

The effect of this scene is to discredit the opportunistic view represented by Odysseus. It is clearly revealed to Neoptolemus that this view is inadequate as an answer to the issue with which he is confronted. He will still try earnestly to effect a solution consistent with his patriotic duty and with divine will concerning Troy. But if this duty can be carried out only by dishonorable means, his patriotic responsibility is outweighed by a higher responsibility. Odysseus said that he was following the will of Zeus. After his fashion, Odysseus was right. But Philoctetes

has a just claim for deliverance. And his refusal to go to Troy is a product of his strength and suffering. For the sake of justice, then, his refusal cannot be considered lightly or circumvented by any expedient. It must be met in a manner consistent with the dignity of Philoctetes.

While all this is working in the mind of Neoptolemus, who has now departed with Odysseus, the central fact of Philoctetes' desperation is raised to an even higher degree of emotional content. He is tortured by recollection of his pain and by the prospect of being left alone again. His only recourse is violent death. Philoctetes is now nothing (1217). Presently, however, he is restored to a worthy position in so far as lies in human power. Odysseus cannot shake Neoptolemus from his decision to restore the bow. He has been unjust (1234). Justice will now be done (1246 and 1251). From this decision comes a new kind of strength and sureness. He faces down Odysseus' show of violence, and calls Philoctetes from the cave.

The scene which follows is the culmination of the experience in which Neoptolemus has been confronted with the tragic fact of the evil suffered by Philoctetes, and through which his natural nobility is strengthened with mature understanding. For Philoctetes, the scene brings the answer, in human terms, to his claim for just treatment. But this solution is not adequate as an answer to the question of ultimate justice for him: he must still endure disease. Moreover, there is the question of justice for Neoptolemus. There arises a disproportion between what Neoptolemus deserves for his nobility and what his future contains because of Philoctetes' refusal to go to Troy. This stubbornness assumes the proportions of abnormality when Philoctetes rejects the prospect of health and fame willed for him by the gods. It is an obsession caused by his suffering. As such it is an obstacle to the wholeness of view achieved at the close of the play. But it is important to emphasize that nothing like the Christian concept of sin is involved in the portrayal of his state of mind. His obstinacy, like his challenging attitude toward the gods, springs from strength. This is a distinctively Hellenic view of human personality which insists upon the validity of the individual will.<sup>24</sup> In testing the traditional view of Sophoclean thought

<sup>24</sup> In much that has been written concerning this play, there is a

against the meaning of the *Philoctetes*, it is crucial to understand the significance of this scene. It reveals the philosophic basis of the religious view embodied in the tragedy.

The incident of the scene is simple and natural, quite in the Sophoclean manner. When Philoctetes comes from the cave, he appears stunned and preoccupied. The betrayal of his confidence has deepened his bitterness and disbelief. Therefore when Neoptolemus makes trial of his resolution to remain on the island, Philoctetes is violently firm. Neoptolemus realizes the futility of pleading further at the moment and returns the bow, attesting his sincerity by a mighty oath (1289). The religious feeling expressed in this oath shows the importance which he attaches to his act; he has struggled over this decision and is acting according to his understanding of right. His composure and reflectiveness contribute largely to the dignity which he achieves. When Odysseus attempts to interfere, in the name of the Atreidae and the Greek army, Neoptolemus restrains Philoctetes from violence, observing with quick, sure moral perception that violence is contrary to their honor (1304).

The brief appearance of Odysseus, discredited though he is, serves to emphasize the claim of public interest. Neoptolemus is very much aware of his patriotic duty and of the purpose of the gods. He sees, moreover, that Philoctetes can receive final deliverance only by consenting to go to Troy. Now that the youth has rehabilitated his honor and the confidence of Philoctetes, he attempts soberly and firmly to persuade Philoctetes, reproving him for clinging to his misery unreasonably. Calling Zeus to witness, Neoptolemus reports the prophecy of Helenus in detail, and urges Philoctetes to yield for two reasons: first, that he may be healed, and second, that he may win renown (1345-7).<sup>25</sup> Again, if this argument is compared with the atti-

strong tendency to impute guilt to Philoctetes. This tendency may be a product of two factors: misunderstanding and idolatry of the Aristotelian concept of *harmatia*; and confusion of Greek and Christian attitudes. Beyond this, it seems impossible to argue that Philoctetes is guilty in any meaningful sense, in view of evidence within the play, such as lines 683-5.

<sup>25</sup> To explain the origin of Philoctetes' trouble, Neoptolemus uses the phrase *ἐκ θείας τύχης* (1326). Substantially, this seems to follow the earlier view that the gods are working to postpone Philoctetes' arrival

tude toward Philoctetes at the beginning of the play, it will be seen that a significant change has taken place. The opportunistic political view imposed upon Neoptolemus has been rejected, and the selfish aspect of his ambition dispelled. The main point of presenting Helenus' prophecy is to show the only hope of complete deliverance for Philoctetes. The attitude toward him is not based simply on the fact that he and his bow are required to take Troy, but recognizes that his nature and experience demand that he be treated with compassion and respect.<sup>26</sup>

The refusal of Philoctetes leaves no alternative, and the two men begin their departure to Scyrós. Neoptolemus is concerned for Philoctetes' condition, and apprehensive of criticism and physical danger, but is reassured by Philoctetes that he and his arrows will protect them. They start off in a grim spirit of mutual dependence and confidence. It is noteworthy that Sophocles has the two men work out their own answer, the best which is possible under the circumstances. For both the men, this is a dignified solution, and all the more so because it is counter to the public interest and the will of the gods.

There is no compromise of this dignity in the appearance of Heracles. The process of the resolution can be seen clearly in terms of the fact that Heracles is in the Greek sense a hero. As a man, he appeals directly to Philoctetes his comrade, and carries the argument which Neoptolemus has already well advanced by his nobility. As a god, Heracles is the spokesman of Zeus

in Troy until the appointed time (191-200). What is important, however, is the conviction embodied in the play that the case of Philoctetes is not to be treated lightly just because there is a mechanical reason for his plight. Moreover, this view does not assign any guilt to Philoctetes. In general, the external or accidental form of evil affecting human lives is more common in Sophocles than in Aeschylus or Euripides. Sophocles makes clear his understanding that adversity often is not caused by crime or even mistake.

<sup>26</sup> This accords with the condition set in Helenus' prophecy that Philoctetes must be brought to Troy voluntarily (612 and 1332). Here we can see how Sophocles used his dramatic material. This detail of the prophecy is submerged, apparently by Odysseus' decision that Philoctetes could not be persuaded (cf. 617-18), and Sophocles develops this attitude toward Philoctetes dramatically, that is, by making it the product of Neoptolemus' personal experience with Philoctetes.

and communicates his purposes beyond any shadow of human questioning, even in the embittered Philoctetes. This combination of kindness and authority dissipates the tensions and misunderstandings which have grown out of the evil experience of Philoctetes.

Looking more deeply, we find that Philoctetes is not censured for impiety, nor commanded to sacrifice himself to the common good, nor subjugated by superior power. Nor does the *deus* serve merely to reconcile the drama with accepted myth or to effect poetic justice. There is a fundamental organic relationship between the body of the play and the conclusion. From the standpoint of dramatic mechanics, Heracles in a natural way changes the decision of the two men to go to Scyros. Analysis has shown that this decision is the culmination of the experience shared by Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. Sophocles shows how this experience produces a relationship conducted according to human understanding of right and justice. He does this with the greatest possible emphasis by carrying the process to the point where Neoptolemus renounces his whole purpose because of regard for Philoctetes, that is, to the point of dramatic impasse.

The impasse is resolved in a manner which preserves the significance of the relationship worked out by the two men. In the final stage of the play, Philoctetes learns to trust the gods. But this idea is only intimated by Heracles (1418-22; cf. 1440-4) and has been urged explicitly by Neoptolemus (1374; cf. 1316-17 and 1387). This is only one aspect of the fact that human and divine forces are fused in the play. The same fusion is basic in the process by which final justice is brought about for Philoctetes. The essential purpose of the *deus* is to announce the purposes of Zeus which alone can release Philoctetes from disease, and to accomplish their fulfilment by presenting them in terms which are acceptable to Philoctetes. They are made acceptable by the intimate tie between Heracles and Philoctetes. This relationship works to reverse the decision worked out by Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. But there has developed between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus the same kind of relationship based upon respect. The two relationships possess much the same value. As a result, the good will of the gods toward Philoctetes and the good will of his friends are joined, and final deliverance comes

to him from the gods in concert with the dignity which characterizes his relationship with Neoptolemus and with Heracles.<sup>27</sup>

It is quite clear that this thought is distinctively Greek and distinctively Sophoclean. The parallel often drawn between the Book of Job and Greek tragedy is particularly relevant to the case of Philoctetes because we have in both the same situation of an innocent man who suffers and is finally restored to normalcy and favor. But when the ideas involved in the solutions of the two cases are contrasted, the fundamental difference between the two modes of thought appears. Job possesses the same high spirit found in Philoctetes, and insists upon the recognition of his integrity. But solution of his case comes through Jehovah's assertion of his omnipotence, inculcation of humility in Job, and fiat restoration of Job to his property and family. To the Greeks it was not a sin under stress to cry out against the gods. The issue must be met. The Greek poet would not make a man say, as Job says (42, 6): "Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes." So in the *Philoctetes* we find that Sophocles presents a solution which is essentially religious but is significantly different from the Hebrew since it is based upon the premise of human worth and is effected in terms of this premise.<sup>28</sup>

It is equally clear that Sophocles puts his own interpretation on the story by using the material in a unique way. His major innovations were to represent Lemnos as uninhabited, to portray Philoctetes as inexorably deaf to human persuasion, and to introduce Neoptolemus.<sup>29</sup> From these changes come the main features of his tragedy: the desolation of Philoctetes, his strength of will, the religious interposition, and the interplay of character

<sup>27</sup> The validity of this analysis is shown by the closing words of Philoctetes in farewell to the island. They are not spoken in humility, but are filled with a pleasant feeling of attachment to Lemnos and with joy at the prospect of health and glory. Also, the mutual dependence of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus is remarked by Heracles (1436-7).

<sup>28</sup> There is an interesting, though substantially false, comparison of Job and Philoctetes in A. Vogel, *Quid de Fato Senserint Judaei et Graeci, "Jobo" et Sophocli "Philoctete" Probatur* (Diss. Greifswald, 1869). Here Philoctetes is accused of impious arrogance, and Sophocles is considered inferior to the Old Testament writers because of his "fatalism." Vogel concludes (p. 29): "Quamvis sit admirandus Sophocles: 'Jobum' certe componere non potuit." This is certainly true.

<sup>29</sup> See Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-9.

which is the core of the tragedy. From these new elements Sophocles created his interpretation in which human and divine agencies are united to solve the problem of Philoctetes' predicament. It is also significant that very similar thought is found in the *Oedipus at Colonus* where there is the same kind of indurate bitterness caused by suffering and the same kind of resolution combining the good will of Theseus and the good will of the gods. These two late plays together show a stage of thought in which Sophocles was concerned about the question of what ultimately happens to a man who has been subjected to evil. In each case, he shows his conviction that there is a final solution, and that an ultimate answer must be religious and must satisfy the claims of the hero as a human being.

Finally, there must be some appraisal of the thought found in this play. There is no doubt that the play is based upon a genuine religious attitude. It shows belief in the supremacy and wisdom of the gods whose purposes are ultimately realized. Moreover, the fulfilment of their purposes is a final solution in the sense that it at once solves the social demands of public interest and the individual needs of both Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. There is also belief in the primacy of piety as the words of Heracles show (1442-4). So far we have substantially the traditional view of Sophocles. But this does not suffice. It is quite false to regard these ideas as superficial in Sophocles. His religious view is genuine and deep because it is based firmly upon philosophical understanding. The whole play is oriented upon the fact that Philoctetes has been subjected to evil and suffers unjustly. This fact shapes all the ideas which emerge from the play. Impact with this fact develops the nobility of Neoptolemus and leads him to a high concept of ἀρετή.<sup>30</sup> It is basically because this fact is slighted by Odysseus' strategy that his way of thinking is discredited as a distortion of religious and patriotic motives. And the interposition of Heracles not only releases Philoctetes from disease, but, as we have seen, preserves the value of the attitude which association with Philoctetes' adversity has developed in Neoptolemus. In this way, the tragedy receives its unity and significance from the process by which human and divine purposes, seemingly at odds, are brought

<sup>30</sup> See Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-8.

together to resolve the issue in a manner which satisfies both divine intent and human spirit. Here we have the Sophoclean conception that human and divine forces, philosophical and religious values, interpenetrate and fulfil each other. This view is unlike anything found in Aeschylus or Euripides. Intellectually, it is solid humanistic thought.

The simplicity by which Sophocles achieves this solution must not obscure the thought on which the solution is based. Criticism must come alive to the fact that there is a unique problem in interpreting Sophocles. Often his work is described as if it resembled a quiet pool. And this analogy is appropriate, for there is in his work a surface simplicity and smoothness. But the essential problem is to penetrate the smoothness and to discern the depth which is there.

NORMAN T. PRATT, JR.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY.



## STOIC LOGIC AND THE TEXT OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS.

The text of Sextus Empiricus contains a number of corrupt places which can easily be corrected by reference to a few of the technical terms and elementary concepts of Stoic logic.<sup>1</sup> It is the aim of the present paper to prove this assertion with respect to a certain class of cases and, in so doing, to show that any future editor of Sextus ought to have a clear understanding of Stoic logic.

In each of the cases to be considered, the unsound passage occurs in a context in which Sextus states or refers to a certain very important principle of Stoic logic. As will appear below, a comprehension of this principle is sufficient to enable one to reconstruct the text with practical certainty, and consequently we shall proceed at once to give an explanatory account of it. The principle is as follows: *an argument is valid if and only if the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose consequent is the conclusion is logically (i. e., necessarily) true.*<sup>2</sup> All of the technical terms occurring in the above statement will now be defined, and examples will be adduced to illustrate their meaning.

According to the Stoics, propositions (*ἀξιώματα*)<sup>3</sup> may be

<sup>1</sup>The best published account of Stoic logic is that of J. Lukasiewicz, "Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik," *Erkenntnis*, V (1935), pp. 111-31.

<sup>2</sup>This principle is described and referred to in many different places in the writings of Sextus. One of the best is *Adv. Math.*, VIII, 415 ff. See also *ibid.*, 426; *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, II, 113, 137 ff.

<sup>3</sup>In translating Stoic technical terminology into English I have rendered each term by the corresponding English technical term from the language of modern logic. Sometimes the results of this method are not at all unusual (for instance, "*σύνδεσμος*" is translated by "connective"), but sometimes the reader may feel that it leads to unhappy results. Thus, I have translated "*ἄπλοῦν ἀξιωμα*" as "atomic proposition" and "*σὺν ἄπλοῦν ἀξιωμα*" as "molecular proposition." This procedure is justified, however, by the fact that in all cases we possess Stoic definitions which agree *exactly* with those of the corresponding modern terms. Furthermore, it is a startling fact that the Stoics were so consistent in the use of their technical terms and so sophisticated

divided into two classes: those that are atomic ( $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ ), and those that are molecular ( $\omicron\chi$   $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ ). An atomic proposition is one which is built up out of subject ( $\pi\tau\acute{\omega}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ) and predicate ( $\kappa\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\acute{o}\rho\eta\mu\alpha$ ), without the help of a logical connective ( $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ ). A molecular proposition, on the other hand, consists either of two occurrences of a single proposition or of different propositions and is always recognizable by the presence in it of one or more logical connectives.<sup>4</sup> These logical connectives are "and" ( $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ ), "or" ( $\eta$ ), "if" ( $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  or  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\pi\epsilon\rho$ ), "since" ( $\epsilon\pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota$ ), and the like.<sup>5</sup> Examples of atomic sentences are "it is day," "it is light," "Socrates is walking," "somebody is walking." Examples of molecular propositions are "if it is day, it is light," "it is day and it is light," "Socrates is walking or Socrates is sitting," "if it is day and it is light, I am conversing," "if it is day, it is day," and so forth.

The molecular propositions, in turn, are classified on the basis of the connectives they contain at the "main break." Thus, there is the conditional ( $\sigma\upsilon\nu\eta\mu\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ ), the conjunction ( $\sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\epsilon\pi\lambda\epsilon\gamma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$  or  $\sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\lambda\omicron\kappa\acute{\eta}$ ), and the disjunction ( $\delta\iota\epsilon\zeta\epsilon\upsilon\gamma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ ), according as the main connective is "if," "and," or "or," respectively.<sup>6</sup> (There are several other types, but since only "conditional" and "conjunction" occur in the principle to be explained, we shall confine our attention to them.) In accordance with what we have said, then, the Stoics define a conditional ( $\sigma\upsilon\nu\eta\mu\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ ) as a molecular proposition compounded by means of the connective "if"; for example, "if it is day, it is day," or "if it is day, it is light."<sup>7</sup> In a similar fashion, a conjunction ( $\sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\epsilon\pi\lambda\epsilon\gamma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$  or

from the point of view of logic, that when the logical fragments are translated into English in the manner described, the results read like extracts from a text in modern logic.

<sup>4</sup> Sextus, *Adv. Math.*, VIII, 93 ff.; Diog. L., VII, 64, 68; Galen, *Institutio Logica* (Kalbfleisch), 12. 8; see also *S. V. F.*, II, 182.

<sup>5</sup> Diog. L., VII, 57, 58, 71, 72; Sextus, *Adv. Math.*, VIII, 108 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Diog. L., VII, 71 ff.; *S. V. F.*, II, 182.

<sup>7</sup> Sextus, *op. cit.*, 108 ff.; Diog. L., VII, 72. There is no doubt that in Stoic logic the term " $\sigma\upsilon\nu\eta\mu\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ " always meant a proposition of "if . . . then . . ." form, i. e., a conditional. It was never used to refer to any sort of argument, syllogistic or otherwise, despite Bury's assertion that "the term  $\sigma\upsilon\nu\eta\mu\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$  ('combination') mostly means the 'hypothetical, or major, premiss of a hypothetical syllogism,' but sometimes the whole syllogism" (Loeb translation, I, p. 246, n. a).

*συμπλοκή*) is defined by the Stoics as a molecular proposition compounded by means of the connective "and."<sup>8</sup> As is evident, conditionals and conjunctions always contain at least two component propositions, though these might be two occurrences of the same proposition. In a conditional, that component which immediately follows the connective "if" is called "the antecedent" (*τὸ ἡγούμενον*); the other component is called "the consequent" (*τὸ λήγον*).<sup>9</sup> The antecedent in each of the two conditionals mentioned as examples immediately above is "it is day"; the consequent of the first is also "it is day," while the consequent of the second is "it is light." There were no technical terms for the parts of a conjunction, which were called merely "*τὰ ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ*."<sup>10</sup>

We have now defined the terms "conditional," "conjunction," "antecedent," and "consequent." The remaining technical terms involved in the principle are "argument," "premise," "conclusion," and "valid"; and fortunately there are also extant Stoic definitions for all of these. An argument (*λόγος*) is a system (of propositions) consisting of premises and a conclusion.<sup>11</sup> The premises (*λήμματα*) are those propositions which are agreed upon for the sake of establishing the conclusion, and correspondingly, the conclusion (*συμπέρασμα* or *ἐπιφορά*) is the proposition which is established from the premises.<sup>12</sup> Thus, for example, in the argument

If it is day, it is light.  
It is day.  
Therefore, it is light.

the last proposition is the conclusion and the others are premises. It is important to remember that an argument is always a group of two or more propositions, while a molecular proposition, though it contains other propositions as components, is itself

<sup>8</sup> Diog. L., VII, 72.

<sup>9</sup> Sextus, *op. cit.*, 110, 304; Diog. L., VII, 73, 80; Sextus, *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, II, 111 ff., 148 ff., 189 ff. See also Ioannes Philoponus, *In An. Pr. Comm.*, ed. Wallies, p. 242, lines 27 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Sextus, *Adv. Math.*, VIII, 226; *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, II, 158; Diog. L., VII, 80; Galen, *Institutio Logica*, pp. 15, 33.

<sup>11</sup> Sextus, *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, II, 135; Diog. L., VII, 45; Sextus, *Adv. Math.*, VIII, 301, 386, 388.

<sup>12</sup> Sextus, *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, II, 136; cf. Diog. L., VII, 76.

just one proposition. We must not confuse, for instance, the conditional "if it is day, then it is light" with the argument

It is day.  
Therefore, it is light.

An argument is valid (*συνακτικός* or *περαντικός*) provided that the negation of the conclusion is incompatible with the conjunction of the premises. That is to say, an argument is valid if and only if it is not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Otherwise, the argument is called "invalid" (*ἀπέραντος*).<sup>13</sup> For example, the first argument mentioned in the preceding paragraph is valid, while the following argument is invalid:

If it is day, it is light.  
It is light.  
Therefore, it is day.

Sextus tells us that the latter is invalid precisely because it is possible, supposing that it is night and that the light is on, for both premises to be true and the conclusion false.<sup>14</sup>

With the foregoing explanation and definitions it should not be difficult to understand the principle under discussion. It will be convenient to illustrate it by means of a particular case.<sup>15</sup> Consider the following argument,

If it is day, it is light.  
It is day.  
Therefore, it is light.

Now, according to the principle, this argument is valid if and only if the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose consequent is the conclusion is logically (i. e., necessarily) true. Let us construct the conditional. Its antecedent is the conjunction of the premises, i. e.,

If it is day, it is light; and it is day.

or

It is day and if it is day, it is light.

Its consequent is the conclusion of the argument, namely,

It is light.

<sup>13</sup> Diog. L., VII, 77.

<sup>14</sup> Sextus, *Adv. Math.*, VIII, 420 ff.

<sup>15</sup> This case is discussed by Sextus at *Hyp. Pyrrh.*, II, 137.

Putting the antecedent and the consequent together to form the whole conditional, we get

$a$ : If (if it is day, it is light; and it is day), then it is light.

or

$a'$ : If (it is day and if it is day, it is light), then it is light.

Thus, according to the principle, the argument is valid provided that conditional  $a$  (or  $a'$ ) is necessarily true.<sup>16</sup>

It is hoped that the preceding discussion has been sufficient to make plain the sense, if not the importance, of the Stoic principle. For the purposes of reconstructing the text, it is not requisite that the importance of the principle be established, and consequently the reader must be referred to other places for that information.<sup>17</sup> The point to observe here is that an argument (which is a set of two or more propositions) is said to have the characteristic of validity just in case a certain conditional (which, however complex, is still a single proposition) has the characteristic of necessary truth.

In several places Sextus gives substantially the foregoing explanation of the Stoic principle. For obvious reasons, he usually illustrates his general discussion by means of a particular example, as we have done. But in consequence of this, he also has to formulate "monstrous"<sup>18</sup> conditionals like  $a$  and  $a'$ . In

<sup>16</sup> The reader may be puzzled by the fact that Sextus' statements of the principle always say merely that the conditional must be true, not "necessarily true." This is due to the circumstance that Diodoran implication, which the examples reveal to be the type of implication here used, is so defined that a conditional is true if and only if it is necessarily true. I hope to explain this explanation at length elsewhere.

<sup>17</sup> The principle is closely akin to what Quine calls "the rule of conditionalization" (*A Short Course in Logic*, mimeographed, Harvard Co-op Society, 1947) and to what is known in the literature as "the deduction theorem." Its significance in Stoic logic depends largely on the fact that the Stoics had an "axiomatic" system of inference-schemas, i. e., they took certain types of argument as basic, and they "reduced" (proved) others by means of these basic arguments. They claimed that their system was complete, i. e., that every valid argument could be reduced to the basic arguments; hence they had a means of defining "valid argument" without referring to the truth of the characteristic conditional. Consequently, the principle was neither trivial nor "circular," as Sextus claimed.

<sup>18</sup> As they are properly called by Heintz (*Studien*, pp. 62-3, 195).

Greek, where no parentheses were available, these would appear as follows:

α.: ἔπερ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ φῶς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστίν.

α': εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ φῶς ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστίν.

That sentences such as these did not come through the gauntlet of scribes and editors unscathed, will surprise no one.

82. 25-6.<sup>19</sup> This passage should read ἔπερ <εἰ> ἡμέρα ἐστὶ φῶς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡμέρα ἐστί, [καὶ] φῶς ἐστίν. Sextus has just finished saying that a (demonstrative) argument is valid whenever its conclusion follows from the conjunction of its premises as a consequent follows from an antecedent. He then gives an example, as is his custom, consisting firstly of an argument and secondly of the conditional corresponding to the argument. The argument given is:

εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, φῶς ἐστίν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστίν.

φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν.

Therefore, the conditional must be the one stated above. The καὶ which I have bracketed could be retained without spoiling the sense, but the four parallel cases and the characteristic exactitude of the Stoics in matters such as these make the deletion justifiable.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Numbers will refer to page and line of Bekker's edition of Sextus. Emendations will be made with respect to Mutschmann's edition.

<sup>20</sup> The reading I have proposed is practically the same as that of Heintz (*Studien*, pp. 51-2). Rüstow's attempt (see Mutschmann, II, Praefatio, p. xviii) to make sense of the text by inserting quotation marks is entirely unsuccessful, unless we are to suppose that Sextus suddenly and unaccountably interrupted his discussion to recite the standard Stoic examples of conditionals and conjunctions. Bury (Loeb translation, I, p. 223, n. c) brackets out the entire passage concerned and conjectures "possibly we should read—'It is day; and if it is day it is light; therefore it is light'—thus merely transposing the premisses of the preceding syllogism." Not only would this have no relevance to the general principle which Sextus tries to illustrate, but also there is no precedent in Stoic logic for the half-argument, half-conditional expression proposed. The Stoics, unlike their editors, were always clear on the distinction between an argument (λόγος) and a conditional (συνημμένον).

Manuscript T omits καὶ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ φῶς ἐστίν, but this would be only slightly better than Rüstow's proposal.

88. 7. Here I propose: *εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ φῶς ἐστι, <φῶς ἐστιν>*. This case is as clear as one could possibly desire. In the lines preceding 88. 7 Sextus states the following: "Some arguments are valid, and some are not valid; they are valid whenever the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose consequent is the conclusion, is true; for instance, the previously mentioned argument<sup>21</sup> is valid, since 'it is light' follows from the conjunction of its premises, 'it is day; and if it is day, it is light,' in this conditional . . ."—then follows the corrupt text. We see, therefore, that if the entire passage is to make sense, "this conditional" must be a conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose consequent is the conclusion, i. e., the conditional proposed above.

Two of the manuscripts, M and E, have exactly the reading which is required. Significantly, Mutschmann does not follow these, since the final *φῶς ἐστι, φῶς ἐστι* appears to him to be a duplication. This shows well enough how unlikely it was that our conditional should have survived the scribes and editors, and one must account it a miracle that the correct reading is actually to be found in two of the extant sources.<sup>22</sup>

88. 19-20. Here we should have the conditional, *εἰ νύξ ἐστι καὶ εἰ νύξ ἐστι σκόρος <ἐστὶ, σκόρος> [ἄρα] ἐστίν*. The context is as

<sup>21</sup> The previously mentioned argument is:

If it is day, it is light.

It is day.

Therefore, it is light.

<sup>22</sup> Mutschmann offers [*εἰ*] *ἡμέρα ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἐστίν*. This would be a conjunction, not a conditional. *A fortiori*, therefore, it would not be a conditional with the requisite antecedent and consequent. Rüstow's proposal is, as Heintz says, "unbegreiflich." Heintz (*Studien*, p. 62), following Pappenheim, reads *εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἐστι, <φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν>*, which contains one serious error. The word *ἄρα* never occurs in a conditional; it is rather the sign of the conclusion of an argument. But even apart from the meaning of the passage, the presence of *ἄρα* at 88. 20 is not a reason for inserting an *ἄρα* here, but rather the absence here and in all other parallel cases is a reason for deleting the *ἄρα* there. Bury, combining all the mistakes of the others, reads: [*εἰ*] *ἡμέρα ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἐστίν <φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν>*. Lukasiewicz (*op. cit.*, p. 128, n. 9) uses the correct reading without explicitly mentioning it.

follows. Sextus is explaining a further subdivision of the valid arguments into those that are "true" and those that are not.<sup>23</sup> "Of the valid arguments, some are 'true,' and some are not 'true'; 'true,' whenever not only is there a true conditional consisting of the premise-conjunction and the conclusion, as we said before, but also the premise-conjunction, which is the antecedent in the conditional, is true . . ." Then Sextus proceeds to give an example of an argument that is valid but not "true." "For such an argument as the following is valid,

If it is night, it is dark.  
It is night.  
Therefore, it is dark.

since the following conditional holds"—here the corrupt text—"but the argument is not 'true.' For the conjunctive antecedent is false, since it contains the false conjunct 'it is night' . . ." Thus, once again we need a conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose consequent is the conclusion; we therefore need the reading proposed above.<sup>24</sup>

377. 21-2. This time, it is probable that the conditional should be <εἰ> νύξ ἐστὶ καὶ εἰ νύξ ἐστὶ σκότος ἐστὶ, <σκότος ἐστίν> as is read by von Arnim,<sup>25</sup> whom Heintz<sup>26</sup> follows. The context is closely similar to those which we have described in the other cases, and we know that the above conditional is at least under discussion. Mutschmann's proposal (followed by Bury) to delete all of the disputed words except the σκότος ἐστίν, leaves us with a perfectly intelligible text in which the conditional is referred

<sup>23</sup> The Stoics used the word "true" in different senses, as applied to propositions and as applied to arguments. I shall put the word in quotation marks whenever it applies to arguments. It will be seen that the notion of a "true" argument is defined by means of the notion of a true proposition.

<sup>24</sup> Mutschmann, following Rüstow, reads [εἰ] νύξ ἐστὶ, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἐστὶ σκότος <ἐστίν> ἄρα ἐστίν. But if the εἰ is removed, the result is no longer a conditional and would certainly not be what Sextus calls "τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο." Heintz (*Studien*, pp. 62-3) again follows Pappenheim's version, which is acceptable except for the occurrence of ἄρα. But of all the dozens of examples we possess of Stoic συνημμένα, not one contains the word ἄρα; whereas, in every example of a Stoic argument this word introduces the conclusion. Bury prints what is merely an inaccurate version of Rüstow's erroneous proposal.

<sup>25</sup> *S. V. F.*, II, 239.

<sup>26</sup> *Studien*, pp. 195-6.



to but not stated explicitly. However, it seems better to keep this passage analogous to the four other parallel cases, and there is a small advantage in adding three words instead of deleting six.<sup>27</sup>

378. 24. The conditional should be: *εἰ φῶς ἐστὶ καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ φῶς ἐστίν*, *<ἡμέρα ἐστίν>*, exactly as Kochalsky<sup>28</sup> and Heintz<sup>29</sup> suggest. In this case, Sextus is engaged in showing that the following argument is invalid (and hence, not "true"):

If it is day, it is light.  
It is light.  
Therefore, it is day.

To do this, he applies the principle by constructing the characteristic conditional and by showing that it is possible for this conditional to be false. But if we follow Mutschmann and Bury, we must suppose that Sextus did not even succeed in forming the characteristic conditional and that, far from giving anyone a lesson in logic, he only exhibited his own carelessness.<sup>30</sup>

BENSON MATES.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

<sup>27</sup> Kochalsky (*De Sexti Empirici Adversus Logicos Libris Quaestiones Criticae* [Dissertation, Marburg, 1911], p. 91) suggests that the words *νῦξ ἐστὶ καὶ εἰ νῦξ ἐστὶ* be removed, as Mutschmann does, but that they be reinserted into the text after *συμπλοκῆς* in line 20. This requires further that the inserted words be followed by an addition of *σκότος ἐστὶ*. Like Mutschmann's solution, this method yields good sense, but the simpler proposal is more attractive. Rüstow's long addition corrupts the sense hopelessly and need not be discussed.

<sup>28</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

<sup>29</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 197.

<sup>30</sup> Mutschmann prints *εἰ φῶς ἐστὶ, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστίν*, which isn't even a proposition, much less a conditional, much less a conditional of the type Sextus refers to, as "*τὸ συννημμένον τοῦτο*." Bury reads *εἰ φῶς ἐστὶ καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστίν <ἡμέρα ἄρα ἐστίν>*, erroneously ascribing the addition to Kochalsky. Bury's insertion of the *ἄρα* shows that here, as everywhere, he does not distinguish between an argument and a conditional.

# PATRONS PROVIDING FINANCIAL AID TO THE TRIBES OF ROMAN ATHENS.

Lost among the many other contributions of Dow's basic study *Prytaneis*,<sup>1</sup> the determination that *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1073 and 1074 are contiguous fragments of the same inscription has gone practically unnoticed. Yet it now becomes one of the most interesting documents for the student of Roman Athens. The inscription contains part of a prytany catalogue and of a modified prytany decree which honors the Athenian millionaire Tib. Claudius Atticus and the heiress his wife Vibullia Alcía in return for certain benefactions. In my opinion as in that of my distinguished predecessors, Kirchner, Graindor, and Dow, a date around 120 A. D. accords best with prosopographical indications and with spatial requirements for the imperial titles of line 7. Omitting line 1 and the catalogue, I reproduce the tenor of the decree with some alteration of Dow's text.

- 2 Ἐπειδὴ οἱ πρυτάνεις τῆς Αἰαντίδος οἱ ἐπὶ ----- ἄρχοντος καὶ]  
οἱ ἀΐσκειτο ἐπα[ίνεσαντες καὶ στεφανώσαντες τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν Σεβασ]  
τῶν διὰ βίου Τι Κ[λαύδιον Ἀττικὸν Μαραθῶνιον ἀποφαίνουσιν τὸν ταμίαν]  
5 τῇ βουλῇ τὰς τ[ε θυσίας τεθυκέναι ἀπάσας τὰς καθηκούσας ἐν τῇ πρυτ]  
νείαι καὶ τὴν γυ[μνασιαρχίαν ἡχέναι ----- τεθυκέναι δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ]  
Αὐτοκράτορος [Καίσαρος Τραιανοῦ Ἀδριανοῦ Σεβαστοῦ αἰωνίου διαμονῆς]  
καὶ τοῦ σύμπαν[τος οἴκου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν πρυτάνεων καὶ ἀισίτων καὶ τῆς ἐξ Ἀ]  
ρείου πάγου βου[λῆς καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν ἐξακοσίων καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναί]  
10 ων, ἐπιμεμελῆσ[θαι δὲ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν κατὰ τὴν]  
πρυτανείαν ὧν [προσέταττον οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα, εἰς δὲ τὸ μήποτ' ἐλ]  
λείπειν εἰς τὴν [----- κα]  
τ' ἔτος εἰς τὰ Σϛ[-----]

Restorations: 2 οἱ ἐπὶ, ἄρχοντος Dow; *cetera* Koumanoudes (*Ἀθήραιον*, 1879, 400). 3 τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν Σεβασ Premierstein *apud* Kirchner; *cetera* Koumanoudes. 4 ἀποφαίνουσιν Koumanoudes; *cetera* Graindor (*B. C. H.*, 1914, 415). 5 Koumanoudes. 6 γυ[μνασιαρχίαν Graindor (*Album*, 35); γυ[ναῖκα αὐτοῦ Οὐιβουλλίαν Ἀλκίαν τεθυκέναι? ὑπὲρ τοῦ Dow; *cetera* Oliver. 7 αἰωνίου διαμονῆς Oliver; *cetera* Kirchner. 8 καὶ τῶν πρυτάνεων καὶ τῶν ἀισίτων Dow; *cetera* Koumanoudes. 9 βου[λῇ Koumanoudes; *cetera* Dow. 10 ἐπιμεμελῆσ[θαι δὲ καὶ Koumanoudes; μεγαλοπρεπῶς Dow; *cetera* Wilhelm *apud* Kirchner. 11 αὐτοῖς οἱ νόμοι προσέταττον Wilhelm; καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐγ[λείπειν Dow; εἰς δὲ τὸ μήποτ' ἐλ]λείπειν Oliver. 12 τὴν [σωτηρίαν Dow; κα]τ' Koumanoudes.

<sup>1</sup> S. Dow, *Prytaneis, A Study of the Inscriptions Honoring the Athenian Councillors*, pp. 193-197, No. 121 (= *Hesperia*, Supplement I [1937]).

- μερισμὸν καὶ τη[-----θρη]
- 15 σκωδεσάτα Σ[-----καὶ διὰ ταῦτα παρακαλοῦσιν τὴν βουλὴν ἐπιτρέψαι ἑαυ]  
 τοῖς χαλκῶν ἀν[δριάντων ἀνάθεσιν ----- location ----- καὶ ἐπι]  
 γραφὴν ποιῆσ[ασθαι τήνδε ὃ Τὶ Κλαύδιον Ἀττικὸν Ἡρώδην Μαραθῶνιον καὶ Οὐ]  
 ἰβουλλί[α]ν Ἀλ[κίαν ἢ Αἰαντὶς φυλὴ εὐνοίας ἔνεκεν καὶ εὐεργεσίας τῆς εἰς]  
 τ[ὴν πατρίδα ὅπως οὖν καὶ ἡ βουλὴ φαίνεται τοῖς εὐεργέταις τοῦ δήμου]
- 20 ἀπ[ονέμουσα τὴν προσήκουσαν χάριτ ὃ ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ ὃ δεδόχθαι τῇ βουλή]
- ἐπαιν[έσαι ὡς εὐεργ]έτας τῶν π[ολιτῶν ὄντας τὸν ἀρχιερέα Τι Κλαύδιον Ἀτ]  
 τικὸν Μα[ραθῶνιο]ν καὶ Οὐβουλλί[αν Ἀλκίαν καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτοὺς χρυσῶι]  
 στεφάνω[ι ὡς πάτρι]ό[ν] ἐστιν στεφανο[ῦν τοὺς εὐεργέτας τοῦ δήμου ἐπιτετρά]  
 φθαι δὲ κα[ὶ τοῖς πρ]οτάνοις τῆς Αἰαν[τίδος καὶ τοῖς ἀισείτοις ἀναστῆσαι αὐτῶν]
- 25 ἀνδριάντ[ας καθ]ὼς προέγραπται· [ἀναγράψαι δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸν κατὰ πρυτανεί]  
 αν γραμμα[τέα ἐ]ν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ κα[ὶ στήσαι -----]

14-15 Oliver. 16 ἀν[δριάντων] Graindor; ἀνα[γραφῆν] Koumanoudes; ἐπι[γραφῆν] Kirchner; cetera Oliver. 17 ποιησ[αμένους] Graindor; ποιή-σ[αντας τήνδε· Τιβέριον Κλαύδιον Ἀττικὸν Μαραθῶνιον] Feyel (R. E. A., 1938, 334); ποιήσ[ασθαι, Τι, Ἡρώδην, καὶ Oliver. 18 Οὐ[ὶ]βουλλί[α]ν Ἀλ[κίαν] Koumanoudes; cetera Oliver. 19 Oliver. 20 ἀγα[θῇ] τύχῃ δεδόχθαι τῇ βουλήι lacuna Dow; ἀπ[ονέμουσα τὴν προσήκουσαν χάριν] Oliver. 21 ἐπαιν[έσαι τοὺς εὐεργ]έτας τῶν [πολιτῶν Τιβέριον Κλαύδιον Ἀτ] Dittenberger (I. G., III, 3 and p. 479); πολιτῶν καὶ σωτήρας τοῦ δήμου Wilhelm; ἐπαιν[έσαι ὡς, ὄντας τὸν ἀρχιερέα] Oliver. 22 καὶ στεφανῶσαι Graindor; cetera Dittenberger. 23-26 Dittenberger.

The decree honors Tib. Claudius Atticus for his services to the prytanizing tribe, not for his services as high priest of the imperial cult. He had been treasurer and as such had performed both *munera patrimonii* and *munera personalia*.

The reports of post-Sullan prytany decrees honor the treasurer 1) for the expense to which he has gone in offering the regular sacrifices in behalf of the public welfare, 2) for the good performance of his routine duties.

The report of this decree does exactly the same, but it praises the treasurer for additional services so that we have a reference to one additional matter inserted in the midst of the *munera patrimonii*, and we have another addition after the reference to his good performance of the routine duties. In pre-Sullan prytany decrees references to additional services, usually sacrifices at a festival, are occasionally recorded in the "first" decree. So Insert I is not quite unique. In consideration of the Hellenistic precedents and of the presumably topical arrangement of the document, the most obvious interpretation of Insert I is that it records an expenditure in connection with a festival.

In line 6 Dow made the interesting restoration, καὶ τὴν γυν[ναῖκα αὐτοῦ Οὐβουλλίαν Ἀλκίαν τεθυκέναι? ὑπὲρ τοῦ], the end of which might have read also ἤχθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ]. Dow argues that Vibullia Alcia must be mentioned somewhere in the report since she receives great honor in lines 17-18. This is true, but she may have been mentioned (or implied) in lines 13-15. Dow's restoration of line 6 introduces the wife into the middle of a section concerning the service of Atticus as treasurer of the prytaneis. I believe that it was the treasurer Atticus and not his wife who sacrificed in behalf of the imperial family, just as in Macedonian times the treasurer sacrificed in behalf of the royal family.<sup>2</sup> Graindor's<sup>3</sup> restoration γυν[μνασιαρχίαν, which even in classical Athens was a costly and voluntary expenditure in connection with a festival, can be more easily defended. In the absence of contributions elsewhere the problem of financing the torch race at the festival may have embarrassed the Council, and the expense may have been assumed by the treasurer of the prytaneis. These funds were hard to raise until a few years later when the emperor Hadrian solved the problem for the Athenians by establishing an endowment, the income of which defrayed the expenditure.<sup>4</sup> That the gymnasiarchy was of some concern to the prytaneis is clear from the pre-Hadrianic prytany document published in *Hesperia*, XI (1942), p. 37, No. 7, where the name of the gymnasiarch was recorded in the heading.<sup>5</sup> The phrase restored in the text is restored on the assumption that the formula γυμνασιαρχεῖν, κτλ., is here replaced by a circumlocution, perhaps to avoid an unused perfect tense. The phrases χορηγίαν ἄγειν and δαπάνην ἄγειν provide analogies for the verb.

In lines 10-11, as Wilhelm recognized, the reference is to the good performance of routine duties, but his or Kirchner's restora-

<sup>2</sup> S. Dow, *Prytaneis*, p. 10. More than by his restoration of line 6 I am impressed by Dow's general conclusion on pp. 14-15, "The treasurer's primacy . . . is not difficult to explain. . . . it was the treasurer who offered the sacrifices."

<sup>3</sup> P. Graindor, *Album d'inscriptions attiques d'époque impériale*, p. 35 (= Université de Gand, *Recueil de Travaux publiés par la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres*, LIII [1924]).

<sup>4</sup> P. Graindor, *Athènes sous Hadrien* (Cairo, 1934), pp. 45-47.

<sup>5</sup> At a somewhat later date the heading of prytany catalogues occasionally recorded the name of the panegyriarch, who during the prytany undertook extraordinary expense at a festival. The cases are parallel.

tion of line 11 comes from decrees which honor all the prytaneis, not just the treasurer. In a report concerning the treasurer alone the plural *airois* must be either omitted or replaced by the singular. Of course in Dow's text the plural has the syntactical justification of referring both to the treasurer and to his wife, but surely the laws and decrees cannot have imposed such obligations upon Vibullia Alcia.

Lines 12-15 contain something absolutely unique in our record of prytany decrees. The treasurer's *munera* have already been completely covered. A promise to set up an endowment *eis theōias ētηρίους* such as the tribe would have to defray in its prytany may form the subject, even though with the letters of line 13 τὰς ὑ[πὲρ] --- *theōias* is not the only possible sense. Some reference to a great benefaction or *pollicitatio* in which Vibullia Alcia can have participated is here required.

At line 16 we are once more in familiar surroundings. Lines 16-19 must, I believe, be reconstructed on the basis of parallel passages in *Prytaneis*, Nos. 97, 101, 113, 120 and in a new document published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XVII (1948), p. 29, No. 13. For the restoration of the proposed legend, however, the bases erected by individual tribes in honor of Atticus alone<sup>6</sup> provide a better model.

In lines 19-20 the brief lacuna after the legend contained some version of the formula of purpose (that the Council might show its appreciation). The report is finished, and now the proposals begin.

According to my interpretation of lines 12 ff. the decree refers to the first endowment to relieve a tribe of the expenses imposed by its annual prytany.<sup>7</sup> The endowment, accordingly, was established around 120 A. D. by Claudius Atticus and his rich wife in behalf of the tribe to which their two families belonged. At a later period Claudius Atticus established endowments, which are reflected in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3597, to relieve the other tribes. The endowments were left to the tribes instead of the polis, because the expenses of sacrifices in Roman Athens largely fell upon the prytanizing tribe. The prytaneis paid for the sacrifices even in

<sup>6</sup> *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3597 A-D.

<sup>7</sup> In line 12 the sense *eis τῆς [πρυτανείας]* is perhaps possible but of course cannot be restored.

Hellenistic times or elected a treasurer who would do so alone.<sup>8</sup> The endowments of Claudius Atticus were intended to relieve the tribes of this recurrent embarrassment in perpetuity, but since the Athenians became poorer than ever, it appears that on the death of Claudius Atticus the endowments which he left to the Athenians were recovered by his son Herodes, who to the distress of his compatriots took advantage of a legal complication and successfully established his claim as heir in Roman law. The refusal of Herodes to carry out his deceased father's wishes is mentioned unsympathetically<sup>9</sup> in a letter of Fronto to Marcus Aurelius, a letter datable in 140 or shortly afterwards, surely before it was known that Herodes would definitely be *consul ordinarius* in 143 A. D. The date of Atticus' death is unknown, but he was alive around 134/5 A. D. Graindor<sup>10</sup> with reference to Hadrian's action in obtaining a *senatus consultum* against *fideicommissa*, the only way in which *peregrini* could inherit from Roman citizens, argues that the death of Atticus and Herodes' success in frustrating his father's intentions must have occurred while Hadrian was still alive. In this he is followed by John Day.<sup>11</sup> In other words the endowments for the tribes would have ceased by 138 A. D. at the latest. The endowments to the tribes were announced long before the death of Atticus, but I presume that the reference to the endowment in the testament of Atticus<sup>12</sup> is a reference, at least in part, to these already functioning endowments.

It is surely no accident that most of the prytany catalogues which postdate Herodes' recovery of his father's gift to the Athenians seem to have carried prominently the name of an Athenian citizen who alone or with Athena Polias served as eponymus of the prytanizing tribe. Our datable examples begin

<sup>8</sup> S. Dow, *Prytaneis*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>9</sup> *Ad M. Caes.*, III, 3 (Naber p. 41 = Haines, I, p. 64): *dicendum est de filio impio et precum paternarum immemore*. R. Hanslik, "Fronto and Herodes Atticus," *Opuscula philologica*, VI (1934), pp. 25-33, is inaccessible to me.

<sup>10</sup> P. Graindor, *Un milliardaire antique: Hérode Atticus et sa famille* (Cairo, 1930), pp. 35-37, 71-79.

<sup>11</sup> *An Economy History of Athens under Roman Domination* (New York, 1942), pp. 244-246.

<sup>12</sup> Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*, II, 1, 6.

Μοιραγενής Δροϊκοκλέους ἐκ Κολίης	Ἰπποβοαντίς	Ἡesp. V, pp. 16-17	[Πραξαγόρας] δ καὶ Τιμόθε[ος]	138/9 (third prytany)
Ἀσκλη[πιδ]ότης Ὑγίνου Ἀναφύλατος	[Ἀν]τιοχίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1764 A	Πραξαγόρας δ [καὶ Τι]μόθεος	138/9 (sixth prytany)
Ἐφραίμ Γλαύκου Γαργήτιος	Ἀλγίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1765	Α. Νούμιος Μῆ[ν]ις	140/1-149/50 (twelfth prytany)
[Ἐρμε]ίας Γνα[ύ]κου	Ἀλγ[η]ίς	Hesp. XVII, 37, No. 22	Νούμιος Μῆνις	140/1-149/50 (thirteenth prytany)
[-----]μενίης Ἀθήναις	(Ἰπποβοαντίς)	Hesp. XII, 60, No. 15	Κλ. Δημ[όστ]ρατος	146-165
Μέμ. Ἐπὶ Βοιωτῶν Θορ[ίκ]ος	Ἀκαμαντίς	Hesp. XI, 43, No. 12	[δ μετὰ Τι]μήων Π[ο]ντικὸν ἔρχοντα	Middle of second century
[-----]ου τοῦ Γαργήτιος	(Ἀλγίς)	Hesp. XI, 46, No. 14	ἐνιαυτός	
[Εὐπ]όρος Ἀθῆνα[ίου] Ἀθμομενίς		Hesp. XI, 52, No. 19	Ἀθῆναιώδης Ἀσμένει[ν] δ καὶ	169/70 (third prytany)
Εὐτοπος Ἀθηναίου Ἀθμομενίς	Ἀτταλίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1794	Ἀγρίππας	ca. 180
Φλ. Εὐθύκομος Πατανεὺς	Πανδιονίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1773	Μ. Βαλέριος Μαμερτίνος	166/7
Ἰκέσιος Θεογένους	Ἀκαμαντίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1774	δ μετὰ Μαμερτίνου ἔρχοντα	167/8
Ἰκέσιος Θεογένους Σφήττιος	Ἀκαμαντίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1775	ἐνιαυτός	168/9
Θέοπομπος Θαλάμου Πατανεὺς	Πανδιονίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1776	Τιμήσιος Ποντικὸς Βηθαιεὺς	169/70 (eighth prytany)
[Ἰού]λιος Θεμισών		Hesp. XI, 31, No. 1	δ μετὰ Τι[μ]ήιον Ποντικὸν ἔρχοντα	169/70 or shortly afterwards
[Βού]λιος Πείσαν (Μελιτιεὺς)	(Κερασιεὺς)	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1782	ἐν [α]βυδός	Shortly before 180
Ατλ. Εὐφρόνυρος Παλλληνεὺς	Ἀντιοχίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1792		187?
[Πο]σειδώνιος Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀχαρνέως	Οἰνίς	Hesp. Suppl. VIII, 280	Γ. [Ἰού]λιος Θιαβιαν[ός]	186/7
[Πο]σειδώνιος Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀχαρνέως	Οἰνίς	Hesp. XI, 65, No. 30	Δ[ο]μήτριος Ἀρισταῖος	ca. 200
Ατλ. Πυρρόδμος	(Οἰνίς)	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1801	[-----] Μαρε[λ]θώνιος	ca. 190
Ατλ. Πυρρ[ό]δος	Οἰνίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1803		ca. 190
Ατλ. Π[υρρ]όδος	Οἰνίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1803	Ἀντοκράτωρ [Καίσαρ Μ.] Ἀύρ.	188/9
Ἰπποφ[ό]δος	Ἀδριαν[ός]	Hesp. Suppl. VIII, 282	[Κού]ρι. [-----] Ἐλευσ[τ]ίος	190-200
Ἰπποφ[ό]δος	(Ἀντιοχίς)	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1805		
Φλ. Σωσ[τ]ράτης Παλλληνεὺς	Ἀντιοχίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1817	Ἀύρ. Διονύσιος Καλλίππο[ν]	Early third century
Πολίς Ἀθῆνα, Ατλ. Ἀπολλώνιος	(Ἀτταλίς)	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1824	[-----]ιος Ἀραβιανὸς Μαρεθῶν[ος]	196-211
Πολίς Ἀθῆνα, Πεινάρσιος Πιρόκλ[ος]	Ἀτταλίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1825	Ἰάσιος Κυβίτος Κλε[ων]	196-211
Πολίς Ἀθῆνα, Πεινάρσιος Πιρόκλ[ος]	Πανδιονίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1826	[Ἰάσιος Κυβίτος Κλεῶν]	196-211
Πολίς Ἀθῆνα, Κασ[τ]ανῶν[ος] Ἀπολλωνίου	Ἀντιοχίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1792		Under Commodus
Ατλ. Δεύ[κ]ιος Παλλληνεὺς	Ἀντιοχίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1783		Early third century
Ατλ. Δεύ[κ]ιος Παλλληνεὺς	(Ἀντιοχίς)	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1818		Early third century
[δ π]υρρόδμος [ἐξηγητὴς -----]	Ἀκαμαντίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1820	Τιθέ[ριος] Κλαύδιος Πιάτροκλος	ca. 210
Ἐφραίμ Ἐρακλειδῆος [Σφήττιος]	Ἀτταλίς	I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1828		238/9-243/4
Γ. Πεν. Βάσιος Ἀ[γ]νοστός		I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 1834		
Στάτιος -----		I. G. II <sup>2</sup> , 3705	Φλ. Ἀσκληπιάδης	
[Ἀφρ]οδείσιος Στεφάνου [Μαρε]λώσιος Αλαντίς				

late in the year 138, and they continue to the date at which our extant prytany catalogues cease.

In *Hesperia*, XI (1942), p. 30, in a foreword to a series of new prytany catalogues from the Agora Excavations, I pointed out that the tribal eponymus, who hitherto generally had been confused with the priest of the tribe's eponymous hero, was a patron who helped the prytaneis financially. This could be demonstrated by comparison with a Thasian inscription in which it was stated that in return for financial assistance to the corporation the patron's name would appear as that of the eponymus prominently at the head of all documents of the corporation,<sup>13</sup> and the eponymus was not the chief officer. Since the observation came too late to be of use to John Day, *An Economic History of Athens under Roman Domination* (New York, 1942), not to mention J. A. O. Larsen, "Roman Greece," *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* (edited by Tenney Frank), IV (Baltimore, 1938), pp. 259-498, it is perhaps worthwhile to call attention to this development in the history of Athenian city finances by dressing a table of the Athenian tribal eponymi so far attested. The list as that of men belonging to the wealthier families of Athens has much prosopographical interest as well, although I shall not go into that here. The dates are given, where possible, by archons, for whom I have assigned the years assigned by Notopoulos,<sup>14</sup> or the years and broader dates in my own table.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *I. G.*, XII, 8, suppl., No. 365, originally well published by H. Seyrig, *B. C. H.*, LI (1927), pp. 219-233.

<sup>14</sup> J. A. Notopoulos "Ferguson's Law in Athens under the Empire," *A. J. P.*, LXIV (1943), pp. 44-55, with some further estimates in *A. J. P.*, LXV (1944), pp. 164-165.

<sup>15</sup> "Athenian Archons under the Roman Empire," *Hesperia*, XI (1942), pp. 81-89.

For Athenian inscriptions a new series of dates, by J. A. Notopoulos, "Studies in the Chronology of Athens under the Empire," *Hesperia*, XVIII (1949), pp. 1-57, departs from mine at several points. I do not refer to the application of "Ferguson's Law" about the annual rotation of tribes in the office of secretary, a rule the operation of which Notopoulos has extended usefully into the period of the Roman Empire; the application of "Ferguson's Law" seldom does more than identify the exact year within the known period, for the list will probably always have to be set up in the old way first. Rather I have in mind real shifts to dates in quite different periods. For my part I cannot rely upon his chronological order of the aisiti catalogues; that the hierophant



In estimating the significance of the material presented in the table on p. 304, one must bear in mind that still other cases where the word *ἐπώνυμος* is more or less preserved have not been cited because of the loss of the eponymus' name. Many documents are insufficiently preserved for a determination about the presence or absence of a record concerning the eponymus. How-

and sacred herald "occupy their office for an interval of one or more years, then vacate it only to be reelected to it later" (*op. cit.*, p. 23) seems to me a fundamental error refutable by means of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 3661, 3811 and other passages. Another divergence, the most extensive, is relevant to our subject and must be analyzed.

In the heading of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1832, a prytany catalogue of Hadrianis, the prytaneis proudly engraved the names of the emperor Alexander Severus, of the deified Hadrian, and of the deified Commodus to indicate that these three emperors had become members of their tribe (cf. *Hesperia*, XI, p. 60). In *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1824 and 1825, catalogues of the tribe Attalis to which Alexander Severus did not belong, the isolated word *Αὐρήλιοι* in a similar position has been explained by Notopoulos (*op. cit.*, pp. 37-39) as indicating Elagabalus and Alexander Severus, although the death of Elagabalus fully six months before the exact date he assigned to *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1825 caused him considerable embarrassment. There is no reason to think that Elagabalus became an Athenian citizen or that the Athenian tribe Attalis would have commemorated the elevation of Alexander Severus with the word *Αὐρήλιοι*. Yet Notopoulos is probably right in identifying the Aurelii as emperors. In my opinion, however, the notation must refer to the adoption of the glorious ancestry by Septimius Severus and Caracalla. Hence *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1824-26 must be dated between 196 and 211 A. D.

It has not escaped me that a difficulty exists in the alleged identification of two ephebes with two of the prytaneis in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1824. Either the identification is wrong or the date postulated for the archonship of Arabianus, that of the ephebic catalogue, would have to be changed. On the other hand, my date for *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1824-26 removes other difficulties. For example, Pinarius Proculus of Hagnus, who appears as eponymus in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1824, has been recognized (A. E. Raubitschek, *Hesperia*, Suppl. VIII [1949], p. 280) in line 11 of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1796, now datable in 186/7 A. D., where he apparently was honored for undertaking heavy expenses in connection with a festival. My date for *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1824 is much closer to 186/7 A. D.

Because of his new date for *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1824-26 Notopoulos lowers the dates of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1816 and 1823; because of the new date for *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1816 he lowers the date for *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1817; because of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1817 he lowers the date of *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1818 (*op. cit.*, pp. 43-44); because of the new date for *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1818 he lowers the date for *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1783 (*op. cit.*, p. 42). Notopoulos has placed around 220 A. D. that whole group of inscriptions which used to be dated around 200 A. D. In order

ever, throughout the whole period after 138 A.D., only one case occurs of a prytany catalogue demonstrably without record of an eponymus: Aegeis in the ἀραρχία of 182/3.<sup>16</sup> In this catalogue the first name, presumably that of the eponymus, has been erased as if the man had subsequently suffered *damnatio memoriae*.

There are, I think, four clearly recognizable stages in the patronage of the tribes of Roman Athens. In the period from Sulla to Hadrian the tribes still counted upon finding one rich man in the tribe's contingent of Councillors who were chosen by lot. Such a man, elected by the prytaneis out of their own number as treasurer, was expected to offer the sacrifices at his own expense, but around 20 B.C. a man was called upon to undertake the treasurership a second time,<sup>17</sup> and altogether the decrees honoring treasurers appear more rarely than one would expect. The system was breaking down.

In the second period Hadrian, who did so much for Athens, gave no help here<sup>18</sup> because in his day there was no problem,

to do so he has treated the alleged identification between a prytanis (in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1816) and a homonymous ephebe (of 154/5 A.D.) as cavalierly as I have done in the preceding paragraph. Among prominent persons, however, homonymities cannot be so easily dismissed. Now in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1783, which Notopoulos dates in 221/2 A.D., the man who met the expenses for the tribe is Αἰλ. Δεύκιος Παλληρεῖς. A man of the same name appears as eponymus of the same tribe in *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1792, which Notopoulos dates in 187/8. He claims that they are different persons, but I submit that they are identical.

It remains to explain why the notation Ἀνρήλ[ιοι] appears on *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1825 but not on *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1826 which belongs to the same year. "In the course of G. Quintus Kleon's archonship news of the death of Elagabalus reached Athens and the name Ἀνρήλιοι was omitted," says Notopoulos. Since the death of Elagabalus occurred on March 6 or 11, 222 A.D. while according to Notopoulos' theory the archonship of C. Quintus Cleon did not even begin until September 222 A.D., this explanation does not satisfy at all. I have another explanation in conformity with my theory that the Aurelii are Septimius Severus and Caracalla: Septimius Severus, during an early sojourn at Athens attested by *Vita Severi*, 3, 7, had become an Athenian citizen of the tribe Attalis. *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1824 and 1825 are catalogues of Attalis; *I. G.*, II<sup>2</sup>, 1826 is a catalogue of a different tribe (Pandionis).

<sup>16</sup> *Hesperia*, IV (1935), p. 48, No. 11.

<sup>17</sup> Dow, *Prytaneis*, No. 116.

<sup>18</sup> Hadrian did help the tribes of Megara (*I. G.*, VII, 70-74).

thanks to Claudius Atticus. Endowments set up by Claudius Atticus defrayed expenses for the prytanizing tribes, but after the death of Claudius Atticus the endowments were recovered by his heir, and the Athenians were once again in an embarrassing position.

The third period had already started by the latter part of 138 A.D. and it continued through the reign of Commodus. Unable to return to the old system and to rely on treasurers elected out of the prytaneis themselves, the Athenians appealed to the tribal loyalty of any rich *phyletes* whether he happened to be a prytanis or not. The treasurer no longer appears, and the patron, even when a prytanis himself, is called an eponymus. It is worth noting that foreigners do not appear in the list of known eponymi, whereas they are common among the archons.

In the fourth stage, that of the Severan Period, Athenian tribes looked for men who would contribute half or part of the necessary expenses, while the treasury of Athena Polias contributed the rest. Funds were harder to raise. It is noteworthy that Athena never received the title of the eponymous archonship at Athens, as so often the patron god or goddess of a Greek city assumed the title of the eponymous magistracy in other towns.<sup>19</sup> At Athens Athena Polias became the eponymus of a prytanizing tribe.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

<sup>19</sup> L. Robert, "Divinités éponymes," *Hellenica*, II (1946), pp. 51-64.

### THREE NOTES.

#### I

Lucretius, I, 777.

775 quippe suam quicque in coetu uariantis aëru  
naturam ostendit mixtusque uidebitur aer  
cum terra simul atque ardor cum rore manere.

777 atque ardor *Lambinus* et quodam OQ

Lucretius here directs his polemic against the Empedoclean concept of four elements, and argues that, since these elements, according to Empedocles, retained their own "immortal" nature in *concilio*, nothing apart from them could be created; for in every object the qualities of earth, air, fire, and water would obtrude in varying proportion.

Most Lucretian scholars are agreed that *et quodam* in OQ conceals a mention of the element fire, which otherwise would be lacking, and have therefore adopted Lambinus' emendation *atque ardor*. Lachmann<sup>1</sup> argued that, if *atque* had been abbreviated *atq.*, the corruption would be explicable in capital script "totidem litteris," that is, ATQ·ARDOR became ETQUODAM. The only recent editor not to acquiesce in this judgment is J. Martin,<sup>2</sup> who prints the reading of the MSS and defends it with a quotation from Aristotle, *Met.*, A, 4, 985a: οὐ μὲν χρήται γε [*sc.* Empedocles] τέτταρσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς δυοῖν οὖσι μόνοις, πρὶ μὲν καθ' αὐτό, τοῖς δ' ἀντικειμένοις ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, γῆ τε καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι. But this statement, which opposes fire to the other three elements conjoined, scarcely harmonizes with I, 775 ff. Besides, as Bailey<sup>3</sup> remarks, there is little point in introducing here a doctrine that seems otherwise unknown to Lucretius; and it is hard to discern what force *quodam* could have. Merrill's<sup>4</sup> *atque uapor* has gained no acceptance, and is difficult palaeographically.

The purpose of this note is to offer an explanation of *et quodam* somewhat more precise than "totidem litteris." Suppose Lucretius to have written *atque calor*. Assume that *-que* became

<sup>1</sup> In his *Commentarius* on Lucretius (Berlin, 1350), *ad loc.*

<sup>2</sup> Leipzig, Teubner, 1934, *ad loc.*

<sup>3</sup> *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri VI* (Oxford, 1947), II, *ad loc.*

<sup>4</sup> *Univ. of California Publ. in Class. Phil.*, III (1916), p. 9.

-quo<sup>5</sup> and that *cal-* was inverted to *cla-*, a fecund source of error illustrated by Housman from a wide range of authors in Vol. I of his *Manilius*, pp. lv-lvi.<sup>6</sup> These mutations would result in *quoclaor* which adumbrates the corruption: *cl* looks very like *d* in minuscules,<sup>7</sup> and *or* could have been written in ligature. At any rate, since *quidam* in its various cases is not infrequent in Lucretius,<sup>8</sup> *quodam cum rore* was the obvious correction;<sup>9</sup> *at-* was modified accordingly,<sup>10</sup> although *ac* might have been expected after *simul*. For *calor* = *ignis*, one of the four elements, see I, 786 just below. For *calor* in the metrical position *callór* see III, 247; V, 573. For *simul atque* followed by a word beginning with a consonant see IV, 319, 1041. And note finally the alliteration: *cum terra simul atque calor cum rore manere*.

## II

*Culex*, 364.

Curtius et, mediis quem quondam sedibus Urbis  
364 deuotum †bellis consumpsit gurgis in unda.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. II, 301 *uique Pontanus uiquo* OQU, and an instance very similar to the present, II, 966 *inque* Q<sup>2</sup> in quo OQU. If *atque* was unabbreviated, this would be an example of the frequent confusion of *e* and *o* in minuscules; see E. Chatelain's facsimiles of the *Oblongus* (Lugd. Bata-vorum, Sijthoff, 1908), p. x and oi the *Quadratus* (*ibid.*, 1913), p. v. A brief examination of the facsimiles reveals that *-que* (*atque neque*, etc.) is frequently unabbreviated in O, less frequently in Q. See below n. 9.

<sup>6</sup> A few exx.: Lucr., III, 255 *cuius culuias*, VI, 749 *ipso piso*; Verg., *Aen.*, II, 15 *instar instra*, III, 158 *astra asrta*, IV, 438 *fert fret*, VIII, 72 *sancto snacto*; Georg., IV, 123 *tacuissem teauissem*; Prop., IV, 5, 74 *clatra caltra*; Ovid, *Trist.*, IV, 2, 33 *inclusit inculsit*; Sen., *Phaedra*, 780 (cf. 877, 1227) *cingent cingnet*.

<sup>7</sup> Bentley, *Diss. upon Phalaris*, ed. A. Dyce, I (London, 1836), p. 176: "d being put for el in infinite places." See M. Ihm, *Suetonius* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1907), p. xlviii, Housman's edit. of Juvenal (Cambridge, 1931), ad III, 217 and p. xlv, Lindsay, *An Intro. to Latin Textual Emendation* (London, 1896), p. 83. This confusion is the basis for Gronovius' emendation, Lucr., II, 1080 *indice mente* OQV *inclute Memmi Gronov.* (Munro).

<sup>8</sup> See J. Paulson, *Index Lucretianus* (Leipzig, 1926), s. v.

<sup>9</sup> If *atque* was abbreviated, the resultant corruption *q'claor* (or in lig.) would easily be taken for *q'dam*, or so "emended" to agree with the nearest noun *rore*.

<sup>10</sup> Lachmann's *at* seems the necessary correction of *et* OQ at V, 925; cf. also Diel's *apparatus* at II, 1070; V, 1110; VI, 1059, 1240.

In these lines the writer of the *Culex* alludes to the legend of M. Curtius, recounted by Livy, VII, 6, 1-5: <sup>11</sup> an immense chasm had opened suddenly in the Roman forum, and according to an oracle could only be closed by the sacrifice of what the Romans held most dear. A young warrior named M. Curtius, realizing the import of the oracle, solemnly "devoted" himself to the nether gods and plunged into the chasm, which closed over him. This spot, marshy in early historical times, was called the Lacus Curtius.

In the *Culex*, *bellis* is plainly corrupt. Ellis <sup>12</sup> and Vollmer <sup>13</sup> dagger it; and no conjecture has won any general assent—e. g. Leo's <sup>14</sup> *pallens*, Housman's <sup>15</sup> *luens*, or *telis* by Ellis <sup>16</sup> in his *apparatus*, not to mention earlier attempts. Probably *inbellis* should be read. The absorption of *in* (*im-*) by a preceding *-um* is a very common cause of corruption: Cat., 64, 350 *cum in cett.* in *om.* A, cf. 87, 3; Verg., *Georg.*, I, 203 *illum in codd. plerique in om.* P; *Aen.*, IV, 576 *iterum instimulat cett. stimulat Mab Serv.*; Stat., *Theb.*, IX, 19 *ferrum inmite P mite cett.*; Juv., III, 237 *uicorum inflexu cett. flexu O*; similarly Plaut., *Most.*, 1080 (Lindsay) *nummum umquam B quam cod.*, and Bentley wishing to alter *patiens* to *inpatiens* in Hor., *Carm.*, I, 8, 4 remarks: "Vide um in fine uocis praecedentis et mendae uides

<sup>11</sup> Other sources are Val. Max., V, 6, 2; Aug., *Civ. Dei*, V, 18; Oros., III, 5; Dion. Hal., Exc., XIV, 20-21; Cass. Dio, fr. 30. Varro, *L. L.*, V, 148-50, presents the "triceps historia" of the legend. For a modern account see G. Lugli, *Roma antica*, I (Roma, 1946), pp. 156-57.

<sup>12</sup> Oxford, 1908, *ad loc.*

<sup>13</sup> *Poetae Lat. Min.*, I (Berlin, 3rd ed. rev. by W. Morel, 1930), *ad loc.* G. Curcio, *Culex-Ciris* (Torino, 1928) *ad loc.*, prints an undaggered text, but see Th. Birt, *Phil. Woch.*, LI (1931), col. 1438.

<sup>14</sup> *Culex* (Berlin, 1891), *ad loc.*

<sup>15</sup> *C. R.*, XVI (1902), p. 345.

<sup>16</sup> "fort. *telis*. Dion. Antiqq. II. 42 *καταβελής*." This is evidently mistaken, for Dion. Hal. is writing of another and less popular legend of the Lacus Curtius, viz., how the Sabine soldier Mettius Curtius, wounded by Romulus, escaped by struggling across a deep pool (*λίμνη βαθεία*) in the forum. But Mettius Curtius was neither "devotus" nor swallowed up in the earth, as the Greek makes plain: *ὁ δὲ Κούρτιος πολλὰ μοχθήσας σὺν χρόνῳ σώζεται τε ἐκ τῆς λίμνης τὰ ὕπλα ἔχων καὶ εἰς τὸν χάρακα ἀπάγεται*. Cf. Varro, *L. L.*, V, 148; this legend is rejected by Livy, VII, 6, 5-6. H. R. Fairclough, *Virgil*, II ("Loeb Classical Library," 1924), pp. 398-99, only confused the matter by printing Ellis' conjecture and then referring it to Marcus Curtius.

cunabula" (Lett. to de Veil, May 27, 1707). Here the corruption was helped along by the fact that it resulted in a word superficially probable (to a scribe, at least) and did not impinge on the metre. But the real justification of *inbellis*, as of any emendation, must depend on the sense it makes. An illuminating verbal parallel lies to hand in Stat., *Silv.*, III, 5, 84: *inbelle fretum*, where Statius, with characteristic fulness, amplifies *inbelle* with the phrase *torpentibus undis*. That Statius had read the *Culex* is clear from several imitations,<sup>17</sup> and especially from his own explicit statement in *Silv.*, I, Praef.: *Sed et Culicem legimus. . . .*

Speculation on why a poet selected this or that word is a delicate matter, but perhaps apposite in the present instance. The classic examples in Roman history of a warrior's *devotio* were the Decii, the father in the war against the Latins (Livy, VIII, 9), and the son in the war against the Samnites (Livy, X, 28). After a solemn imprecation to the nether gods each spurred into the opposing ranks to be slain, and thus bring destruction upon the enemy. It is plain from his account that Livy regarded the *devotio* of Curtius as essentially the same.<sup>18</sup> After a solemn prayer Curtius mounts his horse and rides in full armor, not into a warlike battle line, but, so to speak, into the "unwarlike" gulf. Such a piece of preciscity would not be foreign to the writer of the *Culex*. In the *Culex*, then, there are overtones to *inbellis* not heard in Statius.

With regard to prosody, it is true that the writer of the *Culex* seems to avoid elision.<sup>19</sup> In the entire poem of 414 lines there are 49 instances of elision, and only four of these elisions of *-m*. But elision predominates in *θέρου* of the second foot (15 times), the position of *deuotum inbellis*, and two of the *-m* elisions occur in this position (vv. 137, 393). A number of parallels may be observed in Vergil, *Aen.*, I, 51, 450, 688; II, 245, 454; III, 468; IV, 194, etc.

<sup>17</sup> See Ch. Plésent, *Le Culex: Étude sur l'Alexandrinisme latin* (Paris, 1910), pp. 122 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Note the verbal parallels, and see Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. des Antiq.*, s. v. "*deuotio*, II."

<sup>19</sup> Plésent, *op. cit.*, pp. 416 ff.

## III

Seneca, *Phaëdra*, 1025.

- nescio quid onerato sinu
- 1020 grauis unda portat. Quae nouum tellus caput  
ostendit astris? Cyclas exoritur noua?  
[latuere rupes numine Epidauri dei  
et scelere petrae nobiles Scironides  
et quae duobus terra comprimitur fretis.]
- 1025 haec dum stupentes quaerimus, totum en mare  
immugit. . . .
- 1022-24 *del. Leo, post 1026 trai. Damsté*
- 1025 quaerimus E querimur A totum en Peiper en  
totum Ω

A messenger relates to Theseus how a monster rose out of the sea and provoked the death of Hippolytus. The text, established by Leo<sup>20</sup> in 1878, might be termed the modern vulgate. Peiper and Richter<sup>21</sup> accept it, and Herrmann<sup>22</sup> differs only in placing vv. 1022-24 after v. 1026. But if one turns to the edition of Gronovius,<sup>23</sup> he will read at v. 1025: *haec dum stupentes querimur, en totum mare*; this was the older vulgate. The critical issue, therefore, and one which involves vv. 1022-24, is the lection of v. 1025.

The criticism of Seneca's dramas suffers from the same malady that afflicts the criticism of Statius' *Thebais* and Juvenal—the cult of the *codex optimus*.<sup>24</sup> Here a prejudice in favor of the *cod. Etruscus* (E) induced Leo to deal with the text in a fashion violent and arbitrary. He impugns *querimur* (A) on the following grounds, p. 203: "at quid tandem queruntur? an rupes latere, mare agitari, nouam insulam oriri? quae mirari certe

<sup>20</sup> *L. Annaei Senecae Tragoediae*, I (Berlin, 1878), pp. 203-5; all references to Leo are to this work.

<sup>21</sup> Leipzig, Teubner, 1921, *ad loc.*

<sup>22</sup> Paris, Soc. d'édit. "Les Belles Lettres," 1924, *ad loc.*, after P. Damsté, *Mnem.*, XLVI (1918), pp. 184-86. Others, e.g. H. Moricca (Torino, 1918), print Leo's text, but without brackets. J. W. Beck (*Mnem.*, XLI [1913], pp. 16-17) resorts to the absurd expedient of putting a question mark after *fretis* (v. 1024).

<sup>23</sup> Amstelodami, 1682.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. the remarks of Housman on *Hero. Oct.*, 1175-76 in *C. Q.*, XVII (1923), p. 163.



poterant et stupere; queri in litore securos puerile erat. ac mirati quidem sunt: stupentes scilicet queruntur; at nemo simul queritur et obstupescit." When Leo asserts: "queri in litore securos puerile erat," he overlooks, or has forgotten about, vv. 1017-18: *nec ista ratibus tanta construitur lues/ terris minatur*, and vv. 1031-34: *inhorruit concussus undarum globus/ soluitque sese et litori inuexit malum/ maius timore, pontus in terras ruit/ suumque monstrum sequitur—os quassat tremor*; when he further asserts: "at nemo simul queritur et obstupescit," he confuses ancient sentiments with modern. Bentley made the same mistake in a note on Hor., *Carm.*, I, 3, 18, where he conjectured *rectis oculis* for *siccis oculis* (Ω). In fact the ancients commonly associated tears with the emotion of fear; see the examples which Peerlkamp<sup>25</sup> assembled against Bentley on Hor., *loc. cit.*

Leo accounts for the rather bald *quaerimus* by referring it to the questions in vv. 1020-21; vv. 1022-24, which obtrude awkwardly, he deletes as a crude interpolation, though imitative of Euripides, *Hipp.*, 1207-9 and appearing in all the MSS. Since *quaerimus* is patently unmetrical as the line stands, a further change is necessary; so Peiper's transposition *totum en* is preferred against the unanimous witness of the MSS. This despite the fact that the position of *en* can be fixed with some precision in the Senecan trimeter: of 49 instances,<sup>26</sup> 23 occur in 1a (= the first part of the first foot), 19 in 4b, 4 in 1b, 3, in 3b, but not one in 5b, the position of Leo's text. This is but another indication that the present reading of v. 1025 is incorrect.

To sum up: objections to the sense of *querimur* are unfounded, and the reading *quaerimus*,<sup>27</sup> which entails Peiper's

<sup>25</sup> Amstelodami, 1862; see also O. Keller, *Epilegomena zu Horaz* (Leipzig, 1879), pp. 16-17.

<sup>26</sup> Based on the text of Peiper and Richter (incl. *Octavia*); Herrmann differs only at *Tro.*, 58, where he reads *quem* for *que en*. The MSS reading of *Pha.*, 1025, which would be another instance of 4b, is not counted. Figures are based on W. A. Oldfather, A. S. Pease, H. V. Canter, *Index uerborum quae in Senecae fabulis necnon Octavia praetexta reperiuntur*, *Univ. of Illinois Stud. in Lang. and Lit.*, IV, Nos. 2-4 (1918), s. v. "en."

<sup>27</sup> Forms of *quaero* and *queror* are frequently confused; cf. Pers., III, 12, 14, and Oldfather, Pease, Canter, *op. cit.*, s. v. "quaero." That *quaerimus* is a corruption is also confirmed by the fact that it occurs in certain inferior MSS of the A class; see Herrmann's *apparatus*.

transposition and the deletion or displacement of vv. 1022-24, would seem to be a corruption. Vv. 1022-24 should not be deleted or moved: the fear of Hippolytus' attendants is motivated by the sudden appearance of the new and terrible (vv. 1020-21), and the contrasting sudden disappearance of the old and familiar (vv. 1022-24). This is clear from v. 1025 where *haec* comprehends what precedes and depends on *querimur*, cf. Sen., *Herc. Fur.*, 19, 63; *Med.*, 422; *Herc. Oet.*, 177, 215. V. 1025 is crucial to the understanding of the passage, and should read: *haec dum stupentes querimur, en totum mare.*

WENDELL CLAUSEN.

AMHERST COLLEGE.

---

### I. G., C. I. L. AND P. I. R.

The following letter from Dr. Johannes Stroux, President of the Berlin Academy, was made available to the *American Journal of Philology* by Professor Chester G. Starr, to whom it was first addressed. The editors of the *Journal* consider the information and request contained therein of paramount importance for all students of Classical Antiquity and welcome the opportunity to give them wider diffusion in these pages. Although at the time this editorial notice was in proof, postal regulations did not permit the mailing of printed matter to Berlin, all readers of the *Journal* are respectfully urged to keep Dr. Stroux's request in mind against the day when such matter may be sent. For by complying with Dr. Stroux's request they can express in tangible form their interest in the continuation of the monumental works in question, to which all classical scholars are so deeply indebted.

H. T. R.

DEUTSCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN ZU BERLIN.

3. Januar 1949

Sehr verehrter Herr Dr. Starr!

Das Mitglied unserer Akademie, Herr Professor Warburg, hatte die Güte, mir Ihre Anschrift zu nennen für die Mitteilung einer Auskunft über die Fortsetzung einiger Unternehmungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Ich freue mich, Ihnen bestätigen zu können, dass unsere Akademie die beiden grossen Inschriftenunternehmungen

## I. Inscriptiones Graecae

## II. Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum

fortsetzt und versucht, soweit es die gegen früher sehr eingeschränkten Möglichkeiten zulassen, beide Werke zu fördern. Die Inscriptiones Graecae leitet Professor Dr. Gunther Klaffenbach und das Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum der Unterzeichnete. Die Prosopographia Imperii Romani besteht weiter unter dem Patronat unserer Akademie, aber wir haben Professor Dr. Arthur Stein, Prag, der zu seiner Arbeit zurückkehren konnte, mit der weiteren Bearbeitung beauftragt. Professor Groag ist während des Krieges verschieden. Die Frage, die Herr Professor Warburg übermittelte, ob die Akademie Hilfe gebrauchen könnte und wie diese Hilfe sein könnte, ist uns ausserordentlich wertvoll. Denn sie eröffnet die Aussicht, dass die Akademie für die beiden Arbeitsstellen wieder den so dringend notwendigen Zugang zu Materialien, die die Inschriften betreffen, erhält. Sowohl das Gebiet der griechischen wie das der lateinischen Inschriften ist absolut darauf angewiesen, von allen neu gefundenen Steinen Mitteilung zu erhalten. Wir würden daher für jede Publikation von Inschriften beider Gebiete ausserordentlich dankbar sein, die seit 1939 herausgekommen ist. Einige wenige sind uns bereits in Aussicht gestellt oder zugegangen. Besonders bedeutungsvoll für unsere Arbeit sind die aktuellen Funde und Ausgrabungsberichte, soweit solche schon wieder erscheinen. Wenn sich irgendwo der günstigste Fall ereignet, dass uns eine für die Arbeit verwertbare Photographie einer neuen Inschrift oder gar ein Abklatsch zugestellt werden kann, wäre das gleichfalls von besonderem Wert. Wir brauchen nicht zu versichern, dass wir zu jeder Gegenleistung jetzt und in Zukunft gerne bereit sind, wenn unsere Möglichkeiten auch zunächst, ganz beschränkt sein dürften. Am Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum wird zurzeit der Index zu den Inschriften Afrikas (Band VIII) von dem Mitarbeiter Dr. Schubring neugearbeitet. Die neue französische Publikation der Inschriften Afrikas von Merlin ist sehr dankenswerterweise bereits in unseren Händen. Beide Unternehmungen der Akademie haben ihre Arbeitsstelle in der Akademie der Wissenschaften selbst, Berlin NW 7, Unter den Linden 8.

In vorzüglicher Hochachtung

Ihr ergebener

(signed) JOHANNES STROUX.

## REVIEWS.

R. P. WINNINGTON-INGRAM. Euripides and Dionysus. An Interpretation of the *Bacchae*. Cambridge University Press, 1948. Pp. viii + 190.

After too many years in the doldrums Euripidean criticism, as set forth by Kitto, Grube, Dodds, and the work before us, vibrates anew with the life and zest of the days when Verrall made this dramatist as exciting as Shaw, as revolutionary as Ibsen: the sparkle we shall not see again till some Hellenist arises with the same mastery of witty and athletic prose. Professor Winnington-Ingram, we can see in the Appendix, will be disconcerted to find himself regarded as Verrall's successor; but he must not underrate himself: he possesses more than one of Verrall's gifts, without his waywardness. To me this book seems the most illuminating that has ever been written on the *Bacchae*. As a model of exposition it is well-nigh perfect, its candour so complete that everywhere we can either agree without misgiving or reject with clear understanding of the manner in which, and the reasons for which, the author has gone astray. He keeps his eye unswervingly on the subject, avoids all irrelevancies, insists that the drama shall explain itself.

On its poetical and dramatic beauties he writes with charm and insight; on more complex themes he shows equal mastery. The god is not only a malicious intriguer (p. 73) but also an inescapable part of the world-structure (p. 146); in v. 1348, ὄργας πρέπει θεὸς οὐχ ὁμοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς, Euripides finally comments on the deity whom he "recognised but hated" (p. 179); Dionysus' animal side receives valuable and repeated emphasis (pp. 29 f., etc.). The first Messenger's speech is called (p. 89) "the centre-piece of the play's design; and for displaying the poet's insight into the religion of Dionysus, it is perhaps its most important feature." The dreadfully precarious joy of communion with Nature in *all* her moods is described with vision and power, especially in pp. 85 f. Euripides' purpose when composing his play we find described fully at the close: he "recognised Dionysus for the danger that he was, publicly in the societies of men, when he works at full strength through the group, and privately in the lives of individuals. The worship of such a god he could not commend . . . there was only one weapon to employ against him, which was to understand him and to propagate understanding of him." This seems quite sound: no one will complain that it ignores the Bacchic *joie de vivre* and spiritual enfranchisement who realizes how much of the play and of this book is summed in the phrase "to understand him."

On Cadmus, Tiresias, and Pentheus, who merit close attention as showing the different ways in which the new religion affects different types of men, our author dilates (chap. IV) subtly and keenly. Perhaps he handles best Tiresias the ecclesiastic. Concerning Pentheus he writes with equal aptness: for instance, his study of the king's repressed prurience could not be better done. But he seems mistaken in his belief (pp. 54, 59; etc.) that Pentheus is himself a kind of bacchant, because "the lust for power and praise" is in him

"the source of a Dionysiac frenzy." Or those lines we might all be dubbed dionysiacs, including those who hunger and thirst after righteousness.

But two giant difficulties beset our path. First, how are we to understand the lyrics wherein murderous hate and rage are extolled in the same breath with spiritual tranquillity and innocent joy upon the mountains? "There is a double paradox in these Maenad preachers of *sophrosyne*, these Asiatic Eellenists" (p. 59); "peace is only one phase of the emotional life of Bacchanals; the other phase is a fury and violence that make a mockery of their pretensions to sanity and moderation" (p. 68)—and so forth copiously. To confound us yet more, they loudly extol traditional religion, although theirs is a new faith whose rejection by Thebes and her king they furiously denounce. How are we to make sense of people who pose as a blend of Holy Rollers, Wordsworth, Dacoit head-hunters, and Cardinal Newman? The last of these must come to mind when we note that their words  $\tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\ \chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omega\ \mu\alpha\kappa\rho\acute{\omega}\ \nu\acute{o}\mu\mu\omicron\nu\ \alpha\epsilon\iota\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \tau\epsilon\ \pi\epsilon\phi\upsilon\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  read like anticipation of *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*. Winnington-Ingram's solution is most fully stated in pp. 38 f. "The poetry has almost throughout two aspects. One is towards the singers . . . an adequate and beautiful expression of what is immediately in their minds. Of the other aspect they are entirely unconscious; not so the poet and the audience. . . . The poetry is so written as to involve wider relationships than the singers have in mind, to invoke standards, emotional, moral or intellectual, which are not their standards. So it may happen that the song contains a comment upon or criticism of the singers themselves, of their thoughts or emotions or way of life." Euripides, we are to believe, has at length performed the miracle for which he makes Theseus pray (*Hipp.* 928 ff.) that people should have two voices, one to contradict the other. Still, we must accept it, for there seems no alternative; after all, is not the play full of miracles? Nevertheless, it suggests, or reinforces, strange, perhaps unwelcome, thoughts concerning Euripides' own conception of a dramatist's art and relation to his audience.

Secondly, we come to the palace-miracle. Winnington-Ingram's discussion of it shows him, almost throughout, a first-rate master of dramatic criticism. During the forty years that have elapsed since *The Riddle of the Bacchae* appeared and (at least in regard to this scene) received Verrall's approval, scholars have been content to evade its distasteful conclusions by closing their ears to these unpromising words (v. 663): "he flung the palace in fragments to the ground, and all is an utter ruin." What really happened, they report, was a comparatively mild noise behind the scenes. At last arrives a critic who faces the text,  $\sigma\acute{o}\nu\ \nu\eta\phi\omicron\nu\ \phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\rho'\ \epsilon\iota\kappa\eta\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ . He makes three points.

(i) "The story which he [Dionysus] has to tell (. . . in the rapid melodramatic trochaic rhythm) has an atmosphere of its own . . . lighter and less impressive than the unseen voice and the lyrical responses" (p. 83); "there is . . . a phantasmagoric quality about the whole episode (including the narrative of the Stranger)" (p. 182).

(ii) What happens within the house, especially Pentheus' attack

upon the bull, has symbolic meaning: "Dionysus symbolises the power of blind, instinctive emotion. Seek to . . . imprison him in the dark, and the result is, inevitably, catastrophic. . . . The bull is an avatar of Dionysus. . . . Pentheus, as he sweats and grimaces and pants out his heart, is a symbol of crude asceticism" (p. 9: cf. pp. 84 f.). Excellently put; and the bull-idea, at any rate, is incontrovertible.

(iii) "It was a dramatic necessity for Euripides to 'play down' the palace-miracle, since if it were too overwhelming, it would make what follows an anti-climax" (p. 182—a summary of pp. 83 f.). This remark is perhaps more valuable than any other in the book. For the first time all those oddities of *manner* that mark the scene are (or can be) fully explained. It now falls perfectly into place: the rise of excitement and horror proceeds without jolt or relaxation from the prologue to the awakening of Agave.

So far, all is admirable. But now we must consider the palace-miracle itself—the question, that is, whether Pentheus' house falls in ruin. The Appendix shows that Winnington-Ingram believes himself completely opposed to *The Riddle of the Bacchae* on this matter as on others. His book far surpasses its predecessor in acuteness, imaginative depth, and sense of dramatic perspective: so much is gratefully acknowledged. Yet, though he does not realize it, he confirms the earlier treatment in part; and, but for an unusual timidity in drawing conclusions, would confirm it altogether.

For he candidly admits "the mention of headlong collapse" and boldly translates the passage: "the Bacchic god, for further measure, razed the buildings to the ground!" But it is on these words, combined with the later contradiction of them, that the earlier theory rests: and the opponents of that theory, unlike our author, have perforce ignored them. Why is the god, who tells us that the palace lies in ruin, contradicted by the silence of Pentheus (who was inside it when it "fell"), of the Messengers, of Cadmus, and of Agave both when delirious and later when sane? Winnington-Ingram answers thus (p. 84):

"If, therefore [referring to the 'playing-down' of this whole scene], neither Pentheus nor any of the characters subsequently refers to the wrecking of the palace, it is not a tactful reticence for the sake of the stage manager, nor is it the accusing finger of rationalism. Characters in Greek plays (as Professor Dodds points out) do not waste time in saying what is dramatically irrelevant, and the palace-miracle, regarded as an actual event, ceases to have any dramatic relevance as soon as the narrative is over. It is the symbolism which counts and which is of lasting effect."

This view was stated in more general terms by Gilbert Murray long ago (*The Nation*, London, May 16th, 1908) when reviewing *The Riddle of the Bacchae*. "The Greek habit was to let each scene stand very much by itself, producing its own effect uninterrupted by references to other parts of the play. An incident or a character which has done its work is simply allowed to drop." That is cutting the Gordian knot with a vengeance! Are we to believe that all these people stand or walk in front of the alleged ruins without so much

as a  $\phi\epsilon\upsilon$  of surprise, annoyance, or sympathy? Winnington-Ingram's remark about dramatic relevance, invaluable as comment on what may be called the incidental quality of the whole scene, does nothing to palliate a crudity so amazing.

This censure depends of course on the assumption that Dionysus' words about the collapse are true, an assumption surely absurd. But our commentator believes that they are true: "the inevitable explosion is symbolised . . . by a catastrophe to the palace of Pentheus" (p. 82); "the Bacchic god . . . razed the buildings to the ground!" (p. 83); "the palace-miracle, regarded as an actual event, ceases to have any dramatic relevance" (p. 84); "the ultimate disaster, which it is the function of the palace-miracle to foreshadow in symbol" (p. 85); "... the obstinate unbeliever, who, if he will not 'believe' after the palace-miracle, will surely be convinced by nothing" (p. 88). All this means that the downfall really happens, as an event of the drama. (Of course no one thinks it a literal, physical, collapse: the house falls just as genuinely as Romeo dies.)

To be blunt, Winnington-Ingram has here involved himself in a hopeless muddle. And yet he has already provided himself with a talisman whereby he could have avoided the quagmire. Had he only asserted that those two lines about the collapse are of a piece with the cries and the "phantasmagoric quality" which he attributes to the events inside the palace, he would have had no more trouble than is provided by the ecstatic hubbub rising from the Bacchanals outside it. This whole scene has a dream-like air: why not boldly conclude that the Bacchanals also are . . . dreaming, or in some condition analogous to dream? By a sudden benumbing of the mind, astonishing in so alert a commentator, he hesitates on the brink of that hypnotism theory advanced by his predecessor, whereby the situation would have been saved. Nay: he peers over the brink, and speaks not indeed of hypnotism but of mass-hallucination and suggestibility (what is the difference here?), which, he remarks wistfully (p. 184), would "subserve a fundamental purpose of the *Bacchae*."

But that is the only considerable fault that Momus himself could unearth. One closes this memorable book with a sense not only of its author's ability, learning, and other tolerably frequent merits; but above all, of his unusual power to treat a great drama with freshness and imagination.

GILBERT NORWOOD.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

---

ARNOLD VON SALIS. *Antike und Renaissance. Über Nachleben und Weiterwirken der alter. in der neueren Kunst.* Erlenbach-Zürich, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1947. Pp. 280; 64 pls.; 30 text figs. 20 fr.

The connections between ancient and Renaissance art have been the object of research of many scholars. The Warburg Institute, formerly in Hamburg, now in London, has contributed much to the clarification of the problems involved. While, however, these prob-

lems have been mostly treated in single monographs or in papers scattered in many periodicals, A. von Salis, formerly Professor in Heidelberg, since 1940 in Zürich, has for the first time attempted the presentation of the subject as a whole in a book. This book is by no means a handbook or a complete and systematic survey. It deals in seven chapters with special sides of the problem and attains to a summary picture of the whole by putting together stone for stone as in a mosaic.

The author lays emphasis on the fact that the relation of the Renaissance to ancient art was not a revival of ancient art, but a revival of Italian art under the influence of what the Cinquecento knew about the earlier period. This knowledge was limited to the Hellenistic and Roman art, with very little knowledge of the classical art. Archaic art and most of the classical Greek art had not yet been rediscovered. Although grandiose buildings like the Colosseum and the Marcellus theater were still standing, they had hardly any influence on the architecture in Rome, because the Renaissance architecture developed in Florence. Not before Bramante erected his tempietto in San Pietro in Montorio and then only in the Baroque period was a purely ancient style developed. It was much more Vitruvius, whose *De Architectura* had been rediscovered in 1414 in Monte Cassino and had been printed first in 1485, who influenced the construction of Renaissance buildings. A. v. Salis rightly mentions often how literary sources just as much as the remains of ancient art influenced the development of Renaissance art. Greek gods and heroes, who now made their appearance in art, were just as much known from literature as from art.

Painting, sculpture, and minor arts, on the other hand, received immediate inspiration from such archaeological discoveries as the "Golden House of Nero" in 1493 (pp. 35-60). The well-read scholars and artists saw at once that here had been found again the work of Fabullus, the court painter of Nero (Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXV, 120), from whose fantastic decorations the so-called fourth Pompeian style developed. The study of the ceilings which were alone preserved in the rooms filled with earth when the house was used as a basement for the baths of Trajan and which were therefore named "grottae," led to the "grotesques," 1493-1495, in the appartamento Borgia of Pope Alexander VI, then to the Sala del Credo and delle Sybillae and to the Loggie, where Giovanni da Udine and other co-workers of Raphael changed from the sober early Renaissance decorations to gay, rich and fantastic decorations. Not only details like miraculous flowers and legendary creatures were taken over, but the whole system of decorating walls and ceilings was changed and enriched. Pinturicchio in Santa Maria del Popolo (1505) and later Caravaggio and Domenichino followed the gay patterns. Cellini (*Vita*, I, 31), like Vitruvius (*De Archit.*, VII, 5) in antiquity, censured this fantastic architectural painting as degenerated.

The single pictures of the "Golden House" also inspired the Renaissance artists, who, however, often gave them new content. Thus a stucco relief showing five gods practicing archery becomes in a sketch by Michelangelo a crowd of men and women aiming at the soul (see Pls. 4-5). He was inspired not only by the picture but also by Lucian (*Nigrinos* or *On the Character of the Philosopher*,



36). The attack fails because love—Amor—, lying on the ground, is asleep. There are also ideas of Plato and other Greek philosophers embodied. Paris and Helen brought together by Aphrodite become in Perugino's and Raphael's *Sposalizio* the marriage of Mary and Joseph by the high priest. Lines, forms, and colors are retained, but pagan adultery has become a sacred Christian marriage.

The influence of ancient art on the Renaissance artists is not always so easy to grasp. Thus in the interment of Christ, painted by Raphael in 1507 for San Francesco in Perugia, memories of sarcophagi with the death of Meleager, of the *Pietà* of Michelangelo, and an event in Perugia, when a young nobleman was carried up the steps of the Cathedral while dying, have been blended (pp. 61-73, Pls. 9-12, Figs. 4-5).

Sometimes several ancient monuments have been used for one Renaissance picture. An interesting example is the battle of Constantine in the Vatican, which has used the scenes on the Arch of Constantine, erected soon after the battle of 312 A. D.; the Trajan reliefs reused on the same arch; and motifs which we know best from the then undiscovered mosaic of Alexander, but which are also well known in vases, ash urns, and sarcophagi (pp. 74-111, Pls. 13-22, Figs. 11-21).

The Renaissance like the Graeco-Roman period had interest in human and everyday motifs. Thus the spanking of a schoolboy, whom another student carries on his back, against an architectural background, recurs in a painting by Benozzo Gozzoli and one found in Pompeii. But again, this ancient picture was then unknown. Pan is spanked in the same way on a Roman sarcophagus, and Prudentius (*Peristephanon*, X, 696 ff.) describes the same procedure. This description may have inspired Gozzoli, or he may have known a now lost monument. In any case the same combination of harshness beside beauty led to similar pictures (pp. 112-123, Pls. 26-27).

The ideal of severe boyish grace of the fifteenth century is the reason why the *spinario*, corresponding to the same ideal of a teenage youth, has been imitated in exact copies, in variations, in adaptations and has also been used as accessory figure more often than any other ancient work of art (pp. 124-134, Pls. 28-35). It is at the same time an example of what an ancient figure can suffer in complications, grotesque and bizarre distortions.

The best examples how the discovery of ancient works of art can lead to the conquering of new fields are the statue groups of the Laocöon and the Three Graces (pp. 135-164). In both cases there are not only many repetitions and continuations of the motif, but it was also developed in more than one direction. The Laocöon group, found in 1506 in the Golden House of Nero, was at once recognized as the celebrated masterpiece of three Rhodian artists, described in Pliny, XXXVI, 37. It was designed, etched, imitated in marble and bronze, used for the minor arts, caricatured, but also adapted for a rising Christ by Titian (Pls. 36-40; cf. also M. Bieber, *Laocöon, The Influence of the Group since its Rediscovery*, 1942); for slaves and apostles originally intended for the tomb of Pope Julius II by Michelangelo (Pls. 41-43). At the same time there is a difference in conception here as well as in the head Arenberg in Brussels (Pl. 43a). Laocöon and his sons suffer like innocently hit animals.

In the slaves and in the head Arenberg the spiritual suffering has been enhanced. In the head even a conscious moral guilt seems to be expressed. Thus the similar forms express the different spirit of pagan antiquity and of Christian baroque.

The Three Graces have been used by Raphael as a companion piece to the Dream of a Knight (Pl. 44; cf. E. Panofsky, *Hercules am Scheidewege, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg*, XVIII [1930]). The young knight Scipio Borghese gets the golden apples which Raphael has put into the hand of his Graces, as a reward, because like Hercules he has chosen Virtue, not Pleasure. The original dance motif found in the ancient group in Siena as well as in the Pompeian wall paintings has been retained by Botticelli in his Primavera, while Rubens in his Graces changed the slim dancers to his favorite luxurious type with soft relaxed attitudes, and Niccolo Fiorentino named them in his medallion *Castitas*, *Pulchritudo*, and *Amor*, Chastity, Beauty, and Love (Pls. 45-48). Thus the original dance motif, also testified by Seneca, *De Ben.*, I, 3, has been changed to suit the intentions of the different artists. A. v. Salis' dating of the original group at the same time as the Laocoon, the first century B. C., is convincing.

The torso of Belvedere is used as an example of the ruined state of the ancient works of art which served as study material for the Renaissance, but which nevertheless has been of the greatest effect and an extraordinary fruitful influence on the artistic activity of that period (pp. 165-189). It was probably found together with the bronze boxer by the same artist, Apollonios, son of Nestor of Athens, as recognized by Rhys Carpenter and recently explained as Amykos by Phyllis Williams Lehmann (*A. J. A.*, XLIX [1945], pp. 330 ff.), an interpretation with which Rhys Carpenter has agreed (*ibid.*, pp. 353 ff.), while he has rightly in my opinion given the name of Marsyas to the torso. The Renaissance, however, did not doubt that Hercules was represented. Thus he was restored as or adapted to a Hercules with club or with bow in statuettes, a Hercules at the crossroads between Virtue and Pleasure by the school of Cranach, a slave to Omphale by Rubens and a Hercules Gallicus in paintings and etchings (Pls. 50-52).

The passionate and momentary movements which Michelangelo gave to his slaves on the ceiling of the Sistine are certainly most strongly influenced by the torso, but also by Laocoon and his sons. The garlands which the slaves carry take the place of the snakes. Some of the slaves are also influenced by the figures of Dionysus and Ariadne and reliefs depicting their wedding. The round medallions which are attached to these garlands are taken partly from ancient oscilla, partly from marble tondi by Donatello, who was also inspired by ancient round reliefs and gems (Pls. 54-57, and Fig. 27). The synthesis from primary and secondary sources, however, is new in form and content.

The last and most complicated, also most interesting and almost mysterious example is the Villa Farnesina and its ancient predecessor (pp. 190-223). The near relationship between the ancient and Renaissance villa on the Tiber cannot be explained by imitation or direct inspiration. When Raphael and his collaborators were commissioned by Agostino Chigi to decorate his casino neither knew the

ancient predecessor. The many parallels which have been found are due to the similar spirit of the time. The sensual life of the period of Antony and Cleopatra, who also had a villa near the Tiber, and that of the rich banker Agostino Chigi were related to each other, and therefore the similar spirit has produced a similar art. In both houses the ceilings have become the firmament, heaven on earth. Pictures of the sun, of the stars and personifications of celebrated stars are found in both. In both many birds and winged mythological creatures indicate the heavenly atmosphere. Not the early Farnesina was used but probably the *Astronomy* of C. Julius Hyginus, which was printed in 1475, and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, which describes so many changes of human beings into birds. From Apuleius (*Metamorphoses*, IV, 28-VI, 24) comes the story of Amor and Psyche, which is used for the two scenes of the judgment of the gods and the wedding of Amor and Psyche on the ceilings (Pl. 53) and the story of the two lovers in the spandrels, the wedge-shaped spaces above the window arches directly below the ceiling. Only the stories which are laid in the sky are represented, while the stories which take place on earth or in the nether world were executed later in the Castello del'Angelo by a pupil of Raphael (see Pl. 59 and Fig. 29). Many of the motifs are ancient, thus the way Jupiter embraces Amor and Venus directs his arrow. The many cupids which fill the space may have been inspired by such epigrams as *Anthologia Plan.*, IV, 215, printed in 1494, but of course are also seen everywhere in ancient wall decorations (see Pl. 60) and other monuments, like the marble base in Paris, formerly in Verona (Fig. 30; cf. Rodenwaldt, *Goethes Besuch zu Verona, Winckelmanns-Programm*, Berlin, No. 102 [1942], pp. 18, 24 and 34, tailpiece).

The architectural frame in the Chigi Farnesina with the many vistas through open porticoes, doors, and windows, the protruding and receding columns are related to the second or architectural style as represented by the ancient Farnesina, the villa of Boscoreale, and parts of the Mystery Villa Item in Pompeii, and again in the picture by Sodoma of the Wedding of Alexander and Roxane, based on the description in Lucian, *Herodotus or Aetion* (cf. Pls. 61 c-d and 64). The crown which Alexander extends to Roxane has its parallel in the crowning of Aphrodite in the ancient Farnesina (Pl. 63a). Like Sodoma, so also Raphael drew inspiration not only from ancient monuments, but also from literature. Thus his triumph of Galatea (Pl. 62a) in the Chigi Farnesina is based on Apuleius (*Met.*, IV, 31 ff.) where Venus drives over the sea in a shell. Raphael's immediate source may have been Angelo Poliziano, *Giostra*, vv. 118 ff., where the drive of Galatea is described, and this in turn is built on Philostratus, *Imagines*, II, 13, where a picture with Galatea and the Cyclops is described; cf. also the picture in the House of Livia on the Palatine, Pl. 63b. Raphael did not copy any existing picture, but he created new paintings peculiar to his own spirit, which was akin to that of antiquity. The ancient idea of "Love is all" dominates in both villas.

Thus the author concludes with the assertion that nowhere in the Renaissance do we find simple reproductions, except in secondary accessories. Motifs are used with changed meaning. These borrowed motifs are not used like foreign bodies, but they appear as the

natural results of similar trends of thought and similar ideas. The great artists of the Renaissance found in ancient architecture, sculpture, and painting what they longed for: greatness and clarity.

There is very little in this excellent book which one would want to change. I would not call the figure behind Constantine the Great on the Arch of Constantine Roma, for she is Virtus (p. 82 and 84, Pl. 13; see M. Bieber, "Honos and Virtus," in *A. J. A.*, XLIX [1945], pp. 25-34, Figs. 7-10). I would not call the figures on the Boscoreale Frescoes the family of the Antigonides, for they are Romans (p. 98; see M. Bieber, *Review of Religion*, II [1937], pp. 10 f.). But these are minor points. The author and the publisher, indeed Switzerland, may be congratulated at the occasion of the appearance of this and many other outstanding books in the German language. Paper, print, and illustrations are of the first rank. Again there is a minor wish: I dislike the distribution of the plates in the text. It is indeed sometimes troublesome to compare the illustrations with each other and with the text. Example: The Minerva in the judgment of the gods, Pl. 53a opposite p. 169, is compared to the Minerva on the Volta dorata on Pl. 59b opposite p. 185, and both are discussed on p. 201. It seems to me better to assemble all plates at the end of a book. But the finding is made easier by the list of illustrations, pp. 273-280, which together with the list of abbreviations, p. 233, and the rich but concise footnotes, pp. 234-272, adds to the usefulness of the excellent book.

MARGARETE BIBER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

VLADIMIR GEORGIEV. *Die Sprachliche Zugehörigkeit der Etrusker*. Sofia, Universitätsdruckerei, 1943. Pp. 102. (*Jahrbuch der Universität des Heiligen Kliment von Ochrid in Sofia*, Bd. XXXIX.)

Georgiev's highly polemic efforts to establish the Indo-European character of Etruscan have been adumbrated in a number of his previous works, all largely inaccessible to American scholars because of communication difficulties during the war (particularly, *Die Sprache der Etrusker* [Sofia, 1938], and *Das Schicksal der Indogermanischen O-Deklination im Etruskischen* [Sofia, 1941]). The present little work may be regarded as a bold, ingenious, but nonetheless completely ineffectual attempt to resolve this bitterly contested issue. Georgiev, in effect, tries to confute those who deny an Indo-European ancestry for Etruscan by attacking what has always been regarded as their most impregnable bastion, the Etruscan numerals and relation-words. Of the numerals, Cortsen once wrote that "numeralia . . . eo addidi consilio, ut omnibus probarem, linguam Etruscam inter linguas Indogermanas, ut vocantur, habendam non esse." Similar statements have often been made in the past about the relation-words (with the exception of Etr. *nefts* "nepos" which many investigators have considered a borrowing from Lat. *nepōs*). The underlying assumption of both Georgiev and his opponents is the perfectly sound empiric formula that numerals and

relation-words have in time past constituted the best criterion for determining if a given language can be counted as Indo-European. With this thesis, at least, no one can quarrel.

But there is much more that is questionable in the particular methodology employed by Georgiev in interpreting the Etruscan inscriptions. Using, like most of his more recent predecessors, both an etymological and a combinatory approach, he differs from them in leaning more heavily on etymological deductions and in using such deductions as the basis for an Etruscan historical phonology which is itself made the starting point for still further etymological proposals. Georgiev admits (p. 14) that "dabei ist eine Art circulus vitiosus unvermeidlich," but defends himself by arguing that such a method has always proved fruitful in Indo-European comparative studies: a few incontrovertible etymologies have served to establish sound laws, whence in turn have sprung less obvious etymologies. The dangerous weakness of this argument is the disappearingly small number of Etruscan words which can be satisfactorily etymologized as Indo-European with anything like the inevitable finality of a hundred reliable equations one might select at random from Walde-Pokorny's Indo-European dictionary. There is no escape, then, from the conclusion that the etymologies assumed as "Stützpunkte" (e. g. Etr. *tur* "give" compared to Gr. δῶρον "gift") are too frail to sustain the sound laws deduced from them; they are merely guesses, more or less plausible, and their assumption implies a continuous *petitio principii*.

Georgiev's sound laws, by which Indo-European was allegedly converted into Etruscan, naturally presume widespread sound shifts. The fact that equally complicated equations must be set up to fit Armenian into the Indo-European phonological system is not, however, despite Georgiev's special pleading (p. 33), an argument to prove or disprove his theories of Etruscan origins.

To another claim of Georgiev's, equally devoid of logical or probative force, more attention should be paid, for it lies at the core of much current etymological speculation: Georgiev insists (p. 16) that only an Indo-European language "lässt sich sprachwissenschaftlich als indogermanisch nachweisen." He suggests that scoffers should try to provide the Basque numerals, for example, with Indo-European etyma. The speciousness of this reasoning is twofold. First, we are very often in ignorance of the exact meaning and the phonetic values of an Etruscan word. This same difficulty besets Hittite and so-called "Anatolian" etymological ventures (Hitt. *mahlas*, for example, seemed at first blush to mean "apple tree" and thereby to furnish such a close parallel to Lat. *mālus* "apple tree" that Cuny even advanced this etymology as a proof that the base \**mālo*- extended beyond the Mediterranean basin; other investigators, more daring still, maintained that *mahlas* had preserved in exemplary fashion a laryngeal element which in *mālus* had disappeared, leaving behind only a trace in the vowel lengthening; subsequently, Ehelolf established the meaning of *mahlas* as "vine branch," destroying with one shrewd blow both theories and the etymology). The second factor which renders Etruscan etymologies peculiarly suspect is the Etruscan merging of voiced and voiceless stops; the result is to multiply the number of possible equations for any given word, thereby reducing the probability of any particular etymology.

Here again the same phenomenon has been equally disastrous in weakening the authority of Hittite etymologies: since Hitt. *tamais* "other" can also appear as *damais*, a presumed Indo-European base in *t-* or *d-* is equally probable, and by the same token equally improbable. Where the number of variables has been so increased, a seasoned Indo-European etymologist could with little difficulty turn out sound laws and phonetic equations sufficient to interpret not only Basque, but also Cherokee or Tagalog, numerals and relation-words as Indo-European.

There is no need to emphasize this point by discussing in detail Georgiev's somewhat bizarre etymologies of the relation-words (one may cite Etr. *śex* "flia" from IE \**dhughatēr*, without rehearsing the linguistic legerdemain by which this result is achieved). For the numerals, it seems worthwhile to note that while the famous Toscanella dice contribute the first six numerals, they by no means guarantee which is which. F. Slotty's attempt to discredit the "Würfelgesetz" (*Archiv Orientální*, IX [1937], pp. 382 ff.) attests at least that such wide divergence still exists among Etruscologists concerning the correct arrangement of the numerals that any hypothesis which dogmatically insists upon a particular ordering of these names is built upon the sand.

Georgiev's conclusion (p. 15) is that Etruscan is an Indo-European language belonging to the "Pelagian-Luwian" branch of the family, somewhat influenced by Hittite and Thracian-Phrygian; after the Etruscans had migrated from Asia Minor to Italy, he adds, so much was adopted from Greek and Italic that the greatest difficulty in Etruscan studies is to separate inherited from borrowed elements. How difficult this can be may be seen from Georgiev's attempt to derive Etr. *nefts* directly from an IE \**nepot-s* (a form without the lengthened grade of Lat. *nepōs* from \**nepōt-s*); it is instructive to compare an almost exactly parallel attempt made long ago by Norbert Jokl (*Linguistisch-kulturhistorische Untersuchungen aus dem Bereiche des Albanischen*, pp. 17-28) to prove that Albanian *nip* "grandchild, nephew" was inherited from Indo-European, not borrowed from Lat. *nepōs*. Inescapably, the invocation of sound laws, justifiable for a language as relatively well-known as Albanian, is more than presumptuous in a language the very interpretation of which is mainly conjecture.

There will not be many readers who will acquiesce in Georgiev's overly enthusiastic etymologies—he admits himself that some are improvable and others even false. Furthermore, it is most unlikely that Georgiev or his predecessors (e.g. Vetter, *Etruskische Wortdeutungen* [Vienna, 1937]), despite their ingenuity, have or will have enough purely factual evidence to demonstrate with reasonable certainty the Indo-European character of Etruscan. More sanely, Paul Kretschmer, although he believes Etruscan to be "indogermanoid," has observed in the most recent revision of his famous *Sprache* (in the Spanish version, *Introducción a la Lingüística Griega y Latina* [Madrid, 1946], p. 227) that "so many and such important divergences with reference to Indo-European . . . do not permit us to introduce Etruscan with any assurance into the group of the Indo-European languages."

GORDON M. MESSING.

- H. P. L'ORANGE. Apotheosis in Ancient Portraiture. Oslo, H. Aschehoug and Co. (W. Nygaard), 1947. Pp. 156; 97 text figs. 25 N. Kr. (*Instituttet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning. Publikasjoner: Serie B, XLIV.*)

Dr. L'Orange is well known already for a book, *Studien zur Geschichte des spätantiken Porträts*, and for a large number of articles both in *Symbolae Osloenses* and in other learned periodicals, mainly upon late imperial art and sculpture; in this admirable volume he breaks new ground and goes back to the Hellenistic Age. The title indicates sufficiently well the nature and scope of his study; it is concerned with the mode of representing in ancient art inspired rulers and leaders, and as might be expected a new artistic type appears to begin with the official portraiture of Alexander the Great. The King's head, turning and lifting up its eyes to take in (as it were) the divine commands, with its open mouth and leonine waves of hair, established a new fashion and standard, which lasted for centuries. Lysippus, who was the first to depict this passionate upturned gaze to Heaven of Alexander, left a powerful impress by his work on the thought and mind of succeeding generations. No Hellenistic ruler could fail to be influenced by the memory and traditional representation of that daemonic man, and this is evidenced by the portraiture of subsequent monarchs. Certain features of this type, according to L'Orange, become standard pattern for the inspired ruler in contact with the gods: parted lips, upturned gaze, large and lustrous eye, a wealth of hair rising in a great wave above the forehead and curling down around the nape of the neck—all these elements, some of them deriving from traditional beliefs found already in Homer, were felt to be fitting in representing an inspired leader, whether he be ruler, statesman, general, or sage. In this review I do not propose to deal with the Hellenistic Age or discuss archaeological detail, but confine myself to giving some account of the development of this type in the Roman Imperial Age (as L'Orange sets it out), and to adding some observations thereon.

From the Hellenistic East this inspired-ruler and saviour-type invaded Rome, for the artists who were commissioned to design coins or to carve statues were in the vast majority Greeks, and naturally worked in the idiom that was most familiar to them. On coins of the late republic both Scipio Africanus and Pompey the Great are shown with a typical Hellenistic heavenward gaze: the *caduceus* that accompanies Scipio, the trident and dolphin that accompany Pompey, hint at their being under the protection and in close contact with some patron god, Mercury or Neptune. It is worth noting that both these representations are subsequent to the death of their subject; the Scipionic coins were struck about 90 B. C., the trident and dolphin type was struck by Sextus Pompeius in Sicily between 38-36 B. C., so that a definite "propaganda" purpose may be involved (but see later, p. 331). It was not for nothing that Pompey arrogated to himself a title that the world had so far reserved for Alexander, or that his admirers at the time of his third triumph deliberately lowered his age to 34 (Plutarch, *Pomp.*, 46) so as to equate him more closely with the world-conqueror.

So we reach the Principate, and here (though L'Orange does not stress it) we may pause to remark on the significance of the portraiture of Augustus. Some portraits of him in the Hellenistic type have survived from the early years of his reign,<sup>1</sup> but after that Augustus (I think consciously) preferred to be represented both on coins and in statues as a Roman citizen, whether statesman or general, now addressing his people, now praying on their behalf, but never in the complete guise of a Hellenistic monarch. Statues and busts reveal a man "*pietate gravem ac meritis à la romaine*."

From this Augustan decision, which Tiberius was bound to follow, the first breakaway occurs (L'Orange suggests) with Nero: according to our author the year of transition, as revealed both by literary sources and in portraiture, is 64. Down to that date Nero had been constitutional; after it coins depict him with a great wave of curls above his forehead, and hair flowing over the nape of the neck,—that is in imitation or reminiscence of the Hellenistic monarch type. Suetonius (*Nero*, 51) notes this changed mode of hair-dressing with extreme disapproval; Nero was "*pudendus*." Here I would merely add that our habit of thinking in political categories, "constitutional" or "despotic" or "god-monarchical," may blind us to another serious cause of discontent against Nero; he was not only becoming unconstitutional or un-Augustan, he was "going Greek," and the average Roman Senator or centurion was by no means inclined to accept the Greeks as better types of humanity (cf. Persius, III, 77 ff. and V, 189 ff.). Nero's open admiration—and worse still, practice—of Greek art, must have been exasperating in the extreme to national pride. 64 is the year when he appeared in public as *citharoedus*, and thereafter he steadily progressed along the phil-Hellenic path. To the examples which L'Orange cites—appearances as Nero-Helios, Nero-Apollo, etc.,—we may add Nero's recruiting for his Eastern expedition of six-footers to be incorporated in a *phalanx Alexandri Magni* (Suetonius, *Nero*, 19).<sup>2</sup>

Assuredly, if L'Orange's interpretation of the coins and busts of 64 and after is correct it adds much to our understanding of Nero. The other emperors whose representations show signs of this tendency are, as we might expect, Domitian, Commodus, Severus, Caracalla, and Gallienus. But with the latter comes a change: whereas Commodus was *Hercules Romanus* Severus' gaze turns not so much towards Greece as to Africa and Egypt, and one of his statuary types recalls strongly the Serapis of Bryaxis; this accords well with an emperor whose huge Septizonium (as L'Orange reminds the reader) was so oriented "*ut ex Africa venientibus suum opus occurreret*," and who raised a white marble tomb to Hannibal. Gallienus' types show much the same characteristics, but by now new motives

<sup>1</sup> See O. Brendel, *Ikongraphie des Kaisers Augustus*, pp. 41 ff.

<sup>2</sup> It is perhaps worth stressing this point, that it was the "Greekness" rather than the unconstitutionality that was unpopular; when Nero assumed the pose and pomp of a Persian King, in receiving and investing Tiridates, the populace seem to have been pleased by this parade of power and magnificence. Since writing the above paragraph a review of L'Orange's book by Dr. Jocelyn Toynbee in *J. R. S.*, XXXVIII (1948), p. 160, has convinced me that the style of hair-dressing on the coins represents Nero ready for public and stage performances, in fact Nero *artifex* and not Nero *basileus*.



are beginning to emerge, as for example the hair parted in the middle and flowing down in symmetrical locks on either side of the parting. Constantine, if we may trust Eusebius (*Vita*, IV 15) ordered that his gold coins should bear a representation of him "looking upwards with an intense gaze like a man praying." This leads the way to a fresh development, in which the eyes—as windows of the soul—receive more and more emphasis, until by the fifth century they are the most prominent part of the whole head.<sup>3</sup> So, while *Lives* of saints and sages speak of the radiance and lustre of their eyes, or the powerfulness of their gaze, statuary reveals "a peculiar modelling of the eye and the parts surrounding it," indicating visibly that "the spiritual vision is developed to a specially high degree."<sup>4</sup> This notion of the inspired gaze of the "pneumatic" or spiritual man L'Orange illustrates by several examples, including an astonishing colossal portrait head of the fifth century from the Ostia Museum, a portrait-bust from Ephesus where the head itself is almost rectangular (ὀλίγου τετράγωνον, as Damascius writes of Isidore), so that all attention is focussed on the eyes, and an icon of bishop Abraham of Bavit in Egypt. This marking-out of the eyes continues in later representation of evangelists in manuscripts of the Gospels,—and, we might add, in various Anglo-Saxon Gospel books. But this holds good not only for holy men: large and luminous eyes manifest the divine power of the great ruler, as seen first in Alexander, and in the fourth century in the well-known porphyry bust of an emperor (?Licinius), and in the colossal heads of Constantius II and of Valentinian I. This develops into the fixed gaze of the immobile emperor, statuesque in his majesty, and in this connection L'Orange recalls the famous passage in Ammian (XVI, 10) describing the attitude of Constantius II as he drove into Rome.<sup>5</sup> Much though I agree with L'Orange's general view I must remark, in passing, that I cannot believe that Tiberius was imitating Eastern or Hellenistic monarchical traditions when he was accused of walking *cervice rigida et obstipa* (Suetonius, *Tib.*, 68); his reserve and taciturnity could be, and was, mistaken for arrogance or pride, but it was Claudian pride not Persian. A short section on the Emperor and his God brings this fascinating study to a conclusion.

Fascinating it may truly be termed, both for its general thesis and for the immense knowledge not only of ancient art but also of ancient texts and literature that L'Orange displays. I think it possible that he overstresses resemblances occasionally, but that may be simply that his observant and well-trained eye can discern more than the non-archaeologist; occasionally too I find myself disagreeing, as e. g. over Tiberius. But I have no doubt of the truth and importance of his general thesis, the more so that it connects so closely with the literary and historical tradition. Once more we are

<sup>3</sup> Lucian (*Timon*, 54) remarks on the terrific glance of the would-be philosopher Thrasyclus; but a certain amount of Thrasyclus' make-up, it should be noted, is based upon Socrates, as the word *βερθυόμενος* betrays.

<sup>4</sup> L'Orange calls attention here to S. Eitrem's treatment of a famous passage in Ammian, XXI, 14, in an article in *Symb. Oslo*, XXI (1942), esp. pp. 63 ff.

<sup>5</sup> I have dealt with this passage, as illustrating imperial deportment deriving from Eastern tradition, in *J. R. S.*, XXXVII (1947), p. 34.

led back to the towering figure of Alexander the Great, and to the lasting impact it made on the ancient world. Once more we find that the imitators of the Hellenistic monarchic style are Nero, Domitian, and Commodus, and that the reign of Gallienus initiates a change. Typical too is the rejection of that style (after a short trial) by Augustus. Most impressive also is the long life of some of the visible concomitants of the great or holy man, the *gratia vultus* of St. Paternus or St. Germanus (p. 29);<sup>6</sup> the flowing long hair of medieval kings; the way in which the emperor and his god of pagan times is transmuted into the emperor crowned by God in the early Middle Ages.<sup>7</sup> And here I must express the hope that Dr. L'Orange's book dealing with the continuing existence right down into modern days of various forms, ceremonies, and symbols, *Fra Antikk til Middelalder*, at present accessible only in Norwegian, will be translated and made available in an English version, for it would be extremely valuable to students.

No one who is interested in the social and religious history of the ancient world can afford to neglect this book, for there is so much to be learnt from it. In concluding, however, I should like to raise two topics. In an earlier paragraph I mentioned (as L'Orange did) propaganda: this term has in recent years acquired so sinister a connotation of calculating deception that its use in discussing ancient history may mislead. Emperors such as Nero or Caracalla were not out to delude their subjects, and I think it is safe to say that they believed in the characters (whether divine or human) which they assumed. Nero took his art and his voice extremely seriously, and the equation Nero-Helios or Nero-Apollo (whatever its precise meaning) implies genuine religiosity. Similarly we must not imagine Caracalla saying to himself or to his courtiers "How can I best persuade these Greeks and Easterners to join enthusiastically in a war against Parthia? I know; let's pretend to be *Alexander redi-vivus*, that'll get them." Just as in his celebrated *Constitutio Antoniniana* the Roman emperor declares how gratified the Roman gods will be by the enormous increase in the number of their worshippers, so Caracalla, φιλαλεξανδρότατος, saw himself as both inspired by and copying Alexander, and here once again the great Macedonian has left his impress.

My second observation is general, too. There is a slight danger attaching to the interpretation of ancient works of art, which is the unconscious assumption that a given symbol, once established, might convey for centuries the same meaning and message, and that a spectator gazing upon a statue would apprehend that symbol with all its accumulation of meaning. Yet, if we may take an analogy from language, just as metaphors can fade and become so much a part of everyday speech as to be employed eventually without any realisation that they are (or were) metaphors, it looks as though

<sup>6</sup> From English history we might add St. Cuthbert elevating his eyes to heaven when he sees in a vision the disaster at Nechtansmere in the year 685 (*Vita Anon.*, IV, 8).

<sup>7</sup> On p. 129 L'Orange reproduces a colossal head from Berlin, usually thought to be Frederick II, "crowned with the ruler's diadem of antiquity, and with the familiar features of the divine ruler of that time."

symbols themselves, however full of meaning at first, may become stereotyped and eventually meaningless. Words themselves undergo strange changes: a Minister at the head of a department probably does not repeat to himself each morning, as he confronts business for the day, that his title means "a servant," and behave accordingly. In language we can observe today how words and phrases that suited the eighteenth or nineteenth century seem to be losing something of their pristine strength and in consequence are replaced by newer formations; so in statuary and portraits the full "Hellenistic-monarch" type is replaced by the intense gaze of the fourth century, until (as L'Orange has shown) the eyes alone remain as the expressive part of the face in the fifth century. I put forward this suggestion with some diffidence, merely to stress the need for caution in interpretation. But a scholar of the learning and eminence of Dr. L'Orange needs no such caution; he is to be congratulated upon a most notable book.

M. P. CHARLESWORTH.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE, O. P. *Liberté et civilisation chez les Grecs*. Paris, Éditions de la revue des jeunes, 1947. Pp. 127. (*Initiations*, XIV.)

"Le propos de cette collection est d'offrir aux jeunes gens et aux jeunes filles, une présentation succincte, mais précise et sérieuse, d'un certain nombre de questions dont la solution intéresse leur vie spirituelle ou leur culture profonde." So we are told on the inside of the back cover of this small volume, one in a series edited by A.-M. Carré and A. Bourgeois.

We are presented with four essays, only the first and longest of which, "De la liberté chez les Grecs" (pp. 1-74), was previously unpublished; it developed from a lecture given in 1945. Here, in three chapters, Festugière traces the idea of liberty in Hellas and finds that, politically, it is bound to democracy, delivery from the tyranny of a master or masters, freedom to live as one wishes. "Il n'y a pas de liberté vraie sans participation au gouvernement" (p. 32). He is led, therefore, to follow the rise of democracy at Athens and to show how its excesses caused its decline.

Even under democracy, however, men are slaves to law and this is all that conserves a true freedom for the citizens. With the fourth century the philosophers, viewing the sad spectacle of a corrupt democracy in Athens, took up the problem of the delicate balance between democratic government and other, more or less attractive, forms. Plato, in particular, merits praise for perceiving how quickly the self-styled protector of the people (i. e., the demagogue) becomes a genuine master.

After Alexander the freedom of the Greek city-state, which had always been held essential to the freedom of the individual, disappeared. For it the Stoics and Epicureans substituted an inner freedom which might bring with it a personal sense of peace and satisfaction. To corroborate his argument Festugière adds (pp.

68-74) a select list of illustrative passages from Epicurus and the Stoics.

In 1942 Festugière published an essay entitled *Communauté et histoire* (Presses Universitaires de France), which is here reprinted in two parts, "Communauté et cité grecque" (pp. 75-95) and "Communauté et Romanitas" (pp. 97-108). In five brief chapters the author shows how, originally, the good life to the Greek was inextricably associated with the *polis*, and how later this "communauté civique" expanded into the idea of "civilisation," an idea which looked beyond the *polis* and came, partially under Alexander but especially under the Romans, to comprise the civilized world. It is not difficult to link the Roman conception, which had been anticipated by Greek philosophers, with Christian thought. "C'était, en somme, la résurrection du vieux concept de cité tel que l'avaient entendu Platon et Aristote, mais devenu infiniment plus riche et plus humain puisque la cité comprenait maintenant des hommes de tout pays, de toute race, dont le lien n'était plus la naissance et le sang, mais une commune éducation" (p. 98).

The fourth and concluding study, "Autarcie et communauté dans la Grèce antique" (pp. 109-126), was first published in 1944 under the title *Communauté et bien commun* (Librairie de Médicis). It concerns the efforts of the particularistic *polis* to achieve self-sufficiency, material and moral. The Greeks failed, for even their unions, whether empires or federations, were unable to secure universal peace and justice; consequently they met disaster. It was left to Rome to eliminate racial and national consciousness, and to substitute the notion of a world-wide civilized community; "Rome, la Rome impériale, mais surtout la Rome chrétienne, accomplit cet achèvement" (p. 126). In the words of the poet, *Urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat* (p. 102).

The book has been thoughtfully written and carefully prepared. I have only one mild protest that is worth recording, and that is against the traditional credit granted to Solon (e.g., p. 9) as a pioneer of democracy. His basic aim was economic prosperity; his method was the institution of political stability. That he failed to produce the latter and that in practice the *demos* possessed no power either in the ecclesia or in the heliaea is amply proved by what we know of Athenian politics in the generation following Solon.

There are few mechanical errors: spelling errors on pp. 10 ("escalavage") and 25 ("Initiattons"); wrong accent on p. 38 (n. 4); notes 1 and 2 are transposed on p. 39; untidy reference on p. 51 (n. 1).

The quality and vitality of this book must not be measured by its brevity. It is satisfying to realize that, at a time when France lay prostrate beneath Hitler, a classical scholar of Festugière's attainments had the courage not only to prepare these essays but to publish some of them. For the heart of Festugière's study deals with the antithesis between true freedom and the tyrant who enslaves the people under the guise of protecting them (cf., e.g., p. 50).

There is no doubt that Festugière understands the tragedy of the Greeks; more than that, he recognizes that we today are confronted by exactly the same problem, the same reluctance to see beyond the individual state. He puts it well and his words are worth quoting at length:

"Il n'y a qu'une solution possible, qui est de restreindre l'autonomie, notamment sur le point de décider, par droit absolu et sans contrôle, de la paix et de la guerre. L'idée de confédération entraîne nécessairement celle d'arbitrage. Ce droit d'arbitrage dévolue au *synédriou* risque, à son tour, de n'être qu'un vain rêve s'il ne s'accompagne d'un vrai pouvoir fondé, dans la pratique, sur une force matérielle. Qu'advient-il, en effet, si l'un des États en litige refuse la sentence des arbitres? Il faudra la lui imposer. . . . Mais l'exemple de la Grèce est là: pour l'avoir pas appris à s'unir, les cités grecques s'effondrèrent; parce qu'elles ne voulurent jamais sacrifier la moindre parcelle de leur liberté, elles finirent par la perdre toute. C'est un grand enseignement" (pp. 119-120).

Yes, the lesson of Greece is bitter, powerful, timeless. It is unfortunate that a book so wise and so beautifully written as this cannot be circulated among our own young people.

MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.

H. T. BOSSERT and HALET ÇAMBEL. *Karatepe. A Preliminary Report on a New Hittite Site.* Istanbul, 1946. Pp. 15; XVI pls. Piasters 35. (*Faculty of Letters of the University of Istanbul. Publications of the Institute for Research in Ancient Oriental Civilisations*, No. 1.)

The subject of this interesting bilingual booklet, the last eight pages of which consist of an English translation of the Turkish text filling pages 1-7, is Karatepe on the Ceyhan River, a site, previously unknown, about 100 kilometers due north of Alexandrette-Iskenderun. When exploring in 1945 the region between Kayseri (Mazaka) and the Gulf of Issus, Professor Bossert of the University of Istanbul and several members of his staff heard for the first time rumors about a supposedly Hittite lion relief carved on a rock in the mountainous region northwest of the well-known sites of Zincirli, Sakçegözü, and Gergin, but were unable to check this information. However, when surveying this region once more in February 1946, they successfully located the sculpture in question on the wooded elevation of Karatepe in the neighborhood of the town of Kadirli. The monument turned out to be a base of black stone which showed a relief of "two lions held by a standing man." As the back of the human statue, which, having been thrown from its base, is now headless, bore a well preserved Old Aramaic inscription of 20 lines (not yet translated), it could not be doubted that a further exploration of Karatepe promised equally important finds, to be compared to the famous reliefs, statues, and Old Aramaic inscriptions of the ancient kings of Sam'al, which von Luschan unearthed at Zincirli and Gergin. A quick provisional examination of Karatepe confirmed this impression at once through the discovery of a number of inscribed and sculptured stone fragments, among which a "Hittite" hieroglyphic inscription deserves mention. Classical scholars will learn with interest that the authors conclude the tentative inferences they have reached by comparing their new material with other finds from the same region with a

statement, in my opinion not sufficiently substantiated, to the effect that the Greeks are likely to have taken over the "Phoenician" script from "the Aramaicised Hittites" of Southern Anatolia, and not directly from the Phoenicians.

JULIUS LEWY.

HEBREW UNION COLLEGE.

SIR D'ARCY WENTWORTH THOMPSON. *A Glossary of Greek Fishes.* London, Oxford University Press, 1947. Pp. 302.

This volume is a companion to Sir D'Arcy Thompson's *A Glossary of Greek Birds*, the first edition of which was published over fifty years ago and a new edition as recently as 1936. The latter has long been a stand-by for scholars, and his *Glossary of Greek Fishes* undoubtedly will find a place beside it on the shelves of many students of ancient literature.

Probably no scholar of our generation has been so well qualified to produce such a book as Sir D'Arcy Thompson, who combined rich classical scholarship with accurate zoological knowledge. Unlike Hans Gossen, who has long displayed a special interest in Greek fish names, he was cautious and conservative in his identifications. He very rarely pushed conjecture beyond the limits of the evidence, much preferring, when the data were meagre or confused, simply to say that the fish is unknown or to suggest a general rather than a specific identification. The fruit of his painstaking research on Egyptian fish names appears in this volume, in many instances clarifying the meaning of obscure Greek fish names.

One minor weakness of the book is that Romance survivals of the ancient fish names, which in some instances make it possible to fix the meanings of Greek terms more precisely, have not been fully utilized, apparently because the literature on them was not given due consideration. This is an inference from the treatment of individual Greek fish names, for there is no bibliography.

It is regrettable that the scope of the book was not broadened to include Latin fish names. The Greek nomenclature of fishes is so closely intermeshed with the Latin that it is almost impossible to consider the former apart from the latter. Sir D'Arcy Thompson's awareness of this situation is reflected not only in the frequent citation of Latin equivalents and discussion of Latin names in relation to the Greek, but the occasional separate listing of Latin names for which there are no specific Greek equivalents, such as *alaua*, *alburnus*, *ambicus*, and *ancorago*.

Since obscure Greek names of unidentifiable fishes occurring only once or twice in such authors as Oppian, Aelian, Hesychius, and Cyranides are listed, it appears that Sir D'Arcy Thompson intended to make his list complete. If so, the following should have been included: *βάραξ* (Hesychius), *ἐννυχίη* (Numenius, *apud* Athenaeus, VII, 304 e and 327 f), *θρυμῖς* (Hesychius), *καλαβώτης* (Hesychius), *κάλαμα* (Hesychius), *κόστης* (Diphilus Siphnius, *apud* Athenaeus, VIII, 357 a; Hesychius, *s. v.* *κοστίας*), *κυνόγλωσσος* (Epicharmus, *apud* Athenaeus, VII, 288 b; 307 c; 322 f), *λαρινός* (Oppian, *Hal.*, III, 399; Hesychius), *μολουρίς* (Hesychius, *s. v.* *μολουρίδες*; Nicander,

*apud* Athenaeus, VII, 32. a), *κύρμη* (Epicharmus, *apud* Athenaeus, VII, 321 a), *νήτοδες* (Hesychius), *πίγγαν* (Hesychius), *πορφύριον* (Hesychius), *πυροῦντες* (Anesikeus, *apud* Athenaeus, VIII, 553 c), *σελάχιας* (Hesychius), *στρουθός*: (Aelian, *Nat. An.*, 14, 3), *σίαπτον* (Hesychius), *τροχός* (Pliny, *N. H.*, IX, 166; Polemius Silvius, 16, 10), *φιλομήλη* (Sim. Seth, p. 113 Langk.; Schol. Oppian, *Hal.*, 7, 97), and *χέννιον* (Hesychius).

Typographical errors are few. The following may be noted: *ancorago* (p. 14): "Schu-hard" for "Schuchardt"; *ἀνθίας* (p. 15): "four of Oppian's three kinds" for "three of Oppian's four kinds"; *γλάνυς* (p. 47): "Strabo xviii" for "Strabo xvii"; *ἐγγέλυσ* (p. 60): "(Lago di Garda), Plin. l. c." for "Plin. ix. 75"; *θύννος* (p. 88): "*ὠμοτάριχος* . . . Diose. i." for "Diose. ii. 31 W."; *κῆρος* (p. 114): "Archestr. *ib.* 490 b 9" for "Archestr. *ib.* 301. f; Arist. *H. A.* 490 b 9"; *κίθαρος* (p. 114): "Plin xxxii. 11" for "Plin. xxxii. 146"; *κίχλη* (p. 116): "*Ctenilchrus*" for "*Crenilabrus*"; *λεπιδωτός* (p. 148): "Boulanger" for "Boilenger"; and *τρώκτης* (pp. 271-272): "Isid. *orig.* xii. 66" for "xii. 6. 6." Under *πολύπους* (p. 208) Apic. ix. 422 is quoted in error for Ahen. 341. e.

There are occasional inconsistencies. For example, on p. 48 he twice cites the same passage of Aristotle (*H. A.* 508 b 20), first stating that the *γλαῦκος* has many pyloric caeca, then that it has a few caeca. On p. 80 he refers the reader to *τρίτομον* for further data on the *θύννος*, but has no article on the former. On p. 223 he implies that Latin *orbis* and *orbella* are synonyms of *ρόμβος*, which he identifies as the turbot, but on p. 185 he identifies *orbis*, *orbella* as probably one of the globe-fishes. On p. 289 he says that the brackish-water *πελωρίδες* of Xenocrates, xxvi, cannot be identified, but on p. 194 he identifies them as probably mussels. On p. 49 he identifies the *γλυκυμαρίς* as *Venus verrucosa*, but on p. 289 as *Tapes decussatus*.

One slightly exasperating feature is that significant data on a fish name are occasionally found, not under the pertinent term, but under a different one. For example, on p. 53 he casually says that *simo* becomes a name for the colchia in Latin, but on pp. 237-233 on *σίμος* he does not mention this development. On p. 16 under *αἰθίας*, to which no cross-reference is given, there is information on the *λύκος* not found in the article on that name on p. 152. On p. 196 under *πέρεκη* he cites *αἰόλος* as an epithet, but fails to include this reference under *αἰολίας* on p. 4. On p. 197 under *πέρεκη* he cites *φυκίδα* from Speusippus, *apud* Athenaeus, 319 b and conjectures that it is a f. l. for *ἐρυθρίον*, but on p. 278 under *φύκης* he makes the same citation without conjecture.

The index is incomplete and contains some errors. The following are the result of random sampling: Tetrodon: p. 279, not p. 289; add pp. 185 and 280; Bagras: omit p. 65; Boutargue: p. 112, not p. 118; Sea-mouse: discussed on p. 280, but not indexed; Scallop: add p. 289; Perch: add p. 194; Orza: add p. 186.

ALFRED C. ANDREWS.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI.

# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

---

VOL. LXX, 4

WHOLE No. 280

---

## ANCIENT INSTRUCTION IN "GRAMMAR" ACCORDING TO QUINTILIAN.

Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* has had an enormous influence on school teaching in most Western European countries, especially England and Germany, and, though about a hundred years ago pedagogues and theorists of education gradually ceased to consult his work or to refer to it, some of the principles and methods which he advocated have persisted down to the present. In view of this and of the high authority which Quintilian enjoyed among educators for many centuries it is perhaps regrettable that very few consistent efforts seem to have been made, at least in more recent times, to find out exactly what, in Quintilian's opinion, instruction in "grammar," which, according to his precepts, is the most important part of instruction in the lower grades, should be like.

It is generally agreed that not everything that Quintilian mentions and discusses in the first book of his *Institutio Oratoria* should, in his opinion, actually be taught or discussed in school. If this view is accepted three questions, therefore, naturally arise: 1. Why did Quintilian mention those things which are not to be taught or discussed in school, since he obviously did not intend to write a treatise on grammar but on instruction in grammar? 2. What part exactly of the material and the problems which he discusses was, in his opinion, to be discussed in school, and what part was not to be discussed? 3. What relevance, if any, did this latter part have to the proper subject of the first book of Quintilian's work? A few attempts to answer these questions have been made within the last several



decades. But they have arrived at widely divergent results, and these results seem in no case quite satisfactory. It may therefore seem worth while to take up the question again.

# I.

In 1886 H. Nettleship published an article<sup>1</sup> in which he tried to show that chapters 4-6 of the first book, which, in a way, seem to form the core of Quintilian's discussion of instruction in grammar in school, were very badly organized. The different parts of this section of Quintilian's work did not form a proper and logical sequence. There were senseless repetitions, the same things being discussed twice or even three times in somewhat different words. Even the same examples were sometimes repeated. Finally these chapters contained much that had no or very little relevance to Quintilian's proper subject. A more detailed analysis seemed to show that the whole section fell into two distinct parts, namely chapters 4, 1—5, 54, and 5, 55—3, 27, which were not very well connected with one another and which in part covered the same ground. In the first section a good many coincidences with the *Ars Grammatica* of Remmius Palaemon could be found, while the second section showed some traces of possible relation to the elder Pliny's work *De Dubio Sermone*, though it had to be admitted that our knowledge of this latter work is altogether very scanty and indirect. The result then seemed to be that chapters 4, 1—5, 54 represent in the main an extract from the *Ars* of Remmius Palaemon, ch. 5, 55—6, 27 an extract from the work of Pliny, in both cases with additions made by Quintilian. These two excerpts were rather carelessly put together by Quintilian. This assumption seemed to explain both the repetitions and the apparent lack of logical sequence from one section to the other. For though the main subjects of the works of Palaemon and Pliny were different they dealt to some extent with the same material and the same problems. Nettleship's theory seemed to explain also why the chapters contain so much that is really not relevant to Quintilian's subject. For the subject of both these earlier works was different from that of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*.

<sup>1</sup> H. Nettleship, "The Study of Latin Grammar among the Romans in the first century A. D." in *Journal of Philology*, XV (1886), pp. 189 ff.

Since Quintilian obviously did not intend to write a big book on grammar, and since, differences in some points of general theory and in details notwithstanding, the bulk of the material to be dealt with in a work on Latin grammar became more or less established and was handed down from one grammarian to the other, it is clear that most of the material with which Quintilian deals in the chapters under consideration, including the stock examples, must have been taken from earlier sources, possibly to some extent from Palaemon, though it is difficult to prove this definitely. In addition Nettleship has shown that in some important respects Quintilian deviates from Varro's *De Lingua Latina* and agrees with Valerius Probus,<sup>2</sup> who in his turn may have agreed with Pliny the Elder, though here again, in this latter respect, it is difficult to find conclusive proof.

To admit all this, however, is not at all the same as admitting that the relevant chapters in Quintilian's book are nothing but careless and hasty extracts from two earlier works, badly fitted together and badly adapted to the purpose of Quintilian's work as a whole. Even if one does not share the unrestricted admiration for Quintilian as a writer and educator which has prevailed through so many centuries, an accusation of this kind should not be raised against a man of such great renown unless a serious attempt has first been made to understand the chapters as they are and to see whether, if correctly understood, they do not make sense as part of the book to which they belong.

Such an attempt was undertaken by F. H. Colson,<sup>3</sup> who later became the author of a well-known commented edition of the first book of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*.<sup>4</sup> He tried to show that there is a logical sequence in chapters 4 to 6, and what this logical sequence is. Chapter 4, he says, "disposes of the work of classification and definition." It would, perhaps, have been more correct to say that it deals with the most elementary analysis of language, namely 1. division of words into syllables and letters, 2. distinction of the various types of words, or the parts of speech, as the grammarians call it, 3. discussion of in-

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 345.

<sup>3</sup> F. H. Colson, "The grammatical chapters in Quintilian I, 4-8" in *C. Q.*, VIII (1914), pp. 36 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *M. Fabii Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber I*, ed. with introd. and commentary by F. H. Colson (Cambridge University Press, 1924).

flection, namely a. declension, i. e. the inflection of nouns (and adjectives), and b. conjugation, i. e. the inflection of verbs. But the decisive problem comes in only with chapters 5 and 6. These chapters, according to Colson, deal with the *recte loquendi regula*. In explaining this rule Quintilian has first to discuss the outright mistakes. These fall into two categories, namely barbarisms, which are mistakes "*in singulis verbis*," and solecisms, which are mistakes "*in pluribus verbis*." The former are discussed in chapter 5, 5-33 (5, 1-4 being an introduction to the whole problem), the latter in chapter 5, 34-54. But, to quote Colson literally "barbarisms and solecisms are mere deformities; the normal application of the '*regula recte loquendi*' lies in the choice of words which are more or less *dubia*." Hence the remainder of the two chapters, according to Colson, deals with the doubtful cases, and, following the same division as before, in 5, 55 to the end of that chapter with doubtful cases "*in singulis verbis*" and in chapter 6 with doubtful cases "*in pluribus verbis*."

As will be shown presently, the first part of Colson's analysis contains, in one way or another, implicitly almost everything that is necessary for a correct understanding of the chapters in question. But in the last part of his explanation he goes completely astray. Colson himself has noticed that in chapter 6 Quintilian discusses many problems which concern strictly "*singula verba*," as for instance the question of whether the word "topper" can be used in good Latin style. He tries to avoid the difficulty by pointing out that these problems belong among the problems of *sermo*, that *sermo* consists of *plura verba*, and that hence problems concerning single words are in fact problems concerning *plura verba*. This is really a kind of logical somersault. For if this argument is correct, the distinction of mistakes and problems *in singulis verbis* and *in pluribus verbis*, which Quintilian after all has made expressly,<sup>5</sup> loses its meaning. Apart from this it is difficult to see why Quintilian

<sup>5</sup> In I, 5, 35 Quintilian goes even so far as to discuss the question whether *amaræ corticis* is not a barbarism rather than a solecism because the mistake is found only in *amaræ*, though it becomes a mistake only in connection with *corticis* if *cortæ* is assumed to be of masculine gender. Yet we are supposed to believe that the faulty use of one foreign word can be a mistake *in pluribus verbis* because single words belong also to *sermo*.

brings in the principles of *ratio*, *vetustas*, *auctoritas*, *consuetudo*, which are the foundations of the *recte loquendi regula*, only at the beginning of chapter 6, if the rules of correct speech, as far as they concern single words, have been discussed in the last paragraphs of chapter 5, especially since Colson himself points out that these principles apply to single words just as well as to combinations of words.

To complete this survey it may finally be mentioned that J. Cousin in his book on Quintilian<sup>6</sup> has also touched upon the question. He says he cannot understand the difficulties found by Nettleship and Colson. To him the arrangement of the chapters seems perfectly natural and sound. For in chapter 5 Quintilian deals simply with deviations from correct usage, while in chapter 6 he deals with the creative forces of language (*les forces créatrices de la langue*). However, though it may be readily admitted that Quintilian in chapter 6 implicitly also touches upon the "creative forces of language," if one wishes to use such an expression, it seems obvious that in a part of his treatise in which he is concerned with school instruction in the lower grades it cannot have been his intention to deal directly with such an exalted subject. The question therefore must be taken up again.

In fact the solution of the problem seems so simple that one would be ashamed of writing about it if it were not for the fact that three outstanding scholars over a period of half a century have given one artificial solution after the other and nobody seems to have pointed out what should have been before everybody's eyes.

There has never been any doubt concerning chapter 5, 1-54. Here Quintilian deals with outright mistakes in speaking, namely barbarisms, which are *in singulis verbis* and solecisms which are *in pluribus verbis*. The difficulty begins with 5, 55 ff. According to Colson Quintilian at this point begins to discuss doubtful cases and it is here that the *recte loquendi regula* comes in. This is to some extent correct. It must, however, be pointed out that doubtful cases are also discussed in the section on solecisms; as for instance where Quintilian says<sup>7</sup> that if *amaræ corticis* is correct then *medio cortice* is a solecism and if

<sup>6</sup> Jean Cousin, *Étude sur Quintilien* (Paris, 1935), I, p. 73.

<sup>7</sup> I, 5, 35.

*amari corticis* is correct then *media cortice* is a solecism, but does not make a decision as to which expressions are correct and which are solecisms. What then is the difference between the section on solecism and the last sections of the fifth chapter? The answer is not difficult to give, if one looks at the questions discussed in this latter section. They are: 1. the use of foreign words in Latin; 2. the declension of Greek words and names in Latin, namely whether the Greek or the Latin endings should be used (here Quintilian tries to show that in some cases the application of the one method, in other cases that of the other method may be awkward); 3. the formation of compound words in Latin (here Quintilian tries to show that, in spite of the attempts of some early Latin poets, the Latin language has not the same facility in forming composites as the Greek has); 4. the use of words in a metaphorical sense; 5. the use and creation of onomatopoeic words. It is clear that in all the cases mentioned it is not merely doubtful whether one form or another is correct, as in the cases discussed under the head of solecism, but it is a matter of taste how far one can or should go in the use of certain words and forms.

So far then the logical sequence seems to be perfectly sound. First the pupils have been taught that there are various types of mistakes which one can make in speaking, reading aloud, and writing, and what these types are. Then they learn that there are certain fields in language in which it is not possible to make an absolutely clear-cut distinction between what is correct and what is incorrect, in which therefore the individual has a certain leeway in either direction, and in which it depends largely on good taste whether he will speak or write well or not.

In this last section in which Quintilian discusses the "doubtful" cases in the sense just defined Quintilian cannot avoid completely a discussion of the question of what seems preferable in certain specific cases and what seems less preferable. In doing this he must occasionally refer to certain criteria of good taste, in this connection mostly the authority of acknowledged authors. Yet so far there has been no systematic discussion of the criteria of correct speech and of good taste in general. The student has merely learned that there are certain types of outright mistakes which he must try by all means to avoid and that there are cases in which a decision is difficult. He will therefore ask: "Well,

all right. We have learned that there are certain types of mistakes which we must avoid. But how, if there are two forms which we find used by others are we to decide which is the correct form or, if both may be used, which is preferable?"

It is exactly at this point that Quintilian brings in the four criteria of correct and good speech, *ratio*, with the two subdivisions of *analogia* and *etymologia*, *vetustas*, *auctoritas*, and *consuetudo*. He then goes on to apply these criteria to the various types of cases and problems which have been discussed in the preceding chapter and shows how, by means of these criteria, a decision as to what is correct and what is not, can be reached. Since each of the five criteria applies both to single words and to combinations of words it would have been most cumbersome to keep the problems *in singulis verbis* and those *in pluribus verbis* separate under each one of the five headings. It is therefore very understandable that Quintilian did not follow such a pedantic arrangement, but discusses freely problems of either kind wherever they serve best to illustrate the application of a certain criterion. He certainly did not confine himself to problems *in pluribus verbis* nor had he any reason to do so.

This interpretation explains also the repetitions in Quintilian's first book, which induced Nettleship to consider the chapters in question as a badly integrated compound of extracts from the writings of other grammarians. In 5, 8 we hear that the use of words alien to the Latin language is one kind of barbarism. In 5, 56 ff. we are advised that some words of Gallic origin and many Greek words and especially Greek names have become so much a part of the Latin language that they may be used without hesitation, but that it is not always quite easy to decide which words may be used and which may not. In chapter 6, finally, we learn what criteria may be applied in order to decide such questions. Likewise in chapter 5, 35 we have learned that if *amarae corticis* is correct then *medio cortice* is a solecism because the word is used with the wrong gender. But we do not learn which is correct or how to determine which is correct. In 6, 5 we learn that if we are not sure about the gender of a word we may decide the question by comparing it with a word of similar form and meaning, the gender of which is known. Or we may form the diminutive of it. If the diminutive is

masculine then the word itself is also masculine, etc. There is no reason why the same examples should not occasionally be used again when the same problem is dealt with a second time but from a different point of view.

We may, of course, consider the method which Quintilian advises the teacher to use as pedantic. We may think that it would be much better to tell the pupils about the criteria of good speech as soon as we begin to tell them about the difference between correct and incorrect speech. But there have always been schoolmasters and educators who preferred the step by step method, even if this meant that the student was kept in the dark for a long time in respect to those aspects of a matter which he must know if he is really to understand what it is all about. In fact the division of barbarism in the narrower sense into barbarism by addition, by subtraction, by transmutation and by immutation, which Quintilian sets forth in 5, 10 ff., appears infinitely more pedantic than the way in which he wishes the teacher to deal with the various aspects of correct and good speech. Yet it has provoked much less criticism from modern philologists than has the arrangement of the material in chapters 5 and 6. At any rate there can be really no doubt that Quintilian arranged it that way because he thought that this was the proper sequence in which it should be taught and that he did not merely throw together extracts from other writers.

So far, then, it has been demonstrated that the various parts of chapters five and six of Quintilian's first book do form a logical sequence and that the repetitions which can be found in these chapters are not senseless but serve a purpose, since the same problems are considered again and again from different points of view. It has not been shown, however, so far what parts exactly of what Quintilian discusses in these chapters he wished actually to be discussed in school; and, since everybody agrees that he did not think that everything should be discussed in school, why he discussed these other matters at all. In order to answer this question it is necessary first to make a new inquiry into the exact nature and historical importance of the five criteria of correct and good speech which Quintilian discusses in chapter 6.

## II.

The four, or, since the first principle has two subdivisions, the five principles or criteria of correct speech, according to the first paragraph of the sixth chapter of Quintilian's first book, are as follows: *ratio*, which comprises *analogia* and *etymologia*, *vetustas*, *auctoritas*, and *consuetudo*. Nettleship, in the article quoted above, has pointed out<sup>8</sup> that Varro, according to Diomedes,<sup>9</sup> had spoken of only four principles, namely *natura*, which corresponds to *etymologia*, *analogia*, *consuetudo*, and *auctoritas*. In his opinion, furthermore, an analysis of the work of Charisius leads to the conclusion that Pliny referred not only to *consuetudo*, for which he is quoted, but also to *ratio*, and that he acknowledged *veterum licentia* and *veterum dignitas* as an element in the explanation of usage. From this he infers that Quintilian's division must be derived from Pliny. He considers the new division as very bad and says that "it is small blame to the philosophers if they were expected to rise in arms against a division like that." His objection is that the subsumption of *etymologia* and *analogia* under the head of *ratio* does not make much sense, and that *vetustas* cannot be accepted as an independent principle but belongs partly to *auctoritas* and partly to *consuetudo*.

Six years later H. Usener raised the same objections against Quintilian's division,<sup>10</sup> but tried to give a different explanation of what appeared to him a confusion in the terminology. He believed that *vetustas* was at some time used as a synonym of *etymologia* since etymology tries to go back to the oldest form of a word. Quintilian, he believed, found two lists, one with *etymologia* and one with *vetustas*, and, in combining them, had to find a new meaning for *vetustas*. So he separated *vetustas* from *auctoritas* to which, if taken in the sense in which Quintilian gives the word, it really belongs. There were also some grammarians who eliminated etymology and so arrived at a division into three principles: *ratio* = *analogia*, *auctoritas*, *con-*

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.* (see note 1), p. 202.

<sup>9</sup> Diomedes, I, 433.

<sup>10</sup> H. Usener, "Ein altes Lehrgebäude der Philologie" in *Wien. Sitzb.*, 1892, pp. 582 ff., reprinted in *Kleine Schriften*, II (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 297 f.



*suétudo*. So where *etymologia* was brought in it was mistakenly combined with *analogia* under *ravio*.

Finally Colson took up the question in the article quoted above,<sup>11</sup> in another article, published in 1919,<sup>12</sup> and in a note on page 73 of his edition of the first book of Quintilian.<sup>13</sup> His conclusions are expressed most clearly and briefly in the note last mentioned, which runs as follows: "I suggest that the original formula was philosophical and described the processes by which the words became what we find them. On this view the formula ran '*natura, vetustas, analogia, consuetudo, auctoritas*, and the meaning is that the true words are given by nature, then modified by time (*vetustas*) till we get the *prima positio* of the noun or verb, which is then inflected by analogy, and this again is modified by usage and literary authority. The looser form of the formula sometimes dropped *vetustas* and thus we get it as it appears in Diomedes.<sup>14</sup> When the grammarians took it over, and used it to determine the correct word in each case, it naturally underwent modifications. For *natura* is substituted *etymologia*, the name of the science which inquires into words in themselves, and through the corruptions of *vetustas* discerns their *natura*. This rendered the retention of *vetustas* unnecessary. But the memory of it lingered and by some schools was retained as a rather unnecessary variant to *auctoritas*." In support of this construction, for which there is otherwise no direct evidence whatever, Colson quotes<sup>15</sup> two sentences from Varro's *L. L.*, namely, *neque omnis impositio verborum extat quod vetustas quasdam deleuit* and *vetustas pauca non depravat, multa tollit*.

All the explanations mentioned obviously imply that Quintilian had no real insight into the matter with which he was dealing and combined various irreconcilable theories in a very mechanical fashion. Since the first part of the present inquiry has shown that, contrary to the opinion of most modern scholars who have written about the problem, the arrangement of the

<sup>11</sup> See note 3.

<sup>12</sup> F. H. Colson, "The analogist and anomalist controversy" in *C. Q.*, XIII (1919), pp. 24 ff.

<sup>13</sup> See *supra*, note 4.

<sup>14</sup> I. e. in Varro, cf. *supra*, p. 245 and note 9.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 12), p. 33, n. 2.

material in chapters 5 and 6 of the first book makes very good sense it seems worth while to ask whether the second accusation raised against Quintilian is not also unjustified.

Colson has made one observation<sup>16</sup> which is very sound and which really gives the key to the problem. This is where he says that when the grammarians took over an old scientific terminology and used it for an investigation of the norms of correct speech it naturally underwent modifications. But if this is realized there is no need for artificial reconstructions.<sup>17</sup>

Varro's work was a scientific work on the Latin Language. When dealing with etymology he discussed also at length the Stoic theory of the origin of language. According to the Stoics, language was *φύσει*, which meant that originally the words had had a natural and direct connection with the things which they designate. In the course of time, however, the words had changed their appearance so that this original connection between word and thing was no longer easily recognizable. It was the task of etymology, as the science of the "true" form of the word, to find the original word from which the word in its present form had sprung and so to win a deeper insight into the nature of the thing designated by it. In this form, etymology was probably an offspring of Antisthenes' theory that *ὀνομαζέων ἐπίσκεψις* was one of the most important tasks of a philosopher.<sup>18</sup>

Varro devoted three of the lost books of his work *De Lingua*

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 73-4, note, *s. v. ratione . . . consuetudine*.

<sup>17</sup> J. Cousin, *op. cit.* (note 6), p. 48, likewise points out that there is a difference between a philosophical analysis of the historical origin and development of a language on the one hand and the use of etymology and analogy as normative principles on the other. Yet he, like Colson, still tries to derive Quintilian's terminology from the philosophical study of language rather than from a theory of the norms of correct usage: "*par 'sermo' Quintilien entend ici la conversation et le style, c'est-à-dire des séries de phrases, c'est-à-dire enfin l'expression d'un certain nombre d'images verbales et l'indication des rapports qui les unissent. Donc le sermo s'appuie sur la 'ratio'; la raison provoque des transformations morphologiques de deux façons en éliminant les morphèmes normaux (c'est l'analogie), en créant de nouveaux morphèmes: la science qui consiste à faire l'histoire de ces créations est l'étymologie. Le 'sermo' s'appuie encore sur l'anciennité, c'est-à-dire que la correction exige que l'on évite les néologismes.*" It will be shown later that this latter explanation of Quintilian's view of *vetustas* as one of the criteria of correct speech is also incorrect (cf. *infra*, p. 350).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. also *Hermes*, LXII (1927), pp. 463 ff.

*Latina* to the discussion of the Stoic doctrine of etymology, setting forth in one whole book all the arguments that had been brought forth in its favor and in another book the arguments which had been used against it. Likewise he wrote several books on the analogist-anomalist controversy. It is true that Varro was interested in these matters not only from a philosophical and historical point of view, but considered also the question of how far etymology and analogy should be used as criteria of correct speech. Yet it is clear that in a study which is primarily, even if not exclusively, concerned with philosophical and historical problems of language, etymology and analogy are entirely different principles which cannot be brought under one head.

Quintilian, on the other hand, obviously takes not the slightest interest in these philosophical and historical controversies. This becomes especially clear when he suggests<sup>19</sup> various Latin words by which the word *etymologia* might be replaced in order to avoid the Greek term. The words that he mentions are *nota*, a translation of the Aristotelean term *σύμβολον*, *veriloquium*, and *originatio*, but he does not say one word about the fact that the first word belongs to a theory according to which language is *θέσει*, the second to a theory according to which language is *φύσει* in the Stoic sense, while the third one is indifferent in regard to these opposite theories.

Quintilian, then, is interested in etymology and analogy exclusively inasmuch as they have been considered as criteria of correct speech. If this is taken into consideration it is by no means difficult to understand how they can be brought together under the one head of *ratio* and contrasted with *consuetudo* and *auctoritas*, and also with *vetustas* though this principle, which presents a special problem, may be discussed later.

*Consuetudo* and *auctoritas* as criteria of good speech are not criteria imposed on the language from the outside, but they are, so to speak, identical with the language itself, namely with that language which was spoken in "good society" and written by authors acknowledged as models of correct speech and good style. In appealing to these principles no further reason why one word or one form should be chosen rather than another can be given except that good and accepted language is what it is,

<sup>19</sup> Quintilian, I, 6, 28.

and perhaps the rather indefinable reason that this is "good taste." It is quite different with *analogia* and *etymologia*.

Analogy, it is true, plays a very important rôle in the formation and structure of the spoken and written language both of the educated and of the uneducated people. But those who defended analogy as a normative criterion of correct speech did not, as a rule, refer to analogy as it was incorporated in the actually spoken and accepted language. As both the ancient references to Caesar's *De Analogia* and Quintilian's own treatment of analogy in the sixth chapter of the first book show, they tried to improve the Latin language by making it more analogical than it actually was. From *consuetudo* and *auctoritas* they appealed to an abstract and "rational" principle which in the actually spoken language was but imperfectly expressed.

The same is true of the advocates of etymology as a criterion of correct speech. There was no doubt that *meridies*, for instance, was supported by both *consuetudo* and *auctoritas*. But the advocates of etymology nevertheless insisted that one should say *medidies* because the meaning of the word was clearly "the middle of the day," hence *medidies* was obviously the original form of the word and at the same time the form which expressed the meaning of the word more clearly. The same principle was also applied to spelling,<sup>20</sup> when it was argued that one should write *obtinuit*, not *optinuit* and *inmanis*, not *immanis*, because the two words contain the prepositions *ob* and *in*.

Both the advocates of *analogia* and those of *etymologia* as criteria of correct speech, therefore, were not satisfied with unrestricted acceptance of the *consuetudo* of educated people, but tried to "rationalise" language by making it more systematic than it actually is. This is the reason why, from this point of view, both analogy and etymology may be considered as *ratio*. It is quite interesting that in this connection the word *ratio* comes very near in its meaning to the modern terms "rational," "rationalizing," though it also retains to some extent its original ancient meaning, since both the advocate of analogy and the advocate of etymology tried to determine correct usage by "calculating" or "figuring" from one word to another.

At any rate it seems quite clear on the basis of these observa-

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 7, 7-8.

tions that *ratio* as the common denominator of *analogia* and *etymologia* makes very good sense and, in fact, makes sense only if and where analogy and etymology are considered primarily as criteria of correct speech. This is what Quintilian, in contrast to Varro and others, does. It is possible that this part of Quintilian's terminology was taken over from some earlier author, possibly even from Pliny, though this cannot be proved with the material at our disposal. But it certainly does not owe its existence to a misunderstanding of an earlier theory of the historical origin of language, as Usener and Colson believed, nor is it directly derived from Varro as Cousin tried to show.

It remains to explain the fifth principle discussed by Quintilian, which he calls *vetustas*. That it is not the meaning of this principle to warn against the use of neologisms, as Cousin contended,<sup>21</sup> is clear from the very first words that Quintilian says about it:<sup>22</sup> *Verba a vetustate repetita non solum magnos adsertatores habent, sed etiam adferunt orationi maiestatem aliquam non sine delectatione: nam et auctoritatem antiquitatis habent et, quia intermissa sunt, gratiam novitati similem parant.* In other words, it is one of the desirable effects of the use of archaic words that they make the impression of something new while at the same time having the authority of something old. This makes it also quite clear that the principle of *vetustas* is not identical with *consuetudo*, since it is of the very essence of an archaic word as archaic that it does not belong to present-day *consuetudo*. On the other hand it is not identical with *auctoritas* either, for the same reason; for though what is old has a certain authority of its own this is not the authority of those authors who are still at the present time generally accepted and acknowledged models of good style. In fact, therefore, and contrary to the opinion expressed by Nettleship and Colson, *vetustas* is at least as different from *auctoritas* and *consuetudo* as *auctoritas* and *consuetudo* are different from one another.

In order to understand the introduction of the principle fully it is perhaps pertinent to point out that this is the only one of the criteria mentioned by Quintilian which has no equivalent in Greek theory. *Analogia* and *etymologia*, as their very names indicate, are directly taken over from Greek theory. *Consuetudo*

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *supra*, note 17.

<sup>22</sup> Quintilian, I, 6, 5-6.

and *auctoritas* together correspond to the Greek definition of ἑλλητισμός as the ἐθισμός τῶν εἰδικομούντων Ἑλλήνων. But there is nothing in Greek theory that corresponds to the Latin principle of *vetustas*.

In a way the Greeks were very conservative in literature. Through many centuries the various types of poetry continued to be written in the dialect and language in which they had originated, so that an epic poet had to learn the Homeric artificial dialect in order to be able to write epic poetry. Furthermore choric and tragic poetry of the fifth century and to some extent later had tried to create a special more solemn language by the use of archaic and unusual words and word-forms. But though the Asianic school of oratory in the Hellenistic age had also revelled in pointed expressions and unusual words, it was not a practice of the Greek rhetoric and oratory of the period in which Greek grammar was gradually elaborated to produce special effects by the use of obsolete and archaic words. This is exactly where Greek and Roman practice differed from one another. This difference in its turn derived from the entirely different position of early literature in Greece and Rome. Early Roman literature was not, like Homer or the great orators of the fifth and fourth centuries, a model for all times. It was considered as somewhat rude and clumsy and, generally speaking, far surpassed by the poetry and prose of the Ciceronian and Augustan ages. Yet there was also something forceful, vigorous, and at the same time venerable about it. Hence the language of this literature was for a large part obsolete and antiquated. To imitate it in whole poems or speeches would have been very bad taste. Yet occasionally an expression or a word borrowed from one of the old writers could very well give a sentence a special glamour, a special color, or a special dignity. But it required much taste to do this in exactly the right way.

This then is the meaning of *vetustas* as distinguished both from *consuetudo* and from *auctoritas* in the narrower sense of the authority of acknowledged models like Cicero. It may also be noted that *vetustas* is not only different but also of a somewhat different character as a principle of correct speech from the other principles mentioned. For while those other principles have to do with correct speech pure and simple the principle of *vetustas* is concerned with expressions the use of which, as a

general rule, would be incorrect, but which under certain conditions may be considered not only unexceptionable but a legitimate means of producing special effects. In Greek theory the principle could not be brought in because the practice did not and could not exist since there was no archaic literature in the Roman sense. In Roman theory it was necessary to bring in the new principle if the theory was to be complete.

All this shows clearly that the Roman grammarians were not always slavishly dependent on Greek models. It shows also that Quintilian knew very well what he was doing when he introduced *vetustas* as one of the principles of correct speech. He certainly did not confuse two different lists of terms or an explanatory principle in the history of language with a normative principle. Quite to the contrary, he or his predecessor, if he took over the term from a predecessor, realized clearly a special problem of Latin style and linguistic usage. Instead of deprecating the deviation of Quintilian and other Roman grammarians from a philosophical terminology which had been created in connection with speculations concerning the origin and development of language, one should therefore rather praise the Roman grammarians for having freed themselves, when turning to new problems, from those parts of the old terminology which were not suitable to their new purpose and for having created a partly new terminology which was very well adapted both to the subject matter and to the problems with which they intended to deal.

### III.

As long as the opinion prevailed that Quintilian in the central chapters of his first book had carelessly thrown together excerpts from the works of several earlier grammarians without paying much attention to logical sequence and coherence, or that his terminology originated largely from misunderstandings of the terminology of various predecessors, it was a rather hopeless undertaking to try to find out which of these things Quintilian actually wished to have taught in school, except perhaps to say that he may not have had a very definite opinion about this question. It is therefore not very surprising that the attempts to answer the question, which have nevertheless been made on this basis, have arrived at rather divergent results and are not very satisfactory. Since it has been shown now that Quintilian

in these chapters does have a plan and understands very well what he says, it will perhaps be possible to take up the question again with better success.

What Quintilian is trying to do is especially clear in the sixth chapter of the first book. Quintilian considers analogy as a useful criterion of correct speech in those cases in which the criteria of *consuetudo* and *auctoritas* do not lead to a clear decision, either because custom has accepted two different forms on which the authorities also do not agree with one another, or because a given word or a form is so rarely used that it is impossible to say what the custom is. If in a case like that the gender of a word is doubtful the question may be decided on the basis of analogy, either by comparing it with other words of the same declension and similar meaning (or with the same consonants or letters preceding the ending) or by reference to the gender of the diminutive, etc.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand Quintilian thinks that the quest for analogy should not be carried so far as to do violence to the actually spoken language as accepted by refined custom. He therefore is strongly opposed to those who urge that one should say *audaciter* instead of *audacter* because of the analogy of *feliciter* or *loquaciter*, or that one should say *face*, *dice*, *duce*, in analogy to other imperatives of the third conjugation.

Likewise he believed<sup>24</sup> that one should follow "etymology" in regard to the division of compound words into syllables, that is one should divide in such a way that the two elements of the word are separated from one another: *haru-spes*, not *harus-pes*, but *abs-temius*, not *ab-stemius*. In other words, he would strongly object to the American custom of dividing, e. g. "analogy" at the end of a line, which does not give a very nice sense if the two parts are understood separately. He likewise believes that sometimes etymological inquiry can give a better insight into the full meaning of a word or a name.<sup>25</sup> But, just as in the case of analogy, he is opposed both to doing violence to the spoken language in favor of abstract principles and to "scientific" explanations which in actual fact are nothing but wild speculations. The main criteria are *consuetudo*, that is the actual practice of refined society, and the authority of acknowledged writers.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 6, 5-6.<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 7, 9.<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 6, 20 ff.



On this basis it is not very difficult to see why Quintilian discusses what he discusses in this chapter. He treats analogy and etymology more fully than the other three principles exactly because he thinks that as criteria of correct speech they are of very restricted value. For there was, as he himself points out on various occasions, a school of grammarians and teachers of grammar who considered these principles to be the very mainstay of grammar, who tried to teach a language much more "correct" than any language spoken anywhere in society or outside the narrow circle of a grammatical clique, and who were very proud of their endless speculations in this field. As has been pointed out very often, Quintilian did not wish to write a grammar, nor even a grammar for schools,—neither a *Grammatik* nor a *Schulgrammatik*,—but a treatise on what should be taught in school and how it should be taught. Hence he had also to say *what* should *not* be taught and *how* grammar should *not* be taught, and, as often happens, the polemical part of his discussion became more extensive than the positive part. For he was not satisfied with stating dogmatically that analogy and etymology have only a very restricted value as criteria of correct speech. He wished also to show that he was right in his opinion and why that was so. Consequently he tried to show that analogical and etymological speculations become extremely uncertain as soon as they go beyond the first and most obvious steps. He also tried to show<sup>20</sup> that analogy is one of the formative principles in the development of *consuetudo* itself but that there is no sense in pursuing this principle beyond the part which it naturally plays in linguistic custom anyway.

It is quite interesting to see that here Quintilian travels in exactly the opposite direction from Varro. Varro starts with the discussion of the origin of language and of the rôle of analogy in its further development and formation. Then he also comes to discuss the question of how far etymology and analogy may be used as criteria of correct speech. Quintilian, on the contrary, starts with analogy and etymology as criteria of correct speech. But in the course of this discussion he arrives at the conclusion that, since analogy is after all *merely* one of the formative elements of *consuetudo*, there is no sense in pursuing it beyond and against *consuetudo* itself.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 6, 16.

From all this it seems obvious that Quintilian in this chapter addresses himself primarily to the teacher. He tries to convince him that he must not give an undue importance to analogy and etymology as criteria of correct speech. He does not, or at least not primarily, say or imply that the teacher must discuss everything with his pupils in the same way in which Quintilian discusses it in this part of his work. Yet the line cannot be drawn quite sharply. For since there are teachers who have a different view of analogy and etymology and since his pupils will hardly fail to hear of their theories sooner or later, the teacher can scarcely avoid giving them some warning when he discusses the subject with them. Hence, while at first sight it may seem as if Quintilian in this chapter was mainly concerned with matters which the teacher has to consider for himself but not to teach, in fact most of what Quintilian says will, in one way or another, have also to be touched upon in school. The main difference will be one of emphasis and extent. For the actual teacher will of course spend more time in trying to teach correct speech according to refined *consuetudo* and *auctoritas* than in warning against a pedantic use of analogy and etymology, while Quintilian, in advising the teacher, does the opposite.<sup>27</sup>

The short section on *vetustas* presents a slightly different problem and the solution of this problem is perhaps not entirely without importance, since it may also throw some further light on the last sections of the fifth chapter, the purpose of which has been so strangely misunderstood by several scholars. Generally speaking, Quintilian is very anxious to keep the tasks of the teacher of grammar and the teacher of rhetoric, who teaches only the higher grades, clearly distinguished from one another. As far as speech is concerned the grammarian, who teaches the lower grades, has to deal only with correct speech pure and simple, while all questions of style are reserved for the teacher of rhetoric. The question of where, when, and how an obsolete or archaic word may be used is really a question of style and therefore should be reserved for the teacher of rhetoric. In fact the problem is taken up again in the 8th book,<sup>28</sup> which, like all books of the *Institutio*, except the first, deals with the instruction in rhetoric or oratory. Yet Quintilian cannot altogether avoid mentioning this principle in the first book, since, according to

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 6, 39-40.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, 3, 24 ff.

the other criteria of correct speech as Quintilian wishes them to be applied, the use of archaic words which are not supported by modern usage would be excluded. Nevertheless it must be conceded that under certain circumstances their use is justified. Hence this possibility has to be mentioned, though the problem as such can be treated properly only after a higher stage has been reached. It is clear in this case also that it is not only Quintilian who mentions the problem at this point; it will also have to be touched upon briefly by the grammar teacher in school.

The position of the last sections of the fifth chapter,<sup>29</sup> which follow upon the discussion of barbarism and solecism, is exactly the same. As pointed out above, there are, according to ancient theory, two types of outright mistakes in the use of language, barbarisms and solecisms. These are defined, divided into various subdivisions, and discussed in chapter 5, sections 1-54. From the definition, description, and illustration by examples, of these mistakes the treatise could go on directly to the criteria of correct speech which, as shown above, are dealt with in chapter 6. Yet since there are certain words, forms, and combinations of words which under certain circumstances may be objectionable and even fall under one of the categories of linguistic mistakes discussed before, but under other circumstances do not, this problem of the doubtful and ambiguous cases has to be mentioned though its adequate treatment is reserved for the teacher of rhetoric.

All this proves once more that Quintilian had very definite opinions of his own concerning the problems discussed in the second half of chapter 5 and in chapter 6, and that he is very far indeed from merely combining excerpts from the works of earlier Roman grammarians. It is not impossible that *vetustas* as a criterion of correct speech was for the first time introduced by Pliny, though, on the basis of the material available to us, it is not possible to prove this. But there can hardly be any doubt that, especially in those sections in which he touches on the borderline between grammar and rhetoric, Quintilian is largely on his own. At any rate it is quite clear that there is nothing superfluous in the whole section from chapter 5, 55 to the end of chapter 6 and that though Quintilian is writing for the teacher and not for the pupil it was his opinion that nearly

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 55-72.

everything that he mentions in this section must in one way or another at least be briefly touched upon in school.

The situation is somewhat different in regard to chapter 4 and chapter 5, 1-54. In these sections Quintilian apologizes several times for dealing with such elementary matters, but more often and more profusely in chapter 5 than in chapter 4, though the subject matter of chapter 4 seems still more elementary than that of the first part of chapter 5. The reason is not difficult to find. For Cicero in his rhetorical works on various occasions<sup>30</sup> speaks of such subject matter as this latter part of Quintilian's work with a certain contempt as of something that the boys must be taught because, without this knowledge, they cannot even dream of becoming orators, but which belongs to elementary instruction and is not really worthy of the attention of the rhetorician.

This somewhat contemptuous view of his own subject in these chapters, which Quintilian has taken over from Cicero, has had certain consequences of which one must be aware in order to understand fully the composition of this part of Quintilian's work. In chapter 6, as shown above, he criticizes the views of earlier grammarians directly, clearly, and adequately. In chapter 5 he mentions the extremely mechanical and totally inadequate division of barbarism into barbarism by addition, subtraction, transposition, and immutation as something generally known and universally accepted without a word of direct criticism,<sup>31</sup> though later,<sup>32</sup> when he comes to concrete examples like *scopa* and *scala* instead of *scopae* and *scalae* he has to admit that it does not make very good sense to find the mistake in the "subtraction" of the letter *e* rather than in the use of the singular instead of the plural. Likewise in his section on solecism he mentions the even more absurd application of the same fourfold subdivision to the latter category of faulty speech without direct criticism, and then brings the more sensible subdivisions under the head of *immutatio*,<sup>33</sup> after having eliminated *additio*, *detractio*, and *transmutatio* as possibly constituting independent categories of faulty speech. Yet he does explicitly object<sup>34</sup> to the extreme pedantry of those who consider *amari*

<sup>30</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, III, 48 and 38; cf. also *Ad Herennium*, IV, 17.

<sup>31</sup> Quintilian, I, 5, 6.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 41 ff.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 16.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 35.

*corticis* as a barbarism rather than a solecism, because the mistake appears in only one word though it becomes a mistake only by the connection of this word with another word. There are also quite a few very pertinent additions to the theory of barbarism and solecism and to the history of this theory; so for instance, when he discusses the various meanings which the word barbarism had been given<sup>35</sup> or when he warns teacher and student not to take a pedantically superior attitude toward poets who deviate from established custom.<sup>36</sup> The students should rather be told that in poetry such deviations may be excused or even be praiseworthy if they are used to produce a certain effect.

It seems obvious then that in this section Quintilian is just as far from copying the work of one earlier author as he is in chapter 6. He has all the various theories at his finger-tips. He even cannot help having his own ideas about the matter. But since Cicero considered the whole subject not quite worthy of the attention of a rhetorician Quintilian touches everything very lightly and does not, as in the 6th chapter, make an attempt to arrive at a consistent solution of the whole question.

It is probably this fact that misled Nettleship and his followers to believe that in chapter 4 and chapter 5, 1-54 Quintilian had copied one author and in chapter 5, 55 to the end of chapter 6 another author, so that he failed completely to understand the arrangement of the various problems in the latter of these two main sections. It is quite true that there is an important difference between the two parts. In the first section the abstract and seemingly logically complete, but actually totally inadequate, divisions and subdivisions of certain earlier grammarians are in the foreground, and what Quintilian has to say to correct them is introduced in such a way as to appear to be a mere addition. The divisions and subdivisions used in the second section are not so abstract and do not have the same apparent logical completeness. They are therefore not quite so easy to understand at first sight. In compensation, however, they are much more concrete and express the linguistic phenomena much more adequately. It is exactly in this section, which, according to Nettleship, has no logical order at all, that the more adequate order of problems and principles is to be found.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 6 ff.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 5, 11-12.

Since, then, in the first part of chapter 5 Quintilian appears to have dealt with his subject less adequately than in the succeeding sections, the question of what was to be taught in school and what is merely discussed for the benefit of the teacher is here somewhat more difficult to answer. In regard to the subject matter of the sixth chapter it was clear that even what Quintilian considered a wrong application of analogy and etymology as criteria of correct speech had at least to be mentioned in school since the students could hardly fail sooner or later to come in contact with men who advocated a much wider application of these principles than Quintilian considered justified and therefore they had to be warned against this doctrine. Pedantry, on the other hand, in the distinction between barbarism and solecism or in making up subdivisions of these categories of faulty speech could not, as would a faulty use of analogy, directly affect the ability of the student to speak correctly. They are merely a hindrance to sensible teaching. Hence, theoretically speaking, it would be sufficient to warn the teacher against such pedantry while the teacher himself need not tell his students very much, if anything, about these pedantic theories, much less discuss with them their application to concrete cases. But, in contrast to his discussion of the more advanced problems of correct speech, Quintilian in the beginning of chapter 5 has not carried his criticism to its logical conclusion. Consequently the theories which seem intrinsically at variance with Quintilian's own more enlightened views are not openly or completely rejected by him but criticised only where their application leads to patently absurd results. It would therefore seem that the teacher has either to take a more radical view than Quintilian does, in which case he can dispense in his teaching with a good deal of what Quintilian discusses, or, if he follows Quintilian closely, he will have to discuss most of what Quintilian discusses if he wishes to make the matter clear to his students.

In regard to chapter 4 the problem of what, in Quintilian's opinion, was to be taught in school and what belonged merely to the necessary equipment of the teacher must again be approached in a somewhat different way if the correct answer is to be found. On the face of it, it appears that Quintilian in this chapter makes a clearer distinction in this respect than

in the chapters discussed so far. For several times he says that the *grammarian* must know a certain point or matter or must concern himself with a problem,<sup>37</sup> while on other occasions he says that the *students* must learn or study a certain matter or problem.<sup>38</sup> Yet even under the second head he sometimes discusses matters that seem hardly fit to be discussed on the very first and most elementary level of instruction in grammar, although, in the opinion of most commentators, this is the level of instruction with which Quintilian in this chapter wishes to deal. Did Quintilian then merely try to show off his own erudition in mentioning these matters, disregarding the fact that they were hardly an appropriate subject of discussion on this level? In order to give a conclusive answer to this question it will be necessary to take up some other problems first.

## IV.

In the beginning of chapter 4<sup>39</sup> Quintilian divides grammar into *recte loquendi scientia* and *poetarum enarratio*. There is no doubt that in chapters five and six he deals exclusively with the first of the two parts mentioned. Then he adds a chapter on the *recte scribendi scientia* or *orthographia*, i. e. correct spelling and related problems. In chapter 8 he finally comes to the *poetarum* or *auctorum enarratio*. Here again, unfortunately, it appears necessary first to dispose of a wrong interpretation.

The arrangement of topics discussed by Quintilian under the head of *auctorum enarratio* seems very clear. First he speaks of the instruction in correct reading, i. e. reading aloud.<sup>40</sup> Here three points have to be observed: The first is correct punctuation, i. e. the reader must bring out the meaning by pausing in the

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 4, 7 and 10.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 4, 12 and 22. It may perhaps also be pointed out that the introductory sentence in I, 4, 6: *ne quis igitur tamquam parva fastidiat grammatices elementa, non quia magnae sit operae, consonantes a vocalibus discernere ipsasque eas in semivocalium numerum mutarumque pariter, sed quia interiora velut sacri huius adeuntibus apparebit multa rerum subtilitas, quae non modo acuere ingenia puerilia, sed exercere altissimam eruditionem ac scientiam possit* seems to leave the question open of whether these more subtle matters should actually be used also to sharpen the minds of the young or whether they are reserved for mature scholars.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 4, 2.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 1-3.

right place, he must distinguish between minor and major pauses, and he must not take breath except where a sentence or a part of the sentence comes to an end. The second point is correct intonation, which should be virile, pleasant, and dignified and must not degenerate into a chant or singsong, when poetry is recited. The third point is characterisation, of which there should be sufficient to indicate when different persons are speaking in a poem, but which must not be exaggerated in a theatrical fashion.

Following this Quintilian discusses the selection of authors and reading material by the teacher.<sup>41</sup> Then he has a section<sup>42</sup> on *praelectio* by the teacher and the practical exercises which are to be connected with it. These exercises are as follows: First the students are asked to point out the different parts of speech, which occur in the passage read, — nouns, verbs, conjunctions, prepositions, etc. — and to analyze the meter and rhythm. Then the teacher points out what words or combinations of words are used in disagreement with common usage. This, as Quintilian emphasizes, is done not in order to criticise the poet, who enjoys a certain poetic freedom, but in order to make the student aware of the artifices of poetic style. If words occur which have more than one meaning the teacher will discuss these meanings. He will carefully explain unusual words, so-called glossemes. He will discuss all the tropes and figures of speech which can be found in the passages read. Finally he will especially point out the beauty of composition, of subject matter, of characterization, of the thoughts expressed, of the choice of words, and of the style.<sup>43</sup>

The last section of the chapter finally deals with *enarratio historiarum*, i. e. "Sacherklärung," the explanations of the subject matter itself as far as this is necessary.

Colson<sup>44</sup> has tried to relate Quintilian's arrangement to two lists of the different parts of *ars grammatica*, one of which is given by Dionysius Thrax,<sup>45</sup> while the other is attributed to Varro by Diomedes,<sup>46</sup> but in Colson's opinion has also a Greek origin. Dionysius' list is as follows: 1. ἀνάγνωσις ἐντριβὴς κατὰ

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 4-11.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 18-21.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 13-17.

<sup>44</sup> *Op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 41 ff.

<sup>45</sup> Dionysius Thrax, *De Grammatica eiusque Partibus*, I (pp. 5-6 ed. Uhlig).

<sup>46</sup> Diomedes, I, p. 426 K.



προσφθίαν, 2. ἐξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικοὺς τρόπους, 3. γλωσσῶν καὶ ἱστοριῶν πρῶχειρος ἀπόδοσις, 4. ἐτυμολογίας εὔρεσις, 5. ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός, 6. κρίσις ποιημάτων, which, as Dionysius says, is the crowning achievement of the art of the grammarian. The "Varronian" list has only four divisions, namely *lectio*, *emendatio*, *enarratio*, and *iudicium*, which seem to correspond to the Greek terms: ἀνάγνωσις, διόρθωσις, ἐξήγησις, and κρίσις.

In his attempt to bring these two lists together with each other and with Quintilian, Colson states that in Dionysius, just as in Quintilian, but in contrast to "Varro," *emendatio* or διόρθωσις is missing, and draws from this the conclusion that Dionysius, like Quintilian, wrote for schools, not for scholars, and hence omitted *emendatio* since textual criticism has no place in school instruction, except inasmuch as the teacher may try to emend his text before he has it read in school; but he will not discuss his emendations with his pupils. Colson states further that the simple ἐξήγησις of Varro or his predecessor has been "developed" into explanation of uncommon or obsolete words and of allusions to facts unknown to the reader (γλωσσῶν καὶ ἱστοριῶν ἀπόδοσις) and of tropes and figures (ἐξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικοὺς τρόπους). Then he tries to relate Dionysius' precepts for the teaching of grammar in school with those of Quintilian. He finds no difficulty in relating Dionysius' ἀνάγνωσις κατὰ προσφθίαν to the first paragraphs of Quintilian's chapter, though prosody is not mentioned there. But this is a minor matter which may be taken up later. Dionysius' γλωσσῶν καὶ ἱστοριῶν ἀπόδοσις and ἐξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικοὺς τρόπους are, of course, also easy to find in Quintilian's plan.<sup>47</sup> But the problem becomes difficult when it comes to ἐτυμολογίας εὔρεσις and ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός. Colson admits that ἐτυμολογίας εὔρεσις is missing from Quintilian's plan for the study of poetry, but considers the omission merely accidental. In reality, he believes, Quintilian must have considered the search for etymologies a part of the instruction in literature, though he does not mention it. On the other hand he thinks that ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός is covered by the exercise in determining the *partes orationis* mentioned in I, 8, 13, but "to the bare parsing of ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός is added scansion and the noting of *barbara* and *impropria verba* and the study of homonyms."

<sup>47</sup> Quintilian, I, 8, 14.

Here, then, the confusion is again complete. It is difficult to see how the identification of the various parts of speech in a given passage can be considered the same thing as *ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός*. But Colson's whole theory is but another attempt to reconcile two things of entirely different origin and purpose. True, Dionysius' *τέχνη* in the form in which we have it, and if one disregards the two introductory paragraphs which contain less than 25 lines, is not a discussion of what a *grammaticus* like Aristarchus did in his lectures. But it is not a school book either. It is a very brief survey of the tools which any grammarian who deals with problems of language must have and above all of the terms that he has to use. But we know also that Dionysius, like his teacher Aristarchus, gave lectures on literature for adults, and there can be no doubt that what he describes in the introductory paragraph is the method followed by the *grammaticus* who gives such lectures. It is not true either that *διόρθωσις* is really absent from Dionysius' list, though the word does not appear there. For the scholia to the passage rightly point out that *ἐτυμολογίας εἵρεσις* and *ἀναλογίας ἐκλογισμός* are parts of *διόρθωσις*; and if there should be any doubt as to whether the scholia are correct in this respect one has merely to point to the fact that, according to Herodianus,<sup>48</sup> Dionysius, in making up the text of the author about whom he lectured, used analogy to a much larger extent than his teacher Aristarchus had considered justified. The function of etymology and analogy in the textual criticism of grammarians like Aristarchus and Dionysius, then, was similar to, though not identical with, their function as criteria of correct speech in the preparatory exercises for the training in oratory. For they served to reconstruct what was supposed to be the correct usage of the author whose text was to be restored. But since textual criticism, as Colson rightly pointed out, has no place in the instruction of boys, etymology and analogy are naturally omitted from Quintilian's discussion of the teaching of literature.

Having disposed of the misunderstandings caused by the introduction of entirely extraneous considerations, it is possible to consider the 8th chapter of Quintilian's first book on its own merits. In the section in which he discusses instruction in correct reading or reciting of poetry, Quintilian does not mention

<sup>48</sup> Herodianus *ad Iliad.*, II, 262, II, 268, XII, 158; cf. also *Anecd. Paris.*, ed. Cramer, III, 285, 16.

prosody, and meter or rhythm, though both of them are undoubtedly a most important element in recitation; obviously because he was to mention them later in connection with the special exercises which accompany the *praelectio* by the teacher. But it seems also clear that *lectio* and *praelectio* cannot be completely separated from each other, but must often have formed part of the same lesson. On the other hand it appears hardly possible that the same students with whom the teacher discussed the most refined questions of style, composition, characterization, etc. were at the same time subjected to such primitive and elementary exercises as the determination and enumeration of the various parts of speech. Undoubtedly, therefore, the various exercises and topics of instruction mentioned in the short section I, 8, 13-17 were not meant to belong, all of them, to the same grade, while, on the other hand, the instruction in correct reading and recitation which is discussed in I, 8, 1-3 must have gone through all grades, even though in different stages of perfection. This is important because it shows that Quintilian, even within the same chapter, does not always follow the order in which the teacher in the course of the school curriculum will take up the various subjects or aspects of the matter one after the other. He rather takes up the various matters by groups and follows the chronology of the school curriculum only within each group, even then making it not always quite clear which of the elements mentioned belong to a lower grade and which are merely intended to precede, within the same class or even lesson, those which come next in his own discussion.

What has just been said concerning the arrangement of the various points within each chapter is self-evident if one considers the relation of the various chapters to one another. Nobody certainly can believe that the reading of literature began only after the instruction in correct speech had been brought to a conclusion, though Quintilian discusses the former only after having finished his discussion of the latter. Likewise the elementary composition exercises which are discussed in chapter 9 must have begun in school long before the instruction in correct speech or the study of literature had reached the higher stages. If this is taken into consideration the difficulties which the 4th chapter of the first book seemed to present disappear for the most part.

Quintilian has divided the subject matter of school instruction according to topics and types of exercises. So he deals first

(chapter 4) with grammar in the narrower sense, that is with the analysis of language as such, then with the problems of correct speech (ch. 5 and ch. 6), and correct writing (ch. 7), then with the study of literature (ch. 8), then with composition exercises (ch. 9), and finally with special subjects like music, and mathematics (ch. 10). It is clear that the problems of correct speech cannot be successfully discussed before the instruction in grammar has reached a somewhat advanced stage. This may, at first sight, create the impression that Quintilian, from chapter to chapter, was following the chronological sequence of the school curriculum. But the later chapters show very clearly that such is not the case. The study of literature and composition exercises start very early and, in the lower grades, are supposed to be connected with grammatical exercises of a rather elementary kind. Vice versa, then, there is no reason to assume that chapter 4 was meant to confine itself to the grammatical problems and exercises which belong to the lowest grades.

If this is taken into consideration it will no longer seem surprising that Quintilian in the 4th chapter deals also with what at his time must have been rather advanced problems of grammar, and that of some of these problems he says expressly that the boys should be made acquainted with them. For we need no longer conclude that he wished them to be discussed at the same time at which the students learned the first elements of grammar. Finally, on the basis of these observations it becomes rather doubtful whether Quintilian, when using expressions like *etiam in ipsis vocalibus grammatici est videre an . . .* or *. . . apparebit multa rerum subtilitas, quae non modo acuer ingenia puerilia, sed exercere altissimam quoque eruditionem ac scientiam possit*<sup>49</sup> meant to say that the teacher, in order to be a good teacher, must be acquainted with these problems but that he must not discuss them with his pupils, as most scholars have assumed. In fact, if one takes into consideration what Quintilian expects the very young boys to learn while they are still struggling with the alphabet one may suspect that he wished to "sharpen" the minds of the young by the discussion of such "scholarly" problems at a rather early stage, even if not when they were just learning the very first elements of grammar.<sup>50</sup>

In conclusion, then, it may be said that, as far as subject matter and problems are concerned, there is probably very little

<sup>49</sup> Quintilian, I, 4, 10 and 6.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 1, 34.

in Quintilian's first book that he did not consider proper for discussion in school, i. e. in that stage of their schooling through which the boys had to go before they entered upon the study of oratory proper. Of course when Quintilian says<sup>51</sup> that certain types of literature and of authors must not only not be read in school but that their very existence should remain unknown to the students he does not wish the teacher to mention these works in any way. There are some other instances of such purely negative advice to teacher and parents in the first book. It is equally clear that the long discussion of the usefulness of music and geometry in chapter 10 is meant for the general public, including teachers and parents, and is not to be repeated in school. But apart from these obvious exceptions one may safely assume that Quintilian considered nearly everything that he mentions in the first book if not as a necessary part of school instruction yet certainly as a proper subject for it.

This result may perhaps seem surprising. For even an enthusiastic modern linguist who is utterly convinced of the value of instruction in linguistics in school will probably admit that, at the stage which linguistics had reached at the time of Quintilian, a good deal of the material and problems which Quintilian discusses in the first book was rather sterile, and of course, even more so when considered as part of the education of boys. However, in any kind of established education one will find elements which are preserved only by the force of tradition though they have lost their meaning, others which have become part of school instruction only because someone wanted to teach them and was able to persuade the public that this should be done, and finally still others which could and should be vital parts of a living education if they were taught properly but which have become sterile because most often this is not the case.<sup>52</sup> It would be a most interesting task to analyze what Quintilian has to say about ancient instruction from this point of view. But this much more interesting question can hardly be attacked successfully unless those much less interesting problems which the present paper has tried to solve have first been settled.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

KURT VON FRITZ.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 8, 6.

<sup>52</sup> I need hardly say that I do not believe that the classics belong to the first or the second of the categories mentioned.

## ON EDITING THE HOMERIC POEMS.\*

Ordinarily the edition of a classic text is an attempt to reconstruct what its author put forth—or, if you can go so far, what he wished at various times to put forth. For the Homeric poems it is obvious that there can be no such goal. Even those who claim that there was a single author<sup>1</sup> for either or both poems think of him as singing or declaiming his work—now this way, now that; and followed for a period of undetermined length by others doing likewise. Evidently there is here no target for an editor to aim at.

An editor must confine himself to the written tradition. It is long and copious. We have quotations from the 5th century B. C. on; papyri fragments<sup>2</sup> start in the 3rd century B. C. and continue to the end of the papyrus period in the 7th century A. D.; extensive scholia<sup>3</sup> give information about the editions of Aristarchus (*ca.* 160 B. C.) and about his predecessors and successors; manuscripts of the complete text range from the 10th to the 16th century, and are to be counted by the hundreds;<sup>4</sup> the last stage, printing, starts with the edition of Demetrios Chalcondylas, Florence 1488, and has not yet ended.<sup>5</sup>

Through all this time there has been constant change. Once there was belief in the sacrosanctity of the text; but modern linguistics has shown that the continual modernization of a text thus transmitted is inevitable. To exemplify for the Homeric

\* In the preparation of this article I have had research and clerical assistance provided by a Minor Grant of the American Council of Learned Societies, which is hereby gratefully acknowledged.

<sup>1</sup> What do they mean by the term? Cf. J. Whatmough, *A. J. A.*, LII (1948), p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Nearly 400 are listed for the *Iliad* by Collart, *Introduction à l'Iliade* (Paris, 1942), pp. 39-59. I shall cite by the numbers of this list, which up to 104 coincide with those of Allen.

<sup>3</sup> On the history of their formation, cf. René Langumier, *ibid.*, pp. 74-88.

<sup>4</sup> The most copious report of their readings in T. W. Allen's major edition of the *Iliad* (Oxford, 1931).

<sup>5</sup> For a list of later editions, cf. W. Schmid, *Gesch. d. gr. Lit.* (München, 1929), p. 192. For the *Iliad* the latest additions are the Budé edition and that of Allen (cf. notes 2 and 4); for the *Odyssey* that of von der Mühl (1946), cf. *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 210-213.

text is tedious rather than difficult. The word for "lung" occurs twice (Δ 528, Υ 486) and the manuscripts always write πνεύμων—a popular etymology for τλεύμων. As late as the 9th century Photius had πλεύμων in his Homer. In the second century Moeris knew that πνεύμων was Eellenistic, in contrast to the Attic πλεύμων. A papyrus of the 2nd century B. C. has now turned up with πλεύμων in M 188b. The only question that remains is just when did this late form printed by all recent editors begin to get into the tradition. Meister has pointed out<sup>6</sup> that the use of EY to designate what resulted from the contraction of EO starts in the Ionic inscriptions only in the 4th century, and cannot be earlier in Homer, where examples can now be found on almost every page.

Faced with this situation an editor must realize that the first thing he should do is to make up his mind as to what stage of the tradition his text is to represent. Surely, he will not wish to reproduce the text of an early stage defaced by later modernizations here and there; nor that of a late stage with earlier readings sewn on now and then like purple patches. His choice must be guided by a knowledge of the history of the tradition.

Its starting point is now clear and should have been so long ago. All that we know about Homer comes from a single manuscript written in Athens in the sixth century. Such an opinion was put forward by Lachmann<sup>7</sup> over a century ago: "Die schriftliche überlieferung der homerischen gedichte im griechischen altertum beruhte einzig auf der arbeit des Pisistratus und seine gefährten." The idea was attacked and ridiculed, but vainly. At present it is sufficient to quote Rhys Carpenter:<sup>8</sup> "Yet the true situation seems rather to be that if antiquity had neglected to record for us the Peisistratean recension of Homer, we should have to invent it for ourselves as a hypothesis essential to explain the facts." "There is nothing here for laughter or for learned gibe, but a historic fact beyond price and beyond invention."

The natural assumption is that a manuscript written at Athens

<sup>6</sup> *Die Homerische Kunstsprache* (Leipzig, 1921), p. 85.

<sup>7</sup> *Betrachtungen ueber Homers Ilias mit Zusaetzen von Moriz Haupt* (3te Aufl., Berlin, 1874), p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> *Folk Tale, Fiction and Saga in the Homeric Epics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1946), pp. 12, 14.

in the sixth century was written in the Old Attic alphabet. From that it follows that some people—οἱ μεταγραφάμενοι—must in the 5th century have transliterated it into the Ionic alphabet. That is another idea that has been ridiculed in vain. The Alexandrians believed (and used) it; in modern hands its usefulness has increased, especially since Meillet has suggested that doubled letters might be written only once no matter whether they represent vowels or consonants.<sup>9</sup>

For earlier scholars the trail broke at this point: the quotations were still uncollected, and the accumulation of evidence from the papyri was still in the future. They had nothing at their command but the scholia and the manuscripts.

The manuscripts are very much alike: each has "surface corruptions" in plenty; yet a tolerable text can be got from any two, and it will not differ greatly from that which could be got from any other two.<sup>10</sup> Such a text may be spoken of as a Vulgate; and the question arose, where did this Vulgate come from, or more narrowly how was it related to the edition of Aristarchus.

The first answer was that the Vulgate was the edition of Aristarchus itself. That opinion was advanced by Giphanius (Hubrecht van Giffen) in 1572<sup>11</sup> at a time when he could have had access only to the so-called Scholia of Didymus and the commentary of Eustathius. After the discovery in 1779 by Villoison of codex Venetus A with its copious scholia, it was clear that the answer was oversimplified. The most that could be claimed was that the Vulgate rested on the edition of Aristarchus. How much that implied was disputed. Had Aristarchus' text been canonized in later times; and if so, was that something for which we should be grateful or not?

Method obviously demands that the first steps should be to reconstruct the edition of Aristarchus, and separately the earliest form of the Vulgate whatever its date may be. The second of

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Cauer, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik* (3te Aufl., Leipzig, 1921), pp. 99-110; Meillet, *R. E. G.*, XXXI (1918), pp. 280 ff.; Schwyzer, *Gr. Gram.* (München, 1938), p. 102.

<sup>10</sup> "Recte enim dixit Leaf, posse si non e quovis codice, at certe e duobus quibusvis forte fortuna arreptis textum confici qui sine offensa legeretur. Quippe lectio haec quam vulgatam seu receptam nuncupamus ita invaluit usu ut codicibus prope omnibus communis sit." Preface to Oxford text (Monro), p. viii.

<sup>11</sup> According to Monro, *loc. cit.*



these tasks has never been undertaken; the execution of the first was promised by Adolph Riemer, but the promise was never fulfilled.<sup>12</sup> Instead editors strove to get the "best" text by choosing eclectically now the reading of Aristarchus, now that of the Vulgate.

Just what the procedure was to produce could not have been very clear. In 1898, however, Ludwig undertook to show that the Vulgate had been in existence from the 5th century on; and had "passed through the cleansing fire of Alexandrian criticism by and large unharmed, but also unpurified."<sup>13</sup> That is the point at which documentary evidence ceases, and Ludwig would consider no other; for him this was the ultima Thule. He would hear nothing of the μεταγραφόμενοι, nor of the Psephisto edition; those who were trying to go further on the ground of linguistic evidence were simply rewriting the poems in "ur-griechisch." They were to be ridiculed as "Knightianer," a term afterwards adopted as a badge of honor.<sup>14</sup>

The supporting evidence was an excellent collection (*op. cit.*, 71-133) of the quotations, and the positive side of his belief met with success. Leaf, the wisest of the editors of Homer, explicitly<sup>15</sup> defines his text as an "endeavour to reconstitute the Attic text as transliterated into the new alphabet"; but adds: "I have not hesitated in many cases to give a reading in the text which is described in the notes as clearly wrong—a corruption, that is, as old as the fifth century, of an older form which we can confidently restore." Monro too was enthusiastic when he wrote in 1902 the preface to the Oxford text. Ludwig had proved, "libros nostros non ex Alexandrina aliqua fabrica, sed e vetustissimis exemplaribus fluxisse." The readings of Aristarchus rest on good manuscripts far older than ours and are to be adopted even when all our manuscripts differ. As for the dialect; a complete restoration is impossible, so no attempt at it is best. We will end with a text (p. xiii): "si non optimum—ut qui ipsius

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Cauer, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>13</sup> *Die Homervulgata als voralexandrinisch erwiesen* (Leipzig, 1898), p. 15.

<sup>14</sup> The epithet derives from Payne Knight, who published in 1820 an edition of the poems, cf. Cauer, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>15</sup> *The Iliad*, ed. Walter Leaf 2nd ed., London, 1900-1902), I, pp. xxiii-xxv.

poetae manum contingeret—attamen in optimis Graeciae saeculis vulgatum.”

An editor has two kinds of problems, both essential, but differing greatly in magnitude: for instance, (1) to read ἐγὼ ἰδέειν or ἐγὼν ἰδέειν; (2) to put the Theseus line (A 265) in the text or in the critical commentary. Hitherto problems of the first type had largely monopolized attention; the accumulation of papyrus evidence was about to bring the second type into the foreground.

In 1906 Grenfell and Hunt noted<sup>16</sup> that *ca.* 150 B. C. a striking change in the transmission of the Homeric text took place abruptly and with almost absolute completeness. Naturally what impressed these scholars most was the quantitative difference between the texts written before and after that date. I mention, however, first two smaller differences, because they show editorial activity at that time.

The Ptolemaic papyri have no division of the poems into books. Some are of course unsuited to reveal the fact; but three others pass from Α to Μ, from Χ to Ψ, and from ι to κ without interruption.<sup>17</sup> Of the papyri written after 150 B. C. (I shall call them the Alpha papyri) those that have stichometric marks or the end of a book show the book division precisely as do the manuscripts and our printed texts. There is but one exception: P339 (1a) passes from Γ to Δ without interruption. It contains only five lines and is best regarded as a belated continuant of the Ptolemaic tradition too short to give other indication of the fact.<sup>18</sup>

Our recent printed texts show movable nu at the end of a line when and only when the next verse begins with a vowel. This is said<sup>19</sup> to be supported by the consensus of the manuscripts. Three of the earliest Alpha papyri—P13 (1a), P104 (1p), P10 (1p)—follow the rule 135 times, fail to write the ν six times, and write it against the rule twenty times. The Ptolemaic papyri show no acquaintance with such a rule. Two of them write (with very rare slips) the ν everywhere; the others are too fragmentary to show anything clearly.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *The Hibeh Papyri*, Part I, 67-75.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *A. J. P.*, XLII (1921), p. 258; *C. P.*, XL (1945), pp. 183-184.

<sup>18</sup> Other such stragglers are P51 (1a), P53 (1p), both markedly different from the Vulgate.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. La Roche, *Homerische Untersuchungen* (1869), pp. 160-163.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *C. P.*, XL (1945), pp. 181-183.

The point properly stressed by Grenfell and Hunt was that in their contents the Ptolemaic papyri contain a text longer than that established by Wolf as our printed Vulgate. The differences run from 20% down; <sup>21</sup> one (P41) seemed close to the Vulgate in length and similar ones (P Jouget of the *Odysey*, and P217) have since been found, but the latter shows a text greatly different from the Vulgate in spite of the similarity of length. <sup>22</sup> In contrast the Alpha papyri are in "substantial" agreement with the Vulgate.

The slight difference here implied between the Alpha papyri and the Vulgate manuscripts needs investigation. I have observed a close correlation among three sets of facts: (1) absence of a line from the Alpha papyri; (2) absence of solid support for the line in the Vulgate manuscripts; (3) absence of the line from the edition of Aristarchus. The correlations are not perfect, and could not be expected to be such, but the residues are small and admit of explanation. To put what results historically: about 150 B. C. some publisher issued a new text, which contained the lines of Aristarchus and the editorial improvements I have mentioned. The edition was a great success, so much so that all rivals were killed. In its transmission a few interpolations were made almost immediately, and during the papyrus period a few others were added; by the time of the manuscripts their number had increased, and we can see that the invaders are fanning out. Wolf picked up about <sup>23</sup> 85 of these lines for his edition. Subtract these lines from our printed Vulgate and you have the lines of the Alpha text and those of Aristarchus.

Still more important is the insight gained into the procedure of the transmission of the text. Whenever two manuscripts differ—bar "surface corruptions"—by the presence or the absence of a passage (never more than three lines long in the manuscripts of the *Iliad*) the passage has not been excised in the manuscript that lacks it, but has been added in the manuscript that contains it. It seemed reasonable to assume that before 150 B. C. the procedure was the same and I tested the idea.

<sup>21</sup> Calculations are given in my *External Evidence for Interpolation in Homer* (Oxford, 1925), p. 45.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *J. E. A.*, XIV (1928), pp. 78-81. Both of the others also show important deviations.

<sup>23</sup> For a few lines the evidence is inconclusive.

Opposed to this is the theory that the Vulgate was not something new in 150 B. C., but something that had existed at least since the 5th century. To maintain this was possible in 1898 when the Ptolemaic material was rather slight—the Petrie papyrus (P8) with parts of  $\Lambda$ , the Geneva papyrus (P5) with parts of  $\Delta M$ , a small fraction of P7 with parts of  $\Theta$ , and a small fraction of P12 with parts of  $\Phi X \Psi$ . Ludwich could brush that evidence off by doubts about their date, by questioning the possibility of restoring them, by regarding them as at best examples of “wild” “expanded” texts the existence of which need occasion no surprise. But by 1906 the papyrus material had increased greatly, and since then it has continued to grow.

We now have for the *Iliad*<sup>24</sup> some scraps (P266: A 485-491, P317: Z 448-55, P59: II 484-9) so small (6-8 lines) that they cannot be expected to yield any information; a somewhat longer fragment (P269: A 539-48, 561-74) that does not diverge greatly from the Vulgate. Also we have in addition to the two papyri (P5, 8) known to Ludwich, a great increase of his fractional knowledge of P7 and P12, and later discoveries: P40 with parts of  $\Gamma$ , P41 with parts of  $\Gamma \Delta E$ , P217 and P342 with parts of  $M$ , and another papyrus in Hamburg said to come from an expanded text of the same book. All eight of these differ clearly from the Alpha text, and there is nothing to contrast with them. To brush this evidence off is no longer possible, and speaking of “eccentric” texts seems now rather quaint.

The quotations—Ludwich’s chief reliance—are not suited to yield much information about the lines in the quoter’s text, and thus show whether it was vulgate or “eccentric.” I plan to speak of this in the introduction to my forthcoming edition of the *Iliad* and shall here say merely that what indications there are favor the no-excisions hypothesis I advocate.

To test this hypothesis I assembled in my *External Evidence for Interpolation in Homer* (Oxford, 1925) all the passages for which there exists evidence that there once were manuscripts that lacked them. The hypothesis stood the testing well, and I drew the conclusion that a reconstitution of the Peisistratean text must not contain them. I noted also (p. 253) that there must be others of the sort, undetected because of the fragmentary nature

<sup>24</sup> For the *Odyssey* conditions are similar, cf. especially P. Jouguet, ed. Guéraud, *Rev. de l'Ég. anc.*, II, pp. 1 ff.

of our information, and that some of these might "lurk among the lines athetized by the Alexandrians."

In 1933 there began in India under the leadership of V. S. Sukthankar the first critical editing of the *Mahābhārata*—an enormous task and carried out in exemplary fashion. It brought to light the fact that the procedure in the tradition of the *Mahābhārata* was the same as that which can be observed in the transmission of the lines of Homer from Aristarchus through the Alpha papyri to the Vulgate manuscripts, and which I had posited for the period before Aristarchus. In the introduction to his edition of the second book Edgerton says of passages such as I deal with: "these are not omissions' in the recension that lacks them, but secondary insertions in those that contain them."

Meanwhile I had been hunting among the athetized lines for other possible interpolations. In doing this I came to appreciate better an idea of Sengbusch and of Ludwig that Aristarchus would not athetize a line unless he had manuscript evidence against it; and furthermore to see that the same was true of Zenodotus. In other words an athetesis by any of the great Alexandrians permits us to infer the existence of manuscripts with and manuscripts without the passage athetized. In that case it must—bar surface corruptions—be interpolated, and must be excluded from a reconstitution of the Peisistratean text. In this way we reach for the sixth century a text of the *Iliad* about 1000 lines shorter than that of Aristarchus, with the probability that some lines of this sort are still undetected. It seemed worth while to pause at this point and present the result in a text of the *Iliad*.

Then problems of the type I have been keeping in the background came to the front. How are the Peisistratean lines to be worded? The selection of a target of definite date has rendered the answer to that question in some ways easier. Obviously all post-Hellenistic, all Hellenistic, all Attic forms not created before the 5th century must go out. The new understanding of the history of the tradition helps likewise. All our manuscripts reduce practically to a single manuscript written about 150 B. C. Aristarchus' edition is but slightly older; before that was the edition of Zenodotus (who has turned out to be a conservative critic) and the indirect tradition—the quotations and the imitations. All of these can give only what *οἱ μεταγραψάμενοι* made out

of the older writing that was before them. We can put it back into the archaic alphabet, and when that is ambiguous (as it frequently is) we are free to interpret it in whatever way seems best. That is not making an emendation.

The great difficulty that remains is how far was the Peisistratean text Atticized. To some extent certainly; for there are, to use Wackernagel's phrase, "Atticisms of the poet"—that is, Attic forms not brought into the text in the course of its transmission but in it from the start. I am far from believing that I have succeeded in a complete solution of this and other problems. I hope that the working at them will continue and will meet with greater success.

With the constitution of the Peisistratean text the task of an editor—in the strict sense—is completed. Much remains for others to do. The poem is there and its existence must be accounted for. That demands two things: an analysis of the composition of the poem; and an understanding of the development of the speech it records. The two must go hand-in-hand. Wilhelm von Humboldt was right in calling the language the *cardo rerum*. With the language one must begin, and with the language one must end; for no analysis can be regarded as satisfactory unless it leads to an orderly picture of the development of the language. It should be possible to recognize various compositional units—sources of our poem—and to assign them to the proper linguistic stage. They can then be written in the form they once had.<sup>25</sup> That is the ultimate goal, but one far beyond strictly editorial activity.

GEORGE M. BOLLING.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.

<sup>25</sup> This has been attempted repeatedly: for single passages by many scholars; for connected texts cf. Bechtel's *Ur-Ilias* and "Ekropos 'Avalpeis," ap. Robert, *Studien zur Ilias* (Berlin, 1901).

## PLAUTINE CHRONOLOGY.

The following remarks may be regarded as complementary to Charles H. Buck's Johns Hopkins dissertation *A Chronology of the Plays of Plautus* (Baltimore, 1940). Apart from the positive results obtained, the writer does excellent service in summing up previous work, so that one stands on sure ground for further investigation. Perhaps his most striking discovery (pp. 14 f.) is what I think is the certain explanation of the *instaurationes* recorded by Livy, i. e. that they represent a response to the popular demand for the repetition of a successful play, and that the religious motive was a mere pretext. This is strongly supported by Dio, LX, 6, 4, who mentions as many as ten repetitions, and says that Claudius put a stop to the practice. (The repetition of the *Eunuchus* on the same day [Donatus, *praef. ad Eun.*], however, may have been merely in the nature of an encore.) I agree that the unprecedented number of seven in B. C. 205 was certainly due to the success of the *Miles*, which must have been a landmark in Roman comedy (p. 16). Apart from this case, however, these records do not help to date the plays, though Buck makes the attractive suggestion that the great increase in the number of days on which plays were performed in the period 214-200 (145, including *instaurationes*) was due to Plautus' own popularity (p. 17) — his only serious rival was Naevius. (The only other comic poets known in this period are Livius Andronicus and probably Licinius Tegula [apparently identical with Licinius Imbrex, of whom Ribbeck gives three fragments],<sup>1</sup> who Livy [XXXI, 12, 10] says wrote the hymn to Juno in 200.)

After the Punic wars, Plautus must have been for some time the *only* comic poet at Rome of any note (there may have been others, e. g. Luscius Lanuvinus, the *vetus poeta* of Terence). Now, however keen he may have been *nummum in loculos demittere*, it is too much to expect he could have written more than say three plays *per annum*, whereas five at least must have been needed, not to count special occasions—votive and funeral games, etc. The natural inference is that to fill the gap plays were *revived*. On what grounds Buck (p. 5) denies this I do not know; from *Bacch.* 214 f.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Teuffel, *Röm. Lit.*, § 107. 4.

etiam Epidicum, quam ego fabulam aequae ac me ipsum amo,  
nullam aequae invitus specto, si agit Pello

it seems a certain inference that the *Epidicus* was revived several times; while the parallel scenes in *Stich.* and *Poen.*, besides much evidence of retractation in other plays,<sup>2</sup> also point to revival (sometimes, no doubt, after Plautus' death). The *Casina* prologue, however (137 B. C.?: cf. *C. Q.*, 1930, p. 106) shows that by that time revivals had ceased for many years—there had been no lack of poets to produce *new* plays.

The lines from the *Bacchides* lead to some interesting speculations. Obviously at some time between the production of *Epidicus* and that of *Bacchides* Plautus had broken with Pello. *Bacchides* is known to have been produced in 189 (Buck, p. 41): is it possible to date *Epidicus*? Buck points to the reference to colonies in line 343, which I agree is a quite definite contemporary allusion, and quotes Velleius to show that, for some time after the Punic wars there were no new colonies, but in 194 eight—which is a clear indication of date. I find another indication in line 33: referring to *παλαρίδες* the speaker says *ante aliis fuit* (sc. *honori*), a very striking expression, which I think refers to the state of things mentioned by Livy (XXXIII, 36 f., 196 B. C.): Marcellus was surprised by the Boii, and several distinguished men killed: *triumphus ei magno consensu patrum est decretus* (over the Insubres and Comenses): *Boiorum triumphi spem collegae reliquit*. Similarly, 25-27: the proconsul Tuditanus was routed and killed in Spain with many distinguished men; at the same time his predecessor Blasio received an ovation.<sup>3</sup>

These considerations lead us to a date about 195—the reference to colonies could come before the actual colonisation (cf. *Pseud.* 1100)—and under the circumstances the reference to the “new look” (*ut nove*, line 222), long ago referred to the repeal of the Lex Oppia, may be accepted.<sup>3a</sup> It seems clear to me that there

<sup>2</sup> Cornelia C. Coulter, “Retractatio” in the *Ambrosian and Palatine Recensions of Plautus* (Baltimore, 1911).

<sup>3</sup> There is a similar reference in *Trin.* 1034, which Ritschl (*Parerga*, p. 339) showed not to be before 194, when the Megalesia first became scenic: the reference to the new aediles would be most apposite the first year in which it could be made. Topical jokes depend for their point upon novelty, a fact not without weight in these investigations.

<sup>3a</sup> If we date *Epidicus* 195, we may, with Ladewig, find in lines 166 f.



must have been a longish interval between *Epidicus* and *Bacchides*, but Buck puts *Epidicus* in 190, apparently for the sole reason that in *Bacchides* there is no reference to the *Pseudolus* of 191, an infinitely better play. But if Plautus had quarrelled with Pello, Pello would not have acted in *Pseudolus*. *Epidicus* may well have been the last play of Plautus in which Pello acted. It is possible that Pello had bought the *Epidicus* from Plautus (as actor-manager), and by repeating it, had to some extent queered the pitch for Plautus' new plays. Note that the words *si agit Pello* imply that others than Pello had taken the part. (The lines in the *Bacchides* would gain in point if Plautus himself took the part of Chrysalus [Buck, p. 14, note 11] but by 189 he would be rather old for the exacting work of a comic actor: cf. Terence, *Haut.* 35-45.)

While we are on the subject of Pello, attention must be called to *Men.* 404: *quasi supellex pelionis, palus palo proximust*. It will hardly be denied that the audience cannot have failed to see a pun in the line, with a side-reference to the wardrobe in which Pello kept his costumes; if so, this too will be before the quarrel. I would put it *ca.* 194, which would agree with the comparative fewness of lyrics and personal allusions.

With regard to the early group, *Asinaria*—*Stichus*, 207 (212?)—200, it can be taken as certain that *Asinaria* and *Mercator* are the earliest, while the dates 205, 203-2, 200 are definitely established for *Miles*, *Cistellaria*, *Stichus* (*Asinaria* was probably 207 rather than 212: Enk finds affinities with *Mercator* [in his edition of that play], F. W. Hall [*C. Q.*, 1926, p. 20] with *Miles*).

*Asinaria* and *Mercator* are connected 1) by the name Maccus in the prologue (the only two cases), 2) by runs of iambic octonarii without diaeresis (cf. Lindsay, *Early Latin Verse*, p. 108). *Cistellaria* and *Stichus*, both from Menander, are each introduced by a highly lyrical scene between women, and marked by a sentimental tone, in *Stichus* at the beginning only (it soon gives way to farce), but no doubt further maintained by Menander, to whom the play we have probably bears little relation (cf. *C. R.*, 1925, pp. 55 ff.) (The extensive Plautine addi-

an echo of Cato's famous speech of that year on the Lex Oppia (Livy, XXXIV, 4, 16). The reference to parricides, *Epid.* 349 ff. (cf. Plutarch, *Rom.*, 22 ult.) offers rough confirmation.

tions in *Miles* and *Stichus* show that at a comparatively early stage in his career Plautus was capable of writing long stretches of independent work.) The earliness would account for some at least of the peculiarities which led Havet to deny Plautus' authorship of the *Asinaria* (see the Budé edition). Indeed Havet proves too much: on his showing the play can hardly have been old at all, and if not, it would not have been accepted by *all* Roman critics.

Turning to the rest of the plays, i. e. those after 200, I think Buck's date of 186 for *Persa* may be taken as established, and *ca.* 191 for *Poenulus* as highly probable. The remainder I consider not proven, though I think 193 for *Curculio* (reference to usurers) is very likely (Buck, p. 64). For *Aulularia* I consider the most likely date 191, the first *ieiunium Cereris* (Buck, p. 37), borne out perhaps by the reference to the plump *tibicina* in line 332 (cf. *Poenulus* 1416). In *Truculentus* the reference to lying accounts of alleged victories might connect either with Cato's speech *De Falsis Pugnis*, 190 B. C. (Bergk), or Tenney Frank's identification of *Homeronida* with Ennius, making the date 186 (Buck, p. 103). But as *Rud.* 994 = *Truc.* 119, and like *Pseudolus* (of 191) refers to the Lex Plaetoria, the balance of evidence is on the whole in favour of 190 for *Truculentus*, especially as it has verbal similarities to *Bacchides* of 189. *Rudens* would be soon after 190, but as it has very striking verbal similarities to *Amphitruo*, we should have to put *Amphitruo* about the same time (Buck's very ingenious arguments for 187-6 do not convince me). Reference to the Boii puts *Captivi* after 191, and the reference to corners in food suggests 189. The date of *Mostellaria* is quite uncertain, though Pasquali (*Riv. Fil.*, LV [1927], p. 30) sees affinities with the *Captivi*, and it bears every mark of Plautus' latest technique.

We thus get a series approximately as follows: *Epidicus* 195, *Trinummus* 194, *Menaechmi* 194, *Curculio* 193, *Poenulus* 191, *Truculentus* 190, *Bacchides* 189, *Rudens* 189, *Captivi* 189, *Amphitruo* 188, *Persa* 186, *Casina* 184. If these dates are even approximately correct, which I think is undeniable, we are faced with the remarkable fact that, of the twenty plays, there are five from 207 to 200, fifteen from 195 to 184, and none at all from 199 to 196 (or 195 according to Buck). Any attempt to explain this must be highly speculative, but certain points are worth considering.

Our 21 Varronian plays are not the only plays Varro thought genuine, but those whose authenticity was admitted by all (Teuffel, § 96. 4). Plautus must have written many more, even if we confine his activity to the period 207-184, several a year in all probability when he was the only notable comic poet at Rome.<sup>4</sup> Many plays would be accepted or rejected by Roman critics on purely subjective grounds of style, etc., and while we can place some confidence in the judgment of expert scholars like Stilo and Varro, many critics, like Volcatius Sedigitus and, I suspect, even Accius would be mere dilettanti. On the whole, then, we may accept with some confidence the extra 19 plays admitted by Varro, which bring the total up to 40, still far fewer than Plautus must have written.<sup>5</sup>

The question arises what credit we can give to the *didascaliae*, and this resolves itself into the question of their origin.<sup>6</sup> It is usually thought that they represent the result of the investigations of ancient scholars, especially Varro's *De Actis Scaenicis*, and that they are based on the records of the magistrates; but the contents rather suggest that they came from the stage-managers. It is unsafe to argue from the Terentian *didascaliae*, which date from a time when records were more systematically kept (yet even these contain mistakes, e. g. the *Hecyra* is attributed in the Bembinus to Menander). For the *Stichus*, the only complete example for Plautus, we have, besides title, author's name, and Greek original, (1) date of production, (2) composer of music, (3) nature of music (instruments required), (4) original actor—followed by *Personae* (which must have been added when masks were introduced, after the time of Terence), a list of masks required, much as in modern theatrical catalogues we find 5 M, 3 F, and so on. (So too the scene-headings meet the requirements of the producer, rather than of the reader.)

Now this strongly suggests not state or any official records, but information for the use of the producer, quite different from what we have in Greek, compiled for readers by scholars, and based on public records.

<sup>4</sup> *Saturio* and *Addictus* are known to be before 207 (Gellius, III, 3, 14). Cf. Buck, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> The *Hauptwerk* is Ritschl's *Fabulae Varronianae* (*Parerga*, pp. 71 ff.).

<sup>6</sup> See especially Michaud, *Sur les Tréteaux Latins* (Paris, 1912).

In Plautus' time magistrates were no more interested in what they paid the proprietor of a play than the proprietor of gladiators or *funambuli*. That is why the records of Plautus and his contemporaries were so ill-preserved. If a play held the stage, there was some prospect of the stage-records being preserved; if not, they would almost inevitably get lost. Hence the hopeless confusion of Accius about early chronology (Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*,<sup>2</sup> p. 66), and the uncertainty of attribution of plays to Plautus in the time of Varro (Teuffel, pp. 168 f.): it is probable that by then most extant copies would have no original *didascalía* at all. The priestly records used by Livy, or his sources (Buck, p. 7, note 11), would be concerned only with the religious aspect, the *instauratio*, and quite probably did not even mention the poet. The aediles would give the name of the poet, and perhaps of the play, the price paid, and little or nothing else—they dealt with the producer, not the poet (at Athens, owing to competitions, conditions were quite different). In such circumstances, some of the details of a *didascalía* could not be supplied by ancient scholars, and numerous revivals with consequent retractation would add to the confusion. This is borne out by the Ambrösian palimpsest, which had *didascalíae* for *Stichus*, *Pseudolus*, *Vidularia* and probably *Rudens*, but apparently not for *Mercator*, *Trinummus*, and *Persa*—for the rest it is impossible to say (Lindsay, *Anc. Editions of Plautus*, p. 88). In some cases it may not have been possible even to identify the Greek original: Athenaeus (336 D) says he had read more than 800 plays of the Middle Comedy alone—I doubt if Varro had access, for example, to Demóphilus' *Onagos* (*Onagros*?). It was the enormous number of Greek comedies and Latin adaptations which gave plausibility to Terence's statement (*Eun.* 34) that he did not know the *Colax* of Menander had already been translated.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> We are apt to overlook the scantiness of our knowledge of ancient literature. But for Plautus we should have known nothing of Demóphilus or the *Achilles* of Aristarchus, and nothing of the comic poet Plautius, had not Varro mentioned the confusion caused by the similarity of names; nor of Luscius Lanuvinus but for Terence. Several comic poets in Ribbeck are known only by two or three fragments. (The alternative titles also were confusing: *Syra* in Festus for the *Cist.*, however, seems not a third title, but a misreading of the first letters of *Synaristosae*.)

I should say that down to about 195 B. C. the records existing in Varro's time were very scanty—the *Stichus* may have been a lucky accident. *Asinaria* and *Mercator* mention Plautus' name in the prologue; *Miles* was famous; about *Cistellaria* we do not know. (Still the choice of attribution in the early period would lie practically only between Naevius and Plautus.) From 202 (or earlier), then, to 195, apart from *Stichus* there was apparently no external evidence in Varro's time guaranteeing Plautus' authorship of any particular play, so that, however certain he felt about it, he could not count it among the "universally accepted." Finally, combining all the results known to me, I suggest as very nearly correct the following chronology:<sup>a</sup>

<i>Asin.</i>	207	<i>Men.</i>	194	<i>Rud.</i>	189
<i>Merc.</i>	206	<i>Curc.</i>	193	<i>Capt.</i>	189
<i>Mil.</i>	205	<i>Poen.</i>	191	( <i>Most.</i> 188?)	
<i>Cist.</i>	203-2	<i>Aul.</i>	191	<i>Amph.</i>	188
<i>Stich.</i>	200	<i>Pseud.</i>	191	<i>Persa</i>	186
<i>Epid.</i>	195	<i>Truc.</i>	190	<i>Cas.</i>	184
<i>Trin.</i>	194	<i>Bacch.</i>	189		

Referring to the metrical tests which I suggested in the *Class. Review*, 1925 and *Class. Quarterly*, 1930, it will be seen that they hold their ground in the definitely early group 207-200 (except for the badly mutilated *Cistellaria*) and in the late *Persa* and *Casina*. I noted at the time that *Poenulus* had far fewer lyrics than we expected for its date, pointing out that the double ending indicated extensive retraction; likewise I suggested that the high proportion in *Epidicus* was due to the shortening it has evidently undergone. But the whole group, *Epidicus* to *Amphitruo*, 195-188, thirteen plays in eight years, is much too close together for the lyric test to carry much weight.

When I wrote, I hoped that someone would approach the problem from a new angle: this Buck has done, and done well, and I think we have now reached a stage at which we can point to

<sup>a</sup> This list roughly agrees with that of J. H. Hough in *A. J. P.*, 1934, pp. 346 ff. (and *C. P.*, 1935, pp. 43 ff.) except for *Poenulus* and *Menaeochmi*. I think *Poenulus* at least must be put much later than Hough puts it: Plautus could hardly have staged such a sympathetic Carthaginian till some considerable time after the war. See also E. V. Arnold on the development of Plautine anapaestics, *C. R.*, 1925, pp. 7-8 (cf. F. W. Hall in *C. Q.*, 1926, p. 1).

definite results, and a chronology which can claim to be in the main established with only a small margin of error. Many "eccentric" datings have, it may be hoped, been finally put out of court, though one which had been thought among the most eccentric, Radermacher's of *Asinaria* in 212 (Buck, p. 32) has been surprisingly vindicated (I would refer it, however, with Buck [*loc. cit.*], to a Scipio of 207, not 212). It still remains to establish details, but we can now study the plays in groups, which should produce some interesting results, and throw fresh light on Plautus' workmanship.

W. B. SEDGWICK.

SCARBOROUGH, YORKS.

## HERACLITUS AND DEATH IN BATTLE (FR. 24D).

Heraclitus, fr. 24 (Diels), is quoted by Clement in the course of a long discussion of the compensations for martyrdom: *Stromateis*, IV, 16, 1 (II, p. 255, Stählin): *εἴτα Ἡράκλειτος μὲν φησιν· ἀρηιφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι. καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας γράφει· τῶν δὲ δὴ ἀπαθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατείας ὅς ἂν εὐδοκμήσας τελευτήσῃ, ἄρ' οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι;* Another version of the fragment occurs in Theodoretus, *Therap.*, 8, 39, where it is separated only by the words *καὶ πάλιν* from an inaccurate reproduction of fr. 25D, also quoted in its most original form by Clement: *μόροι [γὰρ] μείζονες· μείζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι.* There is indeed a close connexion in sense between the two fragments, but no significance should be attached to the juxtaposition in Theodoretus, since it is quite clear that he has culled both quotations straight from Clement, on whom he largely depends for his own discussion in this section of the honour gained by martyrs. More important is the Platonic passage, *Rep.*, V, 468e, reproduced in Clement's quotation above. The observation is of course a commonplace in Greek literature, but the restrictive clause *ὅς ἂν εὐδοκμήσας τελευτήσῃ* is in sharp contrast with the inclusiveness of Heraclitus; Plato (who typifies the usual Greek sentiment on this point) holds that he *who has distinguished himself* in battle, and so meets his death, is raised above the rest of men, but Heraclitus asserts that "Gods and men honour the slain in war," without stipulating valour or otherwise. This distinction would appear to be too nice a one, in view of the conciseness and economy of the Heraclitean style, if there were not other evidence to show that Heraclitus is not on this occasion simply re-echoing a popular sentiment, but intends to emphasize the suddenness rather than the seemliness of death in battle, and to ground this commendation upon his general theory of the nature of the soul.

A scholion on the Bodleian codex of Epictetus, 157a (*vide* Teubner edition of Epictetus, 1916, ed. Schenkl, p. lxxxiii) reads as follows: *Ἡρακλείτου· ψυχὰ ἀρηιφάτοι καθερώτεραι (sic) ἢ ἐν νοούσι.* Disregarding a somewhat naive and unreasoned acceptance of this verse as Heraclitean by K. Praechter, *Philologus*,

LVIII (1899), pp. 473 f., Die's held it to be merely a Byzantine play upon this fragment 24, and classed it among the doubtful and false fragments as no. 136 (22B136 in *Vors.*<sup>5</sup>, ed. Kranz). Certainly the general similarity and especially the recurrence of the epic word ἀρήφατος show that the author of the verse had this fragment, or conceivably a different but similar saying of Heraclitus, in mind: but should the author be put as late as the Byzantine period? Interest in Heraclitus was certainly still alive then, but so far as I know there is no other evidence for any Byzantine verse version or commentary on his work, and it is rather unlikely that a reading of the *Stromateis* would inspire anyone, even a Byzantine scholar, to the composition of hexametrical exegeses of Clement's sources. This point is important, for Clement, just before quoting our fragment, had reproduced a contrast between death in battle and death in sickness which he attributes not to Heraclitus but to "the ancients," and it might just be maintained that this is the reason for the mention of νόσοις in the verse quoted by the scholiast: *Strom.*, IV, 14, 4 (II, p. 255, 3, Stählin): καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ δὲ τῶν παρ' Ἑλληνιστῶν ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθανόντων τὴν τελευτὴν ἐπαινοῦσιν, οὐ τὸ βιαίως ἀποθνήσκειν συμβουλευόντες, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ κατὰ πόλεμον τελευτῶν ἀδελφὸς τοῦ θανεῖν ἀπήλλακται, ἀποτμηθεὶς τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ προκαμὼν τῇ ψυχῇ οὐδὲ καταμαλακισθεὶς, οἷα περὶ τὰς νόσους πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. ἀπαλλάττονται γὰρ θηλυκευόμενοι καὶ ἱμειρόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν. διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ καθαρὰν ἀπολούουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μεθ' ἑαυτῆς φερομένην, εἰ μὴ τινες τούτων ἐλλόγιοι κατ' ἀρετὴν γεγόνασιν. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ μετ' ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀποθνήσκουσιν, οὐδὲν οὗτοι διαφέροντες <ῆ> εἰ καὶ νόσῳ κατεμαραίνοντο. I shall return to this passage later.

There are preserved at least three other phrases attributed to Heraclitus and cast in a hexameter form: fr. 3D, from Aetius: εὖρος ποδὸς ἀνθρωπέου; fr. 10CD, from Plutarch: ὥρας αἰ πάντα φέρουσι; and fr. 137D, from Stobaeus: εἰμαρμένα πάντως. On the other hand metrical endings to continuous prose fragments must be explained by the strong influence of epic phraseology on the earliest Greek prose: so Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, p. 88, n. 1 (cited by Heidel, "On Certain Fragments," etc., *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XLVIII [1912-13], especially pp. 709 ff., who deals well with verse commentaries on Heraclitus). The most striking case of this is the final words of fr. 5D: οὐ τι γινώσκων θεοὺς οὐδ' ἥρωας οὔτινές εἰσι. Now the case of



fr. 100D gives Plutarch's time as a *terminus ante quem* for the composition of a hexameter version of Heraclitus, while the *είμαρμένα* of fr. 137D suggests Stoic influence. We know from the account given by Diogenes Laertius, IX, 1-17 that several works on Heraclitus were composed during this period, and at IX, 15 we hear of two Stoic commentators: *πλείστοι τέ εἰσιν ὅσοι ἐξηγήνται αὐτοῦ τὸ σύγγραμμα· καὶ γὰρ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς, Κλεάνθης τε καὶ Σφαῖρος ὁ Στωικός, πρὸς δὲ Πανσανίας κτλ.* Diogenes says elsewhere that Cleanthes composed four books of *ἐξηγήσεις* on Heraclitus, apparently his longest work. He does not mention verse commentaries, but in view of the pronounced Heraclitean echoes in Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*, written in hexameters, the possibility suggested by Heidel, *loc. cit.*, that Cleanthes was the author of a hexameter version which may have been the source of extant metrical phrases cannot be ignored. Scythinus, the iambic poet, certainly produced a metrical version of Heraclitus: Diogenes, IX, 16: *Ἰερώνυμος δὲ φησι καὶ Σκυθινὸν τὸν τῶν Ἰάμβων ποιητὴν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον διὰ μέτρον ἐβάλλειν.* Of course "iambic poets" did occasionally employ hexameters, and the trochaic lines quoted from Scythinus by Plutarch, *De Pyth. Or.*, 16, p. 402a, might come from a poem on Stoicism as much as from one on Heraclitus.

It seems therefore permissible to conclude that a hexameter line attributed to Heraclitus by a Byzantine scholiast may have been, and probably was, composed during the centuries which followed the revival of interest in Heraclitus fostered by the Stoics; and that the author of it, if not actually Cleanthes or Scythinus, may well have been roughly contemporary with them and stimulated by their example. This means that the content of the hexameter line, if it be not entirely reproduced from an extant fragment, is likely to be based either on some unknown saying of Heraclitus or on conventional Stoic doctrine. Now it is obvious that the statement "souls slain in war are purer than those which perish in diseases" is mainly based upon our fr. 24 from which, as has been observed, it takes the archaic word *ἀρρίφατοι*; but that fragment only deals with death in war, and does not mention disease. Is this additional matter to be considered Stoic or Heraclitean? It may be said at once that there is no trace of any Stoic contrast between death in war and in sickness; and popular belief, while it held the former to be more

admirable, did not postulate any special effect on the *ψυχή*. The deduction is that the author of the hexameter verse is referring to a doctrine of Heraclitus about which we have no other direct information.

I believe that it is possible to deduce from other Heraclitean fragments about the soul what this special doctrine was, and that this contrast between sudden and protracted deaths confirms the only hypothesis on which Heraclitus' psychological pronouncements have any consistency. Fr. 36D asserts that it is death to souls to become water: *ψυχῆσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι*. Here *θάνατος* has its special Heraclitean meaning of change from one basic form of matter to another. We are also told that the dry soul is the wisest and best: fr. 118D, *αὐτὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*. Conversely stupidity and inefficiency mean that the soul is moist; in fr. 117D the drunken man is characterized as *ὕγρην τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων*. It is not too much to deduce that Heraclitus considered the soul to be made of fire, or a form of fire: in fr. 36D the sequence of "deaths" is soul-water-earth, while in fr. 31D, which is concerned with material change on the cosmic scale, the *τροπαί* are fire-water-earth; thus soul in the one fragment fills the place taken by fire in the other. Now it is tempting to assume that on the death of the body the soul always undergoes its own "death" of becoming water; but having become water it is no longer soul, yet in some fragments Heraclitus definitely assumes a continued existence, after the death of the body, for some souls at any rate: fr. 98D, "souls use smell in Hades"; fr. 25D, "greater deaths gain greater portions"; fr. 63D, "... they become guardians, awake, of living and dead." Fr. 27D, "there await men when they are dead things which they neither expect nor suppose" *could* mean anything, and fr. 62D, "immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, etc." might be taken as a further example of the coincidence of opposites rather than a conscious doctrine of the soul: but the total agglomeration of evidence is convincing. One fragment in particular is important as a possible clue to the nature of this survival: fr. 98D, *αἱ ψυχαὶ ὀσμῶνται καθ' Ἄϊδην*. In speaking of "Hades" Heraclitus is making a concession to the established phraseology of Homeric religion, and it is conceivable that the intention of the whole fragment is simply to recapitulate the ancient view that the *ψυχή* is breath; the sense of smell involves breathing in through

the nose, and so this sense might be retained by souls after separation from the body. Yet although Heraclitus often used the language of popular religion, and even maintained that it unintentionally contained a degree of truth, I do not believe that he was ever content simply to reproduce its more naive beliefs, especially when his own views were inconsistent with them. (It is possible that the intention here is ironical; but direct attacks on religion, especially when phrased in picturesque terms, seem to have been carefully recorded as such during this period, as in the case of Xenophanes.) The key word is *ὀσμῶνται*; and if we examine the evidence for early views on the nature of the sense of smell, we discover that it is normally associated with dryness. Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, 30, attributed to Anaxagoras the theory that smell is a form of air, and that it is intensified by rarity and heat: *ὄζειν μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸν λεπτὸν ἀέρα, θερμαίνόμενον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μανούμενον ὄζειν*. Plato and Aristotle held a similar view; but most important is the evidence of the Hippocratean work *περὶ σαρκῶν*, which, although it may not be earlier than the early fourth century, may represent the common medical view: *π. σαρκῶν*, 16: *ὀσφραίνεται δ' ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ὑγρὸς ἐὼν ἀντὶς τῶν ξηρῶν . . . καὶ ὅταν μὲν ξηρὰ ᾖ τὰ κοῖλα τῆς ῥίνας, ὀσμήσθαι τῶν ξηροτέρων αὐτὸς ἐώντων ἀκριβέστερός ἐστι. ὕδατος γὰρ οὐκ ὀσμήται*. Here it is clear that *ὑγρὸς ἐὼν* must mean *relatively* moist (to the object smelled) from the words, "it is more accurate in smelling the things drier than itself." Perhaps too much importance should not be attached to Aristotle's specific attribution to Heraclitus, at *De Sensu*, 5, 443a21 ff.; of the supposedly general view that smell is connected with the dry exhalation: for Aristotle is reading this view into fr. 7D, which he then quotes, and this fragment clearly presents a purely hypothetical case—"if everything were smoke"—to show that unity and diversity can coexist in the same subject; it is not concerned with the actualities of sense-perception at all. This is not the place to demonstrate that the *ξηρὴ* or *καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις*, which Aristotle in the *Meteorologica* firmly attributes to Heraclitus, is in fact his own invention and merely corresponds with some aspects of Heraclitus' fire; but I believe this to be the case. Plutarch appears to combine this belief with another opinion ascribed to Heraclitus by doxographic sources, that the heavenly bodies are nourished by the *moist ἀναθυμίασις*, for in quoting this fr. 98D at *De Fac.*, 28, 943d, he

says that the blessed souls which rise to the region round the moon are strengthened by the aether there, ὥστε ὑπὸ τῆς τυχούσης ἀναθυμιάσεως τρέφεσθαι· καὶ καλῶς Ἡράκλειτος εἶπεν ὅτι αἱ ψυχαὶ δσμῶνται κτλ. Now it is possible, as Mr. W. Hamilton has observed to me, that the context of Plutarch's quotation to some extent corresponds with and gives a clue to the context of Heraclitus' saying as he found it; if this is so, it supports the main contention that some souls at any rate survive the death of the body in a fiery state. (Rohde's theory, *Psyche*, Eng. trans., pp. 393 f., that the souls in fr. 98D have already turned to water, earth, and water again, and are now breathing in fire in the process of being reconstituted as souls, postulates an inaccurate use by Heraclitus both of ψυχή and of δσμᾶσθαι.)

Assuming that Heraclitus may have held some such view, the fragment in question takes on a new significance: souls use smell in Hades because they are surrounded by dry matter, than which they are but little less dry. When one recalls that the soul in life was by implication characterized as a form of fire, it is not difficult to deduce that Heraclitus' "Hades" is a realm of fire, in which the disembodied souls are themselves fiery. But what of fr. 36D, "it is death to souls to become water?" The answer must be that this statement is not inclusive: becoming water does in fact mean "death" to souls, but not all souls suffer this "death" on the death of the body. Some retain their fiery character and rejoin the mass of pure fire in the world; and since dryness, i. e. greater fieriness, was in life held to be the condition of wisdom and excellence, it follows that those souls which remain fiery and do not undergo the death of becoming water are the souls of the virtuous, and that the association with pure fire is the after-life which Heraclitus seems to promise in the fragments already quoted. This is indeed approximately the view reached years ago by Burnet (*Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed., pp. 153 f.), and subjected to ridicule ever since; admittedly Burnet's conclusion was reached intuitively rather than rationally, and nevertheless proposed somewhat dogmatically; but I believe that in essence it is correct (what is not correct is that the soul can suffer a "death" of becoming fire: there can be no excess of fire for souls), and that it is substantiated by the considerations I have put forward here. The criticisms of other scholars have been based mainly upon their misinterpretation of θάνατος in fr.

36D, and upon the arguments advanced by e. g. Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 392 f., against the possibility of survival of the *individual* soul in Heraclitus. With these arguments I should entirely agree, merely observing that for Heraclitus fire is apparently a more primary and "better" kind of matter than water, and that therefore even non-individual survival as fire is preferable to survival as water, quite apart from the consideration that the world-mass of fire (of which souls are a part) may be thought of as percipient and intelligent, which water certainly is not. While it is not necessary to assume with Burnet (*op. cit.*, p. 154, n. 2) and others that Heraclitus is guilty of a major inconsistency on this point, it is certainly probable that he had not fully worked out the implications of his doctrine of the soul, or, for that matter, of his views on material change in general: thus the good souls which remain as fire on the death of the body must *at some time* undergo the *τροπή* to water from which no fire is exempt.

If, then, when the body dies the soul either becomes water or remains fiery, and becomes more fiery still, what is the factor which determines this issue? Clearly, the composition of the soul at the moment of death; the soul in life contains varying proportions of fire and moisture, according as it is wise or foolish, percipient or unpercipient; if the amount of water at the moment of death exceeds the amount of fire, presumably the soul as a whole suffers the "death" of turning to water: but if the soul is predominantly "dry," then it escapes the "death" of becoming water and joins the world-mass of fire. This is deduction, but I think permissible deduction.

To return now to the verse in the scholion on Epictetus: if souls slain in war are called "purer" than those which perish in sickness, their purity must consist in their dryness or fieriness; *καθαρός* applied to the soul must be non-Heraclitean, and dependent upon the development of the Orphico-Pythagorean idea of *κάθαρσις*, by which Heraclitus was apparently unaffected. The question immediately presents itself, why souls in sickness become moist. Again a partial answer is fairly plain: that sickness for Heraclitus *necessarily* involved a moistening of the soul. This may be deduced from one of the most difficult of all the fragments, 26D (this is not the place to discuss the textual difficulties, which are indeed irrelevant to the point in question; the text given is that proposed by Wilamowitz and followed by Kranz and Rein-

hardt): *ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἄπτεται ἑαυτῷ ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις· ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεώτος εὐδῶν, ἐγρηγόρως ἄπτεται εὐδοντος*. The point is that in sleep a man's vision (which depends, like all the senses, upon the operation of the soul) is extinguished, and he touches death, which in this case involves the soul becoming water; it is not too much to assume therefore that the soul is to some extent extinguished and its fire diminished by an increase of water—this is why he touches death, because the soul is approaching the completely watery state which means its *θάνατος*. The man is kindled as an inferior deceptive light for himself, and lives in a private world of dreams in which he is out of contact with *τὸ ξυγόν* but has an *ιδίαν φρόνησιν* (fr. 2D); he sees things peculiar to himself alone (fr. 17D, *ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι*) since he has turned away from the apprehension of the plan of all things (fr. 89D, *εἰς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι*). When Heraclitus refers in fr. 1D to the foolish generality of men who do not know what they are really doing when awake, he says they do not differ from their sleeping state: in both cases, we may observe, their souls are moist.

This may suffice to establish that for Heraclitus sleep involved a temporary extinction of a part of the fire in the soul, and its replacement by water. Now compare sleep and sickness; in both cases the subject is midway between life and death: in sickness a man suffers delirium, and retires into a private and unreal world, as in sleep; in sickness a man is weak, he may be unable to move, he is like one dead, just as the sleeper resembles the dead. On *a priori* grounds then there is good cause to believe that Heraclitus held sickness, like sleep, to involve the extinction of part of the fire which is the soul. This belief may be confirmed by the consideration of the clearly unhistorical story current in Diogenes' time, that Heraclitus died of dropsy: Diogenes, IX, 3 f.: *καὶ μέντοι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο [sc. πῶς σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας] περιτραπὴς εἰς ὕδρον κατῆλθεν εἰς ἄστυ καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν αἰνιγματωδῶς ἐπυνθάνετο, εἰ δύναντο ἐξ ἐπομβρίας αἰχμὸν ποιῆσαι . . . οὐδὲν δὲ ἀνὼν οἶδ' οὕτως ἐτελεύτα βιοῦς ἔτη ἐξήκοντα . . . Ἑρμῆπος δὲ φησι λέγειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ἰατροῖς, εἰ τις δύναται τὰ ἔντερα κενώσας τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐξεραῖσαι (so Diels: . . . δύναται ἔντερα ταπεινώσας ὑγρὸν ἐ. MSS)*. Now it is plain that all the stories of Heraclitus' life, in this part of Diogenes' account, are nothing but trivial fictions based upon Heraclitus' own sayings; thus fr. 36D, "it is death to souls to become water,"

obviously lies behind this story. H. Fränkel, *A.J.P.*, LIX (1938), pp. 309 ff., regards these tales as motivated by malice, a kind of revenge of posterity: thus the preacher of the dry soul gets dropsy, the critic of doctors has to consult the doctors, etc. Yet in this particular case there is an element in the story that is strange to any of our extant fragments, and this is the riddle which Heraclitus put to the doctors. We have two forms of this, one of which is attributed by Diogenes to Hermippus; the phrase "to draw off the moisture" may just be based upon common medical terminology (cf. Hippocrates, *π. νούτων*, II, 61: ἐπὶν ἐξερύσῃς τὸ ὕδωρ), but it may really refer to a well-known saying by Heraclitus on the nature of sickness. The other version, according to which the question was how "to make drought out of wet weather," is much more the kind of thing that would be invented to substantiate Heraclitus' reputation as αἰνιγματώδης.

It is now at last possible to explain why souls that perish (i. e. are involved in the death of the body) in war are purer than those that perish by disease: it is because the death is a sudden one, so that the soul at the moment of death is in its normal condition, and has not been debilitated and moistened by the experience of sickness, which like sleep, only more permanently, is accompanied by a predominance of water over fire. Admittedly the sudden death does not guarantee that the victim's soul should continue its existence as fire—it only ensures that its fate should depend solely on ἦθος, and not on purely external physical circumstances. Similarly one must presume that it is possible for the really virtuous and thus fiery soul to resist the onset of moisture caused by illness; other things being equal, however, it is better to die in battle, especially because this is normally a noble activity which, unless cowardice be shown, tends to increase the fire in the soul. These necessary restrictions vividly recall the language of Clement in *Strom.*, IV, 14, 4 f. quoted on p. 385. There he explains the ancient admiration for death in battle by reasons which are by no means classical, nor yet representative of Clement's own Christian viewpoint: "... it is not the violence of the death that they recommend, but the fact that he who dies in war is gone without fear of dying, cut off from the body, and without previous sickness and debility in the soul, which men suffer in diseases. For then they depart in a womanly way and longing to live on. For this reason they release the soul in no

pure (*καθαράν*) state, but carrying its desires with it like weights of lead—except some among them who have become notable concerning virtue. And there are some too who die in war with desires still upon them; their state in no way differs from that of wasting away by disease.” In this passage I detect two strata: one of Platonist interpretation, according to which the soul in sickness longs to live on and is weighed down by desires for life, and the other of a more ancient view by which the victim of disease is literally *προκαμών τῇ ψυχῇ* . . . [*καὶ*] *καταμαλακισθείς*, while death in battle is praised not for its violence but for its suddenness. It seems at least conceivable that this last stratum represents the views of Heraclitus, and that it is chiefly to him that Clement’s *οἱ παλαιοί* refers. In this case the verse in the scholion would receive remarkable confirmation.

Whether or not one accepts the new interpretation of fr. 24D outlined above depends largely on the view one takes of Heraclitus’ utterances as a whole. Was he content simply to repeat, in graphic form, the traditional beliefs of the people? We know of course that in the sphere of practical ethics his remarks were occasionally indistinguishable from those of other sages of his time, e. g. fr. 43D: *ὑβριν χρὴ σβεννύναι μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν*. But life and death formed a problem in which he was particularly interested and of which his treatment was normally original and highly individual. The words of fr. 24 are unoriginal, in fact *ἀρηφάτους* and the inclusive phrase *θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι* are taken from the language of epic; the sentiment, too, seems to have a close parallel in e. g. the lines of Heraclitus’ earlier fellow-citizen Callinus (fr. 1, 18 f. Diehl): *λαῶ γὰρ σύμπαντι πόθος κρατερόφρονος ἀνδρός / θνήσκοντος, ζῶων δ’ ἄξιος ἡμυθέων*. Nevertheless the evidence offered, some of it admittedly conjectural and some but briefly discussed, shows a way in which the fragment can be fitted as a positive contribution into a fairly consistent doctrine of the soul, and in which it can escape the improbable and un-Heraclitean vice of banality.

G. S. KIRK.

TRINITY HALL, CAMBRIDGE.



THE TEXT OF GAIUS' *INSTITUTES* AND  
JUSTINIAN'S *CORPUS*.<sup>1</sup>

Until Niebuhr's discovery of the Verona palimpsest our exact knowledge of the text of Gaius' *Institutes* rested on the precarious foundation of the quotations of that work in the *Digest* of Justinian. The editors of the *Digest* were known to have had and exercised the right to change and emend the texts they included, and there was no objective test that could be applied to determine the extent of such change. Nearly identical passages occur in the *Institutes* of Justinian, but as that work also had been subjected to the same kind of editing we were scarcely better off with two versions than with one. But the decipherment of the palimpsest gave us a text apparently earlier, if not much earlier, than the time of the *Corpus* and one which had certainly not been subjected to the hands of Justinian's editors. There were not lacking difficulties in the new version, and some inconsistencies gave warning that it could not be regarded as the perfect record of Gaius' own words. Nevertheless, it was generally taken for granted that where the text varied from that of Justinian the palimpsest was to be preferred unless some obvious flaw of law or grammar showed the contrary. It was discovered how very deeply indebted were the *Institutes* of Justinian to the older work and we were pleased with the feeling that we now had a purer source of the Roman law than had previously been available. With the comparative merits of the two works I am not here concerned, but the question of the relation of the various versions to Gaius will repay some attention. There are twenty-eight sections of Gaius' *Institutes* as now published which also occur in whole or in part in both the *Digest* and the *Institutes* of Justinian. In three cases the versions are identical. They are:

G., II. 12 = D., I. 3. 1. 1 = I., II. 2. pr. A single sentence.

<sup>1</sup> This paper is one result of a study of the language of the *Institutes* of Justinian carried on in the Yale Graduate School with Mr. Lawrence Richardson in 1943-44.

G., II. 50 = D., XLII. 3. 37. pr. = I., II. 6. 5 Furtum . . .  
non committitur.

G., III. 135 = D., XLIV. 7. 2. pr. = I., III. 22. pr. A single  
sentence.

All the others show variations of different degree, and these variations I reproduce in parallel columns as a basis for comparison of the texts. For Gaius I have used the readings of Bizoukides (Thessalonica and Leipzig, 1937), but I have always preserved the words of the palimpsest without regard to the cogency of the editor's emendations. For the *Digest* I have used the Eighth Edition of Mommsen and for Justinian's *Institutes* the Fifth Edition of Moyle (Oxford, 1912). His device, first used by Holland, of printing in bold-faced type the words of Justinian taken from Gaius is a convenience but something of a snare. Perfect consistency in such a matter is almost impossible to attain. The black type sometimes gives exactly the reading of the palimpsest and sometimes, as the Preface frankly states, "what passages are 'substantially' from Gaius." Phrases are sometimes so printed which do indeed occur in the palimpsest but which are so slight or so inevitable that the implication of literal indebtedness is hardly justified. Take, for example, I., III. 2 where in two whole pages the words "quod ad feminas" alone are in bold-face. It is hard to believe that this represents an indebtedness to Gaius worth recording. Moreover, any typographical device to show Justinian's omission of a word or two from a quoted passage or the inversion of words would have been so complicated that Dr. Moyle was wise enough not to attempt it. I have no desire to cavil at an extremely useful book or to reproach the editor for not doing what he never intended, but I remark merely that this use of type is a little misleading as expressing the relations of the two *Institutes*. Among other things, when you come upon a light word in a bold-face passage it is a natural conclusion that Justinian's editors put that word in. It is this assumption which I wish to investigate.

## PARALLEL PASSAGES.

## 1.

G., I. 1

—nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur—

D., I. 1. 9

—nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium ipsius civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeque custoditur—

I., I. 2. 1

—nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile quasi ius proprium ipsius civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur—

## 2.

G., I. 8

Omne autem ius—

D., I. 5. 1

Omne ius—

I., I. 2. 12

Omne autem ius—

## 3.

G., I. 9

Et quidem summa divisio de iure personarum haec est—

D., I. 5. 8

Summa itaque de iure personarum divisio haec est—

I., I. 3. pr.

Summa itaque divisio de iure personarum haec est—

## 4.

G., I. 11.

—libertini, qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt.

D., I. 5. 6

Libertini sunt, qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt.

I., I. 5. pr.

Libertini sunt, qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt.

## 5.

G., I. 48

Sequitur de iure personarum alia divisio. Nam—

D., I. 6. 1. pr.

De iure personarum alia divisio sequitur, quod—

I., I. 8. pr.

Sequitur de iure personarum alia divisio. Nam—

## 6.

G., I. 50

Videamus nunc de iis, quae alieno iuri subiectae sint: nam si cognoverimus, quae istae personae sint, simul intellegemus, quae sui iuris sint.

D., I. 6. 1. pr.

Videamus itaque de his, quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt: nam si cognoverimus quae istae personae sunt, simul intellegemus, quae sui iuris sunt.

I., I. 8. pr.

Videamus itaque de his, quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt: nam si cognoverimus quae istae personae sint, simul intellegemus, quae sui iuris sunt.

## 7.

G., I. 52

In potestate itaque sunt servi dominorum—  
—potestatem esse—

D., I. 6. 1. 1

Igitur in potestate sunt servi dominorum—  
—potestatem fuisse—

I., I. 8. 1

In potestate itaque dominorum sunt servi—  
—potestatem esse—

## 8.

G., I. 53

—neque civibus Romanis nec ullis aliis hominibus, qui sub imperio populi Romani sunt, licet supra modum et sine causa in servos suos saevire—

D., I. 6. 1. 2

—nullis hominibus, qui sub imperio Romano sunt, licet supra modum et sine causa legibus cognita in servos suos saevire—

I., I. 8. 2

—nullis hominibus, qui sub imperio nostro sunt, licet sine causa legibus cognita et supra modum in servos suos saevire—

—sacratissimi (? Codex:  
s.) imperatoris Antonini—  
—non minus teneri iube-  
tur—

Sed et maior quoque as-  
peritas dominorum per  
eiusdem principis consti-  
tutionem coercetur.

G., I. 55

Item in potestate nostra  
sunt liberi nostri, quos  
iustis nuptiis procreavimus.

G., I. 98

Adoptio autem duobus  
modis fit, aut populi auc-  
toritate aut imperio magis-  
tratus veluti praetoris.

G., I. 99

Populi auctoritate adop-  
tamus eos qui sui iuris  
sunt—

Imperio magistratus adop-  
tamus eos qui in potes-  
tate parentum sunt—

G., I. 107

Illud proprium est eius  
adoptionis quae per popu-  
lum fit—

—non solum—sed etiam—

G., I. 156

Sunt autem agnati per  
virilis sexus personas cog-  
natione iuncti—

—patrui filius et nepos ex  
eo.

G., II. 13

Corporales hae sunt—

G., II. 14

Incorporales sunt—

—quae iure consistunt—

—et fructus—

—ius successionis—

Eodem numero sunt iura—

—divi Antonini—

—non minus puniri iube-  
tur—

Sed et maior asperitas  
dominorum eiusdem princi-  
pis constitutione coercetur.

9.

D., I. 6. 3

Item in potestate nostra  
sunt liberi nostri, quos  
ex iustis nuptiis procre-  
averimus.

10.

D., I. 7. 2. pr.

Generalis enim adoptio  
duobus modis fit, aut  
principis auctoritate aut  
magistratus imperio.

11.

D., I. 7. 2. pr.

Principis auctoritate adop-  
tamus eos qui sui iuris  
sunt—

Imperio magistratus adop-  
tamus eos qui in potes-  
tate parentum sunt—

12.

D., I. 7. 2. 2

Hoc vero proprium est eius  
adoptionis quae per princi-  
pem fit—

—non solum—sed et—

13.

D., XXVI. 4. 7

Sunt autem agnati qui per  
virilis sexus personas cog-  
natione iuncti sunt—

—patrui filius neposve ex  
eo.

14.

D., I. 8. 1. 1

Corporales hae sunt—

15.

D., I. 8. 1. 1

Incorporales sunt—

—quae in iure consistunt—

—nam et fructus—

—ius successionis—

Eodem numero sunt et  
iura—

—divi Pii Antonini—

—non minus puniri iube-  
tur—

Sed et maior asperitas  
dominorum eiusdem princi-  
pis constitutione coercetur.

I., I. 9. pr.

In potestate nostra sunt  
liberi nostri, quos ex iustis  
nuptiis procreaverimus.

I., I. 11. 1

Adoptio autem duobus  
modis fit, aut principali  
rescriptio aut imperio  
magistratus.

I., I. 11. 1

Imperatoris auctoritate  
adoptamus eos easve qui  
quaeve sui iuris sunt—

Imperio magistratus adop-  
tamus eos. easve, qui  
quaeve in potestate paren-  
tum sunt—

I., I. 11. 11

Illud proprium est illius  
adoptionis quae per sacrum  
oraculum fit—

—non solum—sed etiam—

I., I. 15. 1

Sunt autem agnati per  
virilis sexus cognationem  
coniuncti—

—patrui filius neposve ex  
eo.

I., II. 2. 1

Corporales eae sunt—

I., II. 2. 2

Incorporales autem sunt—

—quae in iure consistunt—

—nam et fructus—

—ius hereditatis—

I., II. 2. 3

Eodem numero sunt iura—

## 16.

G., II. 86

Adquiritur autem nobis—  
—quos in potestate manu  
mancipiove habemus—  
—diligentur dispiciamus.

D., XII. 1. 10. pr.

Adquiruntur nobis—  
—quos in potestate habemus—  
—diligentius dispiciamus.

I., II. 9. pr.

Adquiritur nobis—  
—quos in potestate habemus—  
—diligentius dispiciamus.

## 17.

G., II. 87

Igitur quod liberi nostri  
quos in potestate habemus,  
item quod servi nostri  
mancipio accipiunt vel ex  
traditione nanciscuntur sive  
quid stipulentur vel ex  
aliaqualibet causa adqui-  
runt, id nobis adquiritur:  
ipse enim qui in potestate  
nostra est, nihil suum ha-  
bere potest; et ideo si  
heres institutus sit, nisi  
nostro iussu hereditatem  
adire non potest; et si  
iubentibus nobis adierit,  
hereditas nobis adquiritur,  
proinde atque si nos ipsi  
heredes instituti essemus;  
et convenienter scilicet le-  
gatum per eos nobis ad-  
quiritur.

D., XII. 1. 10. 1

Igitur quod servi nostri ex  
traditione nanciscuntur sive  
quid stipulentur vel ex  
qualibet alia causa adqui-  
runt, id nobis adquiritur;  
ipse enim, qui in potestate  
alterius est, nihil suum  
habere potest; ideoque si  
heres institutus sit, nisi  
nostro iussu hereditatem  
adire non potest; et si  
iubentibus nobis adierit,  
hereditas nobis adquiritur,  
perinde atque si nos ipsi  
heredes instituti essemus;  
et his convenienter scilicet  
legatum nobis per eundem  
adquiritur.

I., II. 9. 1

Igitur liberi vestri utri-  
usque sexus quos in po-  
testate habetis—

I., II. 9. 3

Item vobis adquiritur,  
quod servi vestri ex tradi-  
tione nanciscuntur sive  
quid stipulentur vel ex  
qualibet alia causa adqui-  
runt—Ipsae enim servae qui  
in potestate alterius est  
nihil suum habere potest;  
sed si heres institutus sit,  
non alias nisi iussu vestro  
hereditatem adire potest:  
et si iubentibus vobis adie-  
rit, vobis hereditas adqui-  
ritur, perinde ac si vos  
ipsi heredes instituti esse-  
tis; et convenienter scilicet  
legatum per eos vobis ad-  
quiritur.

## 18.

G., II. 89

—proprietas per eos quos  
in potestate habemus ad-  
quiritur nobis—  
—cuius enim—  
—id nos possidere videmur;  
unde etiam per eos usura-  
pio procedit.

D., XII. 1. 10. 2

—proprietas per eos quos  
in potestate habemus ad-  
quiritur nobis—  
—cuiuscunque enim—  
—id nos possidere videmur;  
unde etiam per eorum lon-  
gam possessionem domi-  
nium nobis adquiritur.

I., II. 9. 3

—proprietas per eos quos  
in potestate habetis ad-  
quiritur vobis—  
—cuiuscunque enim—  
—id vos possidere vide-  
mini; unde etiam per eos  
usufructus vel longi temporis  
possessio vobis accedit.

## 19.

G., II. 91

—habemus—  
—re nostra—  
—nobis adquiratur—  
—quod vero extra eas  
causas, id ad dominum  
proprietas pertineat—  
—iste servus—  
—quod ei datum fuerit,  
non mihi—

D., XII. 1. 10. 3

—habemus—  
—re nostra—  
—nobis adquiratur—  
—si quis vero extra eas  
causas persecuti sunt, id ad  
dominum proprietatis per-  
tinet—  
—is servus—  
—quid aut ei donatum  
fuerit, non mihi—

I., II. 9. 4

—habetis—  
—re vestra—  
—vobis adiciatur—  
—quod vero extra eas  
causas persecuti sunt, id  
ad dominum proprietatis  
pertinet—  
—is servus—  
—quid ei aut donatum  
fuerit, non usufructuario—

<p>G., II. 92</p> <p>Idem placet de eo, qui a nobis bona fide possidetur— —sive liber sit— —idem probatur etiam— —ad dominum—</p>	<p>20.</p> <p>D., XLI. 1. 10. 4</p> <p>Idem placet de eo, qui nobis bona fide possidetur— —sive liber sit— —idem probatur etiam— —ad dominum eius—</p>	<p>I., II. 9. 4</p> <p>Idem placet et de eo, qui a vobis bona fide possidetur— —sive is liber sit— —idem placet et— —ad dominum—</p>
<p>G., II. 93</p> <p>—ex omni causa— Usufructuarius vero usucapere non potest— —deinde quia scit alienum servum esse.</p>	<p>21.</p> <p>D., XLI. 1. 10. 5</p> <p>—ex omnibus causis— Usufructuarius vero usucapere servum non potest— —deinde quoniam scit servum alienum esse.</p>	<p>I., II. 9. 4</p> <p>—ex omnibus causis— Fructuarius vero usucapere non potest— —deinde quia scit servum alienum esse.</p>
<p>G., II. 133</p> <p>—ut ecce si filium—habeam—</p>	<p>22.</p> <p>D., XXVIII. 3. 13</p> <p>—ut ecce si filium—habeam—</p>	<p>I., II. 13. 2</p> <p>—ut ecce si quis filium—habeat—</p>
<p>G., II. 134</p> <p>—rumpatur mihi testamentum— —exheredare debeo—  —ex eo necesse est mihi vel heredem instituere vel exheredare ne forte, me vivo filio mortuo— —nepos neptisve—rumpat testamentum—</p>	<p>23.</p> <p>D., XXVIII. 3. 13</p> <p>—rumpat mihi testamentum— —exheredare nominatim debeo— —ex eo necesse est mihi vel heredem instituere vel exheredare ne forte, me vivo filio mortuo— —nepos neptisve—rumpat testamentum—</p>	<p>I., II. 13. 2</p> <p>—rumpatur eius testamentum— —nominatim exheredare debet testator— —ex filio necesse est ei vel heredem instituere vel exheredare ne forte, vivo eo filio mortuo— —nepos neptisve—rumpant testamentum—</p>
<p>G., III. 136</p> <p>—consensu dicimus obligationes contrahi, quod neque verborum neque scripturae ulla proprietas desideratur— —sufficit eos qui negotium gerunt, consensisse.  —per epistulam aut per internuntium—</p>	<p>24.</p> <p>D., XLIV. 7. 2. 1</p> <p>—consensu dicimus obligationem contrahi, quia neque verborum neque scripturae ulla proprietas desideratur— —sufficit eos, qui negotia gerunt, consentire. D., XLIV. 7. 2. 2 —per epistulam vel per nuntium—</p>	<p>I., III. 22. 1</p> <p>—consensu dicitur obligatio contrahi, quia neque scriptura neque praesentia omnimodo opus est— —sufficit eos, qui negotium gerunt, consentire. I., III. 22. 2 —per epistulam aut per nuntium—</p>
<p>G., III. 137</p> <p>—de eo—</p>	<p>25.</p> <p>D., XLIV. 7. 2. 3</p> <p>—de eo—</p>	<p>I., III. 22. 3</p> <p>—in id—</p>

This is not a large body of material, and some of it is of very slight value, but it will serve our purpose.

We may begin by disposing of a class of variations whose character is certain. In spite of the composite nature of the *Institutes* of Justinian, the book as a whole preserves the fiction

that it is actually the words of the Emperor addressed to the students. The first person, therefore, is reserved for the emperor, and where the first person occurs in a text that is being quoted it is changed to the second or third. Illustrations of the change are found in the preceding passages, Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23. Lapses sometimes occur, as in Nos. 9, 11, and 16, but these are mere oversights that do not affect the general rule which explains a large number of differences in reading between the *Institutes* and the *Digest*, and the *Institutes* and Gaius. Let us consider the differences which are not capable of this solution and the general relation of the three versions.

Since the *Digest* was compiled first, its readings cannot be influenced by the *Institutes*. On the other hand, though the *Institutes* are later in time and in some ways depend on the *Digest*, it is clear that individual quotations cannot have been copied from that source. The great bulk of the *Digest* and the differences in arrangement would have made it a tremendous labor to run down each section of Gaius which the editors wished to include and take the passage from the compilation rather than the original. In addition, so much more of Gaius has been included in the *Institutes* than in the *Digest* that the unlikelihood of any such procedure is increased. Since nothing could have been gained thereby we may take it for proven that the editors of the *Institutes* had, like those of the *Digest*, direct recourse to a MS of Gaius.

What is the relation of their source to the palimpsest? Since that is our only independent text of Gaius it is tempting to assume that it preserves the true reading and that where the *Digest* and the *Institutes* disagree with it they show changes either of intent or of carelessness. But there are a dozen instances where D and I agree on a reading different from G and where the variation is best to be explained by the hypothesis of a different source. Perhaps the best instance is No. 9 where G has "iustis nuptiis procreavimus," D and I, "ex iustis nuptiis procreaverimus." This is one of the exceptional cases where I retains the first person in a general sense, which is very strong evidence that the verb is exactly what it was in I's source: if any change were to be made it would be a change of person. The substitution of future perfect for perfect is a finesse characteristic of neither D nor I, nor is the added preposition a

particularly symptomatic change. To assume that two minor changes were made independently in D and I but the regular change in I omitted is stretching probability.

A somewhat different instance is No. 1. "Ipsius" in Gaius clearly refers to "populus," and the sentence means that the law of a particular "populus" is the law of a particular "civitas" or "ius civile." D and I add "civitatis" after the first "proprium" and "ipsius" after the second. The first addition is wrong because it misunderstands the meaning of "ipsius"; the second is wrong because it makes the second clause merely identical repetition. One cannot guess when or by whom the changes were made, but they cannot have been made independently by two sets of editors copying from the same MS which had the true reading.

Most of the instances are cases of the usual type of MS variation where there is really nothing to choose between readings; e. g. No. 13 where G has "et nepos," D and I "neposve." Some may be real changes, such as No. 8, G "teneri," D and I "puniri," but the number of those where no reason for the change can be imagined is large enough to justify the conclusion that the source of D and I is not the MS of G which we possess.

But did D and I have the same source? There are, as a matter of fact, a number of instances in which G and I agree against D where no reason for intentional change in D is to be found, e. g. Nos. 2 and 5 and No. 12, G and I "sed etiam," D "sed et." There are also cases of agreement of G and D against I, e. g. Nos. 14, 15, G and D "Incorporales sunt," I "Incorpórales autem sunt," G and D "ius successionis," I "ius hereditatis," 20, G and D "Idem placet de eo," I "Idem placet et de eo," 20, G and D "idem probatur etiam," I "idem placet et." And the second phrase of No. 21 is an instance of three versions identical in meaning but different in wording. The only explanation of these phenomena is that we are dealing not with two MSS of Gaius, but with three.

Of course, there are cases of intentional change. In No. 8 the law in Gaius is given for Roman citizens and all other men in the empire. Since the distinction had been abolished for the most part by the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, D omits the phrase "civibus Romanis" while I substitutes "imperio nostro" for "imperio Romano." In Nos. 10, 11, and 12 the rule for adopt-



ing "populi auctoritate" given by G is, of course, obsolete by Justinian's time, but the substitution of imperial for popular authority is differently worded in D and I. No. 17 is an instance of a passage that has been thoroughly rewritten in two different ways. In such cases we see unmistakably the hand of Justinian's editors. But the proportion of these to the cases of MS variation is less than might have been expected.

If the result of this experience is applied to the *Institutes* in general, it will be found that a surprisingly large number of variants from the text of the palimpsest may be explained—and best explained—by the use of a different MS, and the scorn with which the accuracy of the editors of the *Institutes* is sometimes regarded may be somewhat abated. On the other hand, though we have no proof, we may have somewhat more confidence in the general verbatim accuracy of quotations in the *Digest*. Of course, this by no means lays the ghost of interpolation. The editors certainly did change the text when there was reason to do so, but some enthusiastic searchers for interpolation seem almost to have come to the conclusion that the editors preferred to change if they could, and that is a position hardly to be maintained.<sup>2</sup>

What is to be our practice with respect to the text of Gaius? Editors like Bizoukides have frequently emended the reading of the palimpsest, when emendation is needed, on the basis of the reading of the *Digest* and the *Institutes*, but they do not go to the length of printing those versions as variants where the text

<sup>2</sup> Reference to E. Levy and E. Ebel, *Index Interpolationum quae in Iustiniani Digestis inesse dicuntur* (Weimar, 1929, 1931, 1935) produces only two places where the question of interpolation touches the passages under discussion.

1) Most of them, but not all, are treated by E. Grupe ("Die Gaiianischen Institutionen fragmente in Justinians Digesten," *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung*, XVI [1895], pp. 300-319). He assumes and does not attempt to prove that the reading of the palimpsest is that of Gaius, and that when this disagrees with the reading of the *Digest* Gaius has been changed. (He wrongly attributes the reading *dicitur* to Gaius, III, 136.)

2) Fritz Pringsheim, "Bonum et aequum" in the same journal, LII (1932), pp. 122-124, suggests that in Gaius, III, 137 the words "de eo . . . oportet" are a gloss. In spite of I's reading "in id" he considers it likely that G, D, and I are all descended from a single MS which contained the gloss.

It will be seen that neither of these suggestions is supported by the evidence presented in this paper.

of the palimpsest is sound. Yet that, I think, would be the better practice, as the readings of Gaius are recorded in the apparatus of the *Corpus*. Except in cases where there is evidence of intentional change, we are really dealing with three independent sources of the text of Gaius. Which is closest to the original we shall probably never know. We are not assisted here by any such reverence for the *ipsissima dicta* as protects the tradition of works of art. If the law was correctly reported it made very little difference whether the scribe wrote "aut" or "vel," "et" or "etiam," "velut" or "veluti," and that kind of variation must have set in early. Further study of the language of Gaius and further study of the language of Justinian may give us a means of discrimination which is not now apparent, but there is every reason to believe that Tribonian and his colleagues had good MSS available for their work of compilation and that they knew the difference between a good MS and a bad one. Their readings should be treated with respect.

ALFRED R. BELLINGER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

#### ADDENDA TO PAGES 301, 302 AND 304.

At the beginning of footnote 5 on p. 301 add: The reference to the gymnasiarch in *Hesperia*, XI, No. 7 should read [γυ]μνασιαρχοῦ[τος — — — ~~παρὰ~~ — — — [ τοῦ] τῆς ἐξ Ἀρε[ίου πάγου βουλῆς κήρυκος].

To footnote 7 on p. 302 add: With the letters *μερισμον* at the beginning of line 14 it is interesting to compare Plato, *Law's*, VI, 771 d, *θυσίων περί συνόδους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ποιούμεθα δύο τοῦ μηνός, δώδεκα μὲν τῇ τῆς φυλῆς διανομῇ, δώδεκα δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πόλεως διαμερισμῷ*.

To the list on page 304 add (Σουλπίκιος) Ἐλευσείνιος Μακαρέως (Ἀχαρνεύς) attested as eponymus of the tribe *Οἰνίς* by I. G., II<sup>2</sup>, 2199 for the archonship of Cassius Apollonius (207/8 A. D. or shortly before) and perhaps Βεϊτάλιος Ἀριστείδου (Σφήττιος) attested for the tribe Ἀκα[μαν]τίς by I. G., II<sup>2</sup>, 3680 from the archonship of Φλάβιος Εἰαχ[χαγωγός] (at the beginning of the third century).

J. H. OLIVER.

## THE FAMILY OF CRITIAS.

In the year 1914 John Burnet, in an unobtrusive footnote, advanced a notion which appears to have been widely accepted among British and American scholars.<sup>1</sup> Discussing the Critias who is one of the *dramatis personae* of Plato's *Timaeus*, Burnet feels that it is "perfectly clear that this Kritias is not the Kritias who was one of the Thirty, but his grandfather, though the two are hopelessly confused by modern writers. He is a very old man (?),<sup>2</sup> who can hardly remember what he was told yesterday (?), but remembers the scenes of his boyhood clearly. At that time the poems of Solon were still recent. It seems clear to me that most of the poetical fragments ascribed to the younger Kritias are really his grandfather's." And on another occasion: "It is hard to understand how he was ever supposed to be the oligarch, though Diels, Wilamowitz, and E. Meyer seem to have felt no difficulty in the identification."<sup>3</sup>

The two passages in the *Timaeus* which lie at the bottom of Burnet's difficulty both belong to the tale of Critias; 20 E: "Now Solon—as he says himself in many of his poems—was a relative and very dear friend of our great-grandfather Dropides; and he<sup>4</sup> told our grandfather Critias—as the old man himself, in turn, related to us—that the exploits of this city . . . ."

<sup>1</sup> J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy Part I, Thales to Plato* (London, 1923), p. 338, note. Cf. A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 23 ff.; also his *Plato: The Man and His Work* (New York, 1936), p. 437; F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937), pp. 1 ff.; H. Herter, "Platons Atlantis," in *Bonner Jahrbuecher*, CXXXIII (1928), pp. 28 ff.; H. Raeder, "Platons muetterliches Geschlecht," in *Hermes*, 1937, p. 40f; Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), merely quotes Burnet's view in his notes. L. Robin, *Platon* (Paris, 1935), p. 2, follows Burnet.

<sup>2</sup> The question marks in the quotation are mine, to indicate the weak points of Burnet's argument.

<sup>3</sup> J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*<sup>3</sup> (London, 1920), p. 203, note 3.

<sup>4</sup> R. G. Bury, whose translation in the Loeb series (*Plato*, VII [London, 1942]) I have taken the liberty to change somewhat, here translates: ". . . and Dropides told our grandfather Critias . . . ." Similarly R. D. Archer-Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato* (London, 1888), p. 67. But the text does not justify a change of subject; cf. 25 D: *καὶ ἀκούειν*. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 13, translates "he," thus leaving it to the reader to decide whether Solon or Dropides is meant.

And 21 A: "It is an old tale, and I heard it from a man not young. For Critias was then, as he said himself, close to ninety years of age, while I was about ten."

Plato thus allows for only three generations to separate Solon from his Critias. Diogenes Laertius who on the basis of the *Timaeus* establishes a family tree for the oligarch unwittingly reveals the faults of Plato's scheme.<sup>5</sup> J. Kirchner was quick to recognise that one, perhaps two additional links were required to bring order into the system of generations, and he proposed a tree which featured the intercalation in the sixth century of an added Dropides and Critias, father and son.<sup>6</sup> Burnet accepted Kirchner's stemma, but its implication that Plato had made a mistake was intolerable to him. If it is true, he concluded, that there is space for five generations between Solon and the oligarch, then the Critias of the *Timaeus* cannot be the oligarch; he must be his grandfather. The fact that we know next to nothing about this grandfather should not disturb us; we simply proceed to draw him into prominence by attributing to his authorship "most of the poetical fragments ascribed to the younger Kritias."<sup>7</sup>

Dorothy Stephans, the writer of the latest and best monograph on the oligarch, accepts the reasoning of Burnet's attempt to

<sup>5</sup> Diogenes Laertius, III, 1.

<sup>6</sup> J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica*, s. vv. "Dropides," "Kritias," and "Platon." A stemma is supplied for the latter under no. 11855. Burnet, *Gk. Phil.* I, Appendix, p. 351, provides a family tree of his own which is more or less identical with Kirchner's. W. Nestle, "Kritias," in *Neue Jahrbuecher*, 1903, p. 84, note 7, notes that Plato is wrong; he refers to Mueller-Struebing, in *Philologus*, Supplement IV, p. 102.

<sup>7</sup> Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1934-38); II, pp. 375 ff., does not acknowledge Burnet's proposal, nor does Miss Stephans (see following note), pp. 50 ff.—Taylor, *Comm.*, p. 24, suggests that Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*, III, 1416 b 26-9 means to refer to the older Critias, the grandfather, when he says that his deeds are not generally known. "This can hardly refer to the 'oligarch.' It is not true that οἱ πολλοὶ did not know what his πράξεις were. Everyone knew them only too well." I think, on the contrary, that the citizens of democratic fourth century Athens knew little more of Critias' career than the events following the collapse of the city after Aegospotami. The very fact that we have so little information about the earlier years of Critias' life can only mean that after the debacle of 404-3 all parties concerned decided to forget as much as they could about the accomplishments of the leader of the Thirty.

"save Plato," and tries to consolidate their position with further details.<sup>8</sup> Among other arguments, she repeats Burnet's statement that the Critias of the *Timaeus* is an old man, so old that he forgets what happened on the previous day.<sup>9</sup> Now a careful reading of the passage in question will show that Critias says nothing of the sort. Critias says 26 B: "Marvellous, indeed, is the way in which the lessons of one's childhood grip the mind, as the saying is. For myself, I do not know whether I could recall to my mind everything that I heard yesterday; but as for this story which I heard quite some time ago, I should be immensely surprised if a single detail of it has escaped my mind. At the time I listened to it with a great deal of pleasure and amusement, and the old man was eager to tell me . . . ." There is nothing in this passage which would characterise Critias as an old man; "quite some time ago" is to be understood as contrasting with "yesterday"; and he certainly does not say that he "can hardly remember what he was told yesterday." On the contrary, by permitting him to refer to his grandfather as "the old man" (cf. also 25 D) Plato suggests quite clearly that Critias himself is, at most, a middle-aged man.

20 A: "As to Critias, all of us here know that he is no novice in any of the subjects we are discussing." Taylor who follows in Burnet's footsteps has this to say about the words of Socrates:<sup>10</sup> "The words are of themselves enough to show that the Critias of the dialogue has a long career of eminence behind him and is known to all Athenians at once as a public man and a σοφός. This would not be true of Critias ὁ τῶν τριάκοντα, whose public career seems to have begun in 411." Taylor does not notice that in the *Charmides* 162 DE Socrates addresses Critias in a similar vein: "but you, I should think, may be expected to know, in view of your years and studies." The traditional date for the dramatic setting of the *Charmides* is reckoned near the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.<sup>11</sup> The traditional dating of the

<sup>8</sup> Dorothy Stephans, *Critias: Life and Literary Remains* (Cincinnati, 1939), pp. 4-8. She herself admits, however (p. 86), that we have absolutely no evidence of philosophical activity on the part of the elder Critias.

<sup>9</sup> P. 4.

<sup>10</sup> *Comm.*, p. 49.

<sup>11</sup> The historical allusions of *Charm.* 153 AB point to 432 B.C.

oligarch's birth is about 460 B. C.<sup>12</sup> The oligarch (and there is no doubt whatever concerning his identity in the *Charmides*) was thus in his late twenties when Socrates saw fit to address him with so much respect.<sup>13</sup> Obviously, in spite of our professed ignorance about the earlier part of Critias' political career, Taylor's view cannot be upheld.<sup>14</sup>

What are the dates of the oligarch? Before Burnet introduced his heresy, the year of his birth was approximated from two directions. For one thing, he died in 403 B. C. on the field of battle, fighting vigorously to the end.<sup>15</sup> At the moment of his death, therefore, he cannot have been an old man, a point fully utilised by Burnet and Taylor: 460 B. C. may be adopted as a *terminus post quem* for his birth. The other datum rests on the old interpretation of *Timaeus* 21 A: Critias there says that he was about eighty years younger than his grandfather. The one fact we have about the grandfather's life is a bit of gossip reported by the scholiast on Aeschylus' *Prometheus* 128; the elder Critias, he says, was loved by the poet Anacreon.<sup>16</sup> If Anacreon, as Hesychius tells us, was born about 572 B. C., 540 may safely be considered the latest possible date for the birth of his favourite. This would again yield 460 B. C., this time as a *terminus ante quem*, for the birth of the oligarch.

Miss Stephans subscribes to the traditional date 460 B. C.; but since Plato's span of eighty years lies for her, not between the oligarch and his grandfather, but between the latter and the protégé of Solon, she is compelled to narrow down the space provided for

<sup>12</sup> W. Diehl in Pauly-Wissowa, *R.-E.*, XI, col. 1902; Stephans, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>13</sup> I assume that Socrates' remark is meant in all seriousness. If it is considered ironical, the corresponding passages in the *Timaeus* are of course equally subject to such an interpretation.

<sup>14</sup> The Critias of the *Protagoras* (336 DE) plays the rôle of a mediator between two debaters; thus he is again characterised as a man of mature understanding. The fact that Xenophon consistently mentions Alcibiades side by side with Critias (cf. *Memor.*, I, 2, 12-25 *et al.*) makes it likely that Critias achieved political prominence as a very young man. For the possibility of political activity on the part of Critias as early as 434/3 and 430/29, see Meritt, Wade-Gery, McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I (Princeton, 1939), p. 195 and p. 456.

<sup>15</sup> Xenophon, *Hell.*, II, 4, 19; Diodorus, XIV, 33.

<sup>16</sup> The traditional dates for the life of Anacreon are based on Hesych. (Suidas), V.

the generations in the fifth century to make room for two generations of forty years each in the sixth. The unexpected result is that the grandfather, the beloved of Anacreon, now appears slated for birth about 510 E. C. I suggest that not even Anacreon was man enough to be in his prime in his late seventies, and to love a boy more than sixty years his junior.<sup>17</sup>

It should by now be amply clear how reliable Plato is as a chronicler of his family's fortunes during the early sixth century. The value of his chronology may be gauged from *Charmides* 157 E where Socrates says: "For your father's house which derives from Critias, son of Dropides, has been celebrated by Anacreon and Solon and many other poets . . ." The juxtaposition of the names shows that in Plato's eyes the Critias who was loved by Anacreon was the son of Dropides who was a friend of Solon. In other words, Plato telescoped the happenings of the sixth century; Solon, for his purposes, lived just before Anacreon, and Anacreon in turn was active in the early fifth century. It is indeed difficult to see how Plato could have managed to keep apart the various bearers of the names Dropides and Critias who alternated on the family roll without repeatedly referring to the city archives.

In the *Charmides* passage two of the oligarch's ancestors, Dropides and Critias, are quoted by name for their friendship with famous men of letters. In the *Timaeus*, Critias similarly cites the names of his ancestors Dropides and Critias, and extols their literary connexions. The conclusion is self-evident: the Critias of the *Timaeus* is identical with the Critias of the *Charmides*, i. e. he is the oligarch. To quote, as Burnet and Miss Stephans have done, the Roman numerals which Kirchner attaches to the various men named Dropides and Critias will only confuse us. Plato himself, writing two hundred years after Solon, and more than two generations after Critias, neglected to inquire into the exact number of generations intervening between Solon and the oligarch.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> D. Stephans, *op. cit.*, p. 7, paragraph 2.

<sup>18</sup> D. Stephans says on p. 5: "Plato's errors, wherever deliberate, are not purposeless." This I do not understand. We may, however, follow Athenaeus, V, 218 b, who charges Plato with committing serious anachronisms. J. S. Morrison, in *G. Q.*, 1941, p. 2, attempts to refute Athenaeus on individual points, but the charge as such must be allowed to stand. Cf. G. Rohr, *Platons Stellung zur Geschichte* (Berlin, 1932),

There still remains Critias' remark that his grandfather used to sing the poems of Solon in his youth because they were then new (*Timæus* 21 B). This difficulty has been cleared up by Linforth.<sup>19</sup> "The explanation probably is to be found in the fact that these poems would have been thought of as modern in contrast with Homer and Hesiod. Plato may also have been led to speak as he does by the fact that in his own day Solon's poems were no longer recited on such occasions, having become old-fashioned in the midst of the abundant Athenian poetry of the fifth century." We might add to this what we have pointed out above, that Plato seems to have considered Solon an immediate forerunner of Anacreon. To his telescoping turn of mind, the poetry of Solon was new in the days of Critias' grandfather.

Is it possible to fix a dramatic date for the *Timæus*? Burnet and Taylor had based part of their argument against the oligarch on a date close to the peace of Nicias: "At the time of the peace of Nicias this Critias must have been a very young man who had as yet played no part in public life."<sup>20</sup> For the logic of Taylor's argument we once more refer to *Charmides* 162 DE discussed above. But what is more, Cornford, following Hirzel, has suggested that the dramatic date of the *Republic* (if there is one) should not be used to determine the date for the *Timæus*.<sup>21</sup> Socrates' "yesterday" (17 C) is to be understood as a token of Plato's own trend of thought rather than as a pointer to any external setting. The figure of Hermocrates, on the other hand, is much too problematical to help us in the matter. Thus, the meeting of Socrates, Critias, Timæus, and Hermocrates may be imagined to have occurred at any time in the late fifth century prior to the return and death of Hermocrates.<sup>22</sup> The dramatic setting, as so often in Plato's later dia-

pp. 120 ff.; also H. Ræder, *op. cit.*, pp. 407 f., and his *Platons philos. Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1920), pp. 300 ff.

<sup>19</sup> I. M. Linforth, *Solon the Athenian* (Berkeley, 1919), p. 11. Linforth apparently was not aware of Burnet's theory.

<sup>20</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Comm.*, p. 23.

<sup>21</sup> F. M. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 4; cf. P. Friedlaender, *Platon*, II (Berlin & Leipzig, 1930), p. 600, note 2, who refers to Hirzel, *Dialog*, I, 257.

<sup>22</sup> If we admit that the dating is uncertain, there is no reason why we should not, as against Taylor, *Comm.*, p. 25, take up the notion of Dercylides, viz. that the unnamed absentee (*Timæus* 17 A) is Plato himself. Cf. H. Ræder, *Platons philos. Entwicklung*, pp. 375 ff.



EURIPIDES, *MEDEA*, 160-172. A NEW  
INTERPRETATION.

MH.	ὁ μεγάλη Θέμι καὶ πότνι' Ἄρτεμι λεύσσεθ' ἃ πάσχω, μεγάλοις ὄρκοις ἐνδησαμένα τὸν κατάρατον πόσιν; ὃν ποτ' ἐγὼ νύμφαν τ' ἐσίδοιμ' αὐτοῖς μελάρθοις διακναιομένους, οἱ' ἐμὲ πρόσθεν τολμῶσ' ἀδικεῖν.	160     165
TP.	ὁ πάτερ, ὦ πόλις, ὃν ἀπενάσθη αἰσχροῦς τὸν ἐμὸν κτείνασα κάσιν— κλύεθ' οἷα λέγει κάπιβοᾶται Θέμιν εὐκταίαν Ζῆνά θ', ὃς ὄρκων θηητοῖς ταμίᾳς νενόμισται; οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἐν τινι μικρῷ δέσποινα χόλον καταπαύσει.	    170

The discrepancy between lines 160 and 169 has vexed the commentators, both ancient and modern. Medea invokes Themis and Artemis, yet the Nurse says to the Chorus, "Do you hear her cries to Themis and Zeus?" The text seems secure; if there is any corruption it is pre-Alexandrian. While a few scholars, such as Elmsley, have found the discrepancy unobjectionable, there have been numerous attempts made either to eliminate the difficulty or to minimize it, but so far no single solution has been generally accepted. It is my purpose in this note to suggest that the discrepancy is real, but that it is also intentional; that the reason for it is to be found in the dramatic situation; and that its presence heightens the dramatic effect.

Although at least eight solutions have been proposed,<sup>1</sup> it is

<sup>1</sup> These may be summarized under three headings. I. *Emendation*. a) Weil emends 160 to: ὁ μεγάλε Ζεῦ καὶ Θέμι πότνια. b) Nauck, more ingeniously, reads Ζηνὸς δς for Ζῆνά θ' δς in 169. II. *Other textual changes*. a) Apollodorus of Tarsus assigned the appeal to Zeus in 148 to Medea. This disregards the strophic arrangement. b) Murray interprets 148 as an echo of Medea's words, and so supplies ὁ Ζεῦ καὶ γὰ καὶ φῶς after the αἰαί in 143a. This is attractive, but does not solve our problem; as Page notes, 169-170 must refer to 160 ff., not to something so remote as 143. c) The final sentence in the Σ to 169 records the proposal that θυμνυμι be understood in 169, thus eliminating the reference to Medea's actual words. III. *Interpretation*. a) Didymus found an allusion to Zeus in Medea's prayer (144-145) that a thunderbolt strike her. This is too remote, and does not suit the definition of Zeus in

obvious, and curious, that none of them takes into account the broader aspects of the dramatic situation. Medea, deserted by Jason, has reacted with intense emotion; the Nurse has expressed her fears that Medea may commit suicide and has hinted at possible danger to the children. The Paidagogos enters, with news of a fresh calamity, Crech's decree of banishment. This is indeed serious, for the Nurse has made it clear why Medea cannot look either to home or to Iolkos for help or friendship. Then, while Medea is heard lamenting within, the chorus of Corinthian women appears to express their sympathy for her. This, the one possible source of aid and comfort, must not be alienated. But in the speech beginning at 160 Medea calls on the gods to witness Jason's infidelity, and then (unconscious that she is being overheard) prays for the utter destruction of Jason and his royal bride. This must surely make the Nurse uneasy, for the women are presumably loyal Corinthian subjects. And when Medea then refers bluntly to the murder of her brother, the most shocking incident in her past, and one that seems not to have been commonly known at Corinth,<sup>2</sup> it is only too clear that she risks losing their goodwill.

At this point there is a curious and apparently unparalleled metrical irregularity: Medea's speech does not close with the usual paroemiac. This had been noticed earlier, but Murray was the first to see its significance. Medea has not finished speaking, she is interrupted by the anxious Nurse ("festinat Nutrix sermonem periculosum interrumpere").<sup>3</sup> It is a tense moment. Somehow, anyhow, the Chorus must be distracted. They must

169-170 as *ῥῆκων τῆρας*. b) On the basis of *τὰν Ζηνὸς ὀρκίαν θέμιν* in 203, the scholiast at that point suggests that Medea's invocation of Themis in 160 in itself implies an appeal to Zeus. c) Following Paley, Page feels that Medea's reference to Jason's oath justifies the Nurse in calling this an appeal to Zeus "as long as she defines Zeus at once as the *ῥῆκων τῆρας*." This is, I think, substantially correct, but the dramatic reason for this oblique reference still needs to be made clear.

<sup>2</sup> Note lines 257-258, where she tells the Chorus that she has, no brother to protect her. This would hardly do if she thought that they knew the story.

<sup>3</sup> Page accepts Murray's interpretation, but adds: "Medea's mind must not be allowed to dwell on kindred-murder." Medea, however, is within the house; the Nurse is outside talking to the Chorus. It is with the effect of the statement on *their* minds, not on Medea's, that the Nurse is at this moment concerned.

not be allowed to realize the implications of Medea's words. The Nurse must talk, loud and fast. Any words will do, provided they drown out the voice of Medea.

Murray apparently failed to see that this anxiety of the faithful Nurse is the only explanation needed of the "discrepancy" between the two speeches. Frantically the Nurse harks back to the safe ground of Medea's opening words. "Do you hear," she says, "how she calls upon Themis?" But she is seriously rattled. The reference to oaths suggests Zeus,<sup>4</sup> but when she goes on to explain sententiously that "mortals consider Him the steward of oaths," it is not her words that matter but simply that she should find something to say. To refer to Medea's bitter anger (171-172) may seem ill-advised,<sup>5</sup> but at least it holds the attention of the Chorus on the present situation and away from Medea's criminal past. And no doubt the Nurse heaves a sigh of relief when the Chorus fails to inquire about the remark that was interrupted.

Seen thus, there is no question of textual corruption, much less of a careless slip on the part of the poet. On the contrary we are given a fine dramatic touch, which enlivens and gives point to the scene. Even his critics admit that Euripides is a master of dramatic effect. Had there been here a simple stage direction to indicate that the Nurse was meant to display agitation and confusion, no one would have questioned the passage.<sup>6</sup> Lacking stage directions, we too often forget that these plays were meant to be acted, and we miss the dramatic movement. With good acting this passage could undoubtedly be highly effective.

FRANCIS R. WALTON.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

<sup>4</sup> There is certainly no reason why she should deliberately suppress the name of Artemis. Artemis is a perfectly reputable goddess, rightly invoked by Medea as a protector of women and patron of marriage. Nothing in the context would suggest an identification with Hecate.

<sup>5</sup> In any case, the Chorus does not object to her punishing Jason.

<sup>6</sup> Stage directions would also be welcome at 184-203. The Nurse's garrulity seems to be inopportune, but Grube suggests that it reveals her reluctance to approach Medea.

## REVIEWS.

FRITZ WEHRLI. *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar.*  
Heft III: Klearchos. Basel, Benno Schwabe & Co., 1948. Pp.  
85.

The first two fascicles of this work, containing the fragments of Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, were reviewed in volume LXIX (October, 1948), pp. 455-457, of this Journal. The description there given of those fascicles applies as well to this, the third, which contains the fragments of Clearchus of Soli in thirty-two pages, a brief bibliography, and forty pages of commentary. Like the earlier parts this one has no index of any kind, but the advertisement on the cover now gives the reassuring news that the last fascicle of the work will contain exhaustive indices. Until those indices have appeared, scholarly use of the edition will be seriously limited; such use will be facilitated if among the indices the editor will include a table by means of which one can quickly find in his collection fragments to which reference has hitherto been made by the numbering of earlier editions such as Müller's for Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus, and Clearchus.

To Müller's collection of the fragments of Clearchus Wehrli has added about half a dozen passages, most of which had been indicated by Kroll in his article in *R.-E.*, XI, 580-583. He has rearranged and renumbered the fragments and frequently prints a more extensive text than Müller did; these changes are usually improvements upon the older collection. Wehrli also gives an *apparatus criticus* for his text as he did in the two preceding fascicles, but unfortunately this *apparatus* is neither complete nor accurate, as a few samples will demonstrate.

In fragment 2a (Diogenes Laertius, III, 2), for example, Wehrli prints *Ἀναξίλιδης*, ascribing it to "editores Basilienses" although it was the reading of Stephanus; he does not in his *apparatus* mention the form *Ἀναξίλαϊδης*, the form printed by Cobet and by Hicks and adopted by Schwartz in *R.-E.*, I, 2083, although this is the form of the name that he employs in his note on p. 46. In fragment 4 (Plutarch, *De An. Proc.* 1022 E = p. 10, 12 [Wehrli]) he prints *συμπληρουμένων* and in his *apparatus* calls *συμπληρουῶν* "varia lectio"; but *συμπληρουῶν* is in fact the reading of both E and B, and Bernardakis properly prints it in his text without attested variant. In fragment 7 (Proclus, *In Platōnis Rem Publicam*, II, p. 123, 3-4 [Kroll] = p. 11, 23 [Wehrli]) *ἐμοιον ἀψύχῳ* is printed without comment, although Kroll has on this phrase the note: "*ὁμοίων ἀψύχων* Morus, corr. Bernays qui *ὁμοίως*." In fragment 11 (*Schol. Platon. Leges* 739 A) Wehrli prints without comment *περὶ παροιμίας φησὶ κτλ.*, which is also given without any critical note in Greene's *Scholīa Platonica*, p. 321, although both Müller (fragment 44a) and Hermann (*Platonis Dialogi*, VI, p. 379) print *παρὰ παροιμίας φησὶ κτλ.*; *παρὰ* appears to me to be more reasonable ("The source of his remark is the proverb," etc.), but in any case a critical note is called for at such a point. In fragment 2c (Athenaeus, XV, 670 e = p. 17,

24-25 [Wehrli]) τοῦ ἐμποδῶν is printed without mention of Edmonds' τῷ ἐμποδῶν which Gulick adopts and apparently without cognizance of Gulick's note on the passage. The text and apparatus of fragment 97 (Plutarch, *De Facie*, 920 F [not E]) are misleading. No indication is given that in the MSS there is a lacuna before καὶ πρὸς Κλέαρχον at the beginning. ὁ ἀνὴρ, Ἀριστοτέλους is ascribed to Müller, who had simply copied it from Dübner, Ἀριστοτέλους having been the emendation of Turnebus. The impossible ἵππς is printed without even a mention of the emendation, ὄψις, of Turnebus and Kepler. ἱ<ρυν> is ascribed to "editores" instead of Turnebus. Xylander's <σύντη>ξιν is adopted without mention of other proposals, although here Raingeard's πῆξιν is certainly correct.

Wehrli's text at several points raises more substantial questions, however, questions which involve his interpretation rather than the adequacy of his editorial technique. In fragment 14 (Hesychius, s. v. Μανέρως = fragment 29 [Müller]) he adopts the alteration of παρὰ Μάγων, to παρὰ Μουσῶν and supposes that with these words Clearchus intended to ascribe the invention of music to the Egyptians; but the combination of the facts that Clearchus made the Hindu gymnosophists "descendants of the Magi" (fragment 13 = Diogenes Laertius, I, 9) and the Jews "descendants of the philosophers among the Hindus" (fragment 6 = Josephus, *Adv. Apionem*, I, 22 ff.) and that Aristotle, as Wehrli himself observes, is said to have declared in the περὶ φιλοσοφίας that the Magi were older than the Egyptians (Diogenes Laertius, I, 8) seems to me to speak in favor of retaining the MS reading, παρὰ Μάγων, in Hesychius and to see here the possibility that Clearchus may have traced all "philosophy" back to a single ultimate source in Persia.

Wehrli calls ΕΡΩΤΙΚΟΣ the work which Müller entitled ΕΡΩΤΙΚΑ and argues (p. 57, note on fragment 35) that it must have been in the form of a dialogue. According to Athenaeus, II, 57 e ἐκάλουν δὲ καὶ τὰ νῦν τῶν οἰκιῶν παρ' ἡμῖν καλούμενα ὑπερῶα ὡς, φησὶ Κλέαρχος ἐν ἐρωτικοῖς. Since according to Scholion T on *Iliad*, XVI, 184 it was the Spartans who used ᾧα for the μετέωρα οἰκήματα, Wehrli, assuming that this notice derives from Clearchus, concludes that παρ' ἡμῖν in fragment 35 means Sparta, that Clearchus could not have said this in his own person as a Cypriote, and that therefore the words of the fragment are proof that the work was a dialogue. The speaker does not say, however, that the upper chambers are or were ever called ὡς παρ' ἡμῖν; to the contrary, he says: "They used to call ὡς the parts of the houses that are now in our country called ὑπερῶα," which rather sounds as if the speaker, whether Clearchus in his own person or not, were distinguishing his countrymen from the subject of ἐκάλουν. So this provides no evidence for the form of the work; and as for the title, all the references to it, ἐν ἐρωτικοῖς as here, ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν, ἐν δευτέρῳ ἐρωτικῶν imply the ΕΡΩΤΙΚΑ assumed by Müller or ΕΡΩΤΙΚΟΙ rather than Wehrli's ΕΡΩΤΙΚΟΣ.

The punctuation in fragment 41 and the note on p. 60 appear to involve a misconception of Sappho's lines (Athenaeus, XV, 687 a-b; Sappho, frag. 65 A, 25-6 [Diehl] = frag. 118 [Edmonds]). ἔρος τῶελίω is the subject of λέλογχε of which τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν is object; and so Clearchus construed it, interpreting ἡ τοῦ ζῆν

ἐπιθυμία τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶχεν αὐτῇ. Wehrli should not then have set off ἔρος τῶελίω by commas, nor is there justification for his note: "Die Dinge zu welchen Sappho sich bekennt, ἀβροσύνη, Liebe zur Sonne oder Lebensfreude und καλόν werden alle gleichgesetzt, woraus K. folgert, für die Dichterin berge Lust als solche einen ethischen Wert."

In fragment 76 b (Suidas, s. v. νεοττός) Wehrli omits the sentences introduced by the words Κλέαρχος ἐν τῷ περὶ οἶνων συγγράμματι φησιν, which Müller prints as fragment 74 a, and assigns to Clearchus the subsequent story which is introduced by μαρτυρεῖ καὶ Χρύσιππος, assuming that "Chrysippus ursprünglich als zweiter Gewährsmann für die Erzählung hinter K. genannt, in dem durch Kürzung verwirrten Text des Suidas allein stehen geblieben ist" and that Clearchus combined the fragment of Menander which appears at the beginning of Suidas' article with the story which is ascribed to Chrysippus not only by Suidas but also by Cicero. I think Wehrli is probably right in suspecting that περὶ οἶνων in the text of Suidas is a mistake for περὶ παροιμιῶν; for the rest of his treatment of this fragment there is no foundation whatever. The sentences which he omits are in Clearchus' manner, for they would explain, as the story ascribed to Chrysippus makes no attempt to do, why people had called the yolk νεοττός though mistakenly, as he points out according to good Peripatetic doctrine (cf. Aristotle, *De Gen. Animal.* 751 B 4-7, 752 B 23-28, 753 B 10-12). The story ascribed to Chrysippus, on the other hand, is, *pace* Wehrli, a testimonial to divination and not an αἴτιον of the proverbial expression, for the point of the story assumes the currency of the expression in order that the finder of the treasure may understand the rebuke of the diviner.

A problem of like nature but with more serious implications is involved in the treatment of fragment 53 (Athenaeus, XII, 530 c = fragment 13 [Müller]). Wehrli prints as part of the fragment the sentence, διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης Ξενοκράτην τὸν Χαλκηδόνιον σκώπτων . . . ἔλεγεν "χείρες μὲν ἀγναί, φρήν δ' ἔχει μίαισμά τι," and in his note says: "die üble Anwendung des Euripideszitates gehört zum Klatsch, der sich an den Gegensatz zwischen Aristoteles und der Akademie hängte; K. ist nicht Peripatetiker genug, um diesen Gegensatz sachlich zu begreifen." It is by no means certain, however, that this sentence belongs to Clearchus; Müller did not print it; and its form following the indirect discourse, Κλέαρχος . . . Σάγαριν φησι . . . προενέγκασθαι, suggests that Athenaeus did not mean to ascribe it to Clearchus. In fact, the remark of Aristotle and the habit of Xenocrates to which it refers have nothing to do with the motive of Clearchus' story about Sagaris but only a superficial verbal connection with οὐ πάποτε δὲ τὴν χεῖρα κατωτέρω τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ προενέγκασθαι. The following διὸ therefore probably belongs to Athenaeus himself, who not infrequently uses this means of lending a specious logical connection to the quotations and stories that he strings together. Another example of this habit is provided by the verses of Anaxilas, introduced by διὸ πρεπόντως ἂν τις εἴποι τῷ σοφῷ τούτῳ φιλοσόφῳ (Athenaeus, XII, 548 c), which are Athenaeus' own addition to the preceding quotation from Clearchus, though Wehrli prints them as part of his fragment 60 (pp. 26-27).

If Clearchus is responsible for the story of Aristotle's insulting

gibe at Xenocrates, however, his attitude towards the Academy must have been one of personal animosity; and this one would reasonably suppose to be the meaning of Wehrli's remark that Clearchus was "not Peripatetic enough to have an objective understanding of the opposition between Aristotle and the Academy," were it not that in his note on fragment 2, to which he here refers, he suggests that Clearchus openly opposed the animosity of Aristoxenus towards the Academy (p. 46). By lack of "objective understanding" does Wehrli then mean that Clearchus was too stupid to understand the implications of the slander that he supposes him to have repeated in fragment 53? However that may be, Wehrli sees Clearchus as more of a Platonist than an Aristotelian. Indeed, in his commentary on fragment 73 (Athenaeus, XIII, 555 c = fragment 49 [Müller]) he says: "Als Platoniker wird er die spartanischen Massnahmen als Erziehungsmittel bewundern" (p. 71), although there is nothing in the fragment to indicate either a tendency towards Platonism or approval of the Spartan custom there reported. The Platonism of the *περὶ ὕπνου* (fragments 5-10) is established hardly any more firmly. According to Wehrli (p. 47) "Das gemeinsame Thema Schlaf interessierte K. als der Zustand, der Sonderexistenz und damit Unsterblichkeit der Seele offenbart. K. bleibt damit seinem Platonismus treu, wofür er sich auf den aristotelischen Eudem berufen kann"; but then he must suppose (cf. *apparatus* to fragment 9, p. 12) that Κλέαρχος is a mistake for Δικαίταρχος in Theoderet, *Graec. Affect. Curatio* V, 18: Κλέαρχος δὲ τῶν τεττάρων εἶναι στοιχείων τὴν ἀρμονίαν (*scil. τὴν ψυχὴν*), for, if this correctly states the opinion of Clearchus, fragments 7 and 8 (Proclus, *In Plat. Rem Pub.* II, p. 122, 22 ff. and p. 113, 19 ff. [Kroll]) and fragment 38 (Athenaeus, IV, 157c) do not. It should be observed that in none of these passages does Proclus or Athenaeus say that Clearchus asserted his own belief in the separability or immortality of the soul. Proclus says that he represented Aristotle as having been so persuaded, and Athenaeus says that he ascribed the opinion expressed in fragment 38 to Euxitheus the Pythagorean; and lacking knowledge of the contexts from which these reports or excerpts come we can hardly guess what relation they bore to Clearchus' own conclusions or even be sure that he expressed any dogmatic conclusion at all. To Wehrli, however, the ascription of a Πλάτωνος Ἐγκώμιον to Clearchus (fragment 2 = fragment 43 [Müller]; Diogenes Laertius, III, 2) means that Clearchus wrote a "philosophical confession" and as a Peripatetic could appeal in support of his tendency towards Plato to the "platonizing early works of Aristotle, for whose later movement away from the Academy he obviously had no understanding" (p. 45). He does not mention the fact that there are strong grounds for suspecting the soundness of the text which ascribes this Πλάτωνος Ἐγκώμιον to Clearchus instead of to Speusippus who is mentioned in the same passage (cf. Lang, *De Speusippi Academici Scriptis*, pp. 32 ff.). What is stranger still, he does not in this connection take cognizance of Plutarch's assertion that Clearchus πολλὰ τοῦ Περιπάτου παρέτρεψεν (*De Facie* 920 E); and neither here nor in his notes on that passage (pp. 79-80 on fragment 97) does he consider the implications of that statement, the context of which (ὁμέτερος γὰρ ἀνὴρ . . . εἰ καὶ πολλὰ . . . παρέτρεψεν) suggests in fact that the Peripatetics sought to disown Clearchus. Wehrli might have argued that in so

doing they were disowning the "early Aristotle"; but this would raise the embarrassing question why they did not also directly disown the "early Aristotle" whose works, after all, were known to them. The fact is that the remains of Clearchus' writings are so meagre that we are unable to determine with any assurance what his philosophical position, if he adopted any definite position, really was.

One further point concerning the interpretation of fragment 97 must be mentioned, for it illustrates the danger of interpreting passages as isolated fragments. Wehrli in his note (p. 80) takes the theory of the rainbow mentioned in p. 36, lines 27-28 (Plutarch, V, p. 404, 22 ff. [Bernardakis]) as that of Clearchus (. . . "so wie nach K's Meinung das Licht des Regenbogens nach der Wolke"). The theory is Aristotle's and in that sense Peripatetic (cf. Aristotle, *Meteorology* 373 A 32-375 B 12 and Areius Didymus, fragment 14 = *Dox. Graec.*, p. 455, 14 ff.); but, as αἴεθ' ὑμεῖς addressed to Apollonides shows, Plutarch intended to ascribe it to mathematicians generally (cf. καὶ καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὴν ἴριν . . . λέγουσι . . . in the similar passage, *De Iside* 358 F). For the notion that the sea is reflected in the moon cf. also Lucian, *Icaromenippus*, § 20. Wehrli is mistaken in supposing that Clearchus assumed the reflection of the sea in the moon to be "indirect"; both he and the "Pythagoreans" of Aëtius, II, 33, 1 had in mind simply the phenomenon of "seeing around a corner" by means of a mirror and not a reflection from sea to sun or central-fire(!) and thence to the moon.

HAROLD CHERNISS.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON, N. J.

GIUSEPPE MORETTI. *Ara Pacis Augustae*. Rome, La Libreria dello Stato, 1948. Text, pp. 325 with 13 plates and 202 cuts; portfolio of 39 plates.

This outstanding monument of Augustan Rome has now been rendered accessible by means of an impressive *édition de luxe*. In view of the restriction to 500 copies, and the high price, it is fortunate that a small portable volume *L'Ara Pacis Augustae*, from the same press and author, appeared some years ago in the series *Itinerari dei Musei e Monumenti d'Italia*.

The present publication follows almost four centuries of intermittent discovery and study; it is the outcome of the activities of the Italian State, as represented by the late *Soprintendente alle Antichità di Roma e Lazio*. A prefatory note by the son, Mario Moretti, states that the text and plates thus presented embody in all respects the views of his father, who was able to follow the undertaking up to and including the correction of the final proofs.

The *Rendiconti* of the Pontifical Roman Academy of Archaeology, XXII (1946-7), pp. 17-22, contain a commemoration of Giuseppe Moretti (1876-1945), by Roberto Paribeni: he exemplified the best qualities of an archaeological functionary, and the culmination of his career was the carrying to completion, in 1937-8, of that pecu-



liarily difficult enterprise, the recovery from among the foundations of the Palazzo Fiano, in the ancient Campus Martius, of the remains of the *Ara Pacis Augustae* which earlier discoveries had suggested might still lie buried in the vicinity, and then, in the years following, the reassembling and re-erection of that monument at a site between the Mausoleum of Augustus and the Tiber.

The complexity of the final undertaking was partly due to the nature of the waterlogged subsoil and the presence in and near the area concerned of various Renaissance and modern buildings, the stability of which would have been compromised by a lowering of the flood-level: for the constant pressure of the water serves to hold their foundations in place. Pp. 56-68 and pls. XXXVI, XXXVII, show how the awkward technical problem of isolating the required area was eventually solved by the ultra-modern expedient of a chemical freezing apparatus, thus forming a water-tight compartment.

The actual material reconstruction of the monument makes use of (1) original blocks, slabs, and fragments; (2) for the substructure, marble from quarries at Carrara—not demonstrably those used by the Augustan builders; (3) for certain parts of the friezes and decorative elements, the originals of which are preserved elsewhere, plaster casts taken from those originals; (4) for some of the missing decorative parts, further casts, made from details already used elsewhere in the restoration, and arbitrarily introduced here for a second time in order to assist in giving a general impression of the sculptured bands; (5) also, in some instances, newly modelled plaster details. With few exceptions, no fresh restoration was applied to the figured friezes, in contrast with the decorative floral elements; but portions of the figures, and especially many heads of the personages forming the procession on the north side of the enclosing wall, had already been restored in marble in Renaissance times, and it proved necessary to retain these restorations even at the cost of tolerating painful dissonances. Moreover, as already stated, the whole structure was re-erected at a point remote from its original location, and it was actually set at an orientation some 90 degrees divergent from the ancient one. Hence, for various reasons, the *Ara Pacis Augustae* in its present form cannot lay claim to complete authenticity as embodying either the symbolism or the artistic achievement envisaged by its makers.

The publication is highly informative. Commendation is due the skill and conscientiousness of the draftsmen who prepared the restored designs of the monument as it now is: a most helpful feature of the volume of plates, although, not even when used in connection with the indications afforded in the text, invariably helpful in distinguishing between what is original and what is due to restoration. It does not appear possible, however, to extend the same degree of praise to the photographic plates and text-cuts: these were taken partly from the original marble, partly from casts; in general, the lighting appears to have been conditioned by the present location, and cannot be considered ideal for the purpose. Moreover, in most instances the printing has been executed in a uniformly muddy brownish tint and upon paper which absorbs the surface values, themselves already somewhat diffused and diluted at earlier stages

of the process; the cuts in the text show everywhere the rippling lines of the fabric of the paper; the contrast with the small illustrations in Morelli's earlier volume is by no means entirely in favor of the more ambitious presentation. But—when all due recognition has been accorded to some veritable triumphs of reproduction in this and other volumes issuing from the same press—we have by now become accustomed, in the luxurious official or semi-official publications of the present time, to the falsification of tone qualities; and the surfaces of the *Ara Pacis Augustae*, which in any case no longer show the appearance in which the makers left them, have probably fared not much worse than those of the waxy encaustic paintings of Pompeii and the sharply struck metallic issues of the Sicilian mints.

When so much is generously given, more, perhaps unreasonably, is desired. The boukrania, paterae, and festoons of the upper register of the interior face of the enclosing wall appear in the restored designs, pls. VI-IX, and in nine text-cuts, figs. 1, 10, 66, 136-141: but they are not represented photographically and in detail on the plates. This omission will be regretted by those who see, in the garlands at least, not only one of the artistically most admirable features of the whole monument but, from the standpoint of cult practice, one of the most essential: they are the sublimated rendering in sculpture of the actual garlands which fulfilled a more than decorative function at the moment of thanksgiving and devotion.

It is not our intention to repeat here the information regarding this monument which, as the result of earlier discoveries and learned treatment, is accessible in the manuals and text-books and may be assumed to be common knowledge. The proverbial schoolboy has probably seen the name, his eye has been caught by an illustration or two, and he has formed some more or less definite associations in his mind. The campaign of 1903, however,—to be brief—had revealed the presence of an entrance at the eastern, back, end of the structure, corresponding to that already assumed, and in that same campaign actually found, at the front, to the west (p. 48); and this discovery had necessitated the elimination from consideration of the "Della Valle" reliefs (pp. 28-33, 33, 119-131), for which there was no longer room available and which therefore must have formed part of another structure. The outstanding result of the most recent campaign itself was the finding of enough of the essential elements of the actual cult altar that stood within the enclosure (figs. 85, 142-3 represent its tufa core; figs. 61, 63, 64, 144-7, 151-2, and pls. XXVIII-XXXV some of its sculptured adornment, to which may be added the further fragments discussed on pp. 81-6) to justify its reconstruction (figs. 99, 140-1, 158), thus revealing the functional and organic nature of the ensemble.

The volume of text embodies an account of the successive phases of discovery and interpretation, a description of the recent finds and of the re-erection of the monument, and a hermeneutical and aesthetic appreciation. The first two-thirds thus possess much of the fascination of a mystery novel—they form both a presentation of evidence and a study in deduction. But it must be observed that this method has entailed sacrifices as well. We hesitate to criticise an arrangement which the peculiar nature of Moretti's task may have rendered inevitable. But, as executed, it has led to a distribution of

material which taxes the agility and the energies of those endeavoring to make use of the publication, and—in the absence of a subject-index—occasionally it falls to the plates rather than to the volume of text to present the monument as an organic whole. In the text, the several features do not always appear where they might, *a priori*, have been expected. Certain sculptured details recur in widely-scattered plates: thus Mars, in figs. 54, 110, 124, as well as pls. XVI, XXI, and pp. 30, 241-2 of the text. The valuable observations as to polychromy (pp. 176-8) form an incident in the treatment of the restoration of the inner face of the enclosing-wall. The cuttings for clamps and dowels, also the lewis-holes—a matter of prime importance for the builders' technique—are clearly shown on pl. V, which is supplemented by figs. 88 and 118, with a few words of text on pp. 92 and 143; but they deserved a place in a coherent treatment of construction, which might then have been extended to include the—seemingly quite unexplained—horizontal cuttings appearing at regular intervals on the outer face of the topmost course of the podium of the enclosing-wall (pls. I, III, IV), which can hardly be due to later readjustment.

We must not linger in detail over the interpretation, and the aesthetic appreciation, of the several friezes of the enclosing-wall and the altar, which, in general and within fair limits, have been treated in the work under review: especially as the nature and importance of this monument will doubtless evoke varied appraisal from numerous scholars in the next few years. A publication such as this, while marking the end of one period of investigation, may well serve as the starting-point for further interpretation.

One matter, however, appears to call for a few words. Moretti (pp. 232-7) gave generous consideration, though not acceptance, to our own effort (*J. R. S.*, III [1913], pp. 134-41) to interpret the familiar panel with the matronly figure flanked by *aurae velificantes*. But apparently our subsequent endeavor (*A. J. A.*, XLI [1937], p. 651) to express more clearly the implications of this interpretation was not known to him. This appears regrettable, if, as we feel, it has led him to fall somewhat short (pp. 310-11) of a full comprehension of the significance of the *Ara Pacis Augustae* as a logically conceived whole, and a full recognition of its cosmic import as conceived by its makers. For us, equilibrium is restored to the main frieze only with the recognition that, just as its west front exhibits the balance between Aeneas, the bringer of civilization to Italy, to the south of the entrance way, and Romulus, the founder of Rome, to its north; and just as the procession of the Julian House and its attendants on the south side finds its corresponding element in the Roman procession on the north side; so the eastern entrance was flanked to its south by Italia and to its north by Roma: the whole series of representations on the great frieze forms a coherent and closely reasoned system. The two parallel processions leave the rear portal to the care of the two divine guardians, and on reaching the front at the west they will find their respective ancestral representatives of the heroic age.

A. W. VAN BUREN.

W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT and O. NEUGEBAUER. *The Calendars of Athens*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press for the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1947. Pp. xii + 115. \$5.00.

The last generation has witnessed a series of thoughtful studies which have carried our knowledge of the Athenian calendar far beyond what earlier scholars might have dreamed was possible. For the fruitfulness of the results which aim at providing for Greek history a sound chronological basis in general and a sharper perspective in its particulars, we are indebted primarily to the inscriptions, especially to the rich yield of the Athenian agora, and to the persistent and ingenious work of such men as Meritt, West, Ferguson, Dinsmoor, Pritchett, and Dow. Now, at just the right time, comes an important book by Pritchett and Neugebauer which takes stock of progress, evaluates method, and issues a few needed words of caution to the epigraphists, whose dexterity sometimes carries them beyond the credible limits of the evidence.

Although the authors admit the double datings *κατ' ἀρχοντα* and *κατὰ θεόν* as their point of departure, they were soon led to survey all the epigraphic material bearing on the calendar from the fifth to the second centuries B. C. and thus to examine the now familiar puzzles, e. g., intercalation, length of prytanies, calendar cycles, backward or forward count. What has obviously impressed them most is the correctness of Aristotle's statement concerning the rigid prytany calendar.

A major virtue of this book is that the problems are clearly put and the terminology is precisely defined. As the authors recognize, all do not belong to the small circle of chronological experts; yet most Greek historians are interested in the difficulties and the methods. The first chapter (Problems of the Athenian Calendar) will be instructive to the experts as well as to others, for here the leading arguments are anticipated without the usual assumption that the reader is intimate with the evidence and with the previous literature. So, for example, the nature of a lunar (astronomical) calendar is described as are the character and purpose of cycles constructed by a system of intercalation. The same principle is adhered to throughout the volume. An illustration is the table of Athenian monetary symbols presented in note 10, p. 97, which, elementary as it may be to epigraphists, will earn praise from non-specialists; cf. the useful list of the days of the Athenian month on pp. 30-31, with the illuminating Notes (pp. 31-33).

The basic assumptions of this book are significant enough to present here:

- (1) Aristotle's report of a rigid prytany calendar is certainly true of his own day; probably a rigid prytany calendar was the real civil calendar "in all periods which concern us" (p. vii).
- (2) The Metonic cycle cannot be employed for the distribution of ordinary and intercalary years; all such cycles should not be presumed to have contained seven intercalations.
- (3) The months of the civil calendar do not necessarily alternate

between full and hollow; years may have  $354 \pm 1$  days (ordinary) or  $384 \pm 1$  (intercalary).

- (4) The count in the last third of the month ( $\phi\theta\iota\nu\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma$  or  $\mu\epsilon\tau' \epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}\delta\alpha\varsigma$ ) is always backward and only the 29<sup>th</sup> day varies according to the nature of the month, full or hollow, i. e., the 22<sup>nd</sup> is always  $\epsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta$  and  $\delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$  (29<sup>th</sup>) does not occur in a hollow month.
- (5) The archons, as the  $\kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$  dates imply, felt free to tamper with the true (lunar) calendar ( $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu$ ).

"... the Athenian calendar seems to us to be the combination of a rigid prytany calendar and a civil calendar having the normal irregularities of lunar reckoning, and subject to arbitrary modification on certain occasions" (p. 4).

Chapters II to V are devoted to a demonstration of the validity of the above convictions. Here the calendaric equations from 341/0 to 100 B. C. are methodically listed, restorations are tested, some are rejected, possible substitutions are offered. This thorough year-by-year examination does not, so far as I can determine, damage the basic assumptions. It is true that Pritchett and Neugebauer are forced to posit scribal errors; their predecessors posit rather more to establish their systems. They conjecture dislocations of formulae and irregularities in stichedon order; so do their predecessors. In any case, such disturbances are attested in the extant portions of the documents. The sheer weight of the evidence corroborates the belief that throughout this period the prytanies conformed to a pattern and that the civil calendar was often arbitrarily retarded.

In the final chapter the authors turn to the fifth century in an attempt to discover if equality in the length of prytanies was then the rule. Their conclusion is positive, that each prytany year (to judge from the quadrennium 426/5 to 423/2) contained 366 days, the first six prytanies comprising 37 each, the last four 36. With typical conservatism they set out the evidence first on the basis of those texts which do not depend upon restoration. They then tackle the broken sections of the vital inscription, *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324, and show that these do not vitiate their assumptions.

In their treatment of *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324 they make certain noteworthy criticisms of the present restorations. Meritt (*The Athenian Calendar*, especially p. 33), in computing the interest on loans, had stated that "fifths and tenths were avoided, as were also the odd fractions  $1/7$ ,  $1/11$ ,  $1/13$ ,  $1/14$ ,  $1/15$ ,  $1/17$ , etc." Pritchett and Neugebauer now point out that this method works both ways, i. e., it must be also employed in the restoration of a principal sum. If both  $1/5$  and  $1/7$ , as amounts of interest, are calculated as  $1/6$ , then a given interest of  $1/6$  may correspond to any principal between  $714 \frac{2}{7}$  and 1000 drachmae. "The maximum error permitted in any given method of computing interest should likewise be allowed in computing the principal" (p. 100). The authors utilize this thesis and other epigraphical characteristics of the document to prove that *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 324 may be restored so as to produce a regular pattern in the length of prytanies. But, they emphasize, "the preserved portions are the only part which may be used for historical evidence" (p. 105).

The volume is brought to a conclusion by an Appendix on

Athenian coins of the second century which have been thought to concern the calendar, and by an Index of Greek Inscriptions Cited.

In the course of the argument Pritchett and Neugebauer make a good many sensible observations; I can select only a few. "For the restoration of the character of any particular year, the Metonic cycle, even in its emptiest form, is without any value" (p. 9). "... the age of Meton had not yet reached fundamental insight into the astronomical conditions governing the movements of the sun, much less that of the moon ..." (p. 11). The ambiguity occasioned by a concurrent employment of forward and backward count "is to say the least very puzzling. The reader of a prescript with a date  $\mu\epsilon\tau'$   $\epsilon\kappa\acute{\alpha}\delta\alpha\varsigma$  had to know whether the month in question was hollow or full and whether the counting was backward or forward when he wanted to establish a specific date. Furthermore, the character of a month as full or hollow must always have been decided in advance ..." (p. 24).

My belief is that this study is of fundamental importance and must be very seriously considered by all who work on these problems in the future. To my mind, we shall require more evidence than we possess today to prove the authors' basic assumptions wrong. Some, it will be noted, are negative; but a negative result is often to be preferred to a positive theory that is erected upon insufficient and contradictory evidence; in calendaric matters such a theory is propped by restorations. When the quarry is elusive the road is beset with Loreleis.

The epigraphic determinations in *The Calendars of Athens* (and, as the authors tell us, the emphasis is placed upon the epigraphical aspects) are firmly conservative. Absolute reliance is never placed upon restoration, and readings that could not be controlled are regarded with suspicion; see, for example, p. 51 and cf. pp. 52-53, where Wilhelm is chided for his sparing use of dots. Such wariness is laudable and the reader, who is taken fully into the authors' confidence, need never feel that a theory is being built upon hazardous supplements.

In their study of the calendar of the fifth century Pritchett and Neugebauer, maintaining their principles, deliberately refuse to deal with the badly worn inscription catalogued as *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 304B, on the ground that they cannot at this distance control the readings. They believe, however, that the document can be restored in accordance with a prytany pattern on the assumption of arbitrary interference with the civil calendar. Examination of the stone in Paris may compel them to agree with Meritt's readings and to modify their conclusions; this, I think, they recognize.

The book has been prepared with typical care and I suspect that some of the flaws mentioned in this paragraph are not the responsibility of the authors. Distortions of spelling occur on pp. vii ("conviction"), 26 ("is" has become "it"), 34 (read "Sandys" for "Sandy's" in n. 1), 45 and 74 ("unnecessary"), 66 ("which"), 72 ("he" has become "the" in r. 9), 77 ("dittography" in n. 28), 90 ("occurred"), 106 ("parapegma" in n. 27).  $\text{A}\iota\gamma\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$  has a wrong accent on p. 46,  $[\epsilon\gamma\gamma\alpha\mu\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma]$  has lost its accent on p. 44. Punctuation is faulty on p. 31 (in the second Note), a metathesis has gone unnoticed in the heading of the table on p. 97, and a symbol is miss-

ing from the table in n. 10 on the same page. A few errors in English usage disturb the reader: the third sentence on p. 18 needs rewriting; the antecedent of "it" is not clear in the second paragraph of p. 23; "Panathenaia" is treated as singular on p. 73, n. 14; "implied" is used for "inferred" on p. 108. The reference in n. 52 on p. 59 should be to *I. G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 63 (not 304); the same mistake is to be found on p. 31. The Greek font is not always attractive; the final sigmas seem ugly to me and in Chapter VI epsilon beneath the circumflex has suffered shrinkage (e. g., p. 101).

This study is carried out in an expert manner and with scrupulous honesty. The epigraphic responsibility is Pritchett's, the astronomical contributions are Neugebauer's. Both are scholars of reputation and this impressive performance will enhance both reputations.

MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.

ERNST ROBERT CURTIUS. *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*. Bern, Francke, 1948. Pp. 601.

The scholarly development of Professor Curtius is remarkable for the wide range of the pendulum of his interests: a pupil of Gröber's, that is of the most factual-minded and the most rigorously positivistic spirit of an age that has gone, he started by editing an Old French text (*Li quatre livres des Reis*, 1911), suddenly to shift his interests to contemporary French literature, publishing a monograph on Brunetiere and, after the first World War, the volume *Die literarischen Wegbereiter des neuen Frankreich* (1919), which, with its—sometimes not too critical—emphasis on most recent French literature, with its acceptance of the then fashionable philosophies of Scheler and Bergson, with its intelligent aesthetic appraisal of new literary techniques, with its brisk, elegant, near-journalistic style, was to provoke a storm of indignation from the *vieux grognons* school of German philologists, and to be enthusiastically received by the public at large, and, finally, to usher in a new era (coinciding with that of the Weimar Republic) for the German university curriculum: now was begun the study of contemporary foreign literatures as a means for the understanding (and this was thought to lead toward the political understanding) of the national genius, the national moral and aesthetic ideologies of other peoples. The *Wegbereiter* was followed by studies on Valéry and Proust, by books on Barrès and Balzac, and by that *Essai sur la France* (the German title is "Frankreich," 1930) in which France is portrayed as a partner with Germany in that dialogue on occidental civilization which the two nations had pursued for centuries. (The English and Spanish partners in that conversation were not forgotten: studies on Joyce and the generation of 1898). Thus Curtius had, by 1930, acquired the international position of a European "critic of civilization" on a par with Thomas Mann, T. S. Eliot, Ortega, and Madariaga. Charles Dubos devoted to him one of his searching essays and greeted him as a Goethe *redivivus*.

In 1932, with the publication of the book *Deutscher Geist in*

*Gefahr* and the study *Jorge Manrique und der Kaisergedanke*, a sudden change of interest manifested itself on the part of the "modernist" Curtius. In the first, he issued a warning to Germany, on the verge of turning Nazi, and called her back to Humanism and her cultural past; in the second we see an abandonment of all aesthetic, philosophic and modernistic tendencies, only historical and philological questions being treated: the late medieval Spanish poet studied here was only considered as a link in a thousand-year-old tradition which can be retraced to the rhetorical exercises of late antiquity and which is redacted in medieval Latin historiography. Curtius was here interested not in the poetry of Manrique as a whole, nor even in the single poem, the *Coplas en la muerte de su padre*, which he treats: he is concerned only with the topos: "catalogue of pious Roman emperors," which happens to be found therein and which he traces back to antiquity. The judgments of Miss Burkart in her study of Manrique that this catalogue is an inorganic ("bildungbeweisend") and therefore unpoetic section of the *Coplas*, was rejected by Curtius, who declared such aesthetic scruples to be irrelevant, given the position of this topos in tradition. Thus, by now, the pendulum had swung back to Curtius' philological beginnings: and since 1932 he has published more than a score of philological articles (about 1000 printed pages) on medieval Latin poetry, always stressing the continuity of poetic tradition from (late) antiquity up to the Romance and European literatures. All these studies have been reworked, compressed or enlarged, to form the impressive book under discussion which faithfully illustrates the program announced in its title.

How should we explain, in the later work of a great scholar and critic, the repudiation of his earlier work: the prophet of a new Europe become "a prophet turned backward," a historian of the Europeanism of the Middle Ages; the aesthetic and cultural critic become a philologist; the acolyte of Bergson's intuitionism and of Scheler's phenomenology become a "neopositivist"? The obvious political explanation (that under the Nazi regime a European point of view on cultural questions was dangerous) is too superficial: the change in Curtius had come from within. As early as 1932, he had become aware of the "perils" for the German mind which lay in its too easy, too lovingly-fostered irrationalism and which was able to engender a barbarous movement such as Hitlerism. With his flair for the duty of the hour, Curtius turned toward "solid philology" and toward medieval philology where sobriety and discipline of mind had reached their greatest triumphs. It was logical that an aristocratic mind such as Curtius' should, before the onslaught of the plebeian hordes, retreat into the Latin past of Germany, into a difficult subject matter, one inaccessible to minds of the Rosenberg stamp, and should limit itself to strictly rational methods that could have a sobering effect on the ideology- and word-drunken Germans, thus avoiding the pitfalls of a Karl Vossler whose vague irrational or idealistic categories ("the struggle against materialism, positivism and specialism") seemed, ironically enough, dangerously close to those of Hitlerism. The "European" Curtius could thus still preserve his scholarly integrity and also survive—in medieval garb. I even suspect that Curtius may have become surfeited, not only with



the vague intuitionism of his fellow Germans, but with his own, his own cultural speculation and his journalistic vein, and I distinctly sense in his new disillusioned attitude a bitter note of iconoclasm directed against himself, a will to matter-of-fact, ascetic, philological aridity, as if to chastize his former nature. Just as he had formerly suppressed in himself the marvelous philologist he had always been, he is now suppressing the marvelous essayist in him. Such suppression, now of this, now of that half of his nature, will, of course, never result in a Goethe-like balance.

Thus the positivistic approach of his teacher Gröber (the medievalist who had treated—separately, it is true—both medieval Latin and French literature in that forbidding bulky *Grundriss* which bears his name), was revived in Curtius, who not only fuses the two literatures, but extends the scope to include European medieval literature, and adds to its treatment his personal gift of form, his elegant essayistic style with its sharp epigrammatic formulae and the wide perspectives it is able, at any moment, to open up before the reader, with his power of organizing and mastering an overwhelming source material which, while embracing the classical languages and all the occidental vernaculars, is compressed into a readable book (of 18 chapters and 25 appendices, with generously comprehensive indices). This encyclopedic book offers a collection of *topoi* (traditional patterns of expression and artistic devices) followed through in all occidental languages from antiquity to the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, with the greatest stress on the literary period between the third and the tenth century, for which Latinist and Romance scholars alike have generally shown little interest (Curtius is the only living scholar in Romance who has read all the medieval Latin texts listed in Manitius' compendium). The great poets are mentioned in this book under the particular *topoi*, as links in the uninterrupted chain—Curtius proceeds, even more systematically than such predecessors as Faral or Scheludko, like a grammarian or rhetorician (he calls his book a *Nova Rhetorica*) who draws his examples from great authors (*auctoritates*) in order to illustrate suprapersonal developments; if he allows himself appreciations of their whole work he does so only for the sake of placing them within his European-Latin framework. Thus his book has become an inexhaustible mine of uncontroversial facts about the ultimate sources of European poetry. How happy must we be to possess such a vast grammar (or dictionary) of *topoi* in which a glance at the index may enable us to find all that is known to a unique connoisseur of classical, Neolatin and Romance philology about such topics as the Muses in the Middle Ages, the medieval concept of poetry, number symbolism and *Zahlenkomposition*, the concept of the "book" or of the landscape, the formulae of humility, *armas y letras*, *puer senex*, etc., and about the semantic development of many technical terms of modern literary history, terms that Curtius succeeds generally in antedating considerably! Page after page is devoted to the enumeration of texts intended to demonstrate a particular conviction of the author on the historical continuity in the expression of a thought or in an artistic device; and the quotations from Shakespeare, Milton, Calderon, or Goethe, when appearing against the medieval background are made to appear in a new

light—as less original, more traditional, at least as concerns their content. The wealth of material that is unfolded in every chapter or appendix produces in us a particular elation: that aroused precisely by the realization of the historical continuity of our European civilization. When the seventeenth-century writer Gracián's concepts of *ingenio* and *concepto* are retraced to a passage of the fifth-century writer Martianus Capella in which their Latin equivalents *ingenium* and *conceptus* are found side by side, one feels as though the world-clock stood still: man appears here as a being consisting in continuity. And is not the insight into such basic conservatism of man an antidote against the feeling of helplessness engendered by the vista of chaotic dismemberment and of the crumbling of tradition that the world of today offers us? Before the forces of barbarism that encircle us, Curtius has found an escape by immersing himself in the necropolis of a past that was alive as late as the eighteenth century (this is for Curtius the dividing line between his Middle Ages and modernity).

No comprehensive book on medieval literature in the last fifty years is more epoch-making than this: it seems to me to surpass in solidity, in wealth of material and range of interest Wechssler's *Kulturproblem des Minneangs*, Vossler's *Göttliche Komödie*, and C. S. Lewis' *The Allegory of Love*. For here speaks an historian of Romance (and European) literature who sees the unity of Latin and Romance ("European") in a manner paralleled only by the linguistic comparatists, a Dief or a Meyer-Lübke (it is the linguists who, in the demonstration of their vision of unity, have preceded the literary historians by 100 years). No wonder that Curtius should at times himself turn comparative linguist or semantacist.

Shall I say that with Curtius' insistence on the "topological" and rhetorical in medieval poetry a new era of medieval studies has begun, similar to that initiated for modern literary studies by his *Wegbereiter*? Curtius, with his characteristic absolutism, tells us as much, implying at times that his historical-philological method should take the place of history of ideas (to which it obviously contributes), of the study of national temperaments, of aesthetic criticism, of investigation as to the interrelation between the arts in a given period ("classic—baroque period")—in short, most of the recent trends in literary scholarship seem now superfluous or obsolete to him. But Curtius seems here to be throwing out the baby with the bath: because Hitlerites and pre-Hitlerites twisted history of ideas, history of ideas as such must not be abandoned; because some acolytes of Wölfflin twisted his idea of the baroque, this historical category must not be declared useless.

I do not believe that, by tracing some of the "mannerisms" of seventeenth-century poets to late Latin poetry, Curtius (who would have us replace the term "baroque" by "manneristic") has destroyed forever the category of baroque poetry; or that the use of this term testifies to "Unwissenheit und pseudokunstwissenschaftlicher Systemzwang." If, let us say, the *Summations-Schema* (what Hatzfeld has called the "Calderonian résumé") is found already in Tiberianus (4th cent.) and Valerius Maximus (1st cent.)—in each of the two in one example only—, the pullulation of this very device in seventeenth-century poetry is a fact, not negligible in itself, which in turn should be linked with other literary features of the latter period and which, in the totally different

climate of the post-Tridentine world, acquires a new meaning, different from the one it may have had in the fourth and tenth centuries: while materially the same, the device of *Summationsschema* represents something spiritually different in the new complex of phenomena it helps form. Similarly Gracián is not Martianus Capella. The adages of Sancho Panza, although sometimes textually identical with the *Pro-verbes au vilain*, mean something different in the new context, etc. The idea of a "baroque style"—as of any "style" is no less "scholarly" than, for example, Ascoli's idea of a "dialect" (which has not yet encountered valid objections from linguists): a dialect, like a "style" (which could be called "the dialect of a period") is a compound formed by elements which can be found elsewhere, but whose coexistence will hardly repeat itself in any other surroundings.

Personally, I am not convinced that topology is a new *method*—it is only a new, and very rich, source of historical information which finds its place within the age-old inquiry into outward sources—it represents indeed a more systematic approach to the ultimate outward sources. But it is also platitudinously true that the sum total of the sources does not explain the inward form of a particular work of art. Does Curtius forget that the great work of art is always unique and that art strives for uniqueness? Any great feeling tends toward the unrepeatable and the unparalleled, it is in its nature to feel what no one has ever felt before; the words of everyone become new words for the poet, they acquire indeed the quality of proper names. The "common-place" in a poetic work is the prepoetic, that which has been dissolved and reworked into a new, the poet's idiom.

It is, for instance, to take a personal experience, quite correct for the philologist to point out that the simile in the *Poema de Mio Cid* in which the tie between the protagonist and his family is compared to nail and flesh is commonplace in the Middle Ages: nevertheless the attitude of the naïve Spanish admirer of the *Poema* who insists (against philological evidence) on considering the simile as unique, is still valid: in the moment that we enjoy the *Poema* we should forget our philological parallels and the commonplace character of its devices. Is it sufficient (to take some of Curtius' examples), whenever, in Provençal troubadour poetry, we come upon the metaphor "the eyes of the heart," to label the particular passage as an example of "Körperteil-Metaphern" (p. 144) which go back to the "etwas gewagte Bildersprache" of Plato—has Plato, when he first used this metaphor, done all the "daring" once for ever? Again, should we see in Dante's *O voi che siete in piccioletta barca* only an ancient "Schiffahrts-Metapher," in Guinizelli's *Al cor gentil ripara sempre amore* only the "commonplace" ("Gemeinplatz") of the nobility of the mind? Should we truly read Dante only as a medieval Latin rhetorician (no new discovery, especially after Schiaffini's investigations; and was it really necessary to enumerate on p. 279 all the 150 rhetorical paraphrases of Dante's, which are so easily found in Toynbee's *Concise Dante Dictionary*?), simply because the poetics of Dante's time (and of Boccaccio's) confused rhetoric and poetry?

Is it not insufficient to be told of the *Chanson de Saint Alexis* (p. 387): "Deren Perle, das 'Alexiuslied' . . . ist die wohl abgewogene Komposition eines gelehrten Kunstdichters, der die rhetorischen Mittel kannte und Virgil gelesen hatte"? It would seem as though this "gem" of Old French hagiographic poetry were a gem only because it conforms to school precepts and reveals its author's acquaintance

with Virgil. How can one identify that grandiose poem with clichés that could be found as well in Berceo's Spanish poetry as in any hagiographic literature? Again, the *Libro de Buen Amor* is defined (p. 390), in Gröber fashion, in terms of its borrowings from the *Ars amandi* and *Pamphilus de Amore*: Juan Ruiz, we are told, had added only Spanish names, that is "local and temporal color"; the go-between Trotaconventos is an Ovidian figure, itself borrowed from the Greek New Comedy—the particular artistic temperament of Juan Ruiz is not discussed. The Neveu de Rameau derives from the Davus of Horace (*Satire* II, 7), the "structure" of Diderot's work being that of the Horatian satire, and the motif of the puppet (which goes ultimately back to Plato) is also a reflection of this satire (p. 562): the ultimate meaning of the *Neveu* (and of the puppet-motif) for the personal temperament of Diderot is not mentioned.

The aesthetic harm done to a poem by considering its devices or thoughts as unique is truly less great than that done by the levelling, disillusioning epithet "commonplace." And I do not know whether the best way to call the modern world back to humanism is to call it back to that rhetorical lore which the *humanistisches Gymnasium* taught only too much and too dryly.

I fear indeed—*principiis obsta*!—that Curtius' book, philologically sound as it is, will play into the hands of those *vieux grognons* literary historians who, in this country as in Europe, oppose any attempt at individualizing the artistic appreciation of medieval (and modern) works of art. The ascertainment, with the help of Curtius, of a *topos* in a poem may blind the student to what the individual poet has done with it and how he has transcended it. To declare the catalogue of Roman emperors in Jorge Manrique a *topos* does not dispense with aesthetic questions: the last critic, who has had the opportunity of studying Manrique, Pedro Salinas, still persists in finding the catalogue only "bildungsbeweisend." The commendable attempt to furnish an historical understructure for our aesthetic sense must not lead toward the summary identification of the historical with the beautiful, the less so since the historical source may not be identical with the poet's inward source of inspiration (cf. again the relationship Davus—Neveu de Rameau). In my opinion the admirable work of Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis*, written by a German in exile without any resentment against current German movements and interpreting, historically and aesthetically, individual texts that cover the same span of twenty-six centuries as does Curtius' book, and Charles S. Singleton's brief *Essay on the Vita Nuova*, whose author, with profundity and exactness combined, attempts to reenact before the American reader one artistic master-work difficult of access, lead us farther into the inner sanctum of medieval poetry. Such books truly interpret the individual work of art while Curtius informs us, more completely than his predecessors, about its general background.

Curtius' chapter (18) on Dante which is intended by the author as the summit of his edifice seems to me singularly disappointing: the discussions on the rhetorical and Latinizing character of Dante's poetry, on the medieval genre represented by the *Commedia*, on the number of personages introduced into that work (Curtius uses here statistics in order to prove *Zahlenkomposition*) do not furnish the proper pedestal for the statue of Dante at the end, moulded in a Stefan George manner:

Dante, the *one* man who *alone* opposes, and transforms, the whole "Bildungskosmos des lateinischen Mittelalters." Singleton's monograph, on the contrary, shows us that progress in Dantean philology is not to be expected from trite classifications, but from a closely knit demonstration of the manner in which Dante's aesthetic and moral tenets became with him principles and problems of artistic composition. He is not satisfied with the statement of fact that in the *V. N.* there is number symbolism but shows how the principle  $9 (= 3 \times 3) + 1 = 10$  presides over the composition of the whole work: he is not satisfied with the fact that there are Latin sentences in the *V. N.*, but shows their exact functions. He is not satisfied with such a shallow statement as Curtius' that chapter 25, with its discussion of the use of the figure of speech "Amore," is "not convincingly motivated" and, therefore, can only be explained by Dante's wish "to prove his rhetorical training" (here, suddenly, Curtius seems to espouse Miss Burkart's term "bildungsbeweisend"—but this time in reference to Dante!!), but shows how central is chapter 25 in the *V. N.*, since it serves to delimit the position of the human *poeta* in relation to the divine Maker.

Curtius' great book is a powerful synthesis. As such, it opens the way to, and requires, a new synthesis that transcends it.

Two remarks on detail:

There is in Curtius a certain bias against French classicism. We may be shocked by the somewhat trenchant manner in which Curtius disposes of this period according to his personal likes and dislikes. French classicism, we are told, is due to a "humanistic misunderstanding" and represents the "rational basic element of the French mind" (p. 268; is Racine *only* rational? moreover, on p. 197 we had learnt that it is of "minimal scholarly value" to "hypostasize" a national psychology—whom are we to believe, the Curtius of p. 268 [and of the *Essai sur la France*] or the Curtius of p. 197?). Again: "Boileau, dieser beschränkte Banause"—does Curtius not recognize that Boileau, if negligible as an original critical thinker, has been able to make critical theory *poetic* (in Valéry's formula: *de faire chanter les idées*)? Why must Curtius jeer at Boileau's "Enfin Malherbe vint. . . . Et réduisit la Muses aux règles du devoir": "Arme Muse!", instead of accepting the historical fact of seventeenth-century neo-Aristotelian, counterreformational legislation in belles lettres?

Curtius' resentments seem to include the German emigré scholars in Romance who have worked before him in the same direction: there is no mention in his book of Auerbach (whose term *Vulgäranthike* would fit into Curtius' ideological system and whose study of "prefiguration" has dealt, if not for the first time, still most incisively, with a signal medieval topos), of Hatzfeld (to whom we owe such conceptions as "Calderonian résumé," "*veni vidi vici*-style"), or Olschki (who showed us the topos underlying the accounts of medieval and Renaissance explorers) and of myself (for example of my studies on the medieval devices of etymology and gloss—I am not including here my book *Essays on Historical Semantics*, 1948, which Curtius was unable to use, but which comes to the same conclusion as his in the insistence on the importance of late Latin for European semantics).

LEO SPITZER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

LUDWIG RADERMACHER. Weinen und Lachen. Studien über antikes Lebensgefühl. Wien, Rudolf M. Rohrer, 1947. Pp. 220.

Those who, like the present reviewer, have had the privilege of attending the lectures of Ludwig Radermacher over a number of years will welcome this little book as an old acquaintance. The phenomenon of which it tells us has always been one of Radermacher's favorite topics. It is, in one word, the *σπουδογέλοιον*, the immediate proximity or even mutual penetration of grief and joy, fun and earnestness, even of solemnity and lasciviousness—a prominent feature of ancient life and letters. Is it a feature of ancient life only? In the present volume the octogenarian invites us to see the testimony of the ancients against the wide background of universal human experience. Ancient and modern literature, folklore, the history of religion, and to some extent even modern life with its puzzling contrasts and contradictions, all are called upon to bear witness to that surprising polarity of human nature, which cannot bear the burden of life without an occasional escape into exuberant laughter, but which, even in its lightest moods, can never quite forget the dark undercurrent of human existence. There is a comic, and even a grotesque, element in epic and tragic poetry; on the other hand, iambos, fable, comedy, satire are not merely fun for fun's sake; they are always meant to bring home to us some lesson of practical wisdom. *Μηδὲν ἄγαν* is the key to Greek personality. Different from us, the Southerner, now as in times past, does not suppress his feelings; all the more must he strive for the virtue of moderation. Although the ethical theory of the golden mean is comparatively late, the instinct for it was there from the beginning.

If Chesterton once remarked that German scholars have great learning, but do not know how to bear it lightly, this book might have reversed his judgment. Its composition is seemingly loose, the topics follow one another, as it were, by free association, and the whole is barely held together by an approximately historical scheme. All the same, the reader who commits himself to this charming guide is brought safely to his destination and will, at the end of the journey, gratefully admit that he has seen much that lies off the beaten path. The tone is that of cultivated talk, a late descendant of the Horatian *Sermo*, often witty, never tiring. Behind it, however, we feel a deep understanding of human nature, and a willingness to take life easy even when it is pressing hard.

In spite of its light tone, this book is from beginning to end a work of serious scholarship. There is no vagueness about anything, no cheap generalizing, no theories built in the clouds. Elusive as its subject, the foundations for its study have been laid by an expert craftsman. Documentation is carefully selected from a wide range of sources, and flashlights on Greek language and style (it would not be Radermacher, if they were missing) add to its appeal.

To cover satisfactorily an almost inexhaustible subject in two hundred pages of small octavo is certainly a rare achievement. Let us then see how Radermacher has managed to do this.

After a brief statement of the problem in general terms, Radermacher singles out some famous episodes in Greek literature which bear out his thesis. He dwells at some length on the story of Polyphemos and its ethnological parallels. The comparison with primi-

tive folktales brings out most strikingly the art of the epic poet; his, in all probability, has been the merit of combining burlesque and and horror in an impressive contrast. We find the same technique once more towards the end of the *Odyssey*, where the mock-fight between Odysseus and Iros is a prelude to the killing of Penelope's suitors. Similar in effect is the scene in the *Hekabe* of Euripides where the blinded Polymestor, crawling on hands and feet, makes vain attempts at vengeance. Even Aeschylus relieves his listeners at the climax of the *Choephoroi* by the introduction of the old nurse with her small talk. On the other hand, Aristophanes can be very serious and at times even pathetic; his last comedy, the *Plutus*, is pervaded by the sarcasm of the disillusioned.

If great poetry tolerated the proximity of the sublime and the ridiculous, and occasionally even sought it, this was all the more so in those literary genres which arose more directly out of the people. There was, of course, in antiquity no sharp distinction between the amusements of the upper classes and those of the common crowd. In Horace's *Iter Brundisinum* Maecenas and his entourage burst into laughter over the performance of two low-rate clowns. Fun and laughter do not stop at the gates of religion: travesty, mock disputes, and all sorts of lascivious language were part of the Thesmophoria; Demeter in person had, according to the Homeric hymn, been cured of her grief by the jokes of Iambe. The iambos is, in fact, the literary form *par excellence* in which sorrow mingles with laughter. Another such form is the fable, which, in its beginnings, had not yet an outspoken "moral," but told in a parable some common experience. Here the agent is the beast, "man's unruly brother" (p. 35); this comic element, so familiar to the ancients from their favorite game of *εἰκάζειν*, covers, like a bright garment, the often pessimistic wisdom which the poet wants to teach. Aesop, the "inventor" of the fable, whose life was told in an old popular "novel," was represented as the impersonation of his poetry: his low birth and comic exterior contrast with his knowledge of human nature and his latent gentleness of heart.

The romance of Aesop contains a symposium scene. Now symposia have since time immemorial been the occasion for practising the art of testing wisdom in a playful manner. Such must have been the "Symposium of the Seven Sages" in its original form. We know it only in the late version of Plutarch, who, we must fear, has divested it of much of its original humor. Cleverly and amusingly Radermacher separates the ancient elements from those of Plutarch's making; reflections of the earlier type he finds not only in the story of Aesop, but also in the symposium scene of the Letter of Aristeas.

No symposium has become more famous than Plato's. Can we find the traditional features even there? Radermacher thinks we can. Here, as never before, sublimity of mind has been wedded to gaiety of presentation. Socrates is the very prototype of the *σπουδαῖος*; so he was, in fact, called by Dion of Prusa. This is a new and original approach to the problem of Socratic irony. For this purpose Radermacher musters the writings of the early Socratics and the traditions about them, in particular the works of Xenophon. His *Symposium* and *Memorabilia* are of special interest;

a real masterpiece of subtle irony is the dialogue between Socrates and Theodote.

Thanks to the unique personality of Socrates, the *σπουδαγέλοιον* has become a tradition in post-Socratic philosophy. Diogenes "the Dog" and Timon the Sceptic represent the type most conspicuously, but, somewhat subdued, it is present in many, even in Plato. With a wink of his eye, Radermacher lays bare this hidden vein in the "divine" philosopher. We cast a glance at Bion and Menippus, a good word is said for Lucian, some sidelights fall on Hellenistic philosophy in ancient Rome; then, at the end of this chapter, we meet with the name of Horace.

*Verba docent, exempla trahunt.* What comes now is not a study of Horace, but an interpretation of *Satire*, II, 6. No better choice of a single piece could have been made. This little work integrates all the various elements of Horace's *Sermones*, satire and idyll, philosophy and fable, in the most perfect way and presents them to the reader with an ease and grace that is uncommon even in Horace. After a short introduction, Radermacher gives a German translation with a brief, but really illuminating commentary (the very contrary of the traditional *commentarius perpetuus*); then follows the original text with a select *apparatus criticus*. In similar manner Radermacher presents, in an appendix, some selections from Greek literature which illustrate certain aspects of his subject: the iamboi on women by Semonides of Amorgos, an episode from the romance of Aesop, Socrates and Theodote from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Lysias' defence of the cripple ("a not altogether sympathetic personality"), and an anecdote from Galen's *περὶ ψυχῆς παθῶν*. In the edition of these texts Radermacher gives fresh evidence of his keen sense for the subtleties of language. In particular, we find a number of important emendations, made in modest anonymity, on the text of Semonides, e. g. *χέει* for *ἔχει* at v. 20, or *τέρπεται* (for *πέλεται*) at v. 100. Nice is also the question mark after *ἀναπαίσεις* towards the end of Xenophon, *Mem.*, III, 11, 10. I am somewhat doubtful about *Vita Aesopi*, I, 12, 6 (the sheep) *ἐκείνα τὰ συνήθη καὶ μόνά <δόκιμα> δοκεῖ πείσασθαι*. I feel pretty sure that the corruption must be sought in the words *καὶ μόνά*.<sup>1</sup>

To conclude with some remarks on one detail. An interesting parallel to the gruesome buffoonery of Polymestor (p. 29) is the scene in Hroswith's *Dulcitius*, where the tyrant, lustful for the Christian girls in his prison, wanders around in the dark vaults and, in his mad fury, embraces some rusty pots; with a contrast similar to those in ancient poetry, this scene is followed by the martyrdom of the three virgins.

The book is well produced: good paper, clear letter-press, and a simple, but tasteful cover. The number of misprints is negligible.

Radermacher's latest opus leaves the reader with the consoling assurance that even the turmoil of the present times can be borne not only with the stern *σπουδή* of the stoic, but also in the milder spirit of the *σπουδαγέλοιος*, who has learned from the Roman poet the art of *ridentem dicere, verum*.

LUDWIG BIELER.

NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY.

<sup>1</sup> I suggest *ἐκείνα τὰ συνήθη μόνά προσδοκᾷ πείσασθαι*. At the bottom of the MSS reading would then lie the misreading of a *προς*-symbol as *καὶ*.



VICTOR EHRENBURG. *Aspects of the Ancient World. Essays and Reviews.* New York, William Salloch, 1946. Pp. ix + 256; 4 pls. \$4.50.

This collection of fifteen papers—some new, others previously published—will appeal chiefly, I think, to those who are interested in learning the mature conclusions and convictions of a distinguished scholar on a variety of subjects. Professor Ehrenberg is a well-known classicist formerly at Prague University and now at the University of London. One purpose of his book—and it must be one of the highest purposes of scholarship—is to show the importance of antiquity for an understanding of the present, and there are few persons who will not be fascinated, in page after page, by Ehrenberg's breadth of knowledge and skill of presentation. We may differ with his estimate (and certainly with the unfortunate photograph) of Nefretete as "the most perfect illustration of the ideal of female beauty as cherished by our own times," and we may assert that he is wrong when he says that the art, as well as the music, "of the negroes became the fashion of the early twentieth century," but there is no doubt whatever of his ability to illumine a point, and even an era, by broad and interesting and profound strokes of the brush. Ehrenberg, moreover, makes many acute observations on specialized details. His chapter on Athenian Coinage, for example, is a review of Seltman's *Athens, Its History and Coinage before the Persian Invasion*, and since it originally appeared in 1926 in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, it is well to be reminded of his doubts concerning Pre-Solonian issues and the Pangaeian coinage of Peisistratus. The chapter on Early Athenian Colonies, originally published in 1939 in *Eunomia* (a short-lived periodical of Prague), is a brilliant exposition of the theme "that the features of fifth-century policy had their true origin in the policy of sixth-century Athens." And yet, I am not sure that it is correct to speak of this book as always embodying Ehrenberg's mature conclusions and convictions, for I think one weakens his case when he includes references to specific current events: not only do they become quickly dated, but they are open to varying interpretation and endless argument. For example, the chapter on Alexander the Great ends with a hurried paragraph headed "Postscript 1944," in which Ehrenberg protests against Shaw's comparison of Hitler with Alexander in his *Everybody's Political What's What*.

Another weakness of this book—if indeed these are weaknesses—is that some of the essays are for fellow-scholars, others for a more general public. Ehrenberg hopes "that each group of readers will find it possible to accept those articles which are less in their own line." I doubt that a collection of essays—some scholarly, others not—can aim with complete success at two so different audiences; one may write for both audiences at the same time, but I believe the style and technique should remain constant. Nor is it always easy to decide which essay is intended for which group, and to judge it accordingly. The final paper, "The Ancient World and Europe"—written "a few weeks after VE-Day"—is probably for the layman, as are "The Beginnings of European History," "The Greek Coun-

try and the Greek State," and "A Totalitarian State," which was broadcast in German from Prague in 1934, while "Tragic Heracles," "The Early History of the Etruscans," "Eduard Meyer," and "Essays in Historical Criticism," which is an hitherto unpublished review of Gomme's *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (with a reference to Gomme's "sharp sarcasm"), are probably for the scholar.

But if the article on Alexander (originally an address given before an English classical meeting in 1941, "after experiencing the events of 1940 and 1941") is for the general reader, it is not well-rounded; the scholar, on the other hand, may question several interpretations. It is surprising, for example, that one who has previously published a paper on Alexander's *Pothos* (longing) should say here that "it is in the narrative of the years 353 and 332 that for the first time in our sources" we find a reference to this expression; because Arrian speaks of Alexander's "longing" to cross the Danube, and whatever importance there is in *Pothos* must, consequently, be transferred to this earlier period. I doubt that "Egypt was the first of Alexander's conquests that had an old civilization of its own" (Phoenicia had just been conquered); the interpretation of the visit to Siwah on religious grounds strikes me as uninspired (it was militarily important to confirm the fact of the Libyan desert); something wider than vengeance for the burnt Greek temples of 480 was responsible for the burning of the palace at Persepolis (it signified the end of an era); the Greek troops were not merely "dismissed" at Ecbatana, thus ending the fiction of a Panhellenic campaign: many availed themselves of the opportunity to reenlist and marched thenceforth as part of the imperial army, which has its own implications for Alexander's policy toward his vast state; Bessus was executed for his opposition to Alexander, not for the murder of Darius (others got off). When one reads of "revolts and conspiracies . . . suppressed . . . with the harshness and arbitrariness of an Asiatic despot," he naturally concludes that the execution of Parmenio is uppermost in the writer's mind, and yet there is no doubt that the execution was judicial. It is untrue that Alexander "learned that there was no Eastern Ocean"; he thought it lay just beyond the Hyphasis, where mutiny stopped him. It is also untrue that "in a huge festival Alexander gave away thousands of Asiatic women to Macedonian officers and soldiers"; these thousands had already married and now received presents. The mutiny at Opis did not lead to a "compromise," for Alexander sent home exactly the troops originally planned. I think it unfortunate to notice seriously those fantastic, and demonstrably unhistorical, last plans of Alexander (Alexander's so-called Memoirs in Diodorus), which included "a road along the whole shore of North Africa (the road now partly built by Mussolini and used in the African war)" and so on. You come out roughly at the same place—at the fact of Alexander's ambition to conquer the West—if you approach the problem from the point of view of Alexander's germinating ideas in Turkestan and India, mentioned by Arrian; perhaps it is all debatable, but the problem can be approached and argued only on those grounds—that is to say, whether or not Arrian is there correct, and his sources are quite different, it may be added, from the ones he used after Alexander's return to Mesopotamia.

To write for the layman as well as the scholar, to interpret antiquity for the present, these are noble, albeit difficult, aims, but they are utterly essential if our research is to have any validity. Let us, therefore, salute Professor Ehrenberg for his own particular attempt.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

Galen, *On Medical Experience*. First Edition of the Arabic Version with English Translation and Notes by E. WALZER. London, Published for the Trustees of the Late Sir Henry Wellcome by the Oxford Univ. Press, 1944. Pp. xi + 1-83 (Arabic text) + 85-155 (English translation and Greek fragments) + 156-164 (Notes and parallel passages).

Except for two fragments, the Greek text of Galen's work *On Medical Experience* is no longer extant. About the middle of the ninth century, however, Hunain ibn Iṣḥāq translated the book from Greek into Syriac, and shortly thereafter his nephew and pupil, Ḥubaiš ibn al-Ḥasan turned it into Arabic. An eleventh-century copy of this Arabic version, discovered in 1931 in the Aya Sofya Library at Constantinople, has now been edited and translated into English by Prof. Walzer. As a Latin version of Galen's Ὑποτύπωσις ἐμπειρική is the only other fairly detailed exposition of ancient medical empiricism which has come down to us, this publication is of obvious importance to students of ancient medicine, science, and philosophy.

The treatise falls into three main divisions: (1) an introduction (I-II), in which Galen, after affirming his own belief in a union of reason and experience as a proper basis for medical knowledge, ridicules Asclepiades the Bithynian and his followers among the "sophists of today" for rejecting experience; (2) an attack upon experience by a Dogmatist "whose opinion resembles Asclepiades" (III-VII); and (3), following a brief summary of three principal varieties of Dogmatist criticism (VIII), a detailed defence of experience and a counter-attack upon the Dogmatists by "one of the Empiricists, say Menodotus, if you wish, or Serapion, or Theodosius" (IX-XXXI).

Walzer's task in editing and translating the Arabic text was by no means an easy one: he had to work from a single, unvocalized manuscript in which the diacritical points, the sole means of distinguishing between several Arabic consonants, were frequently missing; and while both Hunain and Ḥubaiš were exceptionally able and accurate translators, the chances of misinterpretation are inevitably increased by the fact that the Arabic version was made from a Syriac translation, not directly from the Greek original. Under the circumstances, it is neither surprising that the Arabic text should still stand in need of correction here and there, nor is it a denigration of Walzer's pioneer achievement to suggest that his English rendering has missed the sense of the difficult "translation Arabic" in many passages. The reviewer hopes to publish elsewhere a com-

plete list of his corrections to Walzer's publication, if not a fresh English translation of the entire treatise, since the space which the editor has allotted to this review permits citation here of the merest fraction of the passages which stand in need of revision.

p. 6, lines 9 ff. = p. 89, lines 10 ff.: In Walzer's translation, the Dogmatist is represented as asking: "Or how does one discover that a disease is the same as another disease in all its characteristics?" From this, the reader is likely to think that the Dogmatist's question deals with *two different* diseases; and, as Walzer uses similar language in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter (IV), the reader is apt to become confused. Actually, the Dogmatist is asking how (without the use of "reasoning") disease in any one person may be recognized as the same disease which another person has had. For if a "thing" cannot be recognized to be the same each time it recurs, the Empiricists cannot, as they claim, "see the same thing very many times," and cannot rely upon repeated careful observation for "technical" or authentic knowledge. The sentence should be translated: "Or how may a given case of disease be found to be a certain other (person's) disease in all its characteristics?"—Walzer has read the Arabic here as *marḍun āharu bi-'ainihi*, construing *āharu* = *other*, another as an adjective modifying *marḍun* = *disease*, and so has rendered "the same as another disease." But *bi-'ainihi* cannot mean "the same as"; according to Wright's *Arabic Grammar*, II, 281 D, "*bi-'ainihi* after an indefinite noun means a *certain*." Construing as Walzer has done, we should be obliged to translate: "Or how does one discover that a disease is a certain other disease . . . ?" which is absurd. We should, however, treat *marḍun* as a noun in the construct state and read the Arabic here as *marḍu āhara bi-'ainihi* = *a certain other's disease* or *a certain other's (person's) disease*. Walzer's error is repeated in the last sentence of this chapter. A related error appears in Walzer's translation, p. 124, line 16: "... how it can be that the thing seen 100 times, for instance . . ." should be "... how it can be that the thing seen 100 times in the same form. . . ."

p. 17, lines 10 ff. = p. 98, lines 1 ff.: The second of the three principal varieties of Dogmatist criticism summarized in this section is rendered by Walzer as follows: "Others admit that of the simple, isolated things which in the case of simple symptoms cleave to one's memory, one after the other may be discovered by 'seeing-very-many-times.' But with respect to the other things they reject such a method of discovery, and will have nothing to do with it." Thus rendered, the passage almost defies comprehension; it should be translated as follows: "Others admit that one after the other of the simple, individual things which have been carefully observed and authenticated in regard to simple symptoms might have been discovered by seeing the thing very many times; but as for all other things, they reject and deny their discovery by this method."—In the reviewer's opinion, Walzer has misunderstood the meaning of the verb *ḥafiza* not only here, where it is rendered "cleave to one's memory," but in most of the other 25-odd passages where it occurs. This important term, fortunately, appears in three passages (VII, 3; VII, 5; and XV, 6) where the Greek of the two extant fragments may be compared; and these afford the clue to its meaning; in each case it is the equivalent of *ῥησις* and means *careful observation*.

Frequently in the Arabic text the term appears as *ḥaḥīza bi-r-raṣdi*, to observe by means of watching, observe or study watchfully; and in chapter VI it appears several times in conjunction with *tafaqqada*, to examine attentively. Once something has been "carefully observed" by "seeing it very many times," it is considered authentic, or "technical," by the Empiricists; thus *ḥaḥīza*, as used throughout this treatise, is a technical term meaning *carefully to observe and (hence to) authenticate*. To be sure, *ḥaḥīza* in Arabic also bears a secondary meaning *to learn by heart*, and its verbal noun *ḥifẓun* means not only *attention, watchfulness, care, but memory*. Walzer has gone astray in most of the passages where the term occurs by rendering it in this secondary sense. These passages are too numerous to be noticed here; multiple instances occur in chapters III, VI, VII, X, XXII, XXV, XXVI, XXIX, and XXX.

p. 48, lines 11 ff. = p. 124, lines 4 (bottom) ff.: Walzer: "You will then inevitably have to make one of two answers; either you reject the statement and steadily refuse to admit that he is becoming bald, even if all his hair were to fall out, or should this be quite impossible, when, pray, does he then become bald? Your first assertion would logically involve his becoming bald on the falling out of a single hair." The point of the paradox is lost in Walzer's translation: his misunderstanding of *matā* = *when* as interrogative has led him to introduce a question where none belongs and to separate off the balance of what is really *one* sentence. The passage should read: "You would then necessarily be unable to escape one of two alternatives: either, that you would deny and at no given moment admit that he will have become bald, not even if all his hair should fall out; or, if this be impossible, then whenever you say that he has become bald, and the first time you say this, it necessarily follows that he has become bald only by virtue of the falling out of a single hair."

p. 55, line 1 (bottom) = p. 130, line 16: Walzer: "If they assert in the case of a healthy man and in the case of one to whom anything in general happens, whatever it may be, that he consists of many, we cannot fail to be surprised at their judgment. For if this were the case, then the regulations issued by law-givers, according to which those people who do good gain praise and honour, while people who do what is bad receive admonition and punishment, are useless and absurd, because it is not just nor right that he who is now honoured and rewarded because of a good deed is a different person from the one who has performed any kind of good work, by means of which he deserved just these very benefits. . . ." There are at least three misconstructions of the sense of the Arabic text in this passage: (1) "in the case of one to whom anything in general happens"; (2) "the regulations issued by law-givers"; and (3) "who has performed any kind of good work by means of which he deserved just these very benefits." The passage should be translated: "As for their saying, of anybody who is healthy and of anybody who has any general attribute whatsoever, that he is 'many,' we must marvel at their judgment. For in that event the affirmation of moralists that we owe extreme praise and honor to those who do good, and punishment and chastisement to those who do evil, is useless and nonsensical; since it is surely neither just nor fair that

the person who is presently honored and rewarded for doing good should be another person than the one who had actually done whatever virtuous action the doing of good had called for. . . ."

p. 72, lines 2 (bottom) ff. = p. 145, lines 17 ff.: Walzer: "Perhaps you are doing violence to us and rejecting the authorities or attacking those who in no way deserve it only because it is incumbent on you, seeing that we do not find the (case of the) phrenetic uniform by virtue of reasoning from the visible to the invisible, to hate it and reject it on the ground that it is useless." The word *al-a'imata* = *imams*, which Walzer has rendered "authorities," is clearly an error in the text; the reviewer suggests that the verbal noun *al-wai-mata* = *slander, backbiting* may be the correct reading, as this is supported by the immediately following synonym, *at-ta'na* = *calumniation*. The Arabic words which Walzer has interpreted as "you are doing violence to us" cannot bear this meaning, first, because this would require the verb to govern its object in the accusative instead of being connected with its object by a preposition, as it is here; and secondly, because Walzer's translation simply ignores the accusative which does stand here, namely, *al-amra*. The words should be read *tugallibu 'alainā l-amra*, meaning *you will favor the matter over us*; cf. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, II, 220, s. v. II. The Empiricist is twitting the Dogmatist for favoring the Empiricist principle ("matter") that phrenitis is "one" and not "many" although the Dogmatist logically ought to despise the principle because the Empiricists did not arrive at it by *analogismus*. Translated, the passage reads: "Perhaps you will favor our principle more than you do us and will refrain from slandering or calumniating what does not deserve this; for, in view of the fact that we do not find that the phrenetic is one by means of the reasoning from the manifest to the hidden, it would logically be necessary for you to despise and loathe it as useless."

p. 82, last line ff. = p. 154, lines 20 ff.: Walzer: ". . . 'We for our part do not know the logos and have no idea what it is, while he, on the other hand, is able to make use of what he has discovered and learned.'" Here Walzer has failed to recognize an instance of what the Arab grammarians call *damīru š-šā'ni*, the pronoun of the fact or the story; this 3rd pers. masc. pronoun *-hu*, suffixed to a particle like *inna, walākinna* (as in this passage), frequently represents and anticipates a whole subsequent clause; cf. Wright's *Arabic Grammar*, I, 285A, 293B; II, 81C. The sentence should be translated: ". . . We do not know reascning nor do we know what it is, but what has been discovered and is known can be used."—The Empiricist's point is that utility is the test of knowledge.

ISAAC RABINOWITZ.

ROBERT W. CRUTTWELL. *Virgil's Mind at Work. An Analysis of the Symbolism of the Aeneid.* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1947. Pp. 182.

This is a strange and interesting book. Maintaining that to the prosaic mind a primrose is always a primrose and nothing more, whereas "the poetic mind is one to which things mean something more than themselves," Cruttwell states in his Introduction his intention: "a poem's symbolism will verbally communicate a poet's synthesis of things associated in his mind upon three levels—(1) that of unconscious relation to the poet's own heredity; (2) that of subconscious relation to the poet's own environment; and (3) that of conscious relation to the poet's own identity. To apply these principles analytically to the symbolism of the *Aeneid*, and so to follow Virgil's mind at work upon his synthesis, will be the twofold purpose of this book" (p. ix).

Although the author does not always distinguish clearly between conscious, subconscious, or unconscious symbolism, much of his material must obviously derive from the unconscious recesses of Vergil's mind (or possibly from Cruttwell's interest in primitive religion and ritual patterns?), for it has little relation to the *Aeneid* as most readers know it. The chapter headings ("Venus and Cybele," "Iulus and Julius," "Troy and Rome," "Teucer and Dardanus," "Laomedon and Tiberinus," "Atlas and Hercules," "Shield and Maze," "Vulcan and Vesta," "Hut and Hive," "Urn and House," "Ashes and Spirit," "Tomb and Womb") reveal a gradual withdrawal from the realities of Vergilian interpretation to a thicket of hazardous conjecture. Few readers will quarrel with the poetic fusion of history and legend, the synthesis of Rome's tradition of her early Latin, Sabine, and Etruscan past with those of Crete, Troy, and Greece, as described in the opening chapters. The discussion of the maze-pattern common to the Cretan labyrinth and the Trojan game (cf. W. F. Jackson Knight, *Cumaeae Gates*, pp. 76 ff., 132 ff.) leads to the conclusion that Vergil associates "the idea of the *troia's* dolphin-like maze-pattern both with Augustus as central to Aeneas' shield and with Aeneas as uplifting that shield upon his ship" (p. 97).

But when Cruttwell turns to a consideration of the "unconscious because hereditary Virgilian integration of Vesta's Hearth-fire with Vulcan's Earth-fire" (p. 104) and of Romulus' beehive-hut as "the recognized symbol of Rome's foundation" (p. 119), one has the feeling that the *Aeneid* is left far behind. As the book draws to its close, one can only conclude that Vergil had a crematory complex; cf. p. 160, where Cruttwell calls VII, 462 ff. "an explicitly domestic simile whose crematory implications should by now be clear"; cf. also p. 161: "Turnus' reaction is crematory"; p. 163: "Virgil mentally visualizes the entire Juno-kindled Latin-Dardan war in terms of Vulcan's fire"; p. 164: "the marriage of Aeneas with Lavinia . . . will symbolize an integration . . . of Vesta's domestic hearthfire-spirit and hearthfire-ashes with Vulcan's crematory earthfire-spirit and earthfire ashes."

Part of the difficulty of the book is Cruttwell's style; his sentences are labored and so packed with the data of symbolism that they

lose clarity; e.g. *Troia* is "a name carrying for Virgil's mind not only all the Troadic-Idean associations of Dardanus' Phrygian 'Troy-town,' but also all the Alban-Silvian associations (VI. 756-770) of Iulus' Sicilian 'Troy-game,' whose Cretan-Idean labyrinthine symbolism belongs both to the Iulean-foundation ritual of Lavinium's daughter-city Alba Longa and to the Julian-revival ritual of Alba Longa's daughter-city Rome. (V. 545-602)" (p. 37). Of the omen of the sow in *Aeneid* VIII we read the following: "Since, moreover, the interior of the sow is at once a rapacious tomb for her greedily swallowed food and a capacious womb for her lustily seeded brood, she came in time to symbolize that equivalence of tomb to womb which in her case meant the birth of her jealously heeded brood as resulting from the death of her jealously heeded food" (p. 174); our admiration for the ingenious balance and rhythm of the phraseology almost blinds us to the meaning of the sentence. Vergil descends "into those dreamlands of the unconsciously functioning because hereditarily determined mind-plane wherein are woven the underlying patterns of his poetic symbolism with all their kaleidoscopic surprises" (p. 166), and this symbolism, as Cruttwell tells us again and again, is the integration of the crematory with the domestic; cf. pp. 167 f.: "Virgil's Elysium so integrates the crematory nature of the hearthfire-containing *Volcani domus* with the domestic nature of the hearthfire-containing *Anchisæ domus* as to reproduce unconsciously on the spiritual plane the integrally Vulcanic-Vestal symbolism of that material hut-urn whose life-after-death meaning for Virgil is the House of Dardanus, Teucer's son-in-law and heir."

The reviewer wishes in fairness to point out that in spite of many seemingly improbable conclusions the book is not without value; it deserves (and requires) attentive reading and careful thought. Perhaps the basic thought is best expressed in the author's words on pp. 39 f.: "Indeed, the very keynote of the *Aeneid*, as struck by Virgil himself in its first seven lines, is the idea of continuity, as of a single thread persisting throughout some complicated pattern over far distances of time and space—Troy at the one end of the long series, Rome at the other; with Rome inheriting from the Alban-Silvian height that same racial and religious life which Troy inherited from the Troadic-Idean height. . . . The symbolism of the *Aeneid* is therefore axial, revolving as it were spherically about one central line between two poles—the one pole being a Troy whose symbols are Roman, the other pole a Rome whose symbols are Trojan; and the subjectively Roman thought of the poet travels from Rome to Troy, while the objectively Trojan theme of the poem travels from Troy to Rome."

The book in general is filled with subtle and acute observations; much is possible but seems hardly probable. The author pushes too far his observations on fire and bees and beehive-huts, and disregards the fact that smiles drawn from fire phenomena and from bees are a part of Vergil's conscious treatment of literary tradition; e.g., cf. *Aen.* VI, 707 f. (discussed on pp. 141 f.) with Homer, *Iliad*, II, 87 ff. and Apollonius, *Argonautica*, I, 879 ff. Is Dardanus really interpreted by Vergil as "the 'king'-bee whose figurative equivalent is Aeneas" (p. 139)? Is it true that "the *Aeneid*'s primary symbol for Virgil's mind, upon its level of unconscious relation to his own



heredity, might well be a beehive-hut" (p. 119)? Is Vergil's mind, consciously or unconsciously, so wrapped up with crematory notions? To this reviewer (who possibly still sees a bit of the primrose) much of the *Aeneid* is lost when almost everything means something else. Does Vergil have an "early Latin" mind, so that he is primarily interested in a "Trojan-Roman tomb-womb equivalence"—"the reincarnational equivalence of the entombment of Dardanus' Troy for eventual resurrection to an enwombment of Romulus' Rome for eventual birth" (pp. 169 f.)? Vergil's mind was undoubtedly at work upon other problems also. What of his architectonic power in constructing incidents and episodes, what of his narrative ability, his superb delineation of character, his interest in dramatic effects? These too are a part of Vergil's *Aeneid*. In this respect, the title of Cruttwell's book is misleading. Readers will find much in the book to ponder, on—let them not be disappointed that it does not deal more closely with the *Aeneid*.

GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

---

ALFRED ERNOUT. *Philologica*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1946.  
Pp. vi + 232.

This volume is a selection from among the shorter works of the French scholar who has made such important contributions to the study of the Latin language. The first article, entitled *Le Vocabulaire latin*, appears here in print for the first time, having been delivered as an inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in December, 1945. It is quite general in character, dealing largely with the external history of Latin, and devoting considerable attention to the influence of Christianity on the language. All the other articles had been previously published over a period extending from 1921 to 1946, some in journals which are now difficult of access.

An examination of the table of contents will show that most of the articles deal with matters of vocabulary and word-formation. Only one, No. 15 (*Revue de Philologie*, 1945, pp. 93-115, though the usual reference to the original source is here omitted, and the heading is merely accompanied by the phrase *A. M. Einar Löfstedt*), treats a general problem of syntax, the functions of the Greek infinitives and the Latin gerunds and allied verbal forms, with emphasis on the fundamental difference between the two languages in the structure and use of the non-finite verb. No. 2 discusses the Etruscan element in the Latin vocabulary, taking account of semantic classes and tentatively proposing Etruscan origin for many words as an experimental basis for future investigations. No. 3 illustrates the effect of popular etymology on meaning as exemplified by the association set up between *adolēre* and *adolēscere*: when the semantic development *burn* (a sacrificial offering) > *make burn* (an altar with gifts) > *load* (an altar with gifts) > *increase* had been completed, *abolēre* was built as a negative to *adolēre*. No. 4 deals with the formation and history of the verbs *lactāre* and *lactēre*. No. 5 rejects the etymology which

derives *augur* from the roots of *avis* and *gero*, and defends the old association of *augur*, *augeo*, *augustus*. No. 6 deals with words having the suffixes *-cen*, *-cimum*, *-cino(r)*, and their extension beyond the semantic sphere of the notion *seng*, a process in which *tirocinium* played an important part. No. 7 illustrates the interference of homonyms by tracing the history of *crēvi*, perfect of *cerno* and *crēsko*; *crēvi* from *crēsko*, but *decrēvi* from *decerno*; tended to predominate. No. 8 deals with the distinction between *cruor* and *sanguis*, the formation of *cruentus*, and the semantic development of *crudus*, whose use in active and passive senses is compared to the two-fold use of *surdus* and *caecus*. No. 9 deals with the replacement of *domus* and *fores* by *casa*, *mansio*, and *porta* and the social factors connected with these substitutions. No. 11 treats the early use of *ilico* and *ilicet*, their subsequent decline, and the slight stimulus given to the use of *ilicet* in late authors after Vergil had employed it in the meaning of the metrically unsuitable *ilico*. In No. 12 the irregular declension of *senex* leads to a detailed discussion of nouns with *k*-suffix in Latin, among which several fairly well-defined semantic classes appear. No. 13, on nouns in *-āgo*, *-īgo*, *-ūgo*, has a close connection with the preceding article, not only on the morphological side, since both deal with guttural suffixes, but also on the semantic side, since the formations described in both articles were extensively used in medical, botanical, and other scientific terminology. Articles 10 and 14 deal with problems of text and interpretation in two literary passages. In 10 the author proposes to take the troublesome *ferae pecudes* in Lucretius, I, 14 as a pair of coördinate substantives used asyndetically, an ingenious suggestion partially anticipated by Bentley's emendation *ferae et pecudes*. In 14 he argues against Bonazzi's proposal to read *te nantis* for Scaliger's generally adopted *Teuthrantis* in Propertius, I, 11, 11, and shows that *nantis* cannot be construed as a partitive with *te*. The passages used as support by Bonazzi lead to a discussion of Löfstedt's theory that a genitive participle may stand in agreement with a *dativus sympatheticus*, a view which Ernout rejects. The last article deals with *senectus*, *iuventus*, *servitus*, and *virtus*, their distinction from cognate words of other stems, the legal and social factors which for a time preserved them, and their eventual fate.

The selection included in this volume is not a fortuitous one. The articles are not arranged in chronological order, but they have been chosen with the intention of illustrating the methods to be employed in etymological investigations, and they reveal a certain unity of doctrine. Special attention is given to the effect of social forces on the vocabulary of the language, whether shown in the replacement of words by synonyms with slightly different connotations or in the preservation of form-classes not well adapted for survival (e.g. *senectus*, etc.). The present volume shows in detailed form a small sample of the material which must have been collected and examined before being more succinctly presented in the *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*. Whoever reads it will learn many valuable lessons in Latin linguistic history.

On p. 23 the reference to Plautus' *Persa* should be to the *Poenulus*. On p. 54 read *Moret*. 38 for *Moret*. 27. On p. 55 read *Truc*. 366 for *Truc*. 336. On p. 79 three lines from the bottom *fūbicen* requires a macron over the second *i*. On p. 93 read *Aen*. 12, 905 for *Aen*.

12, 205. On p. 127 read *Ci. 685* for *Ci. 865*. On p. 135 read *Capt. 69* for *Cas. 69*. On p. 162 in the quotation from Brugmann the Old Church Slavic words *ovica*, *otici*, etc. should be preceded by the designation *aksl*.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

E. A. THOMPSON. *The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus*. Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, Macmillan Company, 1947. Pp. xii + 145. \$2.50.

"Diligence and accuracy" says Gibbon, "are the only merits which an historical writer may ascribe to himself"; and after utilizing Ammianus as his chief source for the period (353-378 A. D.) covered by Ammianus' extant work, he concludes: "It is not without the most sincere regret, that I must now take leave of an accurate and faithful guide, who has composed the history of his own times, without indulging the prejudices and passions, which usually affect the mind of a contemporary." Prof. Thompson (now of King's College, London), in this admirable study of a strangely neglected author, subjects this problem of his impartiality to a painstaking scrutiny, based on an extraordinary acquaintance with the works of his contemporaries. He admits some evidence of hero-worship, and of the influence of the savage censorship under several of the emperors; but his conclusion agrees in general with Gibbon's. Indeed, he rates Ammianus superior in this respect to Tacitus, and also in his remarkable talent for depicting character. He feels "that Ammianus' pictures of Constantius, Julian, Jovian, Valentinian, and Valens will stand for ever substantially unchanged."

Ammianus seems to have been soon neglected in antiquity; Priscian and Cassiodorus are apparently the only writers familiar with his work. But 9th century scribes resurrected him; the Renaissance MSS and editions are all based ultimately on archetypes from Fulda and Hersfeld. With the invention of printing, his value was recognized; the editio princeps, based as so often on an inferior MS, came out in 1474; and in 1609 that doughty translator Philemon Holland turned the history into noble Elizabethan English, "albeit this enterprise seemed unto mee more than difficult, considering the harsh stile of the Author, a Souldior, and who being a Grecian borne, delivered these Hystorically reports in Latine." Thompson remarks that "his native Greek shines through it on every page"; yet few foreigners have ever striven more manfully to master a language not their own. He must have known Cicero and Livy almost by heart. In a Yale seminar we were studying the corrupt passage (XIV, 6, 6): "per omnes tamen quotque sunt partes quae terrarum," variously mutilated by emending scholars. Bearing in mind that the Fulda MS had been copied from an Insular one, the late Laura Seguire made a brilliant guess: "quot orae sunt partesque terrarum"; and we

found that combination at once in Cicero (*N. D.*, II, 66, 164). Rolfe points out how this style was complicated by Ammianus' adoption of the accentual cursus, which Harmon had shown casts new light on Latin pronunciation of that period.

Thompson deplores the fact that all modern texts of Ammianus are out of print and difficult for the student to obtain, except Rolfe's Loeb edition, to which I feel he does not do full justice; and the publisher's stock of the Loeb series was mostly destroyed by a German bomb. Likewise there has been no complete commentary since Wagner's of 1808. Few authors offer such an attractive task to an ambitious scholar; Thompson's careful work is a valuable introduction. In great detail he analyzes what we know of Ammianus' life and preparation for his work, as a staff officer active from Germany to Persia; his relation to other writers; his thorough utilization of his reading and his shrewd observations during his campaigns; his highly competent geographical excursions; and his keen characterizations of the leading Romans of his time. For both historian and classical scholar, Thompson has done a great service. When I, a Fellow in our Roman School in 1899, decided to take Ammianus as a subject for text study, Traube warned me that Petschenig might be contemplating an edition. So I wrote him; in his reply he said he was too old and busy, and continued: "I am extraordinarily rejoiced that a young scholar proposes to devote himself to the exceedingly difficult but highly rewarding task of editing Ammianus." May some young American scholar find the same stimulus in Thompson's superb introduction to the man whom he considers the greatest of Roman historians.

CHARLES UPSON CLARK.

NORTH HATLEY, QUEBEC.

---

T. B. L. WEBSTER. *Political Interpretations in Greek Literature.* Manchester, Manchester Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. vii + 149. 7s. 6d. (*Publ. of the Univ. of Manchester, Classical Series, No. VI.*)

The author has stated his purpose in writing this book: "to try and see what were the essential ideas of ancient democracy, how they arose, what were the difficulties encountered by full democracy, and what the remedies proposed." The method followed in fulfilling this purpose consists of a chronological survey of Greek political practices with a running commentary of pertinent passages from Greek literature from Homer to Aristotle. Because of the provenience of most of the literature both the commentary and the survey are fairly limited to the Athenian point of view from the sixth century through the fourth.

The generally accepted views on Homeric monarchy with its feudal tendency toward Hesiodic aristocracy and its single seed of democratic revolution, Thersites, are summarized and illustrated. The earliest growth of settled, working communities and of an impersonal common law, the necessary forerunner of democracy, is seen in Hesiod's *Works and Days* as the new wealth of commerce and in-

dustury weakened the power of land-owning aristocrats. The era of elected arbitrators and self-appointed tyrants who facilitated the transition from aristocracy to democracy is reflected in the elegiac and lyric poets alongside the new realization of human moral responsibility on the part both of dwindling aristocrats and pioneer democrats. Aeschylus is seen as epitomizing in mythology the total victory of democracy in Athens and her allies in opposition to the temporarily pacified aristocrats at home, represented by the Eumenides, and abroad. Various authors of the fifth century contribute to the picture of Athens as the political "School of Hellas," with its emphasis on individual responsibility, the moral and philosophical justification of democracy, and the concept of justice, both natural and human. The ideological conflict of the Peloponnesian War is highlighted by the penetrating observation of Thucydides and Aristophanes, both of whom deprecated the post-Periclean demagoguery and the extremes to which the policy of "might makes right" was carried and heralded the rule of law which became the leading idea of the fourth century in Athens. The writers of this century contribute a systematization of political theory and philosophy based on the practice of the previous centuries and the new growth of rhetoric. Symptomatic of the failure of full democracy are not only the conflicting remedies offered by Isocrates and Demosthenes but also the vast scholarly work of comparative politics undertaken by Aristotle to determine the strengths and weaknesses of this and other forms of government. Finally, the conclusion suggests what the modern political animal can learn from the successes and failures, the concepts and experience of the ancient Greeks.

It seems to me dangerous, especially in a book which attempts to apply the lessons of the past to the problems of the present, to indulge in the "modernist fallacy," whether in small matters like the "Athenian national anthem" (p. 22), or in larger matters like the references to political parties (pp. 45 ff.) without careful distinction between the ancient and modern concepts. The exact nature of ancient political parties has yet to be determined. But Webster has pointed out (p. 48) that the history of the democratic development could also be viewed as the history of great men and their contributions. The latter view is the one taken by most Greek authors, whether because it was easier for them to understand personal agencies or because it was actually men rather than party platforms that inspired loyalty and implemented democratic advances.

As always in culling historical material from the dramatists, there is a temptation to credit the poet with all the views of his characters, but Webster has little excuse for yielding to the temptation (p. 69) since the mere fact that the views existed for expression is all that is necessary to his purpose. There is some doubt in my mind on one other small point, that the award of the tragic prize to Sophocles by the *strategoï*, of which Cimon was one, in 468 B. C. (p. 28) can be accepted as proof that Aeschylus was a democrat. But the book as a whole is an admirable and dynamic synthesis of generally accepted facts and interpretations; it proves that the adage "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" has valuable application even to classical scholarship.

MABEL LANG.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under Books Received. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Aalto (Pentti). Untersuchungen über das lateinische Gerundium und Gerundivum. Helsinki, *Suomalainen Tiedekatemia*, 1949. Pp. 193. (*Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae*, Ser. B, Tom. 62, 3.)

Albenque (Alexandrè). Les Rutènes. Études d'histoire, d'archéologie et de toponymie Gallo-Romaines. Paris, *P. Carrere-Rodes*, 1948. Pp. 338. 550 fr.

Alföldi (Andrew). The Conversion of Constantine and Pagan Rome. Translated by Harold Mattingly. Oxford, *Clarendon Press*, 1948. Pp. vi + 140. \$4.50.

Ames (Russell). Citizen Thomas More and his Utopia. Princeton, *Princeton Univ. Press*, 1949. Pp. 250. \$3.50.

App (Austin J.). The True Concept of Literature. Eight Reprinted and Two Original Articles. San Antonio, Texas, *The Mission Press*, 1948. Pp. v + 100. \$1.00.

Atkins (Stuart Pratt). The Testament of Werther in Poetry and Drama. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1949. Pp. xii + 322. \$4.50. (*Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature*, XIX.)

Bellinger (Alfred R.). The End of the Seleucids. Reprinted from *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XXXVIII (June, 1938), pp. 51-102.

Benveniste (E.). Noms d'agent et noms d'action en Indo-Européen. Paris, *Adrien-Maisonneuve*, 1948. Pp. 174. (*Ouvrage publié avec le concours du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*.)

Boerma (R. E. H. Westendorp). P. Vergilii Maronis Libellus qui inscribitur *Catalepton*, Pars Prior. Groningen, *DeWaal*, 1949. Pp. xlix + 168.

Brandenstein (Wilhelm), ed. Frühgeschichte und Sprachwissenschaft. Wien, *Gerold & Co.*, 1943. Pp. 190. \$4.00.

Brelch (Angelo). Die geheime Schützgottheit von Rom. Zürich, *Rhein-Verlag*, 1949. Pp. 64. (*Albae Vigiliae*, N. F., Heft VI.)

Bröcker (Walter), Dornseiff (Franz), Lewy (Ernst). Lexis. Studien zur Sprachphilosophie, Sprachgeschichte und Begriffsforschung. Band I. Herausgegeben von Johannes Lohmann. Lahr, *Moritz Schauenburg*, 1948. Pp. 304. DM. 16.

Carrière (Jean). Théognis de Mégare. Étude sur le recueil élégiaque attribué à ce poète. Bordas, 1948. Pp. 306.

Carrière (Jean). Théognis, Poèmes élégiaques. Texte établi et traduit. Paris, *Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1948. Pp. 138. (*Collection des universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*.)

Cary (Earnest). The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus with an English Translation on the basis of the version of Edward Spelman, Vol. VI, Books IX (25-71) and X. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *William Heinemann*, 1947. Pp. v + 169. \$2.50 (leather \$3.50). (*Loeb Classical Library*, No. 378.)

Cazzaniga (Ignazio), ed. De Lapsu Susannae (De Lapsu Virginibus Consecratae) Incerti Auctoris. Torino, *Società per azioni G. B. Paravia e C.*, 1948. Pp. lxxvii + 81. Lire 480. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum.*)

Cazzaniga (Ignazio), ed. De Virginibus, Libri Tres, S. Ambrosii Mediolanensis Episcopi. Torino, *Società per azioni G. B. Paravia e C.*, 1948. Pp. xxxli + 94. Lire 450. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum.*)

Cazzaniga (Ignazio). Note Ambrosiane: Appunti intorno allo stile delle Omelie Virginali. Milan, *Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino*, 1948. Pp. 95.

Courcelle (Pierre). Les lettres grecques en Occident. De Macrobie à Cassiodore. Nouvelle édition revue et augmentée. Paris, *E. de Boccard*, 1948. Pp. xvi + 440. (*Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, Fasc. 159.)

Curtius (Ernst Robert). Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter. Bern, *A. Francke Ag.*, 1948. Pp. 601.. 44 Swiss fr.

Della Corte (Francesco). Catone Censore. La vita e la fortuna. Torino, *Rosenberg & Sellier*, 1949. Pp. 190.

Della Valle (Eugenio). I Contendenti. Menandro. Bari, *Gius. Laterza e Figli*, 1949. Pp. 154. (*Biblioteca di Cultura Moderna.*)

Dumbarton Oaks Papers, No. 4. Edited for the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection of Harvard University, Washington, D. C. by the Committee on Publications. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1948. Pp. 305. \$7.50.

Edsman (Carl-Martin). Ignis Divinus. Le feu comme moyen de rajeunissement et d'immortalité: contes, légendes, mythes et rites. Lund, *G. W. K. Gleerup*, 1949. Pp. 305. 13 kr. (*Skrifter utgivna av Vetenskaps-Societeten i Lund*, 34.)

Freeman (Kathleen). Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1948. Pp. ix + 162.

Goldschmidt (Victor). La religion de Platon. Paris, *Presses Universitaires de France*, 1949. Pp. xi + 156. 200 fr. (*Mythes et Religions*, 25.)

Gries (Konrad). Constancy in Livy's Latinity. New York, *King's Crown Press*, 1949. Pp. 176. (Privately printed for the author.)

Grismer (Raymond Leonard). The Influence of Plautus in Spain before Lope de Vega together with Chapters on the Dramatic Technique of Plautus and the Revival of Plautus in Italy. New York, *Hispanic Institute in the United States*, 1944. Pp. 210.

Haarhoff (T. J.). The Stranger at the Gate. Aspects of Exclusiveness and Co-operation in Ancient Greece and Rome, with some Reference to Modern Times. Oxford, *Basil Blackwell*, 1948. Pp. xii + 354. \$3.75.

Hammerich (L. L.). Laryngeal before Sonant. Copenhagen, *Binar Munksgaard*, 1948. Pp. 90. (*Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Historisk-Filologiske Meddelelser*, Bind XXXI, Nr. 3.)

*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Volume LVIII-LIX. Edited by Committee of Classical Instructors in Harvard University. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*; London, *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press*, 1948. Pp. 234.

Heinimann (Felix). Nomos und Physis. Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts. Basel, 1945. Pp. 221.

Höistad (Ragnar). *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*. Uppsala, 1946 (B. H. Blackwell, Ltd.). Pp. 233. 12 s.

Howald (Ernst). *Die Kultur der Antike*. Zürich, *Artemis*, 1948. Pp. 272.

Howe (Susanne). *Novels of Empire*. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1949. Pp. 186. \$2.75.

Janáček (Karel). *Prolegomena to Sextus Empiricus*. Pp. 64. (*Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis*, 4.)

Johnson (Allan Chester) and West (Louis C.). *Byzantine Egypt: Economic Studies*. Princeton, *Princeton Univ. Press*, 1949. Pp. v + 344. \$5.00.

Jones (A. H. M.). *Constantine and the Conversion of Europe*. London, *Hodder and Stoughton Ltd. for the English Universities Press*, 1948. Pp. 271. 5 s. (*Teach Yourself History Series*.)

Katz (Blanche). *La Prise d'Orange* according to MS. A1 Bibliothèque Nationale Française 774 including excerpts, published for the first time, from MSS. B1, C, D, and E, variants from MSS. A2, A3, A4, and B2; with Introduction, Table of Assonances, Glossary and Table of Proper Names. New York, *King's Crown Press*, 1947. Pp. xxxv + 209; 4 pls. \$2.75. Offset.

Kayser (Wolfgang). *Das sprachliche Kunstwerk. Eine Einführung in die Literaturwissenschaft*. Bern, *A. Francke Ag.*, 1948. Pp. 438. 23.50 Swiss fr.

Kerényi (Karl). *Niobe. Neue Studien über antike Religion und Humanität*. Mit 6 Kunstdrucktafeln. Zürich, *Rhein-Verlag*, 1949. Pp. 261. 19.50 fr.

Knapp (Lewis Mansfield). *Tobias Smollett, Doctor of Men and Manners*. Princeton, *Princeton Univ. Press*, 1949. Pp. xiii + 362. \$5.00.

Köller (Hermann). *Die Komposition des platonischen Symposions*. Zürich, *Gebr. Leemann & Co.*, 1948. Pp. 112.

Krutch (Joseph Wood). *Comedy and Conscience after the Restoration*. Revised edition. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1949. Pp. x + 300. \$3.75.

Labourt (Jérôme). *Saint Jérôme. Lettres, Tome I*. Paris, *Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres"*, 1949. Pp. lxxvii + 170. (*Collection des universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé*.)

Laughlin (Sister Mary Frances). *The Rethorica Nova* attributed to Jacobus Izelgrinus. Edited from MS. 441 of the Public Library at Bruges with excerpts from the *Tractatus de Coloribus Rethoricis* preserved in the same manuscript. Washington, D. C., *Catholic Univ. of America Press*, 1947. Pp. xlvii + 52.

Lejeune (Albert). *Euclide et Ptolémée. Deux stades de l'optique géométrique grecque*. Louvain, *Bibliothèque de l'Université*, 1948. Pp. 196. (*Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philologie*, 3<sup>e</sup> Sér., Fasc. 31.)

Léonard (Jean; S. J.). *Le Bonheur chez Aristote*. Bruxelles, *Palais des Académies*, 1948. Pp. 323. (*Académie Royale de Belgique Mémoires*, Tome XLIV, fasc. 1.)

Lepper (F. A.). *Trajan's Parthian War*. London, *Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford Univ. Press*, 1943. Pp. xv + 224. \$5.00. (*Oxford Classical and Philosophical Monographs*.)

Lesky (Albin). *Thalatta. Der Weg der Griechen zum Meer*. Wien, *Rudolf M. Rohrer*, 1947. Pp. 341.



Levi (Mario Attilio). *Nerone e i suoi tempi*. Milano, *Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino*, 1949. Pp. 234. (*La Biblioteca Storica Universitaria*, Ser. II, Vol. I.)

Lobel (E.), Wegener (E. P.), Roberts (C. H.), Bell (H. I.), edd. *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part XIX. London, *Egypt Exploration Society*, 1948. Pp. xiv + 180; 13 pls. £2.10.

Loomis (Roger Sherman). *Arthurian Tradition and Chrétien de Troyes*. New York, *Columbia Univ. Press*, 1949. Pp. xiii + 503. \$6.75.

Lord (Louis E.). *A History of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1882-1942*. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1947. Pp. xiv + 397; 43 pls. \$5.00.

Lundström (Sven). *Neue Studien zur lateinischen Irenäus-übersetzung*. Lund, *C. W. K. Gleerup*, 1948. Pp. 234. (*Lunds Universitets Årsskrift*, N. F. Avd. 1, Bd. 44, Nr. 8.)

MacKay (L. A.). *The Wrath of Homer*. Toronto, *Univ. of Toronto Press*, 1948. Pp. vii + 131. \$2.50.

Malcovati (Henrica). *Operum Fragmenta Imperatoris Caesaris Augusti*. Ed. 3. Torino, *Società per azioni G. B. Paravia e C.*, 1938. Pp. lx + 178. (*Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum*.)

Marmorale (Enzo V.). *Cato Maior*. Seconda edizione. Bari, *Gius. Laterza e Figli*, 1949. Pp. 226. (*Biblioteca di Cultura Moderna*, 459.)

Martin (Victor). *La vie internationale dans la Grèce des Cités (VI<sup>e</sup> s. av. J.-C.)*. Geneva, *The Graduate Institute of International Studies*, 1940. Pp. 633.

Maurer (Joseph A.). *A Commentary on C. Suetonii Tranquilli Vita C. Caligulae Caesaris, Chapters I-XXI*. Philadelphia, *Univ. of Pennsylvania*, 1949. Pp. 108. (Diss.)

Merton (Egon Stephen). *Science and Imagination*. Sir Thomas Browne. New York, *King's Crown Press*, 1949. Pp. 156. \$2.50.

Meyer (Ernst). *Römischer Staat und Staatsgedanke*. Zürich, *Artemis*, 1948. Pp. 466. (*Erasmus-Bibliothek*.)

Mondolfo (Rodolfo). *Problemas y metodos de la investigacion en historia de la filosofia*. *Universidad Nacional de Tucuman (Argentina)*, *Instituto de Filosofia*, 1949. Pp. 222.

Mugler (Charles). *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque*. Strasbourg-Zürich, *Éditions P. H. Heitz*, 1948. Pp. xxviii + 427. 2000 fr.

Muller (Siegfried H.). *Gerhart Hauptmann and Goethe*. New York, *King's Crown Press*, 1949. Pp. 113. \$2.50.

Nicoll (Allardyce), ed. *Shakespeare Survey, I. An Annual Survey of Shakespearian Study and Production*. Cambridge, *University Press*; New York, *Macmillan Co.*, 1948. Pp. x + 144; 24 pls. \$3.75.

Nordh (Arvast). *Libellus de Regionibus Urbis Romae*. Lund, *G. W. K. Gleerup*, 1949. (*Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom*, III.)

Organ (Troy Wilson). *An Index to Aristotle in English Translation*. Princeton, *Princeton Univ. Press*, 1949. Pp. vi + 181. \$5.00.

Pariente (A.). *Etimologías Latinas (Porro y cur—Prosperus y pro-perus—Pauper y opiparus)*. Madrid, *Instituto de Filología Antonio de Nebrija*, 1944. (*Emerita*, XII, pp. 84-122.)

Pariente (A.). *Notas al vocabulario jurídico Latino*. Madrid, *Instituto Nacional de Estudios Jurídicos*, 1946. Pp. 31.

Pariente (A.). *Sobre las diferencias de tipo "Facis: Venis" (Una ley fonética Latina correspondient a la de Sievers)*. Madrid, *Instituto de Filología*. (*Emerita*, XIV, pp. 1-81.)

Parrott (Thomas Mare). Shakespearean Comedy. New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. xiv + 417. \$6.50.

Peacy (Howard). The Meaning of the Alphabet. Los Angeles, Murray and Gee, Inc., 1949. Pp. 96. \$3.00.

Pei (Mario A.). French Precursors of the Chanson de Roland. New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. xiv + 105. \$3.00.

Pflaum (H. G.). Le Marbre de Thorigny. Paris, Librairie ancienne Honoré Champion, 1948. Pp. 71. (*Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études*, Fasc. 292.)

Plezia (Marian). De Commentariis Isagogicis. Kraków, 1949. Pp. 109. (*Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Archiwum Filologiczne* Nr. 23.)

Pohlenz (Max). Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1948. Vol. I: Pp. 490. Vol. II, Notes: Pp. 230.

Pyritz (Hans). Goethe und Marianne von Willemer. Eine biographische Studie. Dritte Auflage. Stuttgart, J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1948. Pp. 131.

Resnick (Nathan). Walt Whitman and the Authorship of *The Good Gray Poet*. Brooklyn, Long Island Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. vii + 38. \$1.75.

Rhadamanthus. A Task for Diogenes. Appleton, Wisc., C. C. Nelson Publishing Co., 1947. Pp. 100.

Richard (Marcel). Répertoire des bibliothèques et des catalogues de manuscrits grecs. Paris, Centre de Documentation du C. N. R. S., 1948. Pp. xv + 129. (*Publications de l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes*, I.)

Robinson (David M.). America in Greece; a Traditional Policy. New York, Anatolia Press, 1948. Pp. 195.

Ruysschaert (José). Juste Lipse et les Annales de Tacite. Une méthode de critique textuelle au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Louvain, Bibliothèque de l'Université, Bureau du Recueil, 1949. Pp. xviii + 222. (*Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philologie*, 3<sup>e</sup> Sér., Fasc. 34.)

Ruysschaert (José). Le séjour de Juste Lipse à Rome (1568-1570). Bruxelles, 1947-1948. (*Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome*, Fasc. XXIV, pp. 139-192.)

Ryba (Bohumil), ed. Magistri Iohannis Hus Quodlibet. Disputationis de Quolibet Pragae in Facultate Artium Mense Ianuario Anni 1411 habitae Enchiridion. Prague, Orbis, 1948. Pp. 236.

Sartre (Jean-Paul). What is Literature? Translated from the French by Bernard Frechtman. New York, Philosophical Library, 1949. Pp. 306. \$4.75.

Schmitz (Hermann). Stadt und Imperium. Köln in römischer Zeit. I: Die Anfänge der Stadt Köln und die Ubier. Balduin Pick, Kölner Universitätsverlag, 1948. Pp. 208.

Schneider (Ferdinand Josef). Die deutsche Dichtung der Aufklärungszeit, 1700-1775. Stuttgart, J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1948. Pp. 368. (*Epochen der deutschen Literatur*, Band III, 1.)

Schröer (M. M. Arnold). William Shakespeare, *Othello*. Paralleldruck der ersten Quarto und der ersten Folio mit den Lesarten der zweiten Quarto. Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1949. Pp. xvi + 211. DM. 5.80. (*Englische Textbibliothek, herausg. von Johannes Hoops, Heft 14.*)

Setton (Kenneth M.). Catalan Domination of Athens 1311-1388. Cambridge, The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1948. Pp. xv + 323. \$7.50.

# INDEX TO VOLUME LXX.

	PAGE		PAGE
Addenda to Pages 301, 302		COPLEY, FRANK OLIN. Emo-	
304,	403	tional Conflict and its	
Alexander and Callisthenes,		Significance in the Lesbia-	
	225-248	Poems of Catullus,	22-40
Amphictionique, Note sur l'in-		Critias, The Family of,	404-410
scription, <i>I. G.</i> , II <sup>2</sup> , 1126,			
	189-191	DAUX, GEORGES. Note sur l'in-	
Ancient Instruction in "Gram-		scription Amphictionique	
mar" according to Quin-		<i>I. G.</i> , II <sup>2</sup> , 1126,	189-191
tilian,	337-366	Dramatic Speech, Livy's Use of,	118-141
ANDREWS, ALFRED C. The			
"Sardinian Fish" of the		Emotional Conflict and its Sig-	
Greeks and Romans,	171-185	nificance in the Lesbia-	
Aphrodite, <i>κεαρὸς ἰυὰς</i> and the		Poems of Catullus,	22-40
Saltire of,	1-6	Empedocles' Thought, The	
Aphrodite, Repetition in the		Unity of,	142-158
Homeric Hymn to,	249-272	Epigraphical Notes,	113-117
Aristotle's <i>Poetics</i> , The Word		Euripides, <i>Medea</i> , 160-172. A	
<i>ἐπεισόδιον</i> in,	56-64	New Interpretation,	411-413
Athens, Roman, Patrons Pro-		Family (The) of Critias,	404-410
viding Financial Aid to		<i>Frumentationes</i> and <i>Princeps</i> ,	7-21
the Tribes of,	299-308		
Addenda to Pages 301, 302		Gaius' <i>Institutes</i> , The Text	
and 304,	403	of, and Justinian's <i>Corpus</i> ,	
			394-403
BELLINGER, ALFRED R. The		GILBERT, ALLAN H. The Word	
Text of Gaius' <i>Institutes</i>		<i>ἐπεισόδιον</i> in Aristotle's	
and Justinian's <i>Corpus</i> ,		<i>Poetics</i> ,	56-64
	394-403	Greek Comparative System,	
BOLLING, GEORGE M. On Edit-		The Morphology of the:	
ing the Homeric Poems,		Its Rhythmical and Repe-	
	367-375	titive Features,	159-170
BONNER, CAMPBELL. <i>κεαρὸς ἰυὰς</i>		GRIES, KONRAD. Livy's Use of	
and the Saltire of Aphro-		Dramatic Speech,	118-141
dite,	1-6		
BOOKS RECEIVED, 111-112, 448-452		Heraclitus and Death in Battle	
BROWN, TRUESDELL S. Callis-		(Fr. 24 D),	384-393
thenes and Alexander,		Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite,	
	225-248	Repetition in the,	249-272
Callisthenes and Alexander,		Homeric Poems, On Editing	
	225-248	the,	367-375
Catullus, Emotional Conflict		<i>I. G.</i> , <i>C. I. L.</i> and <i>P. I. R.</i> ,	315-316
and its Significance in		Justinian's <i>Corpus</i> and the	
the Lesbia-Poems of,	22-40	Text of Gaius' <i>Institutes</i> ,	394-403
CHILVER, G. E. F. <i>Princeps</i>			
and <i>Frumentationes</i> ,	7-21		
<i>C. I. L.</i> , <i>I. G.</i> , and <i>P. I. R.</i> ,	315-316		
CLAUSEN, WENDELL. Three			
Notes,	309-315		

	PAGE		PAGE
<i>κεῖρος ἰπῶς</i> and the Saltire of Aphrodite,	1-6	<i>P. I. R., I. G. and C. I. L.,</i>	315-316
KIRK, G. S. Heraclitus and Death in Battle (Fr. 24 D),	384-392	Plautine Chronology,	376-383
Lesbia-Poems of Catullus, Emotional Conflict and its Significance in the,	22-40	PORTER, H. N. Repetition in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite,	249-272
Livy's Use of Dramatic Speech,	118-141	PRATT, NORMAN T., JR. Sophoclean "Orthodoxy" in the <i>Philoctetes</i> ,	273-289
Logic, Stoic, and the Text of Sextus Empiricus,	290-298	<i>Princeps and Frumentationes</i> ,	7-21
LONG, HERBERT S. The Unity of Empedocles' Thought,	142-158	Purpose (The) of Timoleon's Mission,	65-75
MATES, BENSON. Stoic Logic and the Text of Sextus Empiricus,	290-298	Quintilian, Ancient Instruction in "Grammar" according to,	337-366
MINAR, EDWIN L., JR. Parmenides and the World of Seeming,	41-55	Repetition in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite,	249-272
MOORHOUSE, A. C. The Morphology of the Greek Comparative System: Its Rhythmical and Repetitive Features,	159-170	REVIEWS:	
Note on a Digression of Thucydides (VI, 54-59),	186-189	<i>Arrialdi's</i> Da Plauto a Terenzio, I: Plauto (GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH),	221-224
Notes, Epigraphical,	113-117	<i>Bossert and Cambel's</i> Karatepe. A Preliminary Report on a New Hittite Site (JULIUS LEWY),	334-335
Notes, Three,	309-315	<i>Bourne's</i> The Public Works of the Julio-Claudians and Flavians (HERBERT BLOCH),	99-101
Note sur l'inscription Amphictionique I. G., II <sup>2</sup> ,	1126, 189-191	Cambel, <i>see</i> Bossert.	
OLIVER, JAMES H. Patrons Providing Financial Aid to the Tribes of Roman Athens,	299-308	Casey, <i>see</i> Ryan.	
Addenda to Pages 301, 302 and 304,	403	<i>Castelin's</i> The Coinage of Rhesaena in Mesopotamia (J. F. GILLIAM),	101-102
On Editing the Homeric Poems,	367-375	<i>Oreaghan and Raubitschek's</i> Early Christian Epitaphs from Athens (GLANVILLE DOWNEY),	202-205
Parmenides and the World of Seeming,	41-55	<i>Orattwell's</i> Virgil's Mind at Work. An Analysis of the Symbolism of the <i>Aeneid</i> (GEORGE E. DUCKWORTH),	441-443
Patrons Providing Financial Aid to the Tribes of Roman Athens,	299-308	<i>Curtius'</i> Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter (LEO SPITZER),	425-431
Addenda to Pages 301, 302 and 304,	403	<i>de Romilly's</i> Thucydide et l'impérialisme. athénien: la pensée de l'historien et la genèse de l'oeuvre (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR),	105-107
PEARSON, LIONEL. Note on a Digression of Thucydides (VI, 54-59),	186-189		
<i>Philoctetes</i> , Sophoclean "Orthodoxy" in the,	273-289		

	PAGE
<i>Places' Le Pronom chez indare</i> (RICHMOND LATMORE),	107-108
<i>Andberg's Aspects of the ancient World. Essays and Reviews</i> (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.),	435-437
<i>'s Sex. Propertii Eleazarum Liber I (Monoblos), cum prolegomenis, nspectu librorum et commentationum ad IV libros ropertii pertinentium, otis criticis, commenrio exegetico</i> (ARCHIBALD W. ALLEN),	91-95
<i>out's Philologica</i> (JAMES F. POULTNEY),	443-445
<i>ugiere's Liberté et civisation chez les Grecs</i> (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR),	332-334
<i>rgiev's Die sprachliche uehörigkeit der Etrusker</i> (GORDON M. MESSING),	325-327
<i>idtzon's Bakchiastexte und andere Papyri der unter Papyrussammlung</i> (P. Lund Univ Bibl 4) (ELIZABETH H. GILLIAM),	218-221
<i>bert's Die indirekte Rede is künstlerisches Stilmit des Livius</i> (KONRAD),	88-90
<i>Statues on Coins uthern Italy and in the Classical</i> (SARAH ELIZABETH MAN),	103-105
<i>ge's Apotheosis in ncient Portraiture</i> (M. CHARLESWORTH),	328-332
<i>is' Albinos: Épitomé</i> (HAROLD CHERNISS),	76-80
<i>etti's Ara Pacis Augusae</i> (A. W. VAN BUREN),	418-421
<i>gebauer, see Pritchett.</i>	
<i>ok's Die Entdeckung von uropa durch die Griechen</i> (LIONEL PEARSON),	80-84
<i>berg's Beiträge zur ätlateinischen Syntax</i> (EDITH FRANCES CLAFIN),	211-217

	PAGE
<i>Pohlenz's Der Hellenische Mensch</i> (WILLIAM C. GREENE),	84-88
<i>Pritchett and Neugebauer's The Calendars of Athens</i> (MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR),	422-425
<i>Radermacher's Weinen und Lachen. Studien über antikes Lebensgefühl</i> (LUDWIG BIELER),	432-434
<i>Raubitschek, see Creaghan.</i>	
<i>Rozelaar's Lukrez. Versuch einer Deutung</i> (LUDWIG EDELSTEIN),	95-96
<i>Ryan and Casey's Studies and Documents edited by Kirsopp and Silva Lake, XIV: The De Incarnatione of Athanasius, Part I: The Long Recension Manuscripts; Part II: The Short Recension</i> (FREDERICK WALTER LENZ),	102-103
<i>Studies and Documents edited by Kirsopp and Silva Lake, XIV, see Ryan.</i>	
<i>Tarn's Alexander the Great. Vol. I, Narrative; Vol. II, Sources and Studies</i> (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.),	192-202
<i>Thiel's Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times</i> (ROBERT O. FINK),	206-211
<i>Thompson's A Glossary of Greek Fishes</i> (ALFRED C. ANDREWS),	335-336
<i>Thompson's The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus</i> (CHARLES UPSON CLARK),	445-446
<i>van den Bruwaene's Etudes sur Cicéron</i> (WALTER ALLEN, JR.),	97-99
<i>von Salis' Antike und Renaissance. Über Nachleben und Weiterwirken der alten in der neueren Kunst</i> (MARGARETE BIEBER),	320-325
<i>Walzer's Galen, On Medical Experience. First Edition of the Arabic Version with English Translation and Notes</i> (ISAAQ RABINOWITZ),	437-440

	PAGE		PAGE
<i>Webster's</i> Political Interpretations in Greek Literature (MABEL LANG), 446-447		Text (The) of Gaius' <i>Institutes</i> and Justinian's <i>Corpus</i> , 394-40	
<i>Wehrli's</i> Die Schule des Aristoteles. Texte und Kommentar. Heft III: Klearchos (HAROLD CHERNISS), 414-418		Three Notes, 309-31	
<i>Wilkin's</i> Eternal Lawyer: A Legal Biography of Cicero (WALTER ALLEN, JR.), 109-110		Thucydides (VI, 54-59), Note on a Digression of, 186-18	
<i>Wilmington-Ingram's</i> Euripides and Dionysus. An Interpretation of the Bacchae (GILBERT NORWOOD), 317-320		Timoleon's Mission, The Purpose of, 65-7	
ROSENMEYER, THOMAS G. The Family of Critias, 404-410		Ton, MARCUS N. Epigraphical Notes, 113-11	
Saltire of Aphrodite, <i>κεστρος</i> <i>ιμάς</i> and the, 1-6		Tribes of Roman Athens, Patrons Providing Financial Aid to the, 299-30	
"Sardinian Fish" (The) of the Greeks and Romans, 171-185		Addenda to Pages 301, 302 and 304, 40	
SEDGWICK, W. B. Plautine Chronology, 376-383		Unity (The) of Empedocles' Thought, 142-15	
Sextus Empiricus, Stoic Logic and the Text of, 290-298		VON FRITZ, KURT. Ancient Instruction in "Grammar" according to Quintilian, 337-36	
Sophoclean "Orthodoxy" in the <i>Philoctetes</i> , 272-289		WALTON, FRANCIS R. Euripides, <i>Medea</i> , 160-172. A New Interpretation, 411-41	
Stoic Logic and the Text of Sextus Empiricus, 290-298		WESTLAKE, H. D. The Purpose of Timoleon's	
		Word (The) <i>ἐπειδή</i> <i>τοῦ</i> <i>ποιητῆ</i> <i>τῆς</i> <i>ποιητικῆς</i>	